Retroactive Application and Constitutional Validity of New York’s Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA): A Commentary on Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn., 2025 NY Slip Op 06537

I. Introduction

The New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn. is a major clarification of the scope and constitutionality of the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), L 2022, ch 821. Decided together with Article 13 LLC v Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank (decided the same day), the case confirms that three core provisions of FAPA—§§ 4, 7, and 8— apply retroactively and survive federal Due Process and Contract Clause challenges.

The litigation arises from a quiet title action by a homeowner, Patti Van Dyke, seeking cancellation and discharge of a mortgage on the ground that the six-year statute of limitations for enforcing her residential mortgage loan had expired. The defendant, U.S. Bank, as trustee and successor to prior foreclosing entities, argued that the loan had never been validly accelerated and, alternatively, that retroactive application of FAPA to her case would be unconstitutional.

The Court’s decision addresses:

• Whether FAPA §§ 4, 7, and 8 operate retroactively;
• Whether that retroactive application violates substantive or procedural due process;
• Whether FAPA, as applied, violates the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and
• How FAPA § 7’s estoppel provision applies to a prior foreclosure action that was discontinued without an express judicial finding about the validity of the acceleration.

The Court not only upholds FAPA’s application but also resolves practical questions about the effect of long-pending foreclosure actions, voluntary discontinuances, and prior standing disputes on limitations-based quiet title relief.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

• 2007 Loan: Van Dyke executed a promissory note and a mortgage on Bronx residential property.
• Default: She defaulted in April 2009 and made no payments thereafter.
• 2009 Foreclosure (Mellon Action):
  • Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (“Mellon”) filed a foreclosure action in October 2009.
  • Mellon’s verified complaint alleged it was the owner/holder (or had delegated authority) and expressly accelerated the debt.
  • Van Dyke answered, raising lack of standing as an affirmative defense; the record suggests Mellon lacked the note/mortgage at commencement (assignment occurred in December 2009).
  • In 2016, the loan was ultimately assigned to U.S. Bank (as trustee).
  • Supreme Court and the Appellate Division both later found issues of fact on standing and denied summary judgment; there was no merits determination on acceleration or standing.
  • In March 2022, the parties entered into a stipulation discontinuing the action without prejudice, noting that Mellon had “failed to demonstrate that it had standing.” No mention was made of revoking the acceleration.
• 2022 Quiet Title Action: In April 2022, Van Dyke brought this RPAPL 1501(4) quiet title action, alleging:
  • The loan was accelerated in 2009.
  • More than six years had elapsed, so any foreclosure action was time-barred.
  • The mortgage should be cancelled and discharged of record.
• 2022 Successive Foreclosure: Also in 2022, U.S. Bank commenced a new foreclosure action that remains pending.
• FAPA Enacted (December 2022): While motions were pending in the quiet title case, FAPA took effect. The parties submitted supplemental briefing on its applicability and constitutionality.

B. Lower Court Rulings

Supreme Court:

• Held that FAPA § 7 estopped U.S. Bank from arguing that the 2009 acceleration was invalid.
• Concluded that because six years had run since that acceleration, the mortgage was unenforceable.
• Rejected U.S. Bank’s constitutional challenges to FAPA’s retroactive application.
• Granted summary judgment to Van Dyke, cancelling and discharging the mortgage.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and now also affirms.

C. Core Holdings

1. Retroactivity: FAPA §§ 4, 7, and 8 apply retroactively, as the Legislature clearly intended, and cover this pending quiet title action because no final judgment of foreclosure and sale has been enforced (FAPA § 10).
2. Substantive Due Process: Retroactive application does not improperly impair any “vested rights” of U.S. Bank and is supported by a rational legislative purpose—curbing abusive foreclosure practices and reinforcing limitations-period finality.
3. Procedural Due Process: FAPA did not shorten the six-year statute of limitations; it changed how it operates. Therefore, there was no constitutional requirement for a “grace period” before FAPA took effect.
4. Contract Clause: Even assuming a substantial impairment of contractual rights, that impairment is reasonable, appropriate to a significant and legitimate public purpose, and thus consistent with the Contract Clause.
5. Interpretation of FAPA § 7: The prior denials of summary judgment and the so-ordered discontinuance did not constitute an “expressed judicial determination” that the 2009 acceleration was invalid; thus, FAPA § 7 estops U.S. Bank from contesting the validity of that acceleration in this quiet title action.
6. Result: Because the six-year limitations period triggered by the 2009 acceleration had expired by the time Van Dyke commenced this action, and because FAPA bars U.S. Bank from denying that acceleration, the mortgage must be cancelled and discharged.

III. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

A. Mortgage Acceleration and the Statute of Limitations

Two basic instruments are at the heart of a residential mortgage transaction:

• Promissory note: The borrower’s promise to repay, typically in periodic installments with interest.
• Mortgage: A security interest in the real property securing the debt.

A typical mortgage note includes an acceleration clause, allowing the lender to declare the entire loan balance immediately due upon default. Under New York law:

• Before acceleration, the six-year limitations period (CPLR 213(4)) runs separately on each missed installment.
• Upon valid acceleration, a single six-year limitations period begins on the entire outstanding balance.
• A valid acceleration requires an “unequivocal overt act” clearly indicating the lender’s election, e.g., a verified foreclosure complaint demanding the full amount (Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel, 37 NY3d 1, 22).

Before FAPA, in Engel the Court held that, when a loan was accelerated through commencement of a foreclosure action, a voluntary discontinuance of that action (absent an express contrary statement) effected a de-acceleration as a matter of law, resetting the limitations period if the borrower defaulted again later.

B. FAPA’s Key Provisions

1. Section 4 – CPLR 203(h): No Unilateral Resetting of Limitations

FAPA § 4, codified at CPLR 203(h), provides that once a cause of action under a residential mortgage loan has accrued, no party may, “in form or effect, unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive, or reset the accrual thereof” or otherwise unilaterally extend the limitations period, unless a statute expressly permits it.

In effect, § 4 overrules the aspect of Engel that allowed lenders, by their own voluntary conduct (like discontinuing a foreclosure), to unilaterally reset or undo the running of the six-year clock.

2. Section 8 – CPLR 3217(e): Discontinuance Does Not Affect Limitations Period

FAPA § 8, codified at CPLR 3217(e), specifically addresses voluntary discontinuances of actions on residential mortgage loan agreements. It states that such a discontinuance “shall not, in force or effect, waive, postpone, cancel, toll, extend, revive or reset the limitations period,” unless a statute expressly says otherwise.

Section 8, together with § 4, squarely rejects the pre-FAPA Engel rule that a voluntary discontinuance automatically de-accelerated a loan and thus reset the limitations period.

3. Section 7 – CPLR 213(4)(b): Estoppel on Challenging Prior Acceleration

FAPA § 7, codified in part at CPLR 213(4)(b), governs actions seeking cancellation and discharge of residential mortgages (such as this quiet title case). It provides:

In any action seeking cancellation and discharge of record of [among other things, a residential mortgage], a defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.

In short, if a lender (or its successor) previously accelerated the loan by commencing a foreclosure, it generally cannot later argue that the acceleration was invalid in order to avoid a statute of limitations bar, unless:

• In the prior case, a court expressly determined (on a timely raised defense) that there was no valid acceleration; and
• The prior action was dismissed on that express ground.

4. Section 10 – Effective Date and Retroactive Reach

FAPA § 10 provides that the Act “shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all actions commenced on [residential mortgage loan agreements] in which a final judgment of foreclosure and sale has not been enforced.”

Van Dyke’s quiet title action fits this description. No final foreclosure judgment exists, so FAPA’s provisions apply if they are retroactive.

IV. Retroactivity Analysis

A. The General Presumption Against Retroactivity

New York follows a familiar presumption: statutes are not retroactive unless the Legislature clearly indicates otherwise (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth CSD, 91 NY2d 577, 584).

The Court cited:

• Majewski: nonprocedural statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear intent.
• Matter of Marino S., 100 NY2d 361: retroactivity may be inferred from the nature of legislation and overall legislative goal.
• Matter of Regina Metro. Co., 35 NY3d 332: retroactivity is a matter of legislative judgment, focusing on purpose and context.

