Introduction

In a long-running dispute over an alleyway, erosion control, utilities, and access serving undeveloped lots in Saratoga, Wyoming, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirms a decisive message: once a consolidated series of cases yields a final judgment, later efforts to resurrect—or repackage—the same disputes as “enforcement,” contempt, or mandamus will be barred by claim preclusion. In Randy W. Stevens, Individually and as Trustee of the Randy W. Stevens Living Trust, and Quality Landscape & Nursery, Inc. v. The Governing Body of the Town of Saratoga, 2025 WY 35, the Court holds that res judicata (claim preclusion), not the law-of-the-case doctrine, governs a post-judgment “order to show cause and for writ of mandamus” filed under the original case number. It further clarifies that mandamus is unavailable where the acts sought are discretionary or not legally imposed ministerial duties—indeed, that such an application must be initiated by verified petition in the name of the State, not by motion.

The parties’ saga spans from a 2009 nuisance prosecution and 2010 consent decree to a 2019 bench trial and unappealed final judgment. In 2023, the Stevens parties sought to compel the Town to finish reconstructing the alleyway (with a rock and gabion wall), facilitate or authorize utilities, grant access from River Street, and allow removal of a northern retaining wall. The district court dismissed, invoking res judicata, a one‑year contractual limitations period embedded in the consent decree, and the inapplicability of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirms on all grounds and rejects judicial estoppel.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Jarosh, J.) affirms dismissal of the Stevens parties’ 2023 motion for order to show cause and writ of mandamus. It holds:

• Res judicata applies to bar claims regarding alleyway reconstruction, erosion mitigation, utilities, River Street access, and removal of a retaining wall—issues either actually litigated or that could have been litigated before the 2019 judgment, which the Stevens parties did not appeal (¶¶ 38–46, 47–54).
• Mandamus is unavailable because the Stevens parties did not identify any “absolute, clear, and indisputable” ministerial duty imposed by law. Procedurally, they also sought mandamus by motion rather than by a verified petition “in the name of the state,” as required by statute (¶¶ 55–63).
• Judicial estoppel does not apply because the Town’s positions, even if characterized as inconsistent by the Stevens parties, concerned legal theories rather than contrary factual positions, and the doctrine is a narrow, facts‑based estoppel (¶¶ 64–67).

The Court underscores a pivotal doctrinal point: despite the 2023 filing being styled as an “enforcement” motion in the old case, res judicata, not law‑of‑the‑case, controls after the consolidated litigation concluded in a final 2019 judgment (n.4).

Background and Procedural History

The Stevens Trust acquired ten undeveloped lots in 2008–09 to store landscaping equipment and sell dirt (¶ 5). Disputes with the Town quickly emerged over excavation, retaining walls, and stormwater management. After a cease‑and‑desist and municipal nuisance conviction, the parties entered a 2009 Stipulated Settlement Agreement. In 2010, a Consent Decree required—among other obligations—the Town to reconstruct the alleyway, address grades and stormwater, and issue a River Street driveway permit within 10 days of application. Critically, the decree included a one‑year contractual limitations clause for actions “in relation to an alleged breach or nonperformance,” regardless of discovery (¶ 12).

From 2010–2013 the parties traded motions. A 2012 order found the Town deviated from the contemplated rock-and-gabion wall by installing sheet piling adjacent to two lots without formally submitting revised contours; the court deemed this a de minimis, reasonable modification made in good faith, resulting in no harm (¶ 19). A 2013 order enforcing a negotiated—but oral—settlement required the Town to reconstruct the alley “as modified by the now‑approved sheet piling retaining wall” within 140 days; it refused to relitigate wall type and specifically rejected any obligation to replace sheet piling with gabions (¶ 22).

In 2013, the Stevens parties filed new civil complaints alleging torts, inverse condemnation/takings, and an implied contract to install utilities. On summary judgment (2017), the court dismissed tort claims and held that the Consent Decree’s integration clause voided alleged oral promises to vacate the alley and install utilities (¶ 24). Takings and inverse condemnation claims went to trial (2019). After a bench trial, the court found the Town had no authority to approve or install electrical, water, or sewer utilities; the Consent Decree did not mandate utility installation; and the sheet piling wall impeded buried utilities (¶ 25). The court also found the wall failed to mitigate erosion and that the Town had taken possession of and damaged portions of the property—but that the plaintiffs failed to prove damages, yielding a defense judgment (¶ 26). The Stevens parties did not appeal.

