Residence Alone Is Not Enough: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Plaintiff’s Burden to Allege and Prove Florida Contacts for Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date: November 6, 2025

Case: Mark T. Stinson, Sr. v. Memphis Light Gas & Water; Jeremy Thacker, individually d/b/a PrideStaff (No. 24-12176) — appeal from the S.D. Fla. (No. 1:23-cv-24733-BB)

Disposition: Affirmed (Not for Publication; Non-Argument Calendar; Per Curiam)

Introduction

This appeal turns on a fundamental threshold requirement in civil litigation: personal jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Southern District of Florida’s dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s tort and contract claims because he failed to allege—and later to prove—any Florida contacts by the out-of-state defendants sufficient to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute or constitutional due process.

The dispute began with a 2011 procurement by Memphis Light Gas & Water (MLGW), a Tennessee public utility, for temporary staffing services. The utility required the prime contractor to include a certified minority-, woman-, or locally-owned small business enterprise as a subcontractor. PrideStaff, Inc., a staffing company, identified plaintiff Mark T. Stinson Sr.’s minority-owned enterprise in its bid. After winning the contract, PrideStaff allegedly did not use Stinson’s company, prompting Stinson—by then living in Florida—to sue MLGW, PrideStaff, and PrideStaff’s owner, Jeremy Thacker, in the Southern District of Florida for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, conversion, and violations of Tennessee law.

None of the defendants is based in Florida (MLGW in Tennessee; Thacker in Tennessee; PrideStaff in California), and the complaint contained no Florida nexus for the alleged conduct. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, emphasizing the plaintiff’s burden to plead and, when challenged, to present evidence of Florida contacts under the state’s long-arm statute; pro se status does not relax that jurisdictional requirement.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held:

A plaintiff must first allege sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute. Stinson’s complaint did not allege any Florida contacts by any defendant.
Once defendants submitted declarations demonstrating their lack of Florida contacts (MLGW’s Tennessee-only operations; PrideStaff’s California incorporation, principal place of business, and management; Thacker’s Tennessee residence), the burden shifted back to Stinson to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction. He provided none.
Because the long-arm statute was not satisfied, the court did not need to reach the constitutional due process analysis; in any event, the absence of any identified Florida contacts underscored that exercising jurisdiction would violate due process.
The court reiterated that even with liberal construction of pro se filings, a court “without personal jurisdiction is powerless to take further action,” requiring dismissal.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211 (11th Cir. 2023) — Establishes the standard of review: de novo for dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit applied this standard to independently assess the district court’s personal-jurisdiction ruling.
Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014) and Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008) — Reinforce that pro se pleadings and briefs are liberally construed. The court invoked these to show it had read Stinson’s filings generously, but liberal construction does not supply missing jurisdictional facts.
Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999) — “A court without personal jurisdiction is powerless to take further action.” This underscored why the district court appropriately dismissed without delving into other issues raised (venue, res judicata, limitations).
United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) — Articulates the burden-shifting framework for personal jurisdiction challenges: the plaintiff must allege a prima facie case; if the defendant submits evidence negating jurisdiction, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction. This was the decisive procedural mechanism here.
AcryliCon USA, LLC v. Silikal GmbH, 985 F.3d 1350, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2021) — Sets out the two-step personal jurisdiction analysis for diversity cases: (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute; (2) due process. The court recited and followed this structure.
Fla. Stat. § 48.193 — Florida’s long-arm statute.
- General jurisdiction (§ 48.193(2)) exists if a defendant’s activity in Florida is “substantial and not isolated.”
- Specific jurisdiction (§ 48.193(1)(a)) exists if the cause of action arises from enumerated acts in Florida, such as carrying on business, maintaining an office, committing a tortious act in Florida, owning real property, causing injury in Florida under specified conditions, or breaching a contract requiring performance in Florida.
Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018) — Clarifies the difference between general and specific jurisdiction and reiterates the due process “minimum contacts” and “fair play and substantial justice” standards. The opinion cited Waite to frame both steps and the constitutional touchstones, although it resolved the case at the statutory step.

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning adhered to a clear, sequential analysis.

1) The Plaintiff’s Initial Burden Was Not Met

At the pleading stage, Stinson needed to allege facts that, if true, would bring the defendants within Florida’s long-arm statute. His complaint did not:

MLGW was alleged to be a Tennessee entity providing utility services in Shelby County, Tennessee, with no Florida operations.
Thacker was alleged to be a Tennessee resident.
PrideStaff’s citizenship/location was not alleged at all in the complaint (later shown by declaration to be a California corporation with its principal place of business in California).
No conduct forming the basis of the claims was alleged to have occurred in Florida; the MLGW procurement and relationships were Tennessee-centered.

Because the complaint tied neither defendants nor operative facts to Florida, it failed to allege general jurisdiction (“substantial and not isolated” activities in Florida) or any enumerated basis for specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a). Filing in Florida merely because the plaintiff resides there is insufficient.