Applying these principles—and expressly relying on its companion case, Article 13 LLC v Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank—the Court concluded that FAPA’s text and legislative history “plainly manifest” a legislative intent to apply §§ 4, 7, and 8 retroactively.

B. Legislative Intent for Retroactive Application

The Court references the Legislature’s express findings in the FAPA bill jacket:

• Legislative memoranda describe “abusive” litigation practices by mortgage lenders and noteholders.
• Those abuses centered on the strategic use of acceleration and de-acceleration to avoid the six-year limitations bar.

The Legislature decided that these practices undermined the policy interests in:

• Finality;
• Predictability;
• Fairness; and
• Repose.

Given those findings, the Court concluded that the Legislature intentionally drafted FAPA to reach pending cases where final foreclosure judgments had not yet been enforced. The Court specifically notes that its reasons in Article 13 LLC for concluding FAPA § 7 is retroactive apply equally to §§ 4 and 8.

V. Constitutional Analysis

A. Substantive Due Process

1. Framework

Under federal substantive due process principles:

• Retroactive civil legislation may implicate due process when it “takes away or impairs vested rights . . . in respect to transactions or considerations already past” (Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 269).
• Even then, retroactivity is permissible if it is supported by “a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means” (General Motors Corp. v Romein, 503 US 181, 191; American Economy Ins. Co. v State of New York, 30 NY3d 136, 157–158).
• There is a “strong presumption of constitutionality” for legislative acts; the challenger bears the burden of proving invalidity.

2. Alleged “Vested Rights”

U.S. Bank claimed two types of vested rights:

1. A property interest in the mortgage—allegedly destroyed only because FAPA retroactively gave legal significance to what the bank describes as a nullified acceleration.
2. An interest in prosecuting the 2022 foreclosure action—allegedly timely under pre-FAPA law, such that FAPA’s new rules stripped a vested right to proceed.

The Court, tracking and incorporating its analysis in Article 13 LLC, rejected both arguments.

a. Property Interest in the Mortgage

• The Court emphasizes that it is the six-year statute of limitations, not FAPA, that extinguished the enforceability of the mortgage.
• Mellon and U.S. Bank let the original foreclosure action pend for over a decade—well beyond six years from the 2009 acceleration.
• FAPA § 7 simply estops the bank from relitigating the validity of a prior acceleration to escape the effect of an already-expired limitation period.
• The Court underscores that no well-settled rule existed, pre-FAPA, that a voluntary discontinuance after the limitations period expired could “nullify” prior acceleration and restart the clock.

The Court also addresses the bank’s argument that the prior acceleration was a “legal nullity” due to alleged lack of standing. It notes:

• No binding authority established that a post-limitations discontinuance retroactively erased the legal effects of the acceleration.
• The lender’s reliance on Loeb v Willis, 100 NY 231 (1885), is misplaced: Loeb only held that a discontinued action has no res judicata or estoppel effect; it did not say that all conduct in that action is nullified for limitations purposes.

b. Vested Right to Prosecute the 2022 Foreclosure Action

• Even if one assumes (without deciding) that a party could have a vested right in a cause of action that was timely when commenced, the bank still fails.
• U.S. Bank could not show, under pre-FAPA law, that the 2022 foreclosure was indisputably timely, given that:
  • The loan had been accelerated in 2009; and
  • Engel’s de-acceleration rule depended on affirmative steps taken within six years of acceleration—a requirement not satisfied here.
• Thus, the bank did not carry its burden of proving that FAPA took away a clearly vested, timely cause of action.

3. Rational Basis for Retroactivity

Assuming arguendo that FAPA affects significant interests, the Court next assesses whether retroactive application has a rational basis.

The Court underscores that:

• FAPA addresses identified “abuses” by lenders—repeated acceleration, de-acceleration, and tolling maneuvers that undermined the six-year statute of limitations.
• The Legislature’s stated purpose was to stop those abuses and restore the policy of finality and repose in mortgage litigation.
• Retroactive application is rational because it:
  • Protects as many borrowers as possible from the identified abuses; and
  • Clarifies the legal landscape concerning the statute of limitations and foreclosure practice, aligning it with the Legislature’s policy choices.

