Resignation Elsewhere, Disbarment Here: Reciprocal Discipline and Presumptive Disbarment for Intentional Misappropriation in The Florida Bar v. Robert Michael Fojo

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Florida’s per curiam decision in The Florida Bar v. Robert Michael Fojo, No. SC2024‑0622 (Nov. 26, 2025), is a forceful reaffirmation of two intertwined principles of Florida lawyer discipline:

Intentional misappropriation of client funds, coupled with deceit, presumptively requires disbarment; and
Resignation or equivalent discipline in another jurisdiction for such misconduct warrants reciprocal disbarment in Florida under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3‑4.6.

The case arises from misconduct originally prosecuted in New Hampshire, where Robert Michael Fojo—licensed in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Florida—was suspended and ultimately permitted to resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline for trust‑account violations and related ethical breaches. Massachusetts then imposed reciprocal discipline, striking him from its roll of attorneys.

The Florida Bar brought a Formal Complaint for Reciprocal Discipline under rule 3‑4.6, asserting that the New Hampshire final judgment constituted “conclusive proof” of misconduct for purposes of Florida discipline. A referee agreed on guilt but recommended only a three‑year suspension. The Bar sought review, arguing that disbarment was required. The Florida Supreme Court agreed, disapproving the recommendation and imposing disbarment.

This commentary examines the opinion’s factual background, the legal framework for reciprocal discipline, the Court’s application of the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the role of precedent, and the broader implications for multi‑jurisdictional practice and trust‑account enforcement.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s holding can be summarized in four core points:

Conclusive proof of misconduct. Under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3‑4.6(a), the New Hampshire disciplinary adjudication and order accepting Fojo’s resignation in lieu of discipline constitute conclusive proof of misconduct in Florida. The referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt were approved, and Fojo was found guilty of the misconduct described in his affidavit of resignation and the New Hampshire order.
Scope of review on sanction. The only issue properly before the Court was the appropriate sanction. The Court reiterated that its review of sanctions is broader than its review of factual findings and guilt; it has the ultimate responsibility to determine discipline.
Application of the Florida Standards and case law leads to disbarment. After analyzing Standards 4.1, 4.6, 5.1, and 7.1 of the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, as well as a line of prior cases involving misappropriation and reciprocal discipline, the Court held that disbarment is the appropriate sanction, not a three‑year suspension.
Aggravation, minimal mitigation, and reciprocal resignation justify disbarment. Significant aggravating factors—dishonest and selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, and substantial experience—combined with the fact of resignation in another state and the presumptive rule of disbarment for intentional misappropriation, rendered a suspension unjustifiable.

The Court therefore disbarred Fojo effective 30 days from the opinion’s filing (subject to immediate effectiveness upon his notice that he has no active practice), ordered compliance with the post‑discipline rules, and taxed costs of $1,898.24 against him.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Misconduct in New Hampshire

The misconduct traces back to a personal injury client represented by Fojo in New Hampshire:

In February 2021, the client sought an update on her settlement check. Fojo responded that he was out of the office and provided no substantive information.
When the client followed up, unaware that the defendant’s insurer had already mailed the settlement check to Fojo, he falsely told her:
“For whatever reason, the carrier didn't issue the check or it wasn't sent out. They are going to re‑issue the check.”
The client later contacted the insurer and discovered the check had been issued and cleared months earlier.
She filed a grievance with the New Hampshire Attorney Discipline Office (ADO).

During the ADO’s investigation:

Fojo provided only partial records and responses.
He made a $12,000 partial payment to the complaining client, but subpoenaed IOLTA (trust account) records showed he did not maintain sufficient client funds in trust to cover that payment.
His new IOLTA account contained only $100 of his own money, and no other payments were made to the client; the ADO alleged he was “out of trust” by nearly $15,000, having used one client’s funds to pay another client.
The ADO also found that he overpaid himself under various fee agreements and used client funds to make payments to other clients, cumulatively putting him out of trust by “tens of thousands of dollars.”

