Requiring Texas-Specific Targeting for Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Component Manufacturers:
Commentary on Hyundam Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Swacina

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I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Hyundam Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Swacina sharpens and reinforces the state’s approach to specific personal jurisdiction over foreign product manufacturers—especially component-part makers that operate abroad and sell into global supply chains.

The central issue was whether Texas courts could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Hyundam Industrial Company, a South Korean fuel-pump manufacturer, in a products-liability action arising from a serious car crash in Texas involving a 2009 Hyundai Elantra. The plaintiff, acting on behalf of an incapacitated person and her minor children, alleged that a defective fuel pump manufactured by Hyundam caused the vehicle to stall in traffic, leading to a rear-end collision and severe injury.

Hyundam challenged Texas jurisdiction through a special appearance, arguing that it had no meaningful contacts with Texas and that its role ended in South Korea when it sold fuel pumps to other Korean companies within the Hyundai supply chain. The plaintiff, Swacina, countered that Hyundam had designed the pump for the “North American” market, knew its products would reach Texas, and that replacement Hyundam pumps were sold through a Texas Hyundai dealership. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed.

This commentary examines the Court’s treatment of:

• The evidentiary sufficiency and “personal knowledge” foundation of a special-appearance affidavit; and
• The constitutional limits of specific personal jurisdiction under the “stream of commerce” theory, as refined by recent Texas precedents such as BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik and State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft.

Most significantly, Hyundam reaffirms that a nonresident defendant must engage in conduct that targets Texas specifically. Designing products for a broad geographic region that happens to include Texas, even with knowledge that products will likely be sold here, is not enough. Texas-focused conduct—not regional or global knowledge—is the touchstone.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Texas held:

1. Affidavit issue (evidentiary ruling): The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on an affidavit from Hyundam’s Managing Director, Jinwook Chang, submitted in support of the special appearance. Chang adequately established that his statements were based on his personal knowledge derived from his roles, responsibilities, and access to company information. The motion to strike the affidavit was correctly denied.
2. Jurisdictional issue: Texas courts lack specific personal jurisdiction over Hyundam. There is no evidence that Hyundam “targeted Texas” as required by the Due Process Clause and Texas jurisprudence. Its conduct—designing the fuel pump for a “North American” region, selling pumps to South Korean intermediaries, and knowing that some pumps would reach Texas—showed, at most, foreseeability, which is insufficient to establish purposeful availment.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Granted Hyundam’s petition for review;
• Reversed the court of appeals’ decision; and
• Rendered judgment dismissing the case against Hyundam for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court emphasized that its decision, like its companion case BRP-Rotax, “breaks no new jurisprudential ground” but rather reaffirms the requirement of Texas-directed conduct for specific jurisdiction.

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III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Accident and the Alleged Defect

Johari Kibibi Powell was severely injured when her 2009 Hyundai Elantra stalled in a center lane of traffic in Texas and was rear-ended by another vehicle. The plaintiff claimed that the stalling was caused by the failure of the Elantra’s fuel pump.

Multiple defendants were sued in Texas state court for claims related to this collision. The opinion, however, focuses solely on Hyundam Industrial Company, Ltd., alleged to be the manufacturer of the Elantra’s fuel pump.

B. Hyundam’s Role in the Supply Chain

According to the affidavit of Hyundam’s Managing Director, the supply chain operated as follows:

• Hyundam, headquartered in South Korea, designed and manufactured the fuel pump in South Korea.
• Hyundam did so under specifications provided by Hyundai Motor Company and subject to Hyundai’s approval.
• Approximately 99% of Hyundam’s fuel pumps were sold to Donghee Industries, another South Korean company, which incorporated the pumps into fuel systems in South Korea.
• Donghee then sold the completed fuel systems to Hyundai Motor Company in South Korea, which installed them into Elantra vehicles assembled in South Korea.
• Approximately 1% of Hyundam’s pumps were sold to Hyundai Mobis, another South Korean entity, which handled global distribution of service parts, including to Hyundai dealerships in Texas.

Crucially, once Hyundam sold the pumps in South Korea, it had no control over where finished vehicles or replacement parts were sold or shipped worldwide.

C. Hyundam’s Lack of Direct Texas Contacts

Chang’s affidavit, which the Court credits, further asserted that Hyundam:

• Has never done or sought to do business in Texas;
• Has no offices, employees, or agents in Texas;
• Does not advertise, market, export, or sell products in Texas; and
• Has no control over where Hyundai or Mobis sells vehicles or parts containing its fuel pumps.

