Revocation Does Not Extinguish Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit Authorizes Abeyance and Sequential Adjudication of Supervised Release Violations

Case: United States v. Kh’Lajuwon Amari Murat, No. 24-11614 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2025)

Panel: Circuit Judges Jordan and Brasher; District Judge Virginia Covington sitting by designation. Opinion by Judge Brasher.

Introduction

This appeal presented a first-impression procedural question for the Eleventh Circuit: may a district court, on a single timely revocation petition, adjudicate some alleged violations of supervised release, revoke and impose sentence on those violations, hold other alleged violations in abeyance, and later adjudicate the held counts and impose additional punishment? The district court did exactly that with Kh’Lajuwon Murat. After Murat admitted certain “technical” violations, the court revoked and sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and 54 months’ supervised release, while explicitly holding alleged “substantive” violations in abeyance pending further investigation. On Murat’s scheduled release date from the first five-month term, the court adjudicated the remaining allegations, found one violation, dismissed two, and imposed an additional four months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ supervised release.

Murat challenged the “second” revocation and sentence on two grounds: that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate additional alleged violations after it had already revoked supervised release on others; and that issuing two separate revocation orders rendered his sentence illegal, either because the second term supplanted the first prison term (producing overservice) or because the supervised-release terms stacked beyond the statutory maximum.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that revocation does not terminate the supervised-release term for jurisdictional purposes and that a district court may adjudicate in stages the violations alleged in a single, timely-filed revocation petition. The court further held there was no plain error in the district court’s two-order procedure because, read together, the orders imposed a single aggregate sentence—nine months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ supervised release—within statutory bounds.

Summary of the Opinion

Core holding on jurisdiction: Revocation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) does not terminate the term of supervised release; rather, the defendant “serves in prison all or part of the term of supervised release.” While the defendant is reincarcerated on that revocation, the court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate additional alleged violations asserted in a timely-filed petition and may impose further punishment. This follows Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), and is reinforced by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)’s explicit extension of revocation power beyond expiration for timely-warranted allegations.
Disposition of the sentencing challenge: Applying plain-error review, the court rejected Murat’s argument that the second revocation order illegally stacked punishment. The first order expressly contemplated further proceedings; the second order referenced the first, and together they imposed a lawful, single aggregate sentence of nine months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ supervised release. No prejudice was shown.
Result: Judgment and sentence affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000): Johnson is the linchpin. The Supreme Court explained that “revocation” under § 3583(e)(3) is conceptually distinct from “termination.” Termination ends supervised release without prospect of reimposition; revocation, by contrast, requires the defendant to “serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release,” meaning the supervised-release term “continues to have some effect” during reincarceration. Johnson held that, even under the pre-§ 3583(h) regime, courts could impose additional supervised release following revocation because revocation did not extinguish the term. The Eleventh Circuit relies on Johnson’s textual reading—the unchanged phrase “serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release”—to conclude that district courts retain jurisdiction throughout a defendant’s post-revocation incarceration to act on timely-filed allegations.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3): Authorizes courts to revoke supervised release and “require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute” (emphasis added). The opinion emphasizes that Congress retained the operative language Johnson construed; the addition “authorized by statute for the offense” does not alter Johnson’s core insight.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h): Explicitly authorizes imposition of a new term of supervised release following revocation and imprisonment, subject to the cap that the new term be reduced by the imprisonment imposed upon revocation. Though enacted post-Johnson, § 3583(h) is consistent with Johnson’s understanding of revocation’s effect.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): Extends the court’s revocation power beyond the supervised-release expiration “for any period reasonably necessary” to adjudicate pre-expiration violations if a warrant or summons issued before expiration. The court notes that the petition here was filed (and a warrant issued) before the first revocation; thus, even if one equates revocation with expiration, § 3583(i) would preserve power to adjudicate outstanding allegations in the timely petition.
United States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2012): Factually on all fours. The Fourth Circuit held a district court retained jurisdiction to impose a second prison sentence for other violations alleged in the same timely petition, adjudicated while the defendant was serving a first revocation sentence. The Eleventh Circuit finds Winfield persuasive and aligned with Johnson.
Related circuit decisions (scope noted but not controlling here):
- United States v. Harris, 878 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2017): Jurisdiction to adjudicate new allegations arising during post-revocation imprisonment.
- United States v. Cross, 846 F.3d 188 (6th Cir. 2017): Petition filed after a successive term begins can still be adjudicated.
- United States v. Wing, 682 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2012): Limitation—may not revoke a second term based on newly discovered violations from an earlier term.
The Eleventh Circuit stresses that no circuit has held that a court loses jurisdiction to adjudicate additional alleged violations from the same timely-filed petition during the defendant’s post-revocation incarceration.
Standards and procedural authorities:
- Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2005) (de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction).
- Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirm on any basis supported by the record).
- United States v. Clark, 274 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2001) (plain-error review for issues raised first on appeal).
- United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (plain-error standard articulated).
- United States v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200 (11th Cir. 2023) (nature of supervised release).
- Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (14-day window to correct clear sentencing error)—found inapplicable because the second order did not “correct” the first; it adjudicated separate allegations.