On December 17, 2021, the ADO filed a petition for immediate interim suspension. On December 21, 2021, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire suspended Fojo for violations of:

New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 50 (Trust Accounts); and
New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct:
- Rule 1.3 – Diligence;
- Rule 1.4 – Client Communications;
- Rule 1.5 – Fees;
- Rule 1.15 – Safekeeping Property;
- Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward the Tribunal;
- Rule 8.4(a) – Violation or attempted violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; and
- Rule 8.4(c) – Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

After three separate requests for resignation in lieu of discipline, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire accepted his third request on April 26, 2022, allowing him to resign his license to practice law—expressly described by the Florida Court as “a sanction tantamount to disbarment.” Massachusetts then initiated reciprocal proceedings and, on October 18, 2022, struck him from the roll of attorneys.

B. Florida Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings

On April 26, 2024, The Florida Bar filed a Formal Complaint for Reciprocal Discipline, citing Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3‑4.6 and asserting that:

“the New Hampshire final judgment constitutes conclusive proof of misconduct for purposes of a Florida Bar disciplinary proceeding.”

A referee was appointed and conducted a sanctions hearing. The referee:

Found no due process defects, no paucity of proof, and no grave injustice in the New Hampshire proceeding that would justify Florida’s refusal to honor the foreign judgment.
Noted that even if there had been defects, Fojo waived any challenge by voluntarily seeking resignation and signing an affidavit stipulating to the charged misconduct.
Recommended that Fojo be found guilty of the misconduct described in his affidavit and the New Hampshire order.
Recommended, however, that the appropriate sanction in Florida was a three‑year suspension, not disbarment.

The Bar sought review, arguing that the referee misapplied the law on sanctions and that disbarment was required. Fojo opposed, urging approval of the referee’s report. He did not cross‑petition for review of the findings of fact, guilt, or aggravation/mitigation.

IV. The Legal Framework and the Court’s Analysis

A. Rule 3‑4.6: Foreign Discipline as Conclusive Proof of Misconduct

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3‑4.6(a) provides:

“A final adjudication in a disciplinary proceeding by a court or other authorized disciplinary agency of another jurisdiction, state or federal, that a lawyer licensed to practice in that jurisdiction is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary action will be considered as conclusive proof of the misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding under this rule.”

Three key points flow from this rule, as applied in Fojo:

Conclusive proof. The foreign adjudication (here, New Hampshire’s suspension and acceptance of resignation in lieu of discipline, based on specified rule violations) conclusively establishes the factual misconduct for Florida purposes. Florida does not re‑try the underlying conduct unless extraordinary exceptions apply.
Limited exceptions. The referee specifically found no due process failures, no paucity of proof, and no grave injustice. Moreover, the Court notes that even if such issues existed, Fojo waived them by his voluntary resignation and affidavit stipulating to misconduct. Thus, the New Hampshire judgment controlled the issue of guilt.
Scope of Florida’s authority. While the foreign adjudication is conclusive proof of misconduct, Florida retains independent authority to determine the sanction. Under The Florida Bar v. Hagendorf, 921 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2006), the Court can impose a more severe sanction than that imposed in the other jurisdiction.

Because Fojo did not challenge the guilt findings, the Florida Supreme Court accepted the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt and moved directly to analyze the appropriate sanction.

B. Standard of Review on Sanctions

The Court reiterates two interrelated principles about its review of sanctions:

Under The Florida Bar v. Grieco, 389 So. 3d 1257, 1264 (Fla. 2024), the question is whether the referee’s recommended sanction has “a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,” considering aggravating and mitigating factors.
Under The Florida Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (Fla. 2018), the Court’s review of sanctions is broader than its review of factual findings and guilt:
“it is ultimately this Court's responsibility to determine the appropriate discipline.”

Thus, even where a referee carefully analyzes the facts and cites relevant authority, the Supreme Court ultimately decides de novo whether the recommended sanction aligns with the Standards and case law.