D. The Plaintiff’s Jurisdictional Evidence

To establish jurisdiction, Swacina relied primarily on four types of evidence:

1. North American design intent: Testimony that Hyundam developed the fuel pump “to satisfy specification for North America,” and knew that vehicles with its pumps would be sold in North America—which includes Texas.
2. Replacement part sale in Texas: Evidence that a replacement Hyundam fuel pump was purchased at a Hyundai dealership in Texas (Hub Hyundai).
3. Corporate website: Hyundam maintained an English-language website accessible from Texas, stating that it had supplied Hyundai with fuel pumps since 1994.
4. U.S. Elantra sales: Hyundai sold more than 97,000 Elantras in the United States in 2009.

E. Procedural Posture

• Hyundam filed a special appearance under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a, challenging personal jurisdiction and attaching Chang’s affidavit.
• Swacina objected to the affidavit—principally on the ground that it was not based on Chang’s personal knowledge—and moved to strike it.
• The trial court overruled the objections, denied the motion to strike, and ultimately denied Hyundam’s special appearance.
• Hyundam pursued an interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that:
  • The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the affidavit; and
  • Hyundam purposefully availed itself of the Texas market by designing fuel pumps for the North American region, and it did not need to “single Texas out in some unique way” to satisfy due process.
• The Supreme Court granted review and, without oral argument, reversed.

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IV. Legal Framework

A. Special Appearance and Affidavits (Texas Rule 120a)

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a, a nonresident defendant may file a “special appearance” to dispute personal jurisdiction without submitting to the general jurisdiction of the court. The rule specifies that the court must decide the special appearance based on:

Affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a special appearance:

• Must be made on personal knowledge;
• Must set forth specific admissible facts; and
• Must affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify.

Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings (including whether to strike such an affidavit) for abuse of discretion— meaning the trial court’s ruling will stand unless it was arbitrary, unreasonable, or made without reference to guiding legal principles.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction: Purposeful Availment

The Due Process Clause requires that, before a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:

1. The defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state such that it has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities there; and
2. The plaintiff’s claims must “arise out of or relate to” those contacts.

The Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed this framework in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), which the Texas Supreme Court cites. Texas courts have long adhered to this standard, emphasizing that:

• Courts consider only the defendant’s contacts with Texas, not the unilateral activity of third parties or the plaintiff (Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007); Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013)).
• The defendant’s contacts must be purposeful, not random, fortuitous, or attenuated (Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575).
• The defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of Texas’s jurisdiction (Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005)).

C. Stream of Commerce and “Additional Conduct”

In product-liability cases, especially involving foreign manufacturers, Texas follows the “stream of commerce plus” approach derived from the plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and applied in Texas in Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2010).

Under this approach:

• Merely placing a product into the stream of commerce, even with the knowledge it may reach the forum, is not enough.
• The defendant must engage in “additional conduct” that indicates an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state, such as:
  • Designing the product specifically for the forum;
  • Advertising in the forum;
  • Establishing channels for providing regular advice or service to customers in the forum; or
  • Marketing products through a distributor that has agreed to serve as a sales agent in the forum.

Recent Texas cases such as CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996), TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2016), Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2021), and BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik (Tex. 2025), underscore that mere foreseeability or awareness that products may reach Texas is insufficient; the defendant must target Texas.

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V. The Court’s Holdings in Detail

A. The Affidavit: Personal Knowledge and Competence

Swacina argued that Chang’s affidavit should be struck because it was not based on personal knowledge, rendering it incompetent to support a special appearance.

The Court rejected that argument, emphasizing these points:

• Under In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Tex. 2004), an affiant must swear that the facts in the affidavit reflect his personal knowledge.
• Under Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tex. 2008), an affiant’s belief about facts is insufficient; it must be knowledge.
• Merely stating “these facts are within my personal knowledge,” without foundation, is conclusory and inadequate (Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996)).

However, Chang’s affidavit went beyond a bare assertion:

• He described in detail his seventeen-year work history at Hyundam, including various positions culminating in his role as Managing Director of the Technical R&D Center.
• He explained that he supervised product development for new vehicle models and regularly attended business meetings where he learned about:
  • Purchasers and distribution chains for Hyundam’s products;
  • Quantities of products sold; and
  • Hyundam’s revenues, sales, and marketing practices.
• He noted that he had reviewed contracts and documents related to new vehicle models and product distribution in preparing the affidavit.

