Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960):

  Establishes the competency standard: the defendant must have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. The Seventh Circuit used Dusky, as elaborated in Yang v. United States, to frame its inquiry.

• Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992):

  Confirms that due process forbids prosecution of an incompetent defendant but permits states to structure competency procedures. The court also drew on Medina’s observation that entering an insanity plea presupposes competency, using Powers’s 1999 NGI finding as a data point that he was competent at that earlier time.

• Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975):

  Provides the framework for evaluating competency, including retrospective determinations, and highlights evidence sources: irrational behavior, trial demeanor, and prior medical opinions. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the difficulties of retrospective inquiries but deemed them feasible with the available record.

• Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1996):

  Emphasizes the probative value of detailed, coherent testimony and trial demeanor as evidence of competency and cautions that mental illness alone does not equal incompetence. The court leaned on Eddmonds to treat Powers’s testimony and comportment as “highly relevant.”

• Timberlake v. Davis, 409 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2005):

  Clarifies a defendant need not understand every nuance of the law; frustration or skeptical comments about the system are common and do not alone signal incompetence. The court cited Timberlake to downplay isolated remarks (e.g., Powers’s complaint that the judge “just looked at his file”).

• Yang v. United States, 114 F.4th 899 (7th Cir. 2024):

  Recent circuit authority applying and explicating Dusky. The court used Yang to restate the rational/factual understanding and assistance-with-counsel requirements.

• Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002):

  Notes that persons with low IQ can distinguish right from wrong; low IQ does not itself preclude criminal responsibility or competence. The court used Atkins to show why IQ within 60–75 does not compel an incompetency finding.

• McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2015):

  Illustrates when mental illness becomes dispositive—severe symptoms, hospitalizations, and medication side effects that fundamentally impede understanding or communication. The court contrasted McManus’s extreme facts with Powers’s record to show why the latter did not require a competency hearing or finding.

• Anderson v. United States, 865 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2017); Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2013):

  Emphasize awareness of core trial rights and the nature of proceedings; complete mastery of legal complexities is not required.

• Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009):

  Where no state court has resolved the specific claim on the merits, federal review is de novo. The Seventh Circuit invoked Cone because the State waived its procedural-default defense and no state court adjudicated the trial-competency claim on the merits.

• Matheney v. Anderson, 377 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2004):

  When a defendant was competent at trial, an ineffective-assistance claim premised on failure to raise competency fails. The Seventh Circuit relied on Matheney to dispose of Powers’s derivative IAC claim.

• United States ex rel. Foster v. DeRobertis, 741 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984):

  Reinforces that not every sign of mental illness demonstrates incompetence; it is one factor among many.

• Moreland v. Eplett, 18 F.4th 261 (7th Cir. 2021):

  Confirms that issues outside the certificate of appealability are not before the court; used to reject broader challenges to Wisconsin’s no-merit procedures.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds along the Dusky/Drope axis, incorporating multiple, mutually reinforcing evidentiary strands.

1) Cognitive Baseline and Prior NGI

Powers’s IQ ranged between 60–75, placing him in borderline intellectual functioning to mild intellectual disability. The court treated this fact as cause for caution but not determinative. Drawing on Atkins, the court explained that low IQ does not itself establish incompetence or negate responsibility.

Importantly, the panel treated Powers’s 1999 NGI verdict as a data point that he was competent at that earlier time because entering an insanity plea presupposes competence (Medina). The court carefully noted that NGI (lack of mental responsibility at the time of the offense) and competency (ability to understand and assist at trial) are distinct doctrines. Thus, NGI did not advance a claim of incompetence at the 2006 trial; if anything, it showed he had been deemed competent to stand trial previously.

2) Trial Record: Demeanor and Testimony

Under Drope and Eddmonds, how a defendant behaves and testifies at trial is “highly relevant.” The court found nothing erratic; instead, it emphasized Powers’s calm demeanor and remarkably detailed testimony about:

• Specific times, locations, and people’s clothing;
• Minor details (e.g., offering a Mountain Dew, a request for a Kid Rock song);
• Social conventions (surprise that a stranger walked into his apartment); and
• Strategic thinking (identifying a witness’s possible bias and knowing which testimony helped or hurt him).