C. Application of the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

The referee identified four applicable Standards:

Standard 4.1 – Failure to Preserve the Client's Property;
Standard 4.6 – Lack of Candor;
Standard 5.1 – Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity; and
Standard 7.1 – Deceptive Conduct or Statements and Unreasonable or Improper Fees.

However, the amended report did not clearly place Fojo’s conduct under the disbarment versus suspension subdivisions of each standard. The Florida Supreme Court undertook that analysis itself and concluded that, on the facts established by the New Hampshire proceeding, each of the applicable Standards points to disbarment.

1. Standard 4.1 – Failure to Preserve the Client's Property

Standard 4.1 provides:

Disbarment – 4.1(a):
“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential injury.”
Suspension – 4.1(b):
“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that the lawyer is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”

The distinction hinges on intentional conversion versus less clearly intentional improper handling of client property. The Court squarely places Fojo’s conduct under 4.1(a), finding intentional misappropriation, not mere mismanagement:

He claimed ignorance of the client’s settlement check and attempted to blame an assistant, asserting bookkeeping error.
The New Hampshire referee, however, found that if this were true, the trust account would still have held the $40,000 for the client—which it did not.
Instead, “beginning on the day of the deposit, Fojo proceeded to pay himself $12,000 for his work on the matter, disbursing nothing to [the client] until the ADO expressly encouraged him to do so.”
He then used funds belonging to other clients to make a partial $12,000 payment to the aggrieved client, putting those other clients “out of trust.”

From these facts, the Court concludes that Fojo:

intentionally misrepresented the status of the settlement check, and
intentionally misappropriated client funds.

Accordingly, Standard 4.1(a) supports disbarment.

2. Standard 4.6 – Lack of Candor

Standard 4.6 provides:

Disbarment – 4.6(a):
“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly or intentionally deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another regardless of injury or potential injury to the client.”
Suspension – 4.6(b):
“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client and causes injury or potential injury to the client.”

The Florida Supreme Court emphasizes the purpose and beneficiary of the deception: Fojo lied to his client for months about the settlement check to conceal his misappropriation, allowing him to keep and use the funds for himself. The deception plainly “benefited” him.

Thus, the conduct satisfies 4.6(a): knowing or intentional deception of a client with intent to benefit the lawyer. Standard 4.6 therefore also points to disbarment.

3. Standard 5.1 – Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity

Standard 5.1(a) addresses disbarment where a lawyer’s intentional dishonesty “seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice”:

“Disbarment is proper when a lawyer engages in intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.”

In grounding its application of Standard 5.1, the Court cites The Florida Bar v. Johnson, 132 So. 3d 32, 38 (Fla. 2013):

“The Court has repeatedly stated that misuse or misappropriation of funds held in trust is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit and that disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction.”

Given the intentional misappropriation of trust funds and sustained misrepresentations to the client, the Court holds that Fojo’s conduct “seriously adversely reflects” on his fitness to practice and that Standard 5.1 clearly supports disbarment.

4. Standard 7.1 – Deceptive Conduct or Statements and Unreasonable or Improper Fees

Standard 7.1 provides:

Disbarment – 7.1(a):
“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”
Suspension – 7.1(b):
“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”

Here, the Court explicitly finds that:

Fojo’s conduct violated duties owed as a professional (safeguarding client property, honesty, proper billing, and candor);
he acted with the intent to obtain a benefit for himself (using client funds for his own purposes, paying himself more than allowed, shuffling funds between clients); and
his conduct caused or risked serious injury to the client and to public confidence in the legal system.

Even assuming the client eventually received full payment, the delay and uncertainty “had potential to cause her (and may in fact have caused her) serious injury,” and the misappropriation itself harmed “the reputation of the legal system.” On those facts, 7.1(a) is triggered, and Standard 7.1, too, supports disbarment.

Taken together, the Standards—properly applied—offer a unified conclusion: every applicable standard points toward disbarment rather than suspension.

