Introduction

In Donna Poplar v. Genesee County Road Commission, No. 24-1903 (6th Cir. July 16, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for a public-sector HR Director on two sets of claims: (1) retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Michigan statutes; and (2) failure to accommodate under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq.

The opinion delivers two especially consequential takeaways for Michigan employment law in federal courts:

• Timely written notice under PWDCRA § 37.1210(18) is tied to when the employee “knew or reasonably should have known” an accommodation was needed; that trigger can arise more than once as circumstances evolve (e.g., after new medical advice or the removal of an existing accommodation). The court held the Commission was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on timeliness and that the issue was properly for the jury.
• Requesting part‑time “reader/computer assistance” is not per se unreasonable under the PWDCRA, particularly where the job’s essential functions are not eliminated and where statutory text expressly contemplates “readers or interpreters.” Reasonableness remained a fact question for the jury.

The case also addresses the interplay between verdict forms and jury instructions, “but‑for” causation evidence in retaliation, curative instructions for potentially prejudicial testimony, and the deferential standard for reviewing noneconomic damages awards.

Parties: Plaintiff‑Appellee Donna Poplar (HR Director); Defendant‑Appellant Genesee County Road Commission (public employer led by a Managing Director and Board). Managing Director Fred Peivandi’s actions were central to both sets of claims.

Summary of the Opinion

After an eight‑day trial, the jury found for Poplar on four retaliation claims and one PWDCRA failure‑to‑accommodate claim, awarding $800,000 in damages (including $753,000 in noneconomic damages). The Commission moved for judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50), for a new trial (Rule 59), and for remittitur; the district court denied all motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Key holdings:

• PWDCRA notice timing: On a record showing multiple plausible “trigger dates” when Poplar knew or should have known an accommodation was needed (2018 medical advice; 2021 loss of her reader/assistant), the Commission was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The question of timely written notice belonged to the jury.
• Reasonableness of “reader” accommodation: A part‑time assistant for reading and computer work did not, as a matter of law, eliminate essential functions and was not per se unreasonable—especially given PWDCRA text anticipating “readers” and the employer’s own two‑year provision of that support.
• Alternative accommodations: Larger monitor, dimmer lights, and incidental help after the assistant’s promotion were not necessarily reasonable substitutes. The reasonableness determination remained fact‑intensive for the jury.
• Retaliation (but‑for causation): Temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse actions, combined with indicia of retaliatory animus (including testimony about directives issued to ensure Poplar knew “who the boss was” and a refusal to backfill the assistant role), allowed a reasonable jury to find but‑for causation under Title VII’s stringent standard.
• Jury instructions and verdict form: Omitting a separate verdict-form interrogatory on notice was not reversible; the instructions adequately explained the notice element, and courts presume juries follow instructions.
• Evidentiary issues: Any prejudice from a witness’s stray references to race discrimination was mitigated by curative instructions, the lack of contemporaneous objection, and the overall weight of the trial record.
• Damages: The noneconomic award, supported by medical and lay testimony of significant psychological injury, was not excessive or beyond the range of proof.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Standards of review and procedure: The court consolidated review of Rule 56 and Rule 50 denials, emphasizing the “same” inquiry (White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co.), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant (Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co.; Plumhoff v. Rickard), and avoiding credibility weighing (Tisdale v. FedEx; Ohio Citizen Action v. Englewood). Post‑verdict review focuses on the full trial record (K & T Enterprises v. Zurich; Seales v. City of Detroit). The court also addressed a preserved pure‑law argument arising from summary judgment per Dupree v. Younger.
• PWDCRA substantive law (Michigan):
  • Timely written notice: Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1210(18), (19). The court discussed Bageris v. Brandon Twp. (explaining what written notice must convey), In re Estate of Stern (distinguishable, focused on backward-looking relief), and cases where plaintiffs never gave written notice (Ayer; Aston). The court read the Act in light of its purpose—to ensure employment of the handicapped to the fullest extent reasonably possible (Peden v. City of Detroit; Bachman v. Swan Harbour).
  • Accommodation duties: Employers must take reasonable steps to accommodate unless undue hardship (MCL § 37.1102(2); Petzold v. Borman’s). The court contrasted accommodations that eliminate essential functions (Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr.; Steward v. DaimlerChrysler) with supportive assistance that does not (Rojek v. Catholic Charities). It further noted statutory language expressly addressing “readers or interpreters” and cost caps (§ 37.1210(8)-(12), (16)), even though the public-employer carveout applies (§ 37.1210(17)).
  • Alternatives: An employee cannot demand a specific accommodation if the employer provides another reasonable alternative (Hankins v. The Gap; Bertrand v. City of Mackinac Island). Reasonableness is “highly fact‑specific” (Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens).
• Retaliation causation: Title VII requires but‑for causation (Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar). The court relied on temporal proximity plus corroborative evidence (Kenney v. Aspen Technologies; Randolph v. ODYS; Mickey v. Zeidler Tool).
• New trial and jury instruction standards: A new trial lies for a “seriously erroneous result” (Caudill Seed & Warehouse v. Jarrow Formulas). Instructions are reviewed for whether they were misleading or failed to accurately reflect the law (Wesley v. Campbell; Monroe v. FTS USA). Unobjected-to instructions are reviewed for plain error (Reynolds v. Green).
• Evidentiary prejudice and curative steps: The court applied principles that lack of contemporaneous objection raises the prejudice threshold (Mosby‑Meachem v. MLGW) and that curative instructions generally suffice to mitigate prejudice (Smith v. Rock‑Tenn; Black v. Shultz).
• Damages & remittitur: Highly deferential review; remittitur is reserved for awards beyond the range of proof, shocking to the conscience, or mistaken (Gibson v. Moskowitz; Szeinbach v. OSU; Cranpark v. Rogers Group). Comparing across cases is disfavored (Champion v. Outlook Nashville; Precopio v. City of Detroit). Miller v. Alldata affirmed a verdict where emotional-distress damages comprised the bulk of total recovery.