The court saw in this testimony evidence of memory, rational processing, and ability to assist counsel. His remark to his friend—“Don’t get caught”—further suggested an understanding that sexual activity with a 13-year-old was unlawful, reflecting both moral and legal awareness. Under Dusky, such signs of rational and factual comprehension point toward competence.

3) Posttrial Evaluations: Reconciling Conflicting Opinions

The court navigated three posttrial evaluations:

• Dr. Nathan Glassman (2007): Initially inconclusive in his report, he later opined at a hearing that Powers lacked competence at that time. He noted low intellectual functioning, distractibility, and possible insufficient effort. But his opinion focused on competence in 2007, not directly on 2006 trial competence; comments suggesting counsel could have raised competence were not the same as a retrospective finding of trial incompetence.
• Dr. Craig Schoenecker (2007): Found Powers competent, noting coherent, non-delusional presentation and an understanding of court roles and proceedings. He observed that Powers recognized he could consult his attorney, and he appeared calm, cooperative, and intelligible.
• Dr. Sheryl Dolezal (2015): Nearly a decade after trial, found Powers competent, with basic grasp of legal concepts and the adversary system. She suspected feigning or exaggeration of symptoms and recommended simplified explanations for complex legal matters.

Recognizing Drope’s caution about the “inherent difficulties” of retrospective assessments, the court found the weight of these opinions—two clear competency findings versus one later-time incompetency finding—consistent with competence at the time of trial, especially when anchored by the powerful trial-record evidence.

4) Counsel’s Observations and Strategic Choices

The court placed substantial weight on contemporaneous counsel signals. Drope acknowledges that trial judges must depend, to some degree, on counsel to highlight competency concerns. Here, trial counsel never raised competency before, during, or after trial. Appellate counsel consulted trial counsel and time records and concluded in a no-merit report that a competency challenge would be frivolous. The Seventh Circuit reasonably inferred that the lawyers closest to Powers’s presentation saw no competency problem.

5) Mental Illness vs. Incompetence

Powers’s history of psychiatric hospitalizations, suicide attempts, and antipsychotic medication did not carry the day. The court, invoking Eddmonds and Foster, reiterated that mental illness is neither necessary nor sufficient for incompetence. Unlike the extreme facts in McManus (hospitalizations and medications rendering the mind “soup”), nothing in Powers’s presentation showed an inability to understand proceedings or consult with counsel.

6) Disposition of Ineffective Assistance

Because the court found Powers competent at trial, his derivative ineffective-assistance claim failed under Matheney: counsel cannot be ineffective for omitting a meritless competency challenge. Any broader attack on Wisconsin’s no-merit process was outside the certificate of appealability (Moreland).

Impact and Practical Significance

For Habeas Petitioners and Counsel

• Retrospective competency claims face a high evidentiary bar. Detailed, coherent trial testimony and stable demeanor are powerful indicators of competence. Petitioners must present compelling, trial-proximate evidence showing inability to understand or to assist—not merely low IQ or a mental health history.
• Posttrial evaluations are helpful but not dispositive. Courts will consider temporal proximity to trial, internal consistency, and indications of feigning or poor effort.
• Counsel’s contemporaneous judgments matter. The absence of a competency motion by trial counsel, coupled with appellate counsel’s reasoned decision (especially after consulting trial counsel) not to press competency, can significantly undermine retrospective challenges.

For Trial Practitioners

• Maintain robust records of client interactions about understanding of proceedings and decision-making, especially where there are red flags (e.g., psychiatric history, unusual presentations).
• Early consultation with mental health professionals remains the best practice when doubt exists; however, this case shows that simply having low IQ or a mental health history does not automatically trigger a duty to seek a competency evaluation.

Doctrinal Clarifications

• Low IQ and NGI are not proxies for incompetence. Low IQ, without more, does not establish incompetency. A prior NGI finding presupposes competency at that earlier trial and does not imply incompetence later.
• Record-centered approach is decisive. Trial demeanor, testimony, and counsel’s observations can outweigh ambiguous or conflicting posttrial expert opinions—especially when the latter are remote in time.