D. The Role of Precedent

The referee discussed several Florida cases; the Supreme Court agreed that these cases are “analogous and informative,” but emphasized that all of them resulted in disbarment, undermining the referee’s suspension recommendation. The key precedents include:

The Florida Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2018)
– Establishes that disbarment is the presumptively appropriate sanction for intentional misappropriation of trust funds under the Standards and existing case law.
The Florida Bar v. Rousso, 117 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2013)
– Attorney’s abandonment of the duty to safeguard client funds, prolonged failure to address trust account shortfalls, and additional misconduct and dishonesty warranted disbarment.
The Florida Bar v. Spear, 887 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2004)
– Mitigating circumstances deemed insufficient to overcome the presumptive sanction of disbarment where the attorney converted client funds for unauthorized use.
The Florida Bar v. Massari, 832 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2002)
– Disbarment, rather than a two‑year suspension, was held to be appropriate for fraudulently obtaining, misappropriating, and then attempting to conceal client settlement funds.
The Florida Bar v. Eberhart, 631 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1994)
– Holds that resignation from the bar in another state warrants disbarment as reciprocal discipline in Florida.
The Florida Bar v. Tillman, 682 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1996)
– Misappropriation of client funds and misrepresentations to the Bar warranted disbarment, notwithstanding mitigating factors such as lack of prior discipline and short time in practice.

The Court notes that in Eberhart it had already held that “resignation in another state warrants disbarment,” yet “the referee made no attempt to distinguish that case.”

The combined effect of these precedents is clear:

Deliberate misappropriation of client funds, especially when coupled with deceit, triggers a presumptive rule of disbarment.
Resignation or equivalent removal from practice in another jurisdiction for such misconduct leads to reciprocal disbarment in Florida, absent compelling and extraordinary mitigation.

The Court thus finds that “existing caselaw indicates that disbarment, not suspension, is the appropriate discipline” for Fojo.

E. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Findings of aggravation and mitigation carry a presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. See The Florida Bar v. Scheinberg, 129 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. 2013); The Florida Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 621 (Fla. 2007). The party challenging such findings must demonstrate lack of evidence or contradiction in the record. See The Florida Bar v. Horton, 332 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 2019).

Here:

The referee found five aggravating factors under Standard 3.2(b):
- (2) dishonest or selfish motive;
- (3) pattern of misconduct;
- (4) multiple offenses;
- (7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct; and
- (9) substantial experience in the practice of law.
The referee found one mitigating factor under Standard 3.3(b):
- (1) absence of a prior disciplinary record.

The Bar did not contest these findings; instead, it argued that the significant aggravation and minimal mitigation provided no basis to depart from the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Fojo, for his part, did not file a notice of review or cross‑review challenging the referee’s aggravation or mitigation findings, thereby waiving any such challenge.

The Court explicitly agrees with the Bar:

The aggravating factors are “significant,” particularly given the intentional dishonesty, the pattern of misconduct across multiple clients, and the respondent’s refusal to fully acknowledge wrongdoing.
A single mitigating factor—no prior discipline—is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of disbarment.

The Court ties this directly to its earlier pronouncement in Johnson and similar cases: where intentional misappropriation and deceit are present, only extraordinary mitigation can justify a lesser sanction. That threshold is not met here.

F. The Court’s Sanction Determination

After evaluating:

the conclusive proof of guilt from the New Hampshire proceeding;
the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (all pointing toward disbarment);
the consistent line of Florida cases imposing disbarment in analogous circumstances; and
the strong aggravating and minimal mitigating factors;

the Court concludes:

“Ultimately, every factor we consider when we make an assessment on the appropriate discipline indicates that disbarment is the correct sanction for this case.”

It therefore:

Approves the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt;
Disapproves the referee’s recommended three‑year suspension;
Disbars Fojo from the practice of law in Florida;
Makes the disbarment effective 30 days from the filing of the opinion to permit orderly wind‑down, unless Fojo certifies that he has no active practice, in which case it may become immediately effective;
Orders compliance with Rule 3‑5.1(h) (notice and other obligations of disciplined lawyers) and, if applicable, Rule 3‑6.1 (regulating employment of disbarred or suspended lawyers); and
Directs him to accept no new business from the date of the opinion and taxes costs of $1,898.24 in favor of The Florida Bar.