Legal Reasoning

1) PWDCRA’s 182‑day written notice: When does the clock start?

The central statutory question was the trigger date under § 37.1210(18): within 182 days after “the date the person with a disability knew or reasonably should have known that an accommodation was needed.” The Commission argued that Poplar’s verbal disclosure and early request in 2016 started the sole window—missed by Poplar—foreclosing later reliance on written notices in 2018 and 2021.

The Sixth Circuit found no controlling Michigan precedent establishing a single, one‑time trigger in dynamic employment contexts. It emphasized the Act’s remedial purpose (Peden; Bachman) and a record showing two later points when an accommodation became newly or differently “needed”: (a) after 2018 medical advice connecting eye pain to sustained screen work; and (b) 2021, when Poplar lost the reader/assistant accommodation due to promotion and non‑replacement. On this record, a reasonable jury could find those later dates restarted the 182‑day period and that Poplar’s written notices were timely. Because the issue turned on disputed facts and statutory purpose rather than a categorical rule, judgment as a matter of law was improper.

The court also addressed a misquotation of § 37.1210(19) by the district court at summary judgment (concerning the employer’s posted‑notice condition precedent). Even assuming postings existed, that would only activate the timeliness requirement; it would not resolve timeliness itself. Given a triable fact dispute over timeliness, the misquotation was harmless.

2) Reasonableness of a “reader/computer‑assistance” accommodation

The Commission characterized Poplar’s request as eliminating essential functions (reading and computer work). The court rejected any per se unreasonableness framing because:

• Poplar sought part‑time assistance with essential tasks, not exemption from them. She could perform them, but sustained volume and screen time aggravated her disability.
• The PWDCRA’s text repeatedly contemplates the hiring or retention of “readers or interpreters,” and even specifies cost benchmarks tied to employer size (§ 37.1210(8)-(12), (16)), which strongly suggests the reasonableness of such support paradigms in principle—even if cost‑cap subsections do not bind public employers (§ 37.1210(17)).
• The Commission had already provided an HR assistant for over two years, undermining a claim that such an accommodation was inherently unreasonable, and distinguishing scenarios where assistants wholly supplant essential functions (e.g., Steward).

The reasonableness question stayed where it belongs—before the jury.

3) “Reasonable alternatives” and the fact‑intensive inquiry

While employees cannot demand a specific accommodation if the employer offers a reasonable alternative (Hankins; Bertrand), the “alternatives” here (larger monitor, dimmer lights) predated Poplar’s 2018 medical advice and proved inadequate to stem the harm. The post‑promotion “help” from the former assistant was both not part of her new job description and minimal (30‑60 minutes/day), compared with the prior role where ~60% of time was dedicated to Poplar’s needs. On this record, a jury could find that the “alternatives” were not, in fact, reasonable substitutes for the requested accommodation.

4) Retaliation and but‑for causation

Addressing the highest standard (Title VII), the court concluded a reasonable jury could find but‑for causation through:

• Temporal proximity: Poplar’s protected activities (January 2021 internal complaint; May 2021 EEOC charge; August 2021 internal complaint) closely preceded the adverse actions (August 2021 unpaid suspension; fall 2021 promotion of the assistant and refusal to backfill; ongoing non‑replacement despite budget and repeated requests).
• Corroborative indications of animus: Testimony that Peivandi reacted to Poplar’s complaint by issuing “corrective” directives to show “who the boss was,” then suspended her, and later refused to refill the assistant position—despite prior provision and budget approval—supported inferences of retaliatory motive.

The court rejected the notion that the long‑standing managerial view against a full‑time assistant severed causation: the employer had provided assistance for over two years, and the non‑replacement followed closely on protected activity.

5) Verdict form, jury instructions, and curative rulings

The verdict form did not include a discrete interrogatory on PWDCRA notice. Still, the instructions explicitly required timely written notice, and courts presume juries follow the instructions. The Commission itself argued the notice element to the jury under that structure. The omission did not render the charge confusing or misleading.

As to a witness’s references to discrimination otherwise excluded by an in limine order, the combination of no contemporaneous objection, explicit curative instructions at the outset and close of trial, and a robust record (17 witnesses over eight days) defeated any claim that the trial was unfairly influenced by prejudice.

