Revocation Courts Cannot Expand Original Sentences by Making Them Consecutive to Later-Imposed Terms: Commentary on M. LaForge v. D. Godfrey (Mont. 2025)

1. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Montana Supreme Court’s December 19, 2025 order in M. LaForge v. D. Godfrey, OP 25‑0367, a habeas corpus proceeding arising from the interaction between suspended sentences, revocation proceedings, and consecutive sentencing under Montana law.

The case addresses whether a district court, when revoking a suspended sentence under § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA (pre‑2025 version), may:

Make the revocation sentence run consecutively to another sentence that did not exist at the time of the original sentence; and
Revoke a sentence that has already been fully served (discharged).

The Court, applying its earlier decision in State v. Wolfblack, 2024 MT 166, grants habeas relief to the petitioner, Matthew Mark LaForge. It holds that:

His 2012 revocation sentence in Lewis and Clark County Cause No. DDC‑10‑248 was illegal because the revocation court ordered it to run consecutively to a Cascade County sentence that did not exist when the original Lewis and Clark sentence was imposed; and
His 2017 revocation in the same Lewis and Clark case was void because it occurred after the five‑year term in that case had already been discharged.

Justice Beth Baker concurs in the result, emphasizing that whatever her own view, Wolfblack is controlling precedent for this case. Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson dissents at length, arguing that Wolfblack is “manifestly wrong,” that revocation proceedings do not erase original sentences, and that the revocation court lawfully maintained the consecutive structure of LaForge’s sentences.

This decision is particularly significant because the Legislature has just amended the revocation statute (2025 Mont. Laws ch. 324, HB 612) to reverse the practical effects of Wolfblack. LaForge thus represents a key—and perhaps final—application of the pre‑2025 regime to older sentences and revocations.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Original Lewis and Clark County Sentence (DDC‑10‑248)

Offense: Felony Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA).
Court: First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, Cause No. DDC‑10‑248.
Sentencing date: Oral sentence November 3, 2010; written judgment November 10, 2010.
Sentence: 5 years at Montana State Prison (MSP), with all but 30 days suspended, and 24 days credit for time served.

In practical terms, LaForge served 30 days and then was on a five‑year suspended sentence (probation), subject to conditions.

2.2 First Revocation Petition (2011) and Cascade County Conviction (CDC‑11‑247)

June 2, 2011: The State petitions in Lewis and Clark County to revoke the suspended sentence in DDC‑10‑248, alleging new misdemeanor violations (including DUI, driving offenses, and theft).
January 3, 2012: While that revocation is pending, LaForge is sentenced in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, Cause No. CDC‑11‑247, after a new felony PFMA conviction.

Cascade County sentence (CDC‑11‑247):

4 years at MSP, none suspended;
64 days credit for time served;
Ordered to run consecutively to any other sentence LaForge was then serving.

At that time, LaForge’s Lewis and Clark sentence (DDC‑10‑248) existed and was being served in suspended form (probation).

2.3 2012 Revocation Disposition in Lewis and Clark County

January 25, 2012: Lewis and Clark County holds a revocation hearing in DDC‑10‑248.
LaForge admits the violations.
The court revokes the suspended sentence and imposes a five‑year MSP sentence, all suspended, with credit for time served, and orders this sentence to run consecutively to the four‑year MSP sentence in CDC‑11‑247.

LaForge later discharges the Cascade County 4‑year sentence on October 30, 2015.

2.4 Yellowstone County Conviction (DC‑17‑658) and Second Revocation (2017)

June 4, 2017: LaForge is charged with another felony PFMA in Yellowstone County, Cause No. DC‑17‑658.
June 16, 2017: The State files a second petition to revoke his suspended sentence in DDC‑10‑248.
September 7, 2017: LaForge pleads guilty to the new PFMA in DC‑17‑658.
October 5, 2017: Yellowstone County sentences him to an 8‑year DOC commitment, with 3 years suspended.
October 26, 2017: LaForge admits violations in the Lewis and Clark revocation proceeding (DDC‑10‑248).
November 7, 2017: Lewis and Clark County imposes a five‑year MSP sentence, none suspended, to run consecutively to the Yellowstone County sentence in DC‑17‑658.

