Revocation After Esteras: Courts May Sanction “Breach of Trust” Without Invoking Retribution

Introduction

In United States v. Philroy Johnson (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 24-month, within-guidelines revocation sentence against a defendant on supervised release for a federal firearm conviction (18 U.S.C. § 922(k)). The appeal centered on a narrow but consequential post-Esteras question: whether the district court, in revoking supervised release and imposing imprisonment, relied on impermissible retributive considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), which 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) omits from the revocation calculus.

Johnson admitted the violation after pleading guilty in state court to conduct arising from fleeing police: during a traffic stop, he sped off in daytime traffic and nearly struck an officer. The district court emphasized the danger to the public and law enforcement, referenced Johnson’s criminal history (including the underlying federal firearm offense), and imposed 24 months consecutive to any state time. Johnson argued these comments reflected retribution—an impermissible factor under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025).

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held the district court did not rely—explicitly or implicitly—on retributive considerations barred by Esteras. The panel concluded the district court’s remarks about the dangerousness of the violation conduct and Johnson’s criminal history fit within permissible revocation purposes: deterrence and protection of the public under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C), as incorporated by § 3583(e).

Critically, the court reaffirmed Sixth Circuit doctrine that a revocation sentence may function as a sanction for the supervisee’s breach of trust, which is conceptually distinct from punishment (retribution) for the underlying conviction. The court further held the district court was not required to utter the phrase “breach of trust” to sustain the sentence on that rationale.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)
Role in Johnson: The centerpiece precedent. Esteras held that because § 3583(e) omits § 3553(a)(2)(A), a revocation court may not consider retribution—i.e., it may not revoke supervised release to “provide just punishment” or “reflect the seriousness” of the underlying conviction. The Sixth Circuit in Johnson applied Esteras to test whether the district judge’s comments amounted to retribution for the original § 922(k) offense, concluding they did not.

Key nuance imported into Johnson: Esteras permits consideration of “the nature and circumstances” (and related facts about the original offense) when used to support permissible aims—deterrence, incapacitation/protection of the public, and rehabilitation. Johnson leverages this to treat the district court’s discussion of Johnson’s history and the dangerous violation conduct as properly tethered to public-safety and deterrence.

Scope limitation highlighted: Johnson stresses Esteras “took no position” on the permissibility of sanctioning the “breach of trust” inherent in violating supervision conditions, leaving room for circuit doctrine grounded in Chapter 7 policy statements.
United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2018)
Role in Johnson: Supplies the standard of review for revocation sentences: procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion framework. Johnson uses Price to frame “impermissible factors” as a form of substantive unreasonableness.
United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2009)
Role in Johnson: Quoted via Price for the substantive reasonableness test, including whether the sentence is based on impermissible factors or gives unreasonable weight to a factor.
United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011)
Role in Johnson: A key doctrinal bridge: it distinguishes “sanction” (for violation/breach of trust) from “punishment” (retribution), supporting the panel’s conclusion that the district judge’s use of “serious sanction” did not necessarily invoke § 3553(a)(2)(A). This distinction becomes especially important after Esteras, because it provides a conceptual category (sanctioning breach of trust) that is not retribution for the underlying offense.
United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2025)
Role in Johnson: Post-Esteras reaffirmation that district courts may consider the seriousness of the supervised-release violation when sanctioning breach of trust. Johnson notes that Patterson explicitly used “breach of trust,” but Johnson extends the principle even where the district court does not use those “magic words.”
United States v. Sims, --- F.4th ----, 25-3229, 2025 WL 3539279 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025)
Role in Johnson: Another post-Esteras decision cited for the proposition that revocation courts may treat violation seriousness as relevant to the sanction/breach-of-trust framework without violating the retribution bar.
United States v. Milton, No. 24-4066/4067, 2025 WL 2965822 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025)
Role in Johnson: Supports the same continuity: Chapter 7’s “breach of trust” concept remains compatible with § 3583(e) and Esteras.
United States v. Simpson, No. 23-3961, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19442 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025)
Role in Johnson: Reinforces that the “seriousness of the supervised release violation” can be considered in sanctioning breach of trust; cited as an unpublished order but used to show consistent circuit treatment.
United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2023)
Role in Johnson: Cited (via Simpson) as part of the circuit’s pre-Esteras foundation for using violation seriousness within the permissible revocation framework.