In 2023, the Stevens parties moved for an order to show cause and a writ of mandamus, returning to alley reconstruction (this time demanding a rock and gabion wall along the entire border), utility authorization/facilitation, River Street access, and removal of the north retaining wall (¶ 27). The district court dismissed on res judicata, the consent decree’s limitations clause, and mandamus inapplicability (¶ 29). This appeal followed.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Res judicata / claim preclusion
  • Tozzi v. Moffett, 2018 WY 133, ¶ 16, 430 P.3d 754, 759–60 (defining claim preclusion and its four factors, adopted from Slavens) (¶¶ 35, 37–38).
  • Slavens v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Uinta Cnty., 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 1993) (identity of parties, subject matter, issues, and capacities) (¶ 37).
  • Cermak v. Great West Cas. Co., 2 P.3d 1047, 1053 (Wyo. 2000) (res judicata bars what was litigated and what should have been raised) (¶ 36).
  • Bender v. Uinta Cnty. Assessor, 14 P.3d 906, 910 (Wyo. 2000) (full and fair opportunity is sufficient) (¶ 36).
  • Worman v. Carver, 2002 WY 59, ¶ 13, 44 P.3d 82, 86 (purpose: finality, efficiency, avoiding inconsistent results) (¶ 35).
  • Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 454 (Wyo. 1996) (law-of-the-case doctrine described) (n.4). The Court clarifies that after a final judgment, claim preclusion—not law-of-the-case—governs later filings, even if they reuse the old docket (¶ 38; n.4).
• Contractual limitations periods
  • Nuhome Invs., LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, ¶¶ 8–9, 81 P.3d 940, 944–45 (Wyoming honors negotiated shorter contractual limitations periods) (¶ 52).
• Mandamus
  • Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-101 (definition and scope).
  • Carson v. Albany Cnty. Sch. Dist. #1 Bd. of Trustees, 2024 WY 11, ¶¶ 9–12, 542 P.3d 184, 187 (ministerial duty must be absolute, clear, indisputable) (¶¶ 55–61).
  • State ex rel. West Park Hosp. Dist. v. Skoric, 2014 WY 41, ¶ 22, 321 P.3d 334, 342 (same) (¶ 56).
  • Williams v. Sundstrom, 2016 WY 122, ¶¶ 13–14, 385 P.3d 789, 792–93 (district court could dismiss for noncompliance with mandamus pleading requirements) (¶¶ 33, 59). See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-103 (mandamus must be by verified petition in the name of the State, “on the relation of” the applicant).
  • In re Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Sublette Cnty., 2001 WY 91, ¶ 10, 33 P.3d 107, 112 (abuse-of-discretion standard) (¶ 33).
  • State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, ¶ 14, 201 P.3d 1127, 1132 (discretion in issuing mandamus) (¶ 33).
• Appellate preservation
  • Rafter J. Ranch Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Stage Stop, Inc., 2024 WY 114, ¶ 42, 558 P.3d 562, 574 (no new arguments on appeal absent jurisdictional or fundamental issues) (¶ 62).
  • Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, ¶ 19, 367 P.3d 619, 624; Basic Energy Servs., L.P. v. Petroleum Res. Mgmt., Corp., 2015 WY 22, ¶ 28, 343 P.3d 783, 791 (fairness principle underlying preservation) (¶ 62).
• Judicial estoppel
  • Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2007 WY 10, ¶ 26, 150 P.3d 653, 663 (prevents “playing fast and loose”; applies to factual positions) (¶ 65).
  • Baker v. Speaks, 2013 WY 24, ¶ 60, 295 P.3d 847, 861; Rafter J., 2024 WY 114, ¶ 45, 558 P.3d at 575 (estoppel is narrow and does not reach inconsistent legal theories) (¶ 65).
• Pleading stage document consideration
  • Peterson v. Laramie City Council, 2024 WY 23, ¶ 17, 543 P.3d 922, 929 (court may consider referenced and undisputed central documents on a motion to dismiss) (¶ 31 & n.3). This allowed the district court and the Supreme Court to rely on prior orders when adjudicating the motion to dismiss.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Res judicata controls post‑judgment “enforcement” motions

The Court stresses finality. All four claim-preclusion factors are satisfied because the parties, subject matter, and capacities are identical, and the issues raised in 2023 are the same as, or related to, those that were or could have been resolved by 2019 (¶¶ 37–46). Even though the 2023 filing was styled as an “order to show cause and mandamus” under the original 2009 case number, the 2019 bench trial produced a final judgment disposing of the consolidated controversies. Accordingly, “we will apply the doctrine of res judicata, regardless of the fact that the Stevens Parties sought relief by styling their filing as a motion as opposed to a new complaint” (n.4).