2.5 Prior Habeas Relief (2024) and the Seeds of the Present Case

In LaForge v. Godfrey, No. OP 24‑0495 (Mont. Oct. 17, 2024), a prior self‑represented habeas petition, the Supreme Court:

Granted partial relief by ordering 432 days of credit for “elapsed time” between October 30, 2015 and June 3, 2017 (excluding days in jail).
Included two critical footnotes: one questioning whether the 2012 revocation disposition might violate § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, and another suggesting the 2017 revocation sentence—made consecutive to the Yellowstone County sentence—also “appears to violate Montana law,” citing State v. Wolfblack.

These footnotes invited a focused, counseled challenge, which produced the present 2025 habeas petition.

2.6 The 2025 Habeas Petition

On May 21, 2025, represented by counsel, LaForge petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing:

The 2012 revocation sentence in DDC‑10‑248 is illegal because § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, does not permit a revocation sentence to be made consecutive to another sentence that did not exist when the original Lewis and Clark sentence was imposed;
Had the 2012 revocation been lawful, his DDC‑10‑248 sentence would have been discharged before June 16, 2017; thus the 2017 revocation occurred after expiration of the sentence and is void; and
Even if the sentence had not discharged by 2017, the 2017 revocation sentence is independently illegal because it was ordered consecutive to Yellowstone County DC‑17‑658, which also did not exist when he was originally sentenced in 2010 in DDC‑10‑248.

The Department of Corrections (DOC) opposes the petition but concedes core points about the governing statute and its limits (discussed below).

3. Summary of the Court’s Decision

3.1 The Majority Order

The Court (per curiam) grants the writ of habeas corpus. Its central holdings:

Section 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA (pre‑2025), governs revocation dispositions and caps imprisonment at the term of the original sentence.
A judge may, upon revocation, require the offender to serve either:
- “the sentence imposed,” or
- “any sentence that could have been imposed that does not include a longer imprisonment or commitment term than the original sentence.”
A revocation court cannot, under this statute, make the old sentence consecutive to a sentence that did not exist when the original sentence was imposed.
On January 25, 2012, when the Lewis and Clark court revoked DDC‑10‑248 and purported to make it consecutive to CDC‑11‑247, it exceeded its authority because:
- CDC‑11‑247 did not exist at the time of the original 2010 sentencing in DDC‑10‑248; and
- By making the 5‑year revocation sentence consecutive to the 4‑year Cascade sentence, the court effectively increased LaForge’s overall “imprisonment or commitment term” beyond what the original 5‑year DDC‑10‑248 sentence allowed.
The Court relies on State v. McGuire, 260 Mont. 386, 860 P.2d 128 (1993), for the proposition that only the court imposing a later sentence has authority to determine concurrency or consecutivity between sentences.
Under Wolfblack, the revocation sentence replaces the original sentence.
When the Lewis and Clark court revoked DDC‑10‑248 in January 2012, the original 2010 sentence “no longer existed,” leaving only the four‑year Cascade County sentence in CDC‑11‑247. The new revocation sentence in DDC‑10‑248 ran for five years from January 25, 2012, and therefore:
- Ran its full course by about January 25, 2017; and
- LaForge “served on revocation the entire time of the originally imposed suspended time” in DDC‑10‑248.
The 2017 revocation was illegal because it occurred after the DDC‑10‑248 sentence had discharged.
The State filed the second revocation petition on June 16, 2017, nearly five months after the DDC‑10‑248 revocation sentence had fully expired. A court has no authority to revoke a sentence that has already been completed.
LaForge met his habeas burden.
Under Miller v. Eleventh Judicial District Court, 2007 MT 56, the petitioner bears the burden to show unlawful restraint. Because both the 2012 and 2017 revocation sentences in DDC‑10‑248 were illegal, LaForge is entitled to habeas relief.