V. Complex Concepts and Terminology Explained

A. Reciprocal Discipline and “Conclusive Proof of Misconduct”

Reciprocal discipline occurs when a lawyer disciplined in one jurisdiction faces corresponding discipline in another jurisdiction where the lawyer is also admitted. Florida’s Rule 3‑4.6 embodies this concept.

When the rule says that a foreign adjudication is “conclusive proof of the misconduct,” it means:

Florida will not re‑litigate the underlying facts or whether the conduct violated ethical rules, except in very narrow circumstances (e.g., serious due process violations or lack of evidentiary support).
The findings of guilt and stipulated misconduct from the foreign jurisdiction are accepted wholesale as the factual foundation for Florida’s discipline.

However, the Florida Supreme Court still independently decides the type and degree of sanction (e.g., reprimand, suspension, or disbarment) under Florida’s own standards and case law.

B. IOLTA, Trust Accounts, and Being “Out of Trust”

An IOLTA account (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account) is a special bank account where lawyers hold client funds (e.g., settlement proceeds, retainers) separate from their own money. Interest on the account is typically directed to legal aid or public interest programs, but the principal must remain intact for clients.

A lawyer is said to be “out of trust” when:

The total client funds that should be in the trust account exceed the actual balance; in other words, client funds have been used improperly (whether by neglect, mismanagement, or intentional misappropriation).
If, for example, records show that $40,000 should be held for a client, but the account only contains $10,000, the lawyer is $30,000 “out of trust.”

Being out of trust, especially by “tens of thousands of dollars,” is considered grave misconduct. Even unintentional mismanagement may warrant serious discipline; deliberate use of trust funds for personal or other clients’ benefit is treated as intentional misappropriation and usually leads to disbarment.

C. Resignation in Lieu of Discipline

In many jurisdictions, a lawyer facing serious disciplinary charges may choose to resign in lieu of discipline or to surrender their license. While labeled “resignation,” courts often treat it as functionally equivalent to disbarment because:

The resignation is accepted against the backdrop of serious charges and often includes an admission or stipulation to the misconduct;
The lawyer typically cannot simply reapply as if they had voluntarily left practice; readmission is often equivalent to seeking reinstatement from disbarment.

Florida, in Eberhart and reaffirmed here in Fojo, treats resignation from another state under these circumstances as warranting reciprocal disbarment in Florida.

D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions include lists of aggravating and mitigating factors that can influence the severity of discipline:

Aggravating factors make discipline more severe (e.g., dishonest motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, substantial experience).
Mitigating factors may justify leniency (e.g., no prior disciplinary history, personal or emotional problems, timely restitution, full and free disclosure to disciplinary authority).

In Fojo, the significant aggravation (intentional dishonesty, pattern, multiple clients, lack of remorse, and experience) far outweighed the single mitigating factor (no prior discipline), leaving no room for a suspension in the face of intentional misappropriation.

E. Effective Date of Disbarment and Post‑Discipline Obligations

The Court’s order specifies:

Delayed effectiveness (30 days). This is designed to allow an orderly closure of the practice and protection of existing clients. The lawyer:
- must notify clients, opposing counsel, and courts of the disbarment;
- must take steps to return papers and unearned fees; and
- must cease taking new matters from the date of the opinion.
Immediate effectiveness option. If the lawyer certifies that there is no active practice and the 30‑day period is unnecessary to protect clients, the Court may make the disbarment immediately effective.
Compliance with Rule 3‑5.1(h). This rule details the obligations of suspended or disbarred attorneys to notify clients, withdraw from cases, and file affidavits of compliance.
Rule 3‑6.1 (if applicable). This governs the employment of disbarred or suspended lawyers (for example, as paralegals under strict limitations and oversight).

