Resentencing After Vacatur: Finality of Sentence, Sixth Amendment Fact-Finding, and Law-of-the-Case Doctrines

Introduction

United States v. Jackson (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 2025) presents a rare “fourth round” of appellate review in a long-running child abuse prosecution. Carolyn and John Jackson, adoptive parents of three young children, were convicted after a 39-day jury trial of endangering the welfare of minors under New Jersey law assimilated into federal jurisdiction. Their sentences were vacated three times for flouting federal sentencing law and jury findings, and reassigned to new judges. On the latest remand, Judge Susan D. Wigenton imposed terms of 140 months for Carolyn and 108 months for John. The Jacksons appealed, challenging (1) the Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding, (2) Double Jeopardy and Due Process protections regarding sentence finality, (3) the law-of-the-case doctrine, and (4) procedural and substantive reasonableness under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Third Circuit affirmed in full.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The court held that judge-found facts raising only the Sentencing Guidelines range (but not the statutory maximum or mandatory minimum) do not trigger Sixth Amendment jury requirements (Apprendi v. New Jersey, Alleyne v. United States).

2. A defendant under active appeal, even if incarcerated or having completed the sentence, has no “reasonable expectation of finality” until the appeal concludes or the time to appeal expires. Resentencing after vacatur does not violate Double Jeopardy or the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

3. Once a sentence is vacated, prior sentencing determinations are erased—there is no binding law of the case on remand for new sentencing.

4. The resentencing was procedurally sound: the Guidelines were correctly calculated (including grouping and enhancements), the court applied the three-step process, and any minor error was harmless. The sentences comport with § 3553(a) and are substantively reasonable.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Apprendi v. New Jersey (530 U.S. 466, 2000): Jury fact‐finding required only when facts increase the statutory maximum.
Alleyne v. United States (570 U.S. 99, 2013): Extensions to mandatory minimums likewise trigger Sixth Amendment protections.
DiFrancesco v. United States (449 U.S. 117, 1980): No expectation of finality while an appeal is pending; resentencing after vacatur does not offend Double Jeopardy.
Bozza v. United States (330 U.S. 160, 1947): Correcting an invalid sentence does not expose a defendant to double jeopardy.
United States v. Busic (639 F.2d 940, 3d Cir. 1981): Vacatur of an illegal sentence authorizes resentencing without double jeopardy implications.
Pepper v. United States (562 U.S. 476, 2011): A remand for resentencing gives the district court a “clean slate,” permitting full reconsideration of § 3553 factors.

Legal Reasoning

1. Sixth Amendment and Guidelines Findings: The court reaffirmed that judicial fact‐finding under a preponderance standard is permissible when it alters only the advisory Guidelines range, so long as the defendant’s sentence remains within the statutory maximum. The Jacksons’ aggravated‐assault and “dangerous weapon” enhancements raised their Guidelines ranges but did not exceed the ten-year ceiling.

2. Double Jeopardy and Due Process: Citing DiFrancesco and its progeny, the Third Circuit held there is no dual jeopardy violation in resentencing after vacatur, even if the original sentence has been served in full. A litigant’s “reasonable expectation of finality” attaches only after the conclusion of the direct appeal or expiration of the appeal period. The court also rejected novel “due process” arguments, explaining that the constitutional guarantee does not create unjust “windfalls” of unwarranted leniency.

3. Law of the Case: Vacating a sentence erases all prior sentencing determinations. The court has “no law of the case” to impose on the new sentencer. Prior district‐court findings—even those not clearly erroneous—are not binding when the judgment that produced them is set aside.

4. Reasonableness of Sentence: Judge Wigenton followed the three-step sentencing procedure: calculating the Guidelines, considering departures, and weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Alleged procedural missteps (grouping, application of the assault Guideline to omission counts) were harmless: the court articulated an alternative “3553(a)-only” rationale reaching the same term. The lengths of 140 and 108 months fall well within the broad range of reasonableness given the severity, duration, and cruelty of the abuse.

Impact

• Sentencing Practice: This decision cements that resentencing after appellate vacatur is wholly distinct from double jeopardy concerns and that district courts may make factual findings under the advisory Guidelines without triggering jury‐trial protections so long as statutory ceilings remain intact.

• Finality Doctrine: By clarifying that no expectation of finality exists until direct‐appeal rights are exhausted, the Third Circuit forecloses challenges to resentencing based on post‐serving arguments or due process claims seeking to preserve a flawed original term.

• Law of the Case Limits: Appellate vacatur wipes the slate clean; litigants cannot bind a successor judge to previous, now‐vacated findings.

• Future Appeals: Defendants challenging sentencing enhancements must focus on exceeding statutory maxima or mandatory minimums to invoke constitutional protections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Assimilative Crimes Act: Federal jurisdiction on military bases “assimilates” state criminal laws—here, New Jersey’s child endangerment statutes—to federal court.
Advisory Guidelines: The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines offer a recommended range. Judges calculate enhancements (e.g., “dangerous weapon”) by preponderance of the evidence, but only findings that raise statutory maximums or minimums require jury resolution.
Law of the Case Doctrine: A rule that holds prior appellate rulings on issues should guide subsequent stages—unless the ruling is vacated, in which case the rule evaporates.
Three-Step Sentencing Process: (1) Determine the Guidelines range; (2) consider departures; (3) weigh statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (nature of offense, history of defendant, need for deterrence, etc.).
Plain Error Review: When a defendant fails to object at sentencing, the appellate court corrects only “clear or obvious” errors that affect substantial rights.

Conclusion

United States v. Jackson reaffirms core sentencing principles: judicial fact‐finding under the advisory Guidelines does not violate the Sixth Amendment where statutory limits remain unchanged; resentencing after appellate vacatur poses no double jeopardy or due process concern while direct appeals remain pending or time to appeal has not lapsed; and vacatur eliminates any law-of-the-case constraints, granting the district court a “clean slate.” Finally, the affirmance underscores that sentencing courts must articulate both Guidelines and § 3553(a) rationales, but harmless‐error review will sustain a sentence so long as a valid alternative basis exists. This decision will guide district courts and litigants in the proper procedures and constitutional boundaries for resentencing after vacatur and throughout the life of an appeal.