Retroactive Application of Non-Punitive Sex Offender Registration to Alford Pleas Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto or Due Process: Brown v. Mellekas

1. Introduction

Brown v. Mellekas is a summary order issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 3, 2025. Ralston Brown, proceeding pro se, challenged Connecticut’s retroactive sex-offender registration requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown had entered an “Alford plea” in 1993 to conspiracy to commit third-degree sexual assault. Years later, Connecticut enacted and applied “Megan’s Law” retroactively, requiring him to register and verify his residence. Brown claimed that this application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural and substantive due process rights, and his privacy. He also contested the personal-capacity liability of state police officers and sought judicial estoppel. The district court dismissed his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal in all respects.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. It held that:

• The retroactive application of Connecticut’s sex-offender registration law is regulatory, not punitive, and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
• No procedural due process hearing on current dangerousness is required because the registration requirement rests solely on the fact of conviction.
• The substantive due process right to privacy is not infringed by a non-punitive registration scheme that does not shock the conscience.
• The individual-capacity defendants are not liable because Brown failed to allege personal involvement in his 1993 plea or conviction.
• Judicial estoppel does not apply: the appellees did not adopt any inconsistent position in Brown’s state criminal proceeding.

All remaining arguments were deemed without merit, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The court relied on a well-established framework for reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. (de novo review) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (plausibility standard). It also emphasized liberal construction of pro se pleadings per Meadows v. United Services. On the substantive issues, the court drew heavily on Ex Post Facto doctrine as articulated in U.S. SEC v. Ahmed and the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe (Alaska’s Megan’s Law). Comparisons to Doe v. Cuomo (New York) and Roe v. Office of Adult Probation underscored the regulatory nature of similar statutes. Connecticut state-court decisions—State v. Kelly and Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction—confirmed that Megan’s Law is non-punitive. For due process, the court cited Conn. Department of Public Safety v. Doe (no dangerousness hearing required) and Burrell v. United States (Alford plea equals guilty plea for conviction). Substantive due process references included Cuomo and Goe v. Zucker. Individual-capacity and judicial estoppel principles were drawn from Kravitz v. Purcell, Clark v. All Acquisition, LLC, and United States v. Swartz Family Trust.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit first addressed the Ex Post Facto challenge. Under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, a law is ex post facto if it (1) applies retroactively and (2) increases punishment. The court found Megan’s Law retrospective but non-punitive, serving regulatory and public-safety objectives. It tracked the analysis in Smith v. Doe and Doe v. Cuomo, focusing on legislative intent and effects rather than labels. The registration scheme’s requirements—address verification, public notification, database inclusion—were held non-punitive.

On procedural due process, the court noted that Connecticut elected to predicate registration solely on conviction history, not on current risk assessments. As a result, no hearing on dangerousness is constitutionally mandated. Substantive due process and privacy claims were rejected because the scheme does not “shock the contemporary conscience” or intrude on fundamental rights as recognized in cases like Goe.

Brown’s claims against individual officers failed for lack of personal involvement in his plea or conviction. Judicial estoppel was unavailable because the appellees never asserted inconsistent positions in Brown’s underlying criminal case. Finally, any contention that the law breached his plea bargain or rendered it valueless was found unpersuasive under Second Circuit precedent on plea-agreement interpretations.

3.3. Impact

Brown v. Mellekas reinforces a clear Second Circuit line: retroactive sex-offender registration statutes that are regulatory in nature survive Ex Post Facto, due process, and privacy challenges. It confirms that Alford pleas carry full conviction consequences for collateral obligations. Future litigants face a high bar to show punitive effect or constitutional infirmity in similar schemes. The decision also clarifies that individual-capacity suits against officials enforcing such statutes require allegations of direct, personal involvement.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ex Post Facto Clause: Prohibits criminal laws that retroactively increase punishment.
• Alford Plea: A guilty plea where the defendant maintains innocence but admits enough facts for conviction; legally identical to a standard guilty plea.
• Regulatory vs. Punitive: Regulatory laws aim at public safety (e.g., sex-offender registries); punitive laws impose additional penalties or stigmatizing sanctions.
• Procedural Due Process: Requires fair procedures (notice, hearing) before deprivation of life, liberty, or property interests.
• Substantive Due Process: Protects fundamental rights from government interference, including privacy concerns.
• Judicial Estoppel: Bars a party from taking a legal position inconsistent with one previously asserted in the same or an earlier proceeding.

5. Conclusion

Brown v. Mellekas upholds the retroactive application of Connecticut’s Megan’s Law to convictions by Alford plea, affirming that such registration requirements are regulatory, not punitive. The decision clarifies that no ex post facto violation occurs where legislative intent and actual effects serve public safety. It confirms that procedural due process does not mandate dangerousness hearings when law predicates registration on conviction alone, and that substantive due process and privacy claims cannot overturn a non-punitive, public-safety measure. Moreover, liability in individual-capacity suits demands direct involvement, and judicial estoppel requires an earlier inconsistent position. This case strengthens existing precedent and guides lower courts in evaluating constitutional challenges to sex-offender registries.