Revised Records of Work Activities Must Be Submitted Before Leaving Office Under 2 NYCRR 315.4(a)(2)

Case: Matter of Reynolds v. DiNapoli, 2026 NY Slip Op 00044 (App Div 3d Dept Jan. 8, 2026)

1. Introduction

This CPLR article 78 proceeding (transferred to the Appellate Division, Third Department) challenged the State Comptroller’s denial of Deborah Reynolds’ request to recalculate retirement service credit for her prior elected service as a City Council member for the City of Mount Vernon (2012–2015). The dispute centered on the statutory-and-regulatory mechanism used when an elected or appointed official does not participate in an employer timekeeping system: the “Record of Work Activities” (“ROA”).

The key issues were (i) whether a “revised” ROA submitted years after the official left the position is barred by the timing requirements of 2 NYCRR 315.4(a)(2), (ii) whether the Comptroller’s duty to correct retirement-system errors under Retirement and Social Security Law (“RSSL”) § 111(c) required recalculation notwithstanding timeliness defects, and (iii) whether the hearing process violated due process when the Hearing Officer enforced agency rules limiting rebuttal evidence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department confirmed the Comptroller’s determination and dismissed the petition, holding that:

The “prior to ... ending service in that title” deadline in 2 NYCRR 315.4(a)(2) applies broadly to ROAs, including a purported “revised” ROA offered after the official’s term ends.
Substantial evidence supported the factual finding that petitioner did not submit a revised ROA during her term and instead submitted it nearly five years after leaving office, making it untimely.
The Comptroller’s general obligation to correct errors under RSSL § 111(c) did not compel correction because, given the untimely ROA, petitioner failed to demonstrate an error in service credits requiring correction.
Due process was not violated when the Hearing Officer refused to reopen petitioner’s case-in-chief to offer rebuttal testimony, consistent with 2 NYCRR 317.4’s rule that rebuttal evidence “shall not be permitted.”

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Standard of review / rationality of agency interpretation

The court relied on Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc., 33 NY3d 152 (2019) to anchor a familiar administrative-law principle: where an agency interprets and applies its own regulations, the reviewing court asks whether the result is “irrational or unreasonable.” Here, that deference mattered because the pivotal question was interpretive—whether the final sentence of 2 NYCRR 315.4(a)(2) applies only when service crediting has been suspended for failing to timely submit an initial ROA (petitioner’s view) or applies to ROAs generally (the Comptroller’s view). Andryeyeva supported affirmance once the court concluded the Comptroller’s reading fit the regulation’s text and structure.

Duty to correct errors in retirement records (and its limits in application)

Petitioner invoked RSSL § 111(c), arguing that even if her revised ROA was late, the Comptroller had a statutory duty to correct retirement-record errors. The court cited Matter of Smith v DiNapoli, 167 AD3d 1208 (3d Dept 2018) and Matter of Lane v DiNapoli, 179 AD3d 1267 (3d Dept 2020) for the proposition that the Comptroller must correct discovered errors “to ensure the integrity of the public retirement system.” The decisive move in Reynolds, however, was to treat timeliness as defeating the predicate: absent a timely and compliant ROA, petitioner had not shown that the Retirement System’s existing crediting was “error” as opposed to the lawful result of regulatory noncompliance.

Credibility determinations and substantial-evidence review

On the factual dispute—whether petitioner submitted a revised ROA during her term—the court emphasized deference to credibility findings, citing Matter of McMorrow v Hevesi, 6 AD3d 925 (3d Dept 2004) and Matter of Zanchelli v DiNapoli, 198 AD3d 1058 (3d Dept 2021). Those cases reflect the Third Department’s consistent stance that the Comptroller (or a designated hearing officer) may credit one witness over another, and reviewing courts will not reweigh that evidence so long as the determination is supported by “substantial evidence.”

For the burden-and-proof framing, the court cited Matter of Snyder v New York State & Local Retirement Sys., 211 AD3d 1269 (3d Dept 2022), reinforcing that the applicant carries the burden to demonstrate entitlement to additional service credit. It also cited Matter of P.C. v Stony Brook University, 43 NY3d 574 (2025) for the substantial-evidence framework applicable in transferred article 78 proceedings.

Due process in administrative retirement hearings; limits on rebuttal

The court’s due-process analysis leaned on Matter of Regan v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 14 AD3d 927 (3d Dept 2005), lv denied 4 NY3d 709 (2005), lv dismissed 5 NY3d 824 (2005), which upheld enforcement of the Retirement System’s hearing rules— particularly the prohibition on rebuttal evidence—where the petitioner had notice and a fair opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. In Reynolds, the Third Department found the same: petitioner had notice (about a month) that the Chief Accountant would testify and had “ample” opportunity for cross-examination, making the refusal to reopen her case consistent with a full and fair hearing.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) The key interpretive holding: 2 NYCRR 315.4(a)(2)’s “prior to leaving office” applies broadly.