The Court therefore orders that the writ of habeas corpus be granted.

3.2 Justice Baker’s Concurrence

Justice Beth Baker concurs, emphasizing:

In her view, § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, does not inherently require revocation sentences to run concurrently; the revocation disposition “replaces” the original sentence and should ordinarily continue to run in the same manner (concurrent or consecutive) designated by the later sentencing court.
However, this position is inconsistent with the Court’s controlling decision in State v. Wolfblack, which held to the contrary.
Although she dissented in Wolfblack, it is binding precedent, and the Legislature’s corrective amendment (2025 Mont. Laws ch. 324) is not in play here.

On that basis, she joins the Court’s application of Wolfblack to grant relief in LaForge’s case.

3.3 Chief Justice Swanson’s Dissent

Chief Justice Swanson dissents vigorously, arguing:

Revocation proceedings revoke the suspension, not the sentence itself.
The Court’s reliance on the “fiction” that revocation erases the original sentence and imposes a wholly new sentence (per Wolfblack) is legally unsound and leads to absurd results: repeat offenders obtain shorter total sentences simply because of the timing of revocation proceedings.
The consecutive nature of later sentences is not nullified by revocation.
When a later sentencing court (such as the Cascade or Yellowstone court) orders its sentence to run consecutively, that structure remains in force. The revocation court does not—and, in his view, cannot—convert those sentences to concurrent terms by operation of law.
LaForge did not receive a longer sentence than originally imposed.
The term for DDC‑10‑248 remained five years before and after revocation; the increased overall time results from new crimes and new sentences in other counties, not from an unlawful extension of the original term.
The majority misapplies § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, and ignores statutory evolution.
The phrase “any sentence that could have been imposed,” added to § 46‑18‑203 in 2003, gives revocation courts the full array of sentencing options—including imposing consecutive terms—so long as the term length is not increased.
Legislative text in § 46‑18‑401(1)(b), MCA, rejects automatic merger of probationary terms into new sentences.
That provision expressly forbids merger of an existing suspended sentence into a new sentence absent a judicial order; the majority’s framework effectively forces such a merger.
The Court should overrule Wolfblack as “manifestly wrong.”
He views Wolfblack and its progeny as based on a misreading of the revocation statute, and would instead hold that revocation courts can lawfully maintain or impose consecutive structures, again subject only to the total‑term cap.

In his view, LaForge’s sentences were lawful, his revocations valid, and the habeas petition should be denied.

4. Legal Framework

4.1 Suspended Sentences and Revocation (§ 46‑18‑203, MCA)

Under Montana law, a court may impose a “suspended” sentence: the defendant is convicted and a term of imprisonment is pronounced, but the custodial portion is withheld and the defendant is allowed to serve the time in the community, under supervision, on stated conditions.

Section 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA (2011 version, applicable here), provides:

The judge may revoke the suspension of sentence and require the offender to serve either the sentence imposed or any sentence that could have been imposed that does not include a longer imprisonment or commitment term than the original sentence.

Key points:

The court is limited to imposing at most the imprisonment “term” of the original sentence.
The phrase “any sentence that could have been imposed” opens the door to varying conditions, custody/suspension split, and (according to the dissent) use of the full suite of sentencing statutes, including decisions about concurrency and consecutivity.

4.2 Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences and § 46‑18‑401, MCA

Section 46‑18‑401, MCA, governs original sentencing relationships among multiple sentences. Two parts are especially relevant:

Default consecutive rule: If a sentence is silent about whether it is concurrent or consecutive to an existing sentence, § 46‑18‑401 prescribes that it runs consecutively.
Anti‑merger rule (§ 46‑18‑401(1)(b), 2011 version): Suspended or probationary periods from an earlier offense do not automatically merge into a new sentence “unless the judge otherwise orders.”