The Court quotes Landgraf: “the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope.” The question is not whether application is harsh in a particular case but whether the legislative judgment is rational. The Court answers that question in the affirmative.

Accordingly, substantive due process is not violated.

B. Procedural Due Process and “Grace Period” Arguments

The bank argued that FAPA effectively shortened the limitations period (or its operation) for enforcing residential mortgage loans and that due process therefore required a “reasonable time” or grace period for filing actions that would become untimely under the new rules.

The Court relies on:

• Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290, which requires a grace period where the Legislature shortens a limitations period.

The Court rejects the analogy:

• FAPA did not change the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213(4).
• It instead altered:
  • How and when a cause of action accrues (by regulating acceleration); and
  • The ability of parties to manipulate accrual and tolling by private acts.
• Because the limitations period itself was not shortened, procedural due process does not require a grace period.

C. Contract Clause

1. Framework

Under the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause (Art I, § 10, cl 1):

1. Courts first consider whether a state law substantially impairs a contractual relationship (existence of contract, change in law, and substantiality of impairment).
2. If so, the law still passes muster if:
   • It serves a “significant and legitimate public purpose”; and
   • The adjustment of rights is “based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose” (Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 US 400, 411–412).
3. When the State is not itself a contracting party, courts defer to legislative judgment on necessity and reasonableness.

2. Application to FAPA

The Court assumes, without deciding, that FAPA might substantially impair the bank’s contractual rights under the mortgage (for example, by eliminating the ability to rely on de-acceleration strategies to preserve enforcement rights).

It then holds the law valid under the second step:

• Significant and legitimate public purpose:
  • Ending litigation practices deemed “abusive” and inconsistent with fairness and repose;
  • Ensuring the statute of limitations is meaningful in the foreclosure context; and
  • Stabilizing expectations in a heavily regulated sector (mortgage foreclosure).
• Reasonableness and appropriateness:
  • FAPA is tightly focused: it does not abolish foreclosure; it limits only:
    • Successive collateral attacks on prior accelerations (via § 7); and
    • Lenders’ unilateral ability to reset limitations by discontinuing actions or otherwise.
  • These provisions are tailored to the discrete practices identified by the Legislature as problematic.
  • Mortgage foreclosure is a “highly regulated” field where reallocation of risk and procedure has long been subject to legislative change.

Deferring to legislative judgment, the Court concludes that FAPA is a reasonable and proportionate response to identified public concerns, and thus does not violate the Contract Clause.

VI. Application of FAPA § 7 in Van Dyke’s Case

A. The Core Dispute: Was There an “Expressed Judicial Determination”?

FAPA § 7 allows a lender (or its successor) to escape estoppel only if:

• “The prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.”

U.S. Bank argued that:

• The 2019 order denying summary judgment on standing (and its affirmance by the Appellate Division), and
• The 2022 so-ordered stipulation noting that Mellon “failed to demonstrate that it had standing,”

collectively amounted to an “expressed judicial determination” that the 2009 acceleration was invalid.

B. The Court’s Rejection of That Argument

The Court decisively rejects this reading of § 7.

1. Denial of Summary Judgment Is Not a Merits Determination

• Citing Siegel & Connors and Weinstein, Korn & Miller, the Court reiterates a basic civil procedure principle:

  “The denial of [a summary judgment] motion establishes nothing except that summary judgment is not warranted at th[e] time.”

• Such a denial is not an adjudication on the merits; it does not “determine” standing or the validity of acceleration.
• Therefore, the 2019 order and its affirmance do not qualify as an “expressed judicial determination” under FAPA § 7.

2. The So-Ordered Stipulation Is Not a Judicial Determination

• The stipulation recited that Mellon had “failed to demonstrate that it had standing” for purposes of its summary judgment motion.
• But:
  • This was a statement by the parties, not an independent judicial finding.
  • It did not dismiss the case on the basis that acceleration was invalid; it simply discontinued the action without prejudice.
• Thus, the stipulation does not meet the statutory requirement of a dismissal “based on an expressed judicial determination . . . that the instrument was not validly accelerated.”