Texas courts recognize that an affiant’s job responsibilities can establish personal knowledge of company operations (Valenzuela v. State & County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 317 S.W.3d 550, 553–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)). In light of this detailed foundation, the Supreme Court concluded that Chang’s affidavit met the personal-knowledge requirement of Rule 120a(3).

Accordingly, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the affidavit and in considering it when ruling on Hyundam’s special appearance.

B. No Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Hyundam

The core substantive holding is that Texas lacks specific personal jurisdiction over Hyundam. The Court applies the familiar two-prong test but stops at the first prong—purposeful availment—because that prong is not satisfied.

1. Foreseeability vs. Targeting: North American Design

The plaintiff’s main argument rested on Hyundam’s design choice: the fuel pump was developed to satisfy “North American” specifications, and Hyundam knew vehicles containing its pumps were being sold in North America, including Texas.

The Court’s response is decisive:

Key points:

• Foreseeability that a product will be sold in Texas is not sufficient to establish minimum contacts.
• The jurisdictional inquiry must focus on the defendant’s contacts with Texas, not with a larger region that includes Texas (citing J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885–86 (2011) (plurality)).
• North America is a broad region encompassing the 50 U.S. states and 22 other countries. Designing a product for such a region, without more, does not reveal an “intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state.”

The Court therefore holds that Hyundam’s North America-oriented design work is, at most, evidence of foreseeability and not the “additional conduct” necessary for purposeful availment of Texas.

2. The “BRP-Rotax” Clarification and Texas-Specific Targeting

This decision is expressly tied to BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, decided the same day. In BRP-Rotax, the Court held that even a distribution agreement covering an enormous, multi-continent territory that included Texas did not, without more, demonstrate that the foreign manufacturer had targeted Texas as required for specific jurisdiction.

Here, the Court reiterates that “a key point is that mere awareness, or ‘foreseeability,’ of a product’s sale or distribution in Texas ‘alone’ cannot ‘create minimum contacts’ sufficient to ‘support personal jurisdiction’” and that “the defendant must target Texas; it is not enough that the ‘defendant merely foresees [its] product ending up there.’”

The Court analogizes Hyundam’s conduct to that in BRP-Rotax:

• In BRP-Rotax, the distribution agreement’s territory covered two continents and included Texas, but did not direct or require Texas-specific marketing or sales.
• In Hyundam, the design was for “North America” as a whole, and Hyundam had no control over where within that region vehicles or parts were sold.

In both, the Court found that such broad regional arrangements “express no view, much less any command, about whether any business at all will be transacted in Texas.” Absent conduct directed at Texas itself, there is no purposeful availment.

3. Distinguishing Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft

The plaintiff and the court of appeals relied heavily on State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. 2023), arguing that a defendant need not “single Texas out in some unique way” to be subject to specific jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court explains that Volkswagen is materially different and was misapplied:

• In Volkswagen, the automaker and related companies:
  • Initiated recall and service campaigns in every market in which their vehicles were present, including Texas; and
  • Directly engaged Texas dealerships and Texas regulators as part of their nationwide remedial efforts.
• That conduct clearly targeted Texas, even though it targeted other states at the same time.
• The phrase “need not single Texas out in some unique way” thus meant:
  • Once targeting of Texas is established, due process does not require the defendant to treat Texas differently from other states; and
  • The existence of similar conduct toward other states does not negate the Texas-specific nature of the conduct toward Texas.

By contrast, in Hyundam there is no evidence at all of conduct directed at Texas. The court of appeals erred by treating a broad regional design (North America) as equivalent to Texas-directed activities.

4. Other Alleged Contacts: One Pump Sale, Website, and Hyundai’s U.S. Sales

The Court addresses, and rejects, each of the plaintiff’s secondary jurisdictional arguments.