2) Defendants’ Declarations Shifted the Burden—Plaintiff Offered No Evidence

All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and submitted sworn declarations reinforcing the absence of Florida contacts:

MLGW declared it does not conduct business in Florida, maintains no office or agent in Florida, employs no Florida workers, and uses no Florida address or phone number.
PrideStaff declared it is incorporated and headquartered in California; its main office, management, and day-to-day operations are controlled from California.
Thacker was alleged and treated as a Tennessee resident; no Florida acts were alleged.

Under United Techs. v. Mazer, once defendants present evidence negating jurisdiction, the burden “shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Stinson provided no counter-declarations, documents, or specific facts showing Florida contacts by any defendant. His opposition focused instead on his preference against transfer to Tennessee, noting he had previously litigated and lost related claims there—an argument irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry in Florida.

3) Florida’s Long-Arm Statute Was Not Satisfied; Due Process Would Also Be Offended

Given the lack of allegations and evidence of Florida contacts, the long-arm statute was not satisfied for any defendant—neither under general jurisdiction nor any enumerated basis for specific jurisdiction. Because the statutory prong failed, the court did not need to reach the constitutional due process analysis. Nevertheless, the opinion reiterated the due process “minimum contacts” principle and the requirement that a defendant’s own affiliation with Florida—not random or attenuated connections via others—must justify haling it into a Florida court. That principle, too, would not have been met on this record.

4) Pro Se Leniency Does Not Cure Jurisdictional Defects

While the court liberally construed Stinson’s pro se pleadings and briefing, it explained that leniency does not relax the jurisdictional showing required by statute and Constitution. As Posner underscores, a court lacking personal jurisdiction “is powerless to take further action,” making dismissal mandatory.

Impact

This nonprecedential decision reinforces settled Eleventh Circuit law but carries practical significance for litigants, especially pro se parties and out-of-state defendants.

For plaintiffs (including pro se):
- Residence in Florida is not a jurisdictional hook. A complaint must allege concrete Florida contacts by each defendant fitting § 48.193 or show “substantial and not isolated” activity.
- Anticipate and prepare for burden-shifting. If defendants file declarations negating Florida contacts, plaintiffs must offer competent evidence (affidavits, documents, specific facts) to carry their shifted burden.
- Choose your forum based on where defendants are “at home” (for general jurisdiction) or where the operative events occurred or were directed (for specific jurisdiction). Absent that nexus, dismissal is likely.
For defendants:
- Affidavit practice is decisive. Early, fact-specific declarations on corporate domicile, principal place of business, operational footprint, and absence of Florida activities can foreclose Florida jurisdiction before merits discovery.
- Raise alternative defenses (venue, res judicata, limitations) but expect courts to resolve personal jurisdiction first where it is dispositive.
For Florida courts:
- The opinion reaffirms the two-step framework: long-arm statute first, then due process. Courts should avoid conflating the two and should require plaintiffs to meet both prongs.
On forum shopping and repeat litigation:
- The decision discourages attempts to relitigate out-of-state disputes in Florida absent a Florida factual nexus, even when a plaintiff has relocated to Florida.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Personal Jurisdiction: A court’s power to make binding decisions about a particular defendant. Without it, the court cannot proceed.
Florida Long-Arm Statute (Fla. Stat. § 48.193): A law defining when Florida courts can exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents.
- General Jurisdiction (§ 48.193(2)): The defendant’s activity in Florida is so extensive (“substantial and not isolated”) that Florida courts can hear any claim against it, even if unrelated to Florida.
- Specific Jurisdiction (§ 48.193(1)(a)): The claim arises from specific acts in or directed to Florida, such as doing business here, committing a tort here, owning property here, causing injury here while engaging in Florida solicitation, or breaching a contract requiring performance here.
Due Process / Minimum Contacts: Even if a statute is satisfied, the Constitution requires that the defendant have sufficient ties to the forum so that being sued there is fair and reasonable.
Prima Facie Case of Jurisdiction: The initial factual showing a plaintiff must make in the complaint to plausibly bring the defendant within the court’s jurisdiction. Conclusory assertions are not enough.
Burden-Shifting on a Rule 12(b)(2) Motion:
1. Plaintiff alleges jurisdictional facts in the complaint.
2. Defendant counters with evidence (e.g., declarations) showing lack of jurisdiction.
3. Burden shifts back to plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction; failure to do so results in dismissal.
Per Curiam / Non-Argument Calendar / Not for Publication: A unanimous, unsigned decision issued without oral argument; nonpublished opinions are generally not binding precedent but can be persuasive.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision underscores a straightforward but critical rule: a plaintiff’s Florida residence does not create personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. Plaintiffs must plead and, when challenged, prove that defendants fall within Florida’s long-arm statute and the due process clause. Here, the plaintiff alleged no Florida-related conduct and offered no evidence to rebut defendants’ declarations demonstrating their exclusive ties to Tennessee and California. Affirmance was therefore inevitable.

The opinion provides a practical roadmap: plead concrete Florida connections from the outset; anticipate affidavits by nonresident defendants; be prepared to submit counter-evidence; and select a forum grounded in the defendants’ affiliations and the locus of operative facts. While not precedential, the decision faithfully applies long-standing Eleventh Circuit principles and will guide litigants and courts confronting similar jurisdictional challenges.