Consequently, none of the prior proceedings in the Mellon action trigger the narrow exception in FAPA § 7. U.S. Bank, as Mellon’s successor, is estopped from arguing that the 2009 acceleration was invalid for standing (or any other) reasons in this quiet title action.

C. Outcome Under FAPA § 7

Once:

• The 2009 acceleration is treated as valid and binding, and
• No valid de-acceleration or resetting event is recognized (in light of FAPA §§ 4 and 8),

the consequences are straightforward:

• The six-year limitations period on enforcing the entire debt began in 2009.
• More than six years had elapsed by April 2022, when Van Dyke filed her RPAPL 1501(4) action.
• The mortgage is therefore time-barred and subject to cancellation and discharge.

VII. Key Precedents Discussed

A. Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel, 37 NY3d 1 (2021)

Engel was the immediate doctrinal backdrop for FAPA:

• Held that, absent an express contrary statement, a voluntary discontinuance of a foreclosure action automatically de-accelerates the loan, as a matter of law.
• Permitted lenders to use de-acceleration within six years of an earlier acceleration to reset or avoid limitations problems.

FAPA §§ 4 and 8 were enacted explicitly to overrule core elements of Engel by prohibiting unilateral resetting of accrual and by denying limitations consequences to voluntary discontinuances.

B. Article 13 LLC v Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank (NY Court of Appeals, 2025)

Decided the same day as Van Dyke, Article 13 LLC is repeatedly referenced as providing the Court’s fuller rationale for:

• FAPA § 7’s retroactive effect;
• Why retroactive application does not unlawfully impair vested rights; and
• The existence of a rational basis and compatibility with due process and the Contract Clause.

Van Dyke essentially incorporates Article 13 LLC’s constitutional analysis by reference and applies it to a quiet title context.

C. Loeb v Willis, 100 NY 231 (1885), and Brown v Cleveland Trust Co., 233 NY 399 (1922)

U.S. Bank invoked Loeb to support the notion that a discontinued action is a legal “nullity” for all purposes, including acceleration. The Court clarifies:

• Loeb stands only for the proposition that a discontinued action has no preclusive (res judicata or collateral estoppel) effect.
• Brown similarly notes that after discontinuance there is no adjudication binding anyone.
• Neither case holds that a discontinuance retroactively erases the parties’ conduct or stops the running of the statute of limitations.

D. Retroactivity, Due Process, and Contract Clause Authorities

• Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244: federal guide on retroactivity and due process; recognizes modest constitutional constraints on civil retroactive legislation.
• Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v DHCR, 35 NY3d 332: applied retroactivity principles in a housing context, stressing finality and legislative purpose.
• American Economy Ins. Co. v State of New York, 30 NY3d 136: addressed Contract Clause and due process in the context of workers’ compensation assessments; provides standards for substantial impairment and rational basis.
• Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 US 400; United States Trust Co. v New Jersey, 431 US 1; General Motors v Romein, 503 US 181: key U.S. Supreme Court precedents on Contract Clause and legislative modification of economic relationships.
• Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290: governs when due process requires a grace period after shortening a limitations period; distinguished here because FAPA does not shorten the six-year period.

VIII. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

A. Acceleration and De-Acceleration

Acceleration means that after default, the lender declares the entire remaining debt immediately due, rather than just missed installments. This triggers a single six-year statute of limitations on the whole balance.

De-acceleration is a lender’s attempt to revoke that earlier election and return to installment payments, which—before FAPA—could reset or affect the limitations period.

Engel allowed de-acceleration by voluntary discontinuance, thereby permitting lenders to escape a looming limitations bar. FAPA eliminates that unilateral ability.

B. Statute of Limitations in Mortgage Foreclosures

A statute of limitations is a deadline for bringing a lawsuit. Under CPLR 213(4):

• Six years from the accrual of the cause of action to foreclose a mortgage or sue on a note.
• Before acceleration, each missed payment is separately time-barred after six years.
• After acceleration, there is one six-year period for the entire unpaid balance.

Once that period expires, the lender can no longer use the courts to enforce the mortgage or collect the accelerated debt.

C. Quiet Title under RPAPL 1501(4)

RPAPL 1501(4) allows a property owner to bring an action to:

• “Cancel and discharge of record” a mortgage that is no longer enforceable, including because the statute of limitations has expired.