• Single replacement pump purchase in Texas:
  The record shows only that a replacement fuel pump, attributed to Hyundam, was purchased at a Texas Hyundai dealership (Hub Hyundai). The Court notes:
  • Hyundam sold less than 1% of its pumps to Hyundai Mobis in South Korea.
  • Hyundam had no control over where Mobis distributed those pumps.
  • There is no evidence that Hyundam had a distribution agreement with any U.S. or Texas entity, nor that Mobis acted as Hyundam’s agent in Texas.
  • Under Asahi, using a distributor as a sales agent in the forum can be “additional conduct,” but that was not shown here.
  Therefore, this single sale reflects only that the stream of commerce happened to carry the product into Texas, not that Hyundam itself targeted Texas.
• English-language website:
  Hyundam maintained a website in English, accessible from Texas, stating that it had supplied Hyundai with fuel pumps since 1994. The Court—echoing BRP-Rotax—observes that if merely having an English-language website sufficed to show targeting of Texas, Texas courts would be open to a vast array of foreign companies whose only “contact” is a globally accessible website. This is insufficient to establish purposeful availment of Texas.
• Hyundai’s Elantra sales in the U.S.:
  Evidence that Hyundai sold more than 97,000 Elantras in the U.S. in 2009 is legally irrelevant to Hyundam’s contacts with Texas:
  • Hyundai’s sales are the actions of a third party, not of Hyundam.
  • Texas law prohibits relying on the unilateral acts of third parties to establish the defendant’s minimum contacts (Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151).

Taken together, all of the plaintiff’s evidence at most shows:

This, under Asahi and Texas precedents, is not enough.

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VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Evidentiary and Procedural Precedents

• Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. 2016):
  Cited for the standard of review—evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. 2004):
  Affidavits must reflect the affiant’s personal knowledge, not hearsay or conjecture.
• Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. 2008):
  An affiant’s belief is not the same as knowledge; affidavits based only on belief are legally insufficient.
• Ryland v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996):
  A bare statement that the affiant has personal knowledge, without factual foundation, is conclusory and does not satisfy Rule 120a.
• Valenzuela v. State & County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 317 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.):
  Recognizes that an employee’s job duties can confer personal knowledge of company operations, supporting the sufficiency of Chang’s affidavit.
• Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Vizant Techs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2019), and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.1:
  Cited to explain that a party may urge an alternative ground to affirm the court of appeals’ judgment (here, striking the affidavit) without filing a cross-petition, so long as it does not seek to alter the judgment. This allowed Swacina to attack the affidavit in his merits briefing.

B. Substantive Jurisdiction Precedents

• International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (not cited but foundational):
  Established the modern “minimum contacts” standard under the Due Process Clause.
• CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996):
  Emphasized that mere foreseeability or awareness that a product will enter Texas is not enough to create minimum contacts; cited in Hyundam to support the “no foreseeability alone” rule.
• Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005):
  Articulated that the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of Texas; purposeful availment is measured by the defendant’s actions, not the plaintiff’s.
• Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007):
  Clarified Texas’s two-prong specific-jurisdiction test (purposeful availment + nexus) and emphasized that only the defendant’s Texas contacts are relevant, not unilateral actions of others.
• TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2016):
  Reaffirmed that broadcasting and related activities must be purposefully directed at the forum to support jurisdiction; cited for the principle that mere awareness of an audience in the forum is not enough.
• Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2021):
  Stated explicitly that it is not enough that a defendant “merely foresees” its product ending up in Texas; this language is directly quoted.
• Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021):
  Confirmed that claims must “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum contacts, but made clear that a strict causal test is not always necessary when the defendant extensively serves the forum’s market. Hyundam cites Ford for the general specific-jurisdiction framework.
• Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2010):
  Adopted the “stream of commerce plus” approach requiring “additional conduct” targeting the forum state. This is a key doctrinal anchor in Hyundam.
• Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality):
  Origin of the “additional conduct” requirement for stream-of-commerce cases; cited repeatedly for the proposition that simply placing a product into the stream of commerce is insufficient.
• J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality):
  Held that a foreign manufacturer that intended to serve the entire U.S. market but had no forum-specific conduct was not subject to New Jersey jurisdiction. Hyundam uses Nicastro to reinforce that a regional or national marketing strategy does not automatically equate to targeting any particular state.
• State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. 2023):
  Found jurisdiction because the defendants did engage in Texas-specific (and nationwide) recall and remedial actions related to their diesel vehicles. Hyundam explains that Volkswagen does not relax the requirement of Texas-directed conduct; it simply clarifies that Texas need not be treated uniquely if it is part of a broader multi-state targeting strategy.
• Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2013):
  Reiterates that only the defendant’s Texas contacts matter; acts of third parties cannot establish the defendant’s purposeful availment.
• BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. June 20, 2025):
  Decided the same day. It stands for the proposition that a foreign manufacturer’s awareness that a distributor’s defined territory includes Texas, without Texas-specific marketing or distribution decisions by the manufacturer, does not constitute targeting Texas. Hyundam repeatedly relies on and echoes BRP-Rotax.

