Retroactive Sex Offender Registration: Regulatory, Not Punitive – Brown v. Mellekas

Introduction

In Brown v. Mellekas, 24-970-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resolved a pro se § 1983 challenge to Connecticut’s retroactive sex-offender registry law ("Megan’s Law") as applied to a defendant who entered an Alford plea in 1993. Plaintiff-Appellant Ralston Brown argued that requiring him to register under Connecticut General Statutes § 54-252 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, his procedural and substantive due process rights, and the terms of his plea agreement. The Defendants-Appellees are three Connecticut State Police officers sued in their individual capacities. The district court dismissed Brown’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s dismissal. Reviewing de novo, the Court held:

The retroactive application of Connecticut’s non-punitive Megan’s Law does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Procedural due process is not offended because Connecticut bases registration on the fact of conviction—not on a new hearing regarding present dangerousness.
Substantive due process and privacy claims fail because the registry scheme does not “shock the conscience.”
The officers cannot be held individually liable—they were not personally involved in the 1993 plea or conviction.
Judicial estoppel does not apply, as the officers never took an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. (2d Cir. 2002) – Standard for reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Meadows v. United Services, Inc. (2d Cir. 2020) – Pro se submissions must be liberally construed and read to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) – The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
North Carolina v. Alford (1970) – Establishes that an Alford plea constitutes a valid conviction even without an explicit admission of guilt.
Smith v. Doe (2003) – Alaska’s retroactive sex-offender registration is non-punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Doe v. Cuomo (2d Cir. 2014) – New York’s sex-offender registry remains regulatory rather than punitive under the Ex Post Facto analysis.
Roe v. Office of Adult Probation (2d Cir. 1997) – Connecticut’s sex-offender notification policy is non-punitive.
State v. Kelly (Conn. 2001) and Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction (Conn. 2021) – Connecticut Supreme Court decisions classifying Megan’s Law as regulatory.
U.S. SEC v. Ahmed (2d Cir. 2023) – Recap of Ex Post Facto requirements: retrospective application plus additional punishment.
Burrell v. United States (2d Cir. 2004) – Confirms that an Alford plea conviction counts the same as any guilty plea for collateral consequences.
Kravitz v. Purcell (2d Cir. 2023) – Personal involvement standard for § 1983 liability in individual-capacity suits.
Clark v. AII Acquisition, LLC (2d Cir. 2018) and United States v. Swartz Family Trust (2d Cir. 2023) – Elements of judicial estoppel, including adoption of an earlier inconsistent position.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in several logical steps:

Standard of Review. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Brown’s complaint was construed liberally; factual allegations were taken as true; claims survived only if facially plausible.
Ex Post Facto Challenge.
- To trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause, a law must (1) apply retroactively to events before enactment and (2) impose punishment beyond what was in place at the time of the offense.
- Applying Smith v. Doe, Doe v. Cuomo, Roe, and Connecticut decisions (Kelly, Goguen), the Court concluded Connecticut’s Megan’s Law is a civil, regulatory scheme whose purpose is public safety rather than additional punishment.
Procedural Due Process.
- Brown argued he was entitled to a hearing on his current dangerousness before being required to register.
- Relying on Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), the Court held that Connecticut law bases registration solely on the fact of conviction.
Substantive Due Process and Privacy.
- Brown claimed the registration requirement violated a heightened privacy right.
- Using the “shock the conscience” test (Goe v. Zucker, 2d Cir. 2022) and Cuomo, the Court found no conduct sufficiently shocking to warrant substantive‐due‐process protection.
Individual-Capacity Claims. Brown failed to allege that Officers Mellekas or Garcia were personally involved in his 1993 plea, conviction, or sentencing. Under § 1983, personal involvement is essential for individual liability (Kravitz).
Judicial Estoppel. Estoppel requires a party to have taken an earlier position inconsistent with the current one. Because the officers were not parties to the criminal case and never adopted Brown’s positions in that forum, estoppel did not apply.

Impact

Brown v. Mellekas reinforces and streamlines Second Circuit jurisprudence in several respects:

Confirms that Alford pleas trigger all collateral consequences, including retroactive registry requirements.
Affirms the clear line (Smith v. Doe, Doe v. Cuomo, Roe) identifying civil‐regulatory sex‐offender registration as nonpunitive.
Clarifies that no individualized dangerousness hearing is required where a state law predicates registration solely on conviction.
Limits § 1983 individual‐capacity claims by emphasizing the personal‐involvement requirement.
Restricts judicial estoppel in civil rights suits against non‐criminal‐defendant officials.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Alford Plea: A guilty plea in which the defendant asserts innocence but admits that the evidence would likely lead to a conviction.
Ex Post Facto Clause: A constitutional prohibition against laws that retroactively increase the punishment for criminal acts completed before the law’s enactment.
Procedural Due Process: The requirement that the government follow fair procedures before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Substantive Due Process: Protection against government actions that are so oppressive or arbitrary that they “shock the conscience.”
Judicial Estoppel: A doctrine preventing a party who has successfully asserted a position in one proceeding from taking a contradictory position in a later proceeding.

Conclusion

Brown v. Mellekas upholds the constitutional integrity of Connecticut’s retroactive sex-offender registration scheme. By reaffirming that such a scheme is civil and regulatory rather than punitive, it safeguards public‐safety measures from Ex Post Facto and due process challenges. The decision also makes clear that convictions entered via Alford pleas carry the same collateral consequences as traditional guilty pleas. For § 1983 practitioners, it underscores the importance of pleading personal involvement and the narrow application of judicial estoppel in civil rights suits against government officials.