The DOC and the Court agree that § 46‑18‑401 does not directly apply to revocation proceedings. Those are governed by § 46‑18‑203. Nonetheless, § 46‑18‑401 frames the background rules for original sentencing and informs disputes about sentence structure.

4.3 Habeas Corpus in Montana

A writ of habeas corpus is available to a person “unlawfully restrained of liberty.” In Montana, habeas is traditionally limited: it is not a substitute for direct appeal but can be used to attack a sentence that is facially illegal or imposed without jurisdiction.

Under Miller v. Eleventh Judicial District Court, 2007 MT 56, ¶ 14, 336 Mont. 207, 154 P.3d 1186, the burden is on the petitioner to persuade the Court that relief should issue. In LaForge, the issue is not factual but legal: whether, given the terms of the statutes and the sequence of sentences and revocations, LaForge’s current custody under the Lewis and Clark case is lawful.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 The Majority’s Interpretation of § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA

The majority reads § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, as imposing a hard cap on what can be done at revocation:

The revocation disposition cannot result in a “longer imprisonment or commitment term” than was authorized in the original sentence.
“Imprisonment or commitment term” is understood functionally: the total time the defendant can be required to serve under that sentence.

From this, the Court derives a key rule:

A court revoking a suspended sentence may not make the revocation sentence run consecutively to a different sentence that did not exist at the time the original sentence was imposed, because that would effectively increase the offender’s total term of imprisonment beyond the original authorization.

Applying that rule to LaForge:

In 2010, the Lewis and Clark court imposed a five‑year sentence in DDC‑10‑248. No other felony sentence existed then.
In January 2012, Cascade County (CDC‑11‑247) imposed a four‑year sentence consecutive to any existing sentence.
Later that month, Lewis and Clark, acting in revocation mode, purported to make DDC‑10‑248 consecutive to CDC‑11‑247. Because CDC‑11‑247 did not exist in 2010, this changed the nature of the original DDC‑10‑248 sentence by effectively tacking it onto a new four‑year block—impermissibly lengthening LaForge’s total imprisonment term attributable to that original case.

The DOC essentially concedes this reading for purposes of this case: it agrees that § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii) governs revocation and that a revocation disposition cannot be made consecutive to a sentence that did not exist when the original sentence was imposed.

5.2 The Role of McGuire and the “Second Sentencing Court” Rule

The Court buttresses its statutory interpretation with State v. McGuire, 260 Mont. 386, 387, 860 P.2d 128, 129 (1993), which held:

“[O]nly a district court which imposes [an original] sentence subsequent to one already imposed has the authority to determine whether the sentences will be concurrent or consecutive to each other.”

In other words, the later sentencing court determines how its new sentence relates to any earlier sentences. That rule is straightforward when comparing two original sentences. The complication arises when a court later acts in a revocation posture on an earlier case:

Is that revocation proceeding functionally a new sentence (as in the majority’s reading, following Wolfblack)?
Or is it simply the court re‑activating the conditions of the original sentence (as in the dissent’s view), leaving its originally determined relationship to other sentences intact?

The majority implicitly adopts the first view: revocation yields a new sentence with limited authority under § 46‑18‑203. Consequently, the revoking court cannot re‑write the consecutive/concurrent relationships beyond the bounds allowed by that statute.

5.3 Wolfblack and the “Replacement” Theory of Revocation Sentences

Although the majority’s order does not analyze State v. Wolfblack in depth, its crucial statement—that upon revocation “that sentence no longer existed”—comes directly from Wolfblack, 2024 MT 166, ¶ 14:

“When the District Court revoked the suspended portion of Wolfblack’s initial sentence, the 2003 Theft Sentence was no longer in existence and was replaced by his new 2010 Theft Revocation Sentence.”