The court treated the regulation’s text and organization as decisive. Subdivision (a)(1) sets the baseline ROA procedure (complete within 150 days of taking office; sign/attest; submit to the governing board within 30 days after completion). Subdivision (a)(2) then “collects various rules” dealing with deviations from the baseline, including (i) preparing an alternative representative three-month ROA within the same calendar year if the initial ROA is not representative, (ii) suspension of service credit for failure to timely comply, and (iii) the final sentence: “The record of work activities must be submitted ... prior to the elected or appointed official ending service in that title.”

Petitioner argued that because the deadline appears after the suspension language, it should be read narrowly to apply only in the “suspension” scenario (i.e., when someone failed to timely file an initial ROA). The court rejected that narrowing construction because the last sentence is “drafted broadly,” uses “absolute terms,” and refers to “the record of work activities” “without limitation.”

The court also supplied a policy-consistency rationale: allowing revisions “years or even decades” later would defeat the regulation’s “clear objective” of “contemporaneous and verifiable reporting.” This objective helped justify the Comptroller’s interpretation as reasonable rather than arbitrary.

(B) RSSL § 111(c) does not override timeliness and compliance requirements absent a shown “error.”

While acknowledging the Comptroller’s obligation to correct errors, the court framed the question as whether an “error in service credits meriting correction” had been demonstrated. Because the revised ROA was untimely, the court accepted the Comptroller’s view that petitioner had not shown that the Retirement System’s crediting was wrong under the applicable regulatory scheme; instead, it was the expected outcome of noncompliance.

(C) Substantial evidence supported the finding of untimeliness.

The court treated the hearing record as presenting a credibility contest: petitioner claimed she promptly submitted a revised ROA in 2012 after being told her hours looked low; the City Clerk and Chief Accountant testified they did not receive another ROA during her term. The Comptroller was entitled to credit the latter testimony and reject petitioner’s supporting proof as unpersuasive. With that factual finding in place, the revised ROA’s 2020 submission— nearly five years after leaving office in December 2015—was plainly outside the regulation’s deadline, defeating entitlement to recalculation.

(D) No due process violation from enforcing the “no rebuttal” hearing rule.

The court emphasized that agency rules required an applicant to be prepared to present all evidence and witnesses at the initial hearing (2 NYCRR 317.4[b]) and that rebuttal evidence “shall not be permitted” (2 NYCRR 317.4[c]). Because petitioner had notice of the Chief Accountant witness, and because cross-examination provided an avenue to challenge the testimony, the Hearing Officer’s refusal to reopen the case-in-chief did not deprive petitioner of a full and fair hearing.

3.3. Impact

Hard stop on post-tenure “revisions”: The decision solidifies a practical rule for officials without timekeeping records: a later “revised” ROA is not a vehicle for retroactive credit enhancement after separation from the title. Parties should expect the Comptroller to treat the “prior to ... ending service” language as a bright-line deadline for any ROA meant to affect crediting for that title.
Contemporaneous-verifiability as the animating principle: By expressly tying the interpretation to “contemporaneous and verifiable reporting,” the court signals that retirement-credit disputes will be resolved with skepticism toward late-created records whose reliability is harder to test.
Constraining RSSL § 111(c) arguments: Petitioners may continue invoking § 111(c), but Reynolds indicates that the “duty to correct” does not operate as a general equitable safety valve; it presupposes an “error” demonstrated within (or consistent with) the governing regulatory framework.
Hearing strategy implications: Enforcement of 2 NYCRR 317.4’s “no rebuttal” rule is reaffirmed. Applicants must anticipate opposing witnesses and present their full affirmative case initially, using cross-examination—rather than rebuttal testimony—to counter later-presented adverse testimony.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Record of Work Activities (ROA): A form used to document the work time of officials who do not clock in/out. It is used to calculate retirement service credit by translating reported hours into a “standard work day” and average days worked per month.
Service credit: The retirement system’s measure of how much qualifying service time an employee/official has accrued, affecting eligibility and benefit calculation.
“Substantial evidence” review: A deferential evidentiary standard used in certain administrative challenges. The court does not decide what it would have found; it asks whether the agency’s decision is supported by “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept.”
CPLR article 78 (transferred proceeding): The procedural device to challenge administrative determinations. When the dispute turns on whether an agency determination is supported by substantial evidence after a hearing, the case is transferred to the Appellate Division for that review.
Due process in administrative hearings: Generally requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, including the ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses when credibility is at issue. It does not necessarily guarantee a right to present rebuttal testimony if valid rules structure how evidence must be presented.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Reynolds v DiNapoli establishes (and reinforces) a clear operational rule for retirement crediting of elected/appointed officials who rely on ROAs: an ROA that will be used to determine service credit for a given title must be submitted before the official ends service in that title, and a post-tenure “revision” is untimely under 2 NYCRR 315.4(a)(2). The decision also narrows the practical reach of RSSL § 111(c) in this setting by requiring a demonstrated, correctable “error” within the regulatory scheme, and it reaffirms that Retirement System hearing rules limiting rebuttal evidence can be enforced without violating due process when notice and cross-examination opportunities are provided.