6) Noneconomic damages

The Sixth Circuit deferred to the jury’s valuation, upheld by:

• Poplar’s testimony of fear of losing vision, anxiety, depression, and shame;
• Medical corroboration (diagnoses of generalized anxiety, major depressive disorder, and PTSD; psychiatrist’s recommendation of medical leave);
• Third‑party observations by a licensed social worker/pastor noting panic‑like symptoms.

The court reiterated that comparing across cases is a poor tool for evaluating non‑economic damages and, citing Miller v. Alldata, recognized that large percentages of emotional‑distress awards can be appropriate when supported by the record.

Impact

For Michigan employers and employees (especially public entities)

• Dynamic notice windows under the PWDCRA: In federal courts applying Michigan law, the 182‑day notice period is not necessarily a one‑time window fixed at hire or at the first awareness of disability. When circumstances materially change—new medical insight or removal/downgrading of a prior accommodation—employees can plausibly argue a new trigger date, making timeliness a jury question. Employers should treat renewed or modified requests seriously and evaluate them afresh.
• “Reader” accommodations are mainstream: The PWDCRA’s architecture anticipates “readers or interpreters,” and the court’s reasoning disfavors categorical arguments that reader assistance impermissibly removes essential functions. Employers should instead analyze whether such support helps an employee perform essential functions—rather than replaces them—and whether undue hardship truly exists.
• “Alternative” accommodations must work: Offering an alternative is not a safe harbor if the alternative does not effectively address the functional limitations, particularly in light of updated medical information or changed job realities.
• Retaliation risk management: Close timing between protected activity and adverse actions, coupled with managerial statements suggesting hostility to protected activity, can satisfy but‑for causation. Documentation, neutral decision processes, and temporal separation—where feasible—matter.
• Trial practice pointers: Courts will presume juries follow instructions; if a party wants fine‑grained issues (e.g., notice) resolved by interrogatory, it must carefully preserve and explain how the omission would mislead. Curative instructions can cure stray improper testimony, especially without contemporaneous objections.
• Damages exposure: Noneconomic damages may constitute the bulk of an award where mental health harm is well‑evidenced. Medical testimony and longitudinal lay observations can be decisive. Conversely, employers seeking remittitur should be prepared to show not just size, but lack of evidentiary support, mistake, or conscience‑shocking excess.

Note: This opinion is not precedential within the Sixth Circuit (“not recommended for publication”). Still, it is a persuasive data point predicting how Michigan law operates in federal court and is likely to influence district courts confronting PWDCRA notice triggers, reader accommodations, and retaliation proof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 50 vs. Rule 56: Both test whether a reasonable jury could find for the non‑movant on the full record; Rule 56 is pretrial (summary judgment), Rule 50 is during/after trial (judgment as a matter of law). Appellate courts review Rule 50(b) denials on the full trial record.
• PWDCRA notice requirement: An employee must give written notice of the need for accommodation within 182 days after the date they knew or should have known an accommodation was needed. This “date” can arise anew if circumstances change (e.g., new medical advice, loss of a prior accommodation), turning timeliness into a fact question.
• Essential functions vs. assistance: Employers need not eliminate essential functions or exempt an employee from performing them. But they may need to provide support that enables performance (e.g., a reader), so long as it does not substitute fully for the function.
• Reasonable accommodation vs. alternatives: An employer may choose among effective accommodations. But the alternative must meaningfully address the limitation; cosmetic or inadequate fixes are not “reasonable.”
• But‑for causation in retaliation: The protected activity must be the reason without which the adverse action would not have occurred. Temporal proximity plus evidence of retaliatory attitudes or inconsistencies can satisfy this standard.
• Harmless error and plain error: Minor legal misstatements that do not change the outcome are “harmless.” Unobjected‑to instruction issues require “plain error” (obvious, prejudicial) to merit reversal.
• Remittitur standard: A court reduces a verdict only if it exceeds the proof’s range, shocks the conscience, or results from mistake. Emotional distress awards are highly fact‑dependent; cross‑case comparisons are disfavored.

Conclusion

Poplar underscores two practical and doctrinal points in PWDCRA litigation. First, the 182‑day written‑notice period is context‑sensitive: when the need for accommodation emerges or re‑emerges due to changing circumstances, timeliness is a jury question grounded in the Act’s remedial purpose. Second, a part‑time “reader/computer‑support” accommodation is not per se unreasonable—particularly where it facilitates rather than replaces essential job functions and where the statute itself contemplates such assistance.

The opinion also offers a template for evaluating retaliation under the but‑for standard, calibrating jury‑instruction review, and resisting perfunctory remittitur arguments where noneconomic harm is robustly proven. For Michigan employers, Poplar counsels prompt, good‑faith engagement with evolving accommodation needs and measured responses to protected activity. For employees, it confirms that updated medical evidence and the loss of prior supports can restart the PWDCRA’s notice clock and that credible documentation of mental‑health impacts can sustain substantial noneconomic damages.

While unpublished, Poplar is a careful, fact‑intensive application of Michigan law through federal procedural lenses—a persuasive guidepost for trial courts navigating the PWDCRA’s notice mechanics, accommodation reasonableness, and retaliation causation.