Introduction

STATE OF MISSOURI v. MARK MOLASKY, 765 S.W.2d 597 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1989), represents a pivotal case in Missouri jurisprudence concerning the boundaries of the "substantial step" necessary to sustain a conviction for attempted murder. This comprehensive analysis delves into the case's background, the judicial reasoning employed, precedents cited, and its broader implications on Missouri criminal law.

Summary of the Judgment

Mark Molasky was convicted of second-degree attempted murder and tampering with physical evidence, receiving a combined sentence of 15 years for attempted murder and one year for tampering. Molasky appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted murder conviction.

The Supreme Court of Missouri, upon review, focused primarily on whether the evidence presented sufficiently demonstrated that Molasky took a "substantial step" toward committing attempted murder, as defined by Missouri law. The Court concluded that Molasky's actions, which primarily involved solicitation through conversation without corroborative acts, did not meet the threshold required for a substantial step. Consequently, the Court reversed the attempted murder conviction but affirmed the tampering with evidence conviction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court engaged extensively with both state and comparative precedents to ascertain the appropriate application of the "substantial step" doctrine. Notably:

• STATE v. THOMAS (1969): Emphasized that attempted crimes require actions moving the defendant closer to the commission of the offense beyond mere preparation.
• STATE v. DAVIS (1928): Highlighted that verbal agreements and preparatory actions without overt acts towards the crime do not suffice for an attempt charge.
• STATE v. MOLKENBUR (1987), State v. Walker (1988): Reinforced the necessity of actions indicative of a committed purpose beyond conversation.
• Comparative cases such as STATE v. OTTO (Idaho, 1981) and STATE v. KILGUS (New Hampshire, 1986) were discussed to illustrate varying interpretations of solicitation as a substantial step.
• Model Penal Code § 5.01: Served as a foundational framework for defining attempt and substantial steps.

Legal Reasoning

The Court meticulously analyzed Missouri's statutory language in § 564.011, which aligns with Model Penal Code § 5.01. The essence of the decision hinged on whether Molasky's solicitation constituted a "substantial step" toward the commission of attempted murder.

Key points in the reasoning included:

• Purpose: The Court agreed that Molasky possessed the requisite intent to commit the murders, supported by his opposition to his son's adoption and belief that murdering his parents would secure custody.
• Substantial Step: While Molasky's discussions about the murders and the associated logistics (e.g., payment, disposal of bodies) were present, the Court found a lack of concrete actions corroborating his intent. Factors such as the absence of exchanged money, lack of victim identification, and no physical preparations led to the conclusion that mere solicitation without action does not fulfill the substantial step requirement.
• Comparative Jurisprudence: Drawing parallels with Otto and contrasting with Kilgus, the Court underscored that conversations alone, devoid of accompanying preparatory acts, are insufficient for an attempt conviction.
• Statutory Interpretation: By referencing the "substantial step" framework, the Court emphasized that Missouri requires actions demonstrative of a firm intent to complete the offense, not just preparatory or conversational steps.

Impact

This judgment has profound implications for Missouri criminal law, particularly in delineating the boundaries of what constitutes an attempted crime. By setting a higher threshold for what actions qualify as a "substantial step," the Court ensures that mere discussions or solicitations without tangible preparatory actions do not culminate in an attempt conviction. This clarity aids both prosecutors and defendants in understanding the evidentiary requirements necessary for securing a conviction in attempt cases.

Additionally, the decision underscores the importance of corroborative actions in attempted crime charges, potentially influencing future cases to focus more on concrete steps taken towards the commission of the crime rather than verbal agreements or plans.

Complex Concepts Simplified

"Substantial Step" in Attempted Crimes

In criminal law, an "attempted" crime involves two main elements: the intent to commit the crime and actions taken towards its completion. A "substantial step" refers to actions that significantly further the intent to commit the crime, moving beyond mere planning or discussion.

STATE v. THOMAS Test

This legal test determines whether a defendant's actions have progressed beyond preparation towards committing the actual offense. It requires more than just preliminary steps; there must be actions that bring the perpetrator closer to the crime's completion.

Solicitation as a Substantial Step

Solicitation involves requesting or encouraging someone else to commit a crime. For it to qualify as a substantial step towards an attempt, there must be accompanying actions that show a firm intent to see the crime through, not just verbal agreements.

Conclusion

The STATE OF MISSOURI v. MARK MOLASKY decision serves as a crucial precedent in Missouri’s legal landscape, reinforcing the necessity for concrete actions beyond mere intent or discussion when prosecuting attempted crimes. By clarifying the standards for what constitutes a "substantial step," the Missouri Supreme Court has provided clearer guidance for both prosecution and defense in future attempt-related cases. This judgment underscores the balance between prosecutorial zeal and the protection of defendants from overreaching charges based solely on intent or preparatory conversations without substantive evidence of advancement towards the crime.