In LaForge, the majority repeats this formulation:

“Upon revoking the original sentence in DDC 10‑248, that sentence no longer existed leaving only the sentence in CDC 11‑247.”

This “replacement” theory is pivotal:

It supports treating the post‑revocation term as the operative sentence for all purposes, including calculating discharge and elapsed time.
It underlies the conclusion that LaForge’s DDC‑10‑248 sentence ran five years from January 25, 2012, and thus discharged by January 25, 2017.
It fuels the dissent’s criticism that the Court is relying on an “absurd interpretation” of the statute that has no textual anchor and undermines consistent sentencing of repeat offenders.

Justice Baker’s concurrence underscores that Wolfblack is binding precedent despite her earlier dissent; Chief Justice Swanson urges the Court to overrule it as “manifestly wrong.”

5.4 Calculating LaForge’s Discharge Date

A key practical step in the majority’s reasoning is its calculation of when the DDC‑10‑248 sentence ended:

Original 2010 sentence in DDC‑10‑248: 5 years, with all but 30 days suspended.
Absent revocation, that five‑year term would have discharged around October 2015.
However, in January 2012, the court revoked the suspension and imposed a new five‑year sentence (the revocation sentence), which the Court treats as beginning immediately on January 25, 2012.
This revocation sentence “ran a full five years and discharged on or about January 25, 2017.”

Crucially, the Court reasons that LaForge “did not receive a shorter sentence by virtue of being resentenced upon revocation”—he ultimately served the full five years that were originally suspended, albeit on a different timeline. Therefore, granting habeas does not cut his Lewis and Clark exposure below the original statutory authorization; it merely prevents an unlawful extension beyond that cap via impermissible consecutive structuring and post‑discharge revocation.

Once the Court fixes the discharge date of DDC‑10‑248 at January 25, 2017, the illegality of the June 2017 revocation petition and the November 2017 revocation sentence follows: the sentence had already been fully served; the revocation court lacked authority to act.

5.5 The Dissent’s Competing Framework

Chief Justice Swanson’s dissent fundamentally disputes two pillars of the majority’s analysis: what is revoked, and how the length of LaForge’s exposure should be viewed.

5.5.1 What is “revoked”?

For the dissent:

Revocation proceedings revoke the suspension of the sentence, not the sentence itself.
The underlying judgment of conviction and the original sentence remain “intact and in existence.”
The revocation court is simply exercising supervisory authority over execution of the sentence, not creating a wholly new sentencing judgment.

He cites:

State v. Boulton, 2006 MT 170, ¶ 15, 332 Mont. 538, 140 P.3d 482: Probation is an “act of grace,” revocable if conditions are violated.
State v. Zielie, 2025 MT 90, ¶ 26, 421 Mont. 452, 568 P.3d 516: In revocation, the judge supervises execution of a previously imposed final adjudication, rather than adjudicating guilt anew.

From this standpoint, the notion that the original sentence “disappears into the ether” upon revocation—and that all prior consecutive designations vanish—is a “legal fiction” with no statutory basis.

5.5.2 Did LaForge receive a “longer imprisonment or commitment term”?

Swanson resists the idea that LaForge’s revocation sentence is “longer” in violation of § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA:

The term in DDC‑10‑248 was five years before and after revocation; the revocation court merely withdrew the probationary privilege and required prison time.
The total number of years LaForge is actually incarcerated increases because he committed new felonies in Cascade and Yellowstone Counties—not because the Lewis and Clark court unlawfully extended his original term.

He also challenges the majority’s causal account of why LaForge was still under sentence in 2017:

Even if the Lewis and Clark sentence had never been revoked in 2012, LaForge still would have had to serve the Cascade County 4‑year custodial sentence first.
Under Montana’s consecutive‑sentencing principles (see, e.g., Guccione v. Nichols, OP 23‑0208, 413 Mont. 531, 535 P.3d 1130 (Aug. 1, 2023)), when a defendant has a custodial sentence and a suspended sentence running consecutively, the custodial sentence is served first in sequence.
Thus, LaForge’s discharge of the Lewis and Clark sentence would necessarily have been “paused” while he served the Cascade sentence; he would still have been on probation from DDC‑10‑248 when he offended again in 2017, making the second revocation legitimate.