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VII. Legal Concepts Simplified

A. Specific vs. General Jurisdiction

• General jurisdiction exists when a company’s affiliations with the forum state are “so continuous and systematic” that it may be sued there on any claim, even one unrelated to its forum contacts. For corporations, this is typically limited to their place of incorporation and principal place of business.
• Specific jurisdiction exists when:
  • The defendant has minimum contacts with the forum related to the particular lawsuit, and
  • The claims “arise out of or relate to” those contacts.

Hyundam involves only specific jurisdiction. No one claimed Hyundam was “at home” in Texas.

B. Purposeful Availment

Purposeful availment is about fairness and predictability. A defendant should not be surprised to be sued in a jurisdiction where it has:

• Deliberately conducted business;
• Targeted customers; or
• Enjoyed protections and benefits of that state’s laws and markets.

It is not enough that:

• A product simply ends up in the forum state through someone else’s actions; or
• The defendant could foresee that its product might eventually reach the state as part of the normal course of commercial distribution.

C. Stream of Commerce vs. Stream of Commerce “Plus”

When a product is placed into the stream of commerce (for example, sold to a wholesaler or assembler who then ships it around the world), the “stream of commerce plus” standard asks:

• Did the manufacturer do something more than just sell into the stream?
• Did it take steps that specifically aimed at the forum state, such as appointing a forum-based distributor, designing products for forum regulations, or advertising in the forum?

If the answer is “no”—and the product arrived in the forum only because downstream actors chose to sell it there—then the manufacturer is generally not subject to specific jurisdiction in that forum.

D. Role of Third Parties

A recurring theme is that:

• Third-party conduct (e.g., Hyundai’s decision where to sell cars; Mobis’s decision where to ship service parts; a local dealer’s sale) does not count as the defendant’s contact with Texas.
• Courts look to what the defendant itself chose to do with respect to the forum.

E. Special Appearance in Texas

A “special appearance” is a procedural device that allows a nonresident defendant to challenge the court’s personal jurisdiction without submitting to the court’s power on the merits. The key features:

• It must be filed before any other pleading or motion addressing the merits.
• It can be supported or opposed by affidavits, discovery, and testimony.
• If the special appearance is sustained, the defendant is dismissed from the case.

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VIII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Foreign Manufacturers and Component Suppliers

Hyundam, especially when read with BRP-Rotax, sends a strong signal: foreign manufacturers and component suppliers that operate through multi-layered global supply chains will ordinarily not face litigation in Texas unless they have taken Texas-directed actions.

Examples of conduct that will typically not suffice:

• Designing products for broad regions (e.g., “North America” or “global markets”), even with knowledge that includes Texas.
• Selling products to a foreign OEM or distributor with worldwide distribution rights, without controlling or directing its Texas sales.
• Maintaining a generic English-language website accessible in Texas but not specifically aimed at Texas customers.

Conversely, conduct that may expose foreign manufacturers to Texas jurisdiction includes:

• Engaging Texas-based distributors or dealers, or appointing a distributor with an explicit Texas sales mandate.
• Targeted advertising or marketing directed at Texas consumers or businesses.
• Deploying Texas-specific recall, repair, or service campaigns (as in Volkswagen).
• Designing products specifically to comply with Texas law or standards, combined with other Texas-focused actions.

B. For Texas Plaintiffs in Products Cases

Texas plaintiffs injured by products manufactured abroad will find it more difficult to sue component manufacturers directly in Texas courts unless:

• They can develop evidence of Texas-specific conduct by the foreign manufacturer; or
• They can proceed against domestic entities in the distribution chain (e.g., the vehicle manufacturer, domestic importer, or Texas dealers) that do have sufficient Texas contacts.

In practice, this may increase the importance of:

• Jurisdictional discovery focused on distribution agreements, marketing strategies, and recall or service campaigns;
• Pursuing claims in forums where the manufacturer is clearly subject to jurisdiction (e.g., the manufacturer’s home country or principal place of business); and
• Invoking federal jurisdictional doctrines, where applicable, that may differ in nuance but share the same constitutional baseline.

