Retroactive Application of Megan’s Law as Non-Punitive Regulation: Ex Post Facto and Due Process Limits

Introduction

Brown v. Mellekas, decided April 3, 2025 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addressed whether Connecticut’s retroactive sex‐offender registration regime (“Megan’s Law”) violates federal constitutional protections. Pro se plaintiff Ralston Brown was convicted in 1993, pursuant to an Alford plea, of conspiracy to commit third‐degree sexual assault. Years later Connecticut amended its criminal code to require anyone “convicted” of a covered sexual offense—past or present—to register, notify local authorities of residence changes, and periodically confirm their whereabouts. Brown sued three state‐police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that retroactive registration: (1) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, (2) denies procedural and substantive due process, and (3) breaches his plea agreement. The district court dismissed, and Brown appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed dismissal of Brown’s claims. It held that:

Connecticut’s retroactive registration law is a regulatory, non‐punitive exercise of the State’s police power and therefore does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
No procedural due process violation arises from imposing registration without a hearing on current dangerousness: Connecticut bases registration solely on the fact of conviction, not on risk assessments.
Substantive due process and privacy challenges fail because requiring sex‐offender registration does not “shock the contemporary conscience” nor infringe a fundamental privacy right.
Brown’s breach‐of‐plea‐agreement theory and request for judicial estoppel relief were without merit: the officers were in no way parties to or personally involved in Brown’s 1993 plea, and they never adopted an inconsistent position in any prior proceeding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Alford plea doctrine: North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), establishes that a plea entered to avoid a harsher penalty, even while maintaining innocence, produces a valid conviction.
Rule 12(b)(6) standard: Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002).
Pro se liberal construction: Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2020).
Non-punitive registration regimes: Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (Alaska law); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (New York law); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997) (Connecticut probation notifications); State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23 (2001); Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 508 (2021).
Conscience-shocking standard: Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2022).
Individual capacity liability: Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023).
Judicial estoppel: Clark v. All Acquisition, LLC, 886 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Swartz Family Trust, 67 F.4th 505 (2d Cir. 2023).

Legal Reasoning

1. Ex Post Facto Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3). A law is punitive—and thus barred if applied retroactively—only if it (a) imposes a punishment in the classic sense or (b) disserves a legitimate regulatory goal. The court applied the two‐part test from Smith v. Doe: examine legislative intent (regulatory vs punitive) and, if ambiguous, apply the “effects test” to see if the law’s purpose or effects outweigh its regulatory aims. It found Connecticut’s law clearly aimed at public safety and community notification, not punishment.

2. Alford Plea and Conviction. Brown contended that he could not have foreseen registration when he pleaded under Alford. But an Alford plea results in the same legal conviction as any guilty plea; retrospective laws triggered by “convictions” include him.

3. Procedural Due Process (Fifth Amendment). Brown argued for an individualized hearing to prove or disprove future dangerousness before registration. The court relied on Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003): States may require registration based on conviction, without judicial hearings on risk.

4. Substantive Due Process / Right of Privacy. The court saw no fundamental privacy right in avoiding sex‐offender registries and found no arbitrary or conscience‐shocking government conduct.

5. Individual Liability &est; Judicial Estoppel. None of the named officers had personal involvement in Brown’s entry of plea. Moreover, they never advanced an inconsistent position regarding the plea in any prior forum, so judicial estoppel did not apply.

Impact

Although issued as a summary order (thus non-precedential within the Second Circuit), Brown v. Mellekas reaffirms key points for litigants and courts:

Retroactive sex‐offender registration schemes modeled on Megan’s Law remain constitutionally valid when they serve a public safety purpose and lack punitive intent.
Alford pleas carry the same registration consequences as standard guilty pleas.
Challenges to state registration schemes under procedural due process must overcome the settled principle that conviction‐based registration does not require individualized dangerousness hearings.
Civil‐rights actions under § 1983 require clear allegations of each defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Ex Post Facto Clause: Prohibits laws that retroactively create or increase criminal punishment. Regulatory schemes focused on public safety are outside its scope.
Alford Plea: A defendant may plead guilty—while simultaneously maintaining innocence—to avoid harsher penalties. It produces a “conviction” for all legal purposes.
Summary Order: A court decision that resolves a case without full opinion. It binds the parties but lacks precedential effect in the issuing circuit.
Due Process “Conscience‐Shocking” Test: Government actions infringing fundamental liberties must be so egregious as to offend basic judgments of morality and fairness.
Judicial Estoppel: Prevents a party from adopting a position in litigation that contradicts one it successfully advanced earlier, if it would give that party an unfair advantage.

Conclusion

Brown v. Mellekas underscores the continued vitality of Smith v. Doe and related precedents in upholding retroactive sex‐offender registration laws as non‐punitive, regulatory measures. It clarifies that an Alford plea triggers the same registration duties as ordinary guilty pleas and confirms that individualized hearings on dangerousness are not constitutionally required. Civil‐rights plaintiffs must allege each defendant’s personal participation in any due process or Ex Post Facto violation. Taken together, the case affirms the broad authority of states to enact and enforce registries designed to protect public safety without running afoul of ex post facto or due process constraints.