The Court then walks through each category:

• Alleyway reconstruction / wall / erosion (¶¶ 41–46). The Town’s deviation from gabions to sheet piling was previously adjudicated as a reasonable, de minimis modification in good faith (2012 order); the 2013 settlement-enforcement order directed completion “as modified by the now‑approved sheet piling retaining wall”; and the 2019 judgment expressly considered the wall’s failure to mitigate erosion and the taking/damages issues, ultimately entering judgment for the Town due to lack of proof of damages. The Stevens parties did not appeal and did not then seek an order compelling specific performance. Claim preclusion bars relitigation.
• Utilities (water, sewer, electrical) (¶¶ 47–49). The 2017 summary judgment rejected an implied contract to install utilities based on the Consent Decree’s integration clause and absence of any such obligation. The 2019 trial findings confirmed the Town lacked authority to approve or install utilities and that the Consent Decree did not contemplate utility installation. Final judgment for the Town—no appeal—bars later efforts to compel utility action via contempt or mandamus.
• River Street access (¶¶ 50–52). Access was addressed in the Consent Decree (the Town must issue the excavation permit within 10 business days upon application). Because this claim could have been litigated by 2019, res judicata bars it. Independently, the decree’s one‑year limitations clause bars any late “breach of decree” claim related to River Street access.
• Removal of the north retaining wall (¶¶ 53–54). This was resolved in the 2009 Stipulated Settlement Agreement (Mr. Stevens agreed to remove it, or the Town would do so). Any issues should have been litigated prior to—or during—the 2019 proceedings. Absent new facts, later attempts are precluded.

The Court’s through-line is practical: allowing serial enforcement motions to relitigate settled subjects would “frustrate the judicial process and perpetuate seemingly endless litigation” (¶ 46).

b) Mandamus: procedural and substantive barriers

The Court identifies two independent obstacles to mandamus (¶¶ 55–63):

• Procedural defect: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-103 requires an application be by verified petition “in the name of the state” on the relation of the applicant. The Stevens parties sought mandamus by motion, with no affidavit. The district court could have dismissed on this basis alone (¶ 59).
• No ministerial duty: Mandamus compels only ministerial, not discretionary, acts; the duty must be “absolute, clear, and indisputable” (¶¶ 55–56). Here, the Stevens parties cited no statute, ordinance, or other legal authority imposing such duties. The requested acts—constructing a particular wall, undertaking erosion mitigation, authorizing removal of a wall, granting a River Street access permit, and facilitating or approving utilities—were not shown to be ministerial; indeed, the 2019 findings undermine the premise for utilities, because the Town lacked approval/installation authority (¶¶ 60–61). On appeal, the Stevens parties cited municipal ordinances for the first time; the Supreme Court declined to consider them (¶ 62). Even if considered, the briefing suggested those provisions vested discretion or placed responsibility outside the Town (n.6).

Bottom line: mandamus cannot be used as a backdoor to circumvent the finality wrought by res judicata or to compel discretionary choices.

c) Judicial estoppel rejected

Judicial estoppel is “narrow” and targets inconsistent factual positions, not shifting legal arguments (¶ 65). The Stevens parties argued the Town historically touted a rock-and-gabion solution but later argued otherwise. The Court characterizes this as, at most, legal inconsistency—not a contradictory factual stance—and notes that the alleyway issues were adjudicated by 2019, with the Town’s present arguments framed around preclusion. Two additional observations blunt the estoppel claim: the Town largely maintained a consistent defense to alleged noncompliance, and the Stevens parties conceded at oral argument that a rock-and-gabion wall would not be the “right solution” and could cause long-term problems (¶ 67).

3) Impact and Practical Implications

This opinion does not announce a brand-new doctrine; rather, it provides sharp, practice‑oriented guidance in three recurring contexts: consent decree enforcement, consolidated civil litigation, and the extraordinary writ of mandamus.