Legal Reasoning

Revocation versus termination—why the court retained jurisdiction.
The opinion pivots on Johnson’s distinction: “termination” ends the supervisory relationship; “revocation” modifies how the term is served—some or all of the supervised-release term is served in prison. As the Supreme Court put it, “something about the term of supervised release survives the preceding order of revocation.” Because the statutory phrase Johnson construed remains in § 3583(e)(3), the Eleventh Circuit treats reincarceration as continued service of the same supervised-release term. Consequently, the sentencing court’s authority over that term (and violations of it) persists while the defendant is imprisoned on revocation.
A timely petition anchors continuing authority.
The government filed a single petition covering technical and substantive violations and secured a warrant before the first revocation. Section 3583(i) expressly preserves revocation authority for “the adjudication of matters arising before [expiration]” on timely-warranted allegations. Thus even if revocation were analogized to expiration, § 3583(i) would extend power to resolve the outstanding counts in the timely petition. Nothing in § 3583 curtails the court’s ability to decide some counts first and others later when the petition and warrant predate the term’s end.
Rule 35(a) is beside the point.
Murat’s reliance on Rule 35(a)’s 14-day limit to correct “clear error” fails because the second order did not correct the first. It adjudicated different allegations from the same petition, held in abeyance at the government’s request. The issuance of a second order on different counts is not a “correction” of the first sentence.
No illegal stacking; read the orders together.
Addressing the sentencing structure under plain-error review, the court rejects the idea that the second order either supplanted the first five-month sentence or stacked an additional 48 months of supervised release (on top of the prior 54 months). The first order expressly contemplated future proceedings on remaining counts, and the second order explicitly referenced the first and accounted for time already served. Properly read together, the two orders impose a unified sentence: nine months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ supervised release—well within statutory caps for Murat’s underlying offenses. While the court notes other procedural options might have been cleaner (e.g., a single comprehensive order), any procedural untidiness did not amount to plain error.

Impact and Practical Implications

What this decision changes (and confirms) in the Eleventh Circuit:

Abeyance procedure approved: District courts may bifurcate proceedings on a single, timely revocation petition—revoking and sentencing on some counts while holding others in abeyance for later adjudication—even after the defendant begins serving a prison term on the first revocation.
Jurisdiction endures post-revocation: After revocation, the defendant is still “serving” the supervised-release term in prison. The court retains authority to adjudicate and sentence violations alleged in a timely petition during that period.
Reliance on timely warrant/summons is pivotal: To preserve power to adjudicate held counts, the government should ensure a warrant or summons predating expiration (or revocation) issues on those alleged violations. Section 3583(i) then bridges any gap until adjudication.
No per se bar on multiple revocation orders from one petition: When the record makes clear the first order is interim and the second integrates and accounts for prior custody, the combined sentence can be lawful and appeal-proof.
Consistency with other circuits: Aligns the Eleventh Circuit with the Fourth Circuit’s Winfield and the Sixth Circuit’s Cross on continuing revocation authority, while noting limits recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Wing on revoking a later term for earlier-term violations.