VI. Broader Impact and Future Implications

A. Reinforcement of the Presumptive Disbarment Rule for Misappropriation

The opinion firmly re‑affirms that in Florida:

Intentional misappropriation of client funds, especially in trust accounts, is among the most serious forms of professional misconduct.
The presumptive sanction is disbarment, and only extraordinary mitigation can justify deviation.

For practitioners, this underscores that:

Attempting to cast intentional misconduct as bookkeeping error will be scrutinized—especially where account balances and payment sequences show otherwise.
Partial restitution or eventual payment to a client does not erase earlier misappropriation or sustained deceit.

B. Multi‑Jurisdictional Practice and Reciprocal Discipline

For lawyers admitted in multiple jurisdictions, Fojo carries a clear message:

Misconduct leading to resignation, suspension, or disbarment in one state will likely trigger equal or more severe consequences in Florida.
Resigning “in lieu of discipline” elsewhere—often perceived as a strategic way to avoid a public trial or formal “disbarment” label—will in Florida be treated as tantamount to disbarment for reciprocal purposes.
Florida can impose sanctions even if the other jurisdiction’s procedural endpoint is labeled differently (e.g., resignation versus disbarment) or if another jurisdiction’s sanction is nominally less severe.

This promotes nationwide consistency and prevents forum‑shopping or strategic resignation to evade stricter discipline in states like Florida.

C. Guidance for Referees and Bar Counsel

The decision also offers practical guidance for Florida disciplinary referees and Bar counsel:

Referees should not only cite relevant Standards but explicitly determine whether the conduct falls under the disbarment or suspension text within each standard and explain why.
In reciprocal discipline matters involving resignation or disbarment elsewhere for misappropriation, referees should treat disbarment as the baseline under Standards 4.1, 4.6, 5.1, and 7.1, consistent with Alters, Rousso, Massari, Tillman, and Eberhart.

For Bar counsel, Fojo confirms the strength of seeking disbarment in cases involving:

confirmed foreign findings of trust‑account misappropriation;
resignation in lieu of discipline in the foreign jurisdiction; and
evidence of intentional deceit of clients to conceal financial misconduct.

D. Procedural Lessons for Respondents

The opinion also highlights crucial procedural lessons for respondent attorneys:

Timely cross‑review is essential. Because Fojo did not seek review or cross‑review of the referee’s findings on aggravation and mitigation, he effectively accepted those findings. A respondent wishing to challenge aggravating factors or seek additional mitigation must properly invoke the Court’s review.
Affidavits of resignation carry lasting consequences. By stipulating to the misconduct in New Hampshire, Fojo essentially foreclosed attacks on the underlying facts in Florida. Affidavits in resignation‑in‑lieu‑of‑discipline contexts should be understood as binding across jurisdictions.

VII. Conclusion

The Florida Bar v. Robert Michael Fojo is not a radical departure from existing law but a strong reaffirmation and synthesis of Florida’s core principles on trust‑account violations and reciprocal discipline. The Court:

Applies Rule 3‑4.6 to treat the New Hampshire proceeding—which culminated in resignation in lieu of discipline—as conclusive proof of misconduct in Florida;
Applies the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to find that every relevant standard (4.1, 4.6, 5.1, 7.1) points toward disbarment for intentional misappropriation and related deceit;
Relies on a consistent line of precedents establishing disbarment as the presumptive sanction for misuse of client funds and for resignation or disbarment in a foreign jurisdiction;
Holds that significant aggravation and minimal mitigation provide no basis to depart from that presumption; and
Thus disbars Fojo from the practice of law in Florida, with appropriate timing and compliance provisions.

The decision strengthens the message that Florida will protect clients and the legal system by treating intentional trust‑account violations and deceptive concealment as virtually incompatible with continued membership in the Bar, and that resignation in another state for such conduct will result in reciprocal disbarment in Florida.

Resignation Elsewhere, Disbarment Here: Reciprocal Discipline and Presumptive Disbarment for Intentional Misappropriation in The Florida Bar v. Fojo