• Finality after consolidation and a final judgment
  • Even where parties continue to file “enforcement” or “show cause” motions under a historic case number, a prior final judgment in consolidated litigation will trigger res judicata. Counsel must treat the run‑up to final judgment as the time to bring every related claim and theory—contract, tort, statutory, equitable—and to seek all necessary relief, including specific performance. The failure to appeal a final judgment closes the door (¶¶ 38–46).
• Contractual limitations in decrees are enforceable
  • Negotiated, shortened limitations periods embedded in consent decrees will be honored, and they can bar later “breach of decree” claims irrespective of discovery (¶ 12; ¶ 52). Parties should calendar such deadlines and move promptly when alleging nonperformance.
• Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal or a vehicle to compel discretion
  • Mandamus demands a clear statutory or legal command, not a preference for a particular engineering solution or policy choice. It is jurisdictionally demanding (statutory pleading format) and substantively exacting (ministerial duty). It cannot be used to re‑litigate settled issues or overcome claim preclusion (¶¶ 55–63).
• Integration clauses matter
  • An integration clause in a consent decree can extinguish contemporaneous oral understandings or inducements (like alleged promises to vacate an alley or install utilities), blocking later implied‑contract claims (¶ 24). Practitioners must ensure vital terms appear in the four corners of the written decree.
• Takings without damages
  • The 2019 trial court found a partial taking/damage but entered judgment for the Town because plaintiffs failed to prove damages (¶ 26). The case underscores that in inverse condemnation, proof of damages is essential; absent that showing, no relief issues even if a “taking” is recognized.
• Appellate preservation remains pivotal
  • New legal theories (e.g., municipal ordinances purportedly imposing duties) generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal unless jurisdictional or fundamental; doing so risks forfeiture (¶ 62).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Res judicata (claim preclusion): A final judgment between the same parties on the same subject matter bars later litigation of claims that were or could have been raised in the earlier suit. It promotes finality and efficiency.
• Law of the case: A doctrine that a court’s legal rulings generally bind later stages of the same case. Here, because a final judgment concluded the consolidated litigation, the Supreme Court applied claim preclusion instead of law-of-the-case to the 2023 filing.
• Consent decree: A court order embodying the parties’ settlement terms. Once entered, it is enforceable like any judgment. Terms not included (or expressly superseded by an integration clause) are not enforceable.
• Integration clause: A contract term providing that the written agreement is the complete and exclusive statement of the parties’ agreement, superseding prior or contemporaneous oral statements.
• Mandamus: An extraordinary writ compelling a public official to perform a ministerial (non‑discretionary) duty expressly required by law. In Wyoming, it must be initiated by a verified petition “in the name of the State on the relation of” the applicant (Wyo. Stat. § 1‑30‑103). It cannot compel discretionary acts or circumvent final judgments.
• Ministerial duty: A duty that is absolute, certain, and imperative, leaving nothing to the official’s judgment or discretion. If the law allows choice among options, the duty is not ministerial.
• Judicial estoppel: A narrow doctrine preventing a party from adopting inconsistent factual positions in court to gain advantage. It does not generally apply to shifting legal theories.
• Inverse condemnation/takings: A claim that the government has taken or damaged private property for public use without just compensation. Plaintiffs must prove damages to recover.

Additional Observations and Practice Pointers

• Use the last trial as the “everything goes in” moment: If equitable relief (e.g., specific performance to complete a wall) is essential, seek it and ensure it is adjudicated before or during the final trial. If denied, preserve and appeal.
• Calendar consent‑decree limitations: The one‑year clause here foreclosed River Street access claims and could bar other “breach of decree” actions. Draft and monitor such clauses carefully.
• Know who has utility authority: The 2019 findings (unappealed) that the Town lacked approval/installation authority for utilities made later “mandamus” requests untenable. Identify the correct utility decision‑maker and legal source of duty early.
• Mandamus pleading matters: File a verified petition styled “State of Wyoming ex rel. [Relator],” identify the specific statute/ordinance imposing a ministerial duty, and attach supporting affidavits. A motion will not suffice.
• Do not save key legal theories for appeal: Present municipal‑code or statutory bases for relief in the district court. Late-breaking citations are typically disregarded, absent jurisdictional imperatives.
• De minimis deviations and good faith: Where a public entity deviates from an agreed plan but acts reasonably and in good faith, with no demonstrable harm, courts may tolerate modifications and refuse to relitigate settled construction choices—especially after multiple orders and a final judgment.

Conclusion

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens v. Town of Saratoga reinforces hard‑edged finality principles in complex, consent‑decree‑driven land use disputes. Three takeaways dominate:

• Res judicata, not law‑of‑the‑case, controls when a consolidated litigation has culminated in a final judgment. Later “enforcement” motions cannot revive settled issues or those that should have been raised earlier.
• Mandamus is narrow and formal: it requires a clear ministerial duty imposed by law and strict adherence to statutory pleading. It is not a tool to compel discretionary engineering or policy choices—or to circumvent preclusion.
• Contractual limitations clauses are enforceable and can foreclose otherwise colorable enforcement claims if not timely brought.

In affirming dismissal, the Court provides a careful blueprint for litigants and courts managing the long tail of consent decree litigation: consolidate, litigate comprehensively, prove damages where required, seek all necessary remedies before final judgment, and appeal if necessary. After judgment, the door narrows to true enforcement of new or ongoing obligations that are neither precluded nor time‑barred—and even then, extraordinary writs remain truly extraordinary.