Legal Reasoning

Identify the statutory constraint imposed by § 3583(e) as clarified in Esteras.
The court begins with the post-Esteras baseline: at revocation, Congress directed courts to consider § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D) (deterrence, protection of the public/incapacitation, rehabilitation) but not § 3553(a)(2)(A) (retribution: seriousness, respect for law, just punishment). Thus, a revocation sentence is reversible if it is imposed to punish the defendant for the underlying conviction.
Apply that constraint to the revocation record—looking for explicit or implicit retribution.
The panel finds no explicit reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) and no indication the district court aimed to punish Johnson for the original § 922(k) conviction. The district court’s emphasis—danger to the community, near-striking an officer, and need to protect the public—maps naturally onto § 3553(a)(2)(C) and deterrence under (B).
Treat references to criminal history and underlying offense as permissible when used for public-safety/deterrence.
Johnson argued the district court’s mention of his violent history (including the firearm case) signaled retribution. The Sixth Circuit rejects that inference, explaining that violent history can inform whether revocation is needed “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” a use Esteras itself endorsed.
Resolve the “serious sanction” phrasing through the breach-of-trust doctrine.
A pivotal move is semantic and conceptual: while “serious sanction” could sound retributive, Sixth Circuit law “distinguish[es]” sanction from punishment. Under United States v. Johnson, the court may sanction the supervisee’s breach of trust (consistent with Chapter 7 policy statements) without engaging in retribution for the underlying conviction.
Reject a “magic words” requirement.
The panel notes that even though United States v. Patterson used the term “breach of trust,” other cases conceptualize revocation in those terms without the district court explicitly saying it. Accordingly, the court refuses to fault the judge for not using that phrase, so long as the rationale is tied to permissible considerations.

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is an instructive application of Esteras within the Sixth Circuit and signals several practical consequences for revocation litigation:

Post-Esteras appellate review will be transcript-driven, not label-driven. Courts will look for whether the judge’s reasoning is tethered to deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation, even if the judge uses language (e.g., “serious sanction”) that could be misread as retributive in isolation.
The “breach of trust” framework remains a stabilizing doctrine. Johnson reinforces that revocation may be justified as a response to the supervisee’s violation of court-ordered conditions, which is analytically distinct from punishing the underlying crime. This offers district courts a defensible rationale that fits within § 3583(e) after Esteras.
Defense objections must connect challenged statements to retribution for the underlying conviction. Johnson suggests that references to criminal history and dangerousness are unlikely to succeed as Esteras errors when the record supports public-safety/deterrence rationales.
District courts may continue to emphasize violation dangerousness and community risk. The opinion validates robust discussion of the violation conduct (here, fleeing and near-hitting an officer), especially as it relates to incapacitation and deterrence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Retribution” (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)): Punishing someone because they “deserve” it—reflecting the seriousness of the underlying crime, promoting respect for law, and providing “just punishment.” After Esteras, retribution for the underlying conviction is off-limits at revocation.
“Revocation” (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)): When a person on supervised release violates conditions, the court can revoke release and impose prison. But Congress limited which sentencing purposes apply at this stage.
“Breach of trust” (Chapter 7 concept): The supervisee violated the court’s trust by not following supervision rules. A sentence can be justified as a sanction for that breach—distinct from punishing the original offense.
“Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness”: Procedural errors concern the process (e.g., wrong guideline range, inadequate explanation). Substantive errors concern whether the outcome rests on improper factors or is unreasonable given proper factors.

Conclusion

United States v. Philroy Johnson operationalizes Esteras in the supervised-release context by drawing a firm line between impermissible retribution for the underlying conviction and permissible revocation rationales grounded in deterrence, public protection, and sanctioning a breach of trust. The opinion underscores that district courts need not recite “breach of trust” verbatim; what matters is whether the record shows the sentence was imposed for permissible § 3583(e) purposes rather than as “just punishment” for the original offense.