For prosecutors and probation:

Use a single, comprehensive petition that includes all known violations and secure a warrant/summons before expiration to preserve § 3583(i) coverage.
If ongoing investigations implicate some counts, expressly request abeyance on the record and explain why further time is “reasonably necessary.”
At the later hearing, tie the second order to the first, expressly crediting custody and clarifying that the new supervised-release term supersedes any earlier revocation term to avoid stacking concerns under § 3583(h).

For defense counsel:

Assume the court retains authority while your client serves a revocation sentence, provided the petition and warrant issued timely. Jurisdictional challenges premised on “extinguishment” of the term are unlikely to prevail post-Johnson.
Focus on due process and reasonableness: if abeyance becomes prolonged, argue § 3583(i)’s “reasonably necessary” limiter, speedy adjudication concerns, or prejudice (e.g., impaired ability to defend).
At the second hearing, insist on a clear record that the court is imposing a single aggregate sentence, with explicit credit for time served, and that the supervised-release term is the final, unitary term.

For district judges:

Articulate on the record that the first revocation order is interim as to sentencing and that the court is retaining the petition’s remaining counts in abeyance.
In the later order, expressly reference the first order, consolidate findings, and state the aggregate custodial time and the single supervised-release term imposed, with § 3583(h) calculations if applicable.
Schedule the second hearing within a timeframe that is “reasonably necessary” under § 3583(i), explaining any delays.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release: A post-prison monitoring period designed to aid reintegration, subject to conditions (e.g., commit no crimes, report to probation).
Technical vs. substantive violations: Technical violations breach conditions (e.g., travel without permission) without constituting new crimes; substantive violations are new criminal offenses committed during supervision.
Revocation vs. termination: Termination ends supervision outright. Revocation does not end the term; it changes how it is served—some or all of the supervised-release term is served in prison.
“Serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release” (§ 3583(e)(3)): The statutory phrase Johnson emphasized. It means that after revocation, the supervised-release term continues to exist legally while the person is imprisoned for violating it.
Abeyance: The court pauses adjudication of some allegations to decide them later—often because evidence or parallel prosecutions are pending—while proceeding on others.
§ 3583(i) safety net: If a warrant or summons issues before the supervised-release term expires, the court’s revocation power extends for a period “reasonably necessary” to finish adjudicating those allegations.
Plain error review: A stringent standard for issues not preserved below. The appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined judicial integrity.
Rule 35(a): Lets a court correct clear sentencing errors within 14 days. It does not apply when the court is adjudicating separate allegations rather than “correcting” a prior sentence.

Open Questions and Limits

New allegations arising post-revocation: The Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether a court may add newly discovered violations after revocation. Other circuits diverge (compare Harris with Wing). Counsel should proceed cautiously and consider filing new petitions tied to the correct term of supervision.
Reasonableness of delay: Section 3583(i) contains a “reasonably necessary” constraint. Extended abeyances without good cause may invite due process challenges.
Cumulative imprisonment caps: While § 3583(e)(3) caps imprisonment “on any such revocation” by the class of the original offense, complex revocation histories can raise aggregation issues. Clear recordkeeping and § 3583(h) calculations are important to ensure lawful supervised-release terms after multiple revocations.

Conclusion

United States v. Murat establishes a clear Eleventh Circuit rule: a district court that revokes supervised release on some alleged violations may hold other alleged violations from the same timely-filed petition in abeyance and later adjudicate them—even while the defendant is serving a prison term on the first revocation. Revocation does not terminate the supervised-release term; it reconfigures how the term is served, preserving the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. On the sentencing front, the court emphasizes substance over form: multiple revocation orders are permissible when they are integrated and yield a single, lawful aggregate sentence.

Practically, the decision endorses a flexible, staged approach to revocation proceedings that accommodates ongoing investigations or parallel prosecutions, provided the government timely anchors its allegations and the court transparently manages the sequence. It aligns Eleventh Circuit practice with persuasive authority from sister circuits and gives district courts a roadmap for handling mixed technical and substantive violations without risking jurisdictional missteps or unlawful sentences.