C. For Texas Trial and Appellate Courts

Hyundam provides clear guidance on several points:

• Courts must conduct a forum-by-forum analysis (citing Nicastro and Volkswagen). Conduct directed generically at “North America” or “the United States” is not automatically conduct directed at Texas.
• Statements like “defendant need not single Texas out in some unique way” (from Volkswagen) cannot be taken out of context to eliminate the requirement of Texas-specific conduct.
• Lower courts should be skeptical of jurisdictional claims that rely on:
  • Foreseeability alone;
  • Internet presence alone; or
  • Third-party sales volume in the U.S. or Texas, absent evidence tying those sales to the defendant’s purposeful actions.

D. For Internet-Based Contacts

The Court’s rejection of an English-language website as a jurisdictional hook reinforces a cautious approach to “internet jurisdiction.” The opinion implies:

• Passive or informational websites, accessible from anywhere, do not constitute purposeful targeting of Texas.
• Even the choice of English as a language is insufficient, given the many English-speaking jurisdictions worldwide.
• More interactive, Texas-focused online activities (e.g., direct sales into Texas, Texas-targeted advertising, geolocated promotions) might yield a different result, but that is not before the Court here.

E. Interaction with U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Hyundam positions Texas squarely in line with the more restrictive side of stream-of-commerce doctrine, consistent with:

• The Asahi plurality (Justice O’Connor), and
• The Nicastro plurality (Justice Kennedy).

At the same time, it does not conflict with Ford, which involved a defendant with extensive, direct forum contacts—e.g., advertising, dealerships, and servicing—such that there was no doubt about purposeful availment. In Hyundam, there were simply no comparable Texas-directed contacts.

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IX. Critical Evaluation

From a doctrinal standpoint, Hyundam is coherent, predictable, and tightly linked to prior Texas and U.S. Supreme Court precedents. It clarifies an important misreading of Volkswagen and aligns Texas with a robust requirement of forum-specific targeting in stream-of-commerce cases.

However, the decision also highlights several tensions:

• Access to justice vs. jurisdictional limits:
  Injured Texas residents may find themselves unable to sue foreign component manufacturers in Texas, even though their injuries occurred in Texas and the products are widely sold here. This places a heavier burden on suing domestic entities and on pursuing foreign litigation.
• Modern global commerce vs. territorial jurisdiction:
  Global manufacturers benefit from U.S. markets while carefully structuring their operations to avoid direct jurisdictional ties. Hyundam confirms that such structuring can be effective in avoiding Texas jurisdiction, so long as there is no Texas-directed conduct.
• Line-drawing problems:
  The opinion states that a foreign manufacturer “need not design its products specifically for Texas” to be subject to jurisdiction, but must nonetheless engage in “some conduct targeting Texas.” Defining precisely what that “some conduct” is will continue to be litigated, particularly around issues like:
  • Regional design plus some U.S.-based marketing;
  • Use of national distributors with known Texas operations; and
  • Digital marketing that is nationally targeted but measurably reaches Texas customers.

Still, within its factual setting—component design and sale entirely in South Korea, no control over downstream distribution, and no deliberate Texas outreach—the Court’s conclusion that Hyundam did not purposefully avail itself of the Texas market is firmly grounded in existing law.

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X. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Hyundam Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Swacina stands as a clear reaffirmation of a central rule in Texas personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence:

Key takeaways include:

• Affidavits in special appearances: Corporate officers can provide competent, personal-knowledge testimony based on their responsibilities and access to company information, if they lay an adequate foundation.
• Purposeful availment: Designing products for broad regions (such as North America) and knowing that products are sold in Texas does not, without more, show purposeful availment of Texas.
• Stream of commerce: Texas adheres to a “stream of commerce plus” model—additional Texas-directed conduct is required beyond placing products into the distribution stream.
• Misreading corrected: Volkswagen does not relax the requirement for Texas-specific contacts; it simply clarifies that once such contacts exist, they need not be unique compared to other states.
• Third-party activity and websites: Sales by downstream parties and a generic English-language website do not, by themselves, establish Texas-directed conduct by a foreign manufacturer.

In a broader sense, Hyundam, together with BRP-Rotax, meaningfully limits the reach of Texas courts over foreign companies in products-liability cases. It underscores that constitutional due process remains a potent shield for out-of-state and out-of-country defendants unless plaintiffs can demonstrate concrete, deliberate, and forum-specific conduct connecting those defendants to Texas.