Van Dyke used this procedure to clear title to her property once the foreclosure claim became time-barred.

D. Substantive vs Procedural Due Process

• Substantive due process asks: Does the law unfairly take away vested rights or operate retroactively without a rational justification?
• Procedural due process asks: Did the law provide adequate procedural safeguards—like notice, an opportunity to be heard, or a reasonable grace period when deadlines are altered?

Here, the Court found:

• No wrongful deprivation of vested rights; and
• No need for a grace period, since the six-year limitations period itself was unchanged.

E. Contract Clause

The Contract Clause prevents states from passing laws that unreasonably impair contracts. But not every impairment is forbidden. Courts consider:

1. Is there a substantial impairment of contractual rights?
2. If so, is the law serving an important public purpose and using reasonable means to do so?

Because FAPA targets abusive litigation tactics and reasonably rebalances risks in a regulated field, it survives Contract Clause scrutiny.

F. Estoppel in FAPA § 7

Estoppel here means that a party is legally prevented from taking a position contrary to a prior position or event. Under FAPA § 7:

• If a lender has once accelerated a loan (particularly via a foreclosure action), it generally cannot later deny that acceleration to avoid a limitations defense in a subsequent quiet title or foreclosure action.
• Only a prior, express judicial ruling that no valid acceleration occurred—resulting in dismissal—removes this estoppel.

IX. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Lenders and Servicers

• Acceleration is now more “sticky”: Once a lender accelerates, it cannot rely on unilateral steps—such as discontinuance or internal decisions—to undo the limitations consequences.
• Standing and acceleration arguments are constrained: After FAPA, a lender cannot, in a later action, re-open the question of whether an earlier acceleration was valid unless there was an express prior ruling on that issue.
• Litigation strategy must adapt: Prolonged foreclosure actions and strategic discontinuances now carry significant risks of permanent time-bar.
• File management and diarying of deadlines are critical: Servicers and trustees must closely track acceleration dates; letting six years pass without obtaining and enforcing a foreclosure judgment can forfeit the security.

B. For Borrowers and Homeowners

• Strengthened limitations defenses: Homeowners can invoke FAPA retroactively to defeat foreclosure actions and to clear title once six years have run from an earlier acceleration.
• Quiet title as a powerful remedy: Where the limitations period has expired, RPAPL 1501(4) actions—like Van Dyke’s—can be used to cancel the mortgage, particularly where there was a prior foreclosure acceleration.
• Greater certainty: Borrowers no longer face indefinite exposure due to repeated accelerations and de-accelerations stretching beyond six years.

C. For Courts and Counsel

• Need to identify acceleration events: Judges and lawyers must carefully determine when a loan was first validly accelerated and whether that event has been subject to an express judicial ruling.
• Interplay with standing law: Alleged standing defects in a prior foreclosure may no longer be litigable in subsequent actions unless there was a clear adjudication on that point affecting acceleration.
• Emphasis on finality and repose: FAPA, as interpreted in Van Dyke and Article 13 LLC, solidifies the policy that foreclosure claims, like other claims, are subject to real time limits that cannot be privately waived indefinitely.

X. Conclusion

Van Dyke v. U.S. Bank is a pivotal decision in New York mortgage law. The Court of Appeals confirms that:

• FAPA §§ 4, 7, and 8 apply retroactively to pending matters where no final foreclosure judgment has been enforced;
• FAPA’s retroactive application does not violate substantive or procedural due process or the Contract Clause;
• Denials of summary judgment and party stipulations in a prior foreclosure, absent an express judicial ruling on acceleration, do not exempt lenders from FAPA § 7’s estoppel; and
• When a loan was accelerated more than six years before a quiet title action is filed, and no statutory exception applies, the mortgage is time-barred and subject to cancellation.

Together with Article 13 LLC, this opinion cements FAPA’s function as a legislative override of Engel and a recalibration of the balance between lenders and borrowers in foreclosure litigation. It signals a clear message: once a lender accelerates a residential mortgage loan, it must act diligently within the six-year statutory window, or risk permanently losing its ability to enforce the debt and its security interest.