Retaliation Liability for Reasonable Accommodation Requests under M.G.L. c. 151B

Introduction

Moore v. Industrial Demolition LLC (1st Cir. May 13, 2025) clarifies an important aspect of Massachusetts anti-discrimination law: an employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation is “protected conduct” and any retaliatory termination in response to that request can give rise to liability under M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4). Eric Moore, injured on the Brayton Point demolition site, returned to work under medically prescribed restrictions and asked his employer, Industrial Demolition, to honor those limitations. When his supervisor refused and ordered him to “hit the gate and don’t come back,” Moore sued under M.G.L. c. 151B for both failure to accommodate and retaliation. A jury awarded Moore $10,035 in damages. Both sides appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, and various post-trial rulings. The First Circuit denied all relief, upholding the jury’s verdict and clarifying that:

Requests for reasonable accommodation are protected activity for retaliation claims.
An adverse employment action includes a supervisor’s directive to “hit the gate.”
A retaliation verdict stands independently of a determination that the plaintiff qualified as “handicapped.”

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in full:

Industrial’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)) was properly denied. Even if Moore’s hip injury were too short-lived to qualify as a “handicap” under M.G.L. c. 151B, his retaliation claim based on his accommodation requests alone supported the jury’s award.
The court correctly refused a new trial on retaliation, finding no abuse of discretion in the jury instructions or communications during deliberations.
No remittitur was needed; Industrial failed to prove that Moore did not reasonably mitigate by seeking other work, and there was no evidence that back pay should end when the Brayton Point project concluded.
Moore’s request to deduct his NLRB settlement from damages did not invoke the collateral-source rule, and the district court properly allowed the jury to account for the settlement in its award.
A new trial on punitive damages was not warranted because no evidence showed senior management knew of the supervisor’s discriminatory conduct before Moore’s termination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001): Outlined the standard for what constitutes a request for accommodation—notice with sufficient specificity linking the restriction to the impairment.
Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2003): Held that requesting an accommodation is protected activity in retaliation claims even if the plaintiff cannot prove entitlement to the accommodation.
Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 731 N.E.2d 1075 (Mass. 2000): Confirmed that retaliation claims under M.G.L. c. 151B are independent of discrimination claims and require only that the plaintiff reasonably believe discrimination occurred.
Edwards v. Commonwealth, 174 N.E.3d 1153 (Mass. 2021): Explained that an involuntary termination can be inferred from a supervisor’s directive, without the literal words “you’re fired.”
Mass. General Laws c. 151B, §§ 4(4), 4(16), 9: Statutory provisions prohibiting retaliation and requiring reasonable accommodation.

Legal Reasoning

1. Protected Conduct: The court held that asking for accommodation and opposing its denial satisfy the “protected conduct” element of a retaliation claim. Even if Moore’s hip injury did not qualify as a handicap, his explicit requests and his reminder of the doctor’s restrictions furnished sufficient notice and showed a good-faith belief in entitlement.

2. Adverse Action: Telling an employee to “hit the gate and don’t come back” was held to be tantamount to firing. Under Massachusetts law, a jury may infer termination from the totality of circumstances, including the supervisor’s known usage of the phrase to end employment.

3. Causal Connection: Direct evidence of retaliatory intent was present in the supervisor’s repeated statements that he did not “give an F” about the doctor’s note or what “the office” said. The jury could reasonably find that this animus motivated the termination.

4. Retaliation Claim’s Independence: The First Circuit stressed that retaliation claims do not require proof of an underlying discrimination violation. Thus, even if Moore were not handicapped under § 4(16), his retaliation verdict under § 4(4) remained valid.

Impact on Future Cases

This decision strengthens employee protections by underscoring that mere requests for accommodation are a shield against retaliation.
Supervisors and employers must beware that casual or profane refusals to honor doctor-approved restrictions, followed by a directive to “hit the gate,” can give rise to liability.
It clarifies that retaliation awards under M.G.L. c. 151B stand even if the underlying disability claim proves tenuous.
Employers should train managers to respond constructively to accommodation requests and avoid retaliatory remarks or actions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable Accommodation: Adjusting job tasks or work environment so an injured or disabled employee can continue working.
Protected Conduct: Under Massachusetts law, simply asking for or using an accommodation is enough to protect an employee from retaliation.
Adverse Action: Any significant negative change in employment terms, including being told “hit the gate,” i.e., “don’t come back.”
Collateral Source Rule: Prevents a defendant from reducing damages by amounts the plaintiff receives from third parties (e.g., insurance). Here it did not apply because the settlement came directly from the employer.
Remittitur: A judge-ordered reduction of a jury’s damages award when the award exceeds what the evidence supports. None was needed here.

Conclusion

Moore v. Industrial Demolition LLC establishes a clear precedent under Massachusetts law: employees who request reasonable accommodations enjoy robust protection against retaliation, regardless of whether they ultimately prove they are “handicapped.” A supervisor’s refusal to honor a doctor’s restrictions, coupled with a directive to “hit the gate,” qualifies as an adverse employment action motivated by retaliatory animus. The First Circuit’s decision reinforces the importance of respectful, law-compliant employer responses to accommodation requests, and it underscores that retaliation triumphed here even as the question of Moore’s qualification as handicapped was left unresolved.