From this perspective, the majority’s reasoning confuses the effect of revocation with the effect of intervening custodial sentences and, in practice, “rewards” repeat offenders by reducing their original exposure when revocations are properly initiated.

5.6 Statutory Evolution and the Role of Other Precedents

5.6.1 State v. Seals and Early Revocation Law

In State v. Seals, 2007 MT 71, 336 Mont. 416, 156 P.3d 15, the Court held that revocation proceedings were limited by the then‑existing version of § 46‑18‑203 and that § 46‑18‑401 (concerning concurrency and consecutivity of original sentences) did not apply to revocations. That made sense under the narrower statutory language then in effect, which allowed only “the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence.”

However, the Legislature amended § 46‑18‑203 in 2003 to add the key words “any sentence that could have been imposed,” which remained in force through the time of LaForge’s revocations. Chief Justice Swanson argues that:

This amendment substantially expanded the range of options at revocation; and
Later cases continued to apply Seals as if the statute had not changed, failing to grapple with the implications of the new phrase.

He points to State v. Adams, 2013 MT 189, and State v. Keech, 2025 MT 169, as examples of decisions that imported Seals without revisiting the statutory expansion.

5.6.2 The 2025 Legislative Amendment (HB 612)

Justice Baker and Chief Justice Swanson both reference 2025 Mont. Laws ch. 324 (HB 612), which reorganizes and amends § 46‑18‑203. Among other changes, it:

Clarifies that a revocation disposition does not nullify or convert the consecutive or concurrent nature of sentences already determined by a sentencing court; and
States that the new provisions apply to “any offender whose suspended or deferred sentence is subject to revocation regardless of the date of the offender’s conviction and regardless of the terms and conditions of the offender’s original sentence.”

Chief Justice Swanson reads this as an express legislative rejection of Wolfblack and the majority’s framework here—though he proceeds on the assumption that the new law does not apply to this habeas petition, both because of its effective date (October 1, 2025) and the nature of the proceeding.

The upshot is that LaForge interprets and applies the pre‑2025 version of § 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, with the Legislature having now moved the law in a different direction for future revocations.

6. Simplifying the Complex Concepts

6.1 Suspended Sentence

A Suspended sentence means:

The court pronounces a prison term (e.g., 5 years),
But all or part of that term is “suspended,” so the defendant does not actually go to prison for that portion unless the suspension is later revoked.

The defendant serves the suspended part on probation, under conditions. If conditions are violated, the court can “revoke” the suspension and require the person to serve custodial time.

6.2 Revocation

Revocation is a separate proceeding where the court determines:

Whether the defendant violated probation conditions; and
If so, what to do: continue probation, modify conditions, or require the defendant to serve some or all of the underlying sentence, subject to statutory limits.

The key dispute in LaForge is whether revocation:

Replaces the original sentence with a new one (majority/Wolfblack view); or
Revokes only the probationary “privilege,” leaving the original sentence and its structure intact (dissent’s view).

6.3 Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences

Concurrent sentences: Run at the same time. Serving one counts toward the other.
Consecutive sentences: Run one after another. You must finish the first before starting the next.

A sentencing court’s choice between concurrent and consecutive sentences can dramatically affect total time in custody.

6.4 “Longer Imprisonment or Commitment Term”

Section 46‑18‑203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, forbids the revocation court from imposing a sentence that includes a “longer imprisonment or commitment term than the original sentence.”

In practical terms, this means:

The revocation disposition cannot increase the maximum time the defendant can be forced to serve under that particular case;
The majority treats making the old sentence consecutive to a new, later sentence as effectively increasing that exposure; the dissent says the exposure stays the same, and the increased total time arises from new, separate crimes.

6.5 Habeas Corpus

Habeas corpus is a mechanism for challenging unlawful detention. In this context, it is not about whether LaForge committed the underlying crimes, but about whether, in light of the statutes and sentences imposed, the State still has lawful authority to hold him on the Lewis and Clark case.

7. Implications and Future Impact

7.1 For Defendants with Pre‑2025 Revocations

For offenders whose revocation proceedings occurred under the pre‑2025 version of § 46‑18‑203, LaForge has two clear implications:

Revocation courts could not make a sentence consecutive to a sentence that did not exist at the time of the original sentence.
Where a revocation disposition purported to attach an older case to a newer sentence in a way that extends the total term, those dispositions may be vulnerable to collateral attack as “illegal sentences.”
A sentence cannot be revoked after it has been fully served.
If the original term (or its replacement revocation term, under Wolfblack) has expired, any subsequent revocation is void. The Court’s calculation in LaForge’s case illustrates how elapsed time can cause an earlier sentence to discharge before a second revocation petition is filed.

Practitioners representing inmates with old revocations will likely scrutinize:

Whether revocation courts attached sentences to later‑imposed sentences in a way that increased total exposure beyond the original term; and
Whether revocations occurred after the sentence, as lawfully calculated, should have discharged.

7.2 Post‑2025 Revocations under HB 612

For offenses and revocations governed by the amended statute (effective October 1, 2025), the Legislature has attempted to restore a different structure:

Consecutive/concurrent designations made at original sentencing are preserved through revocation, not automatically converted to concurrent terms.
Revocation courts retain broader authority to align sentences with the full set of sentencing statutes, subject to the term‑length cap.

Thus, LaForge is most important for interpreting the now‑superseded statutory regime and for resolving habeas challenges to pre‑2025 revocations. Going forward, the new statute will likely constrain the impact of Wolfblack and LaForge in fresh revocation cases.

7.3 Doctrinal Tension and Stare Decisis

The split between the concurrence and dissent highlights ongoing tension in Montana sentencing law:

Majority/Baker: Bound by Wolfblack, they apply its “replacement” theory of revocation to grant relief, while recognizing that the Legislature has now clarified a different intent.
Dissent (Swanson): Urges immediate correction of what he sees as a jurisprudential error, rather than waiting on legislative fixes or continuing to apply a flawed precedent to old cases.

The decision thus becomes a central precedent for how the Court treats stare decisis in light of legislative amendments and how it reconciles statutory text with prior judicial interpretations that the Legislature later rejects.

8. Conclusion

M. LaForge v. D. Godfrey crystallizes a critical limitation on revocation sentencing under Montana’s pre‑2025 statute: a revocation court may not transform an original sentence into a longer, consecutive term by tying it to later‑imposed sentences that did not exist when the original sentence was pronounced. Applying Wolfblack, the Court holds that once the full authorized term of the original sentence (or its replacement revocation term) has run, the State cannot revive or extend it through a new revocation.

Justice Baker’s concurrence emphasizes fidelity to binding precedent despite legislative disagreement, while Chief Justice Swanson’s dissent forcefully contends that the Court has misunderstood both the nature of revocation and the scope of § 46‑18‑203, MCA. The subsequent legislative amendments in 2025 suggest that the dissent’s view better matches legislative intent going forward, but for older cases like LaForge’s, the judicial interpretations in Wolfblack and LaForge remain dispositive.

In the broader legal landscape, LaForge illustrates the delicate balance between protecting defendants from unauthorized extensions of punishment, maintaining predictable sentencing structures for repeat offenders, and harmonizing judicial doctrine with evolving statutory schemes. For practitioners and courts dealing with pre‑2025 revocations, it is a leading precedent on when revocation sentences become illegal and when habeas corpus relief is warranted.