Requiring Consideration of DVPO Findings in Child Custody Best-Interests Analysis

Introduction

Jasmine R. v. Cornell R. is a memorandum opinion issued by the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska on March 19, 2025. In the underlying dispute, the parties—Jasmine and Cornell R.—are recently separated parents contesting legal and physical custody of their young son. Early in their post-separation proceedings, Jasmine obtained an ex parte 20-day Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) against Cornell, alleging threats, indecent exposure, and other misconduct. After a hearing, a magistrate judge converted the short-term DVPO into a long-term order based on repeated violations. Meanwhile, the parties filed for divorce and litigated interim custody, visitation, and ultimately a unified custody trial. The superior court awarded joint legal custody and shared physical custody to both parents but made no explicit findings about the underlying DVPO violations when analyzing the “best interests” factors. Jasmine appealed, arguing that the court overlooked key domestic violence findings that trigger a statutory presumption against joint custody.

Summary of the Judgment

The Alaska Supreme Court upheld most of the superior court’s rulings, affirming that:

No clear error supported finding a pattern of domestic violence beyond the DVPO violations.
The court did not err in weighing six of eight best-interests factors, including the child’s needs, each parent’s ability to meet them, emotional bonds, stability, encouragement of the other parent’s role, and substance abuse concerns.
The trial court properly reserved property division for a later proceeding without prejudice to either side.
No error arose from declining to change the child’s last name, as no formal name-change petition was filed at trial.

But the Supreme Court found one reversible oversight: the superior court failed to show that it actually considered the “numerous incidents of contact” underpinning Jasmine’s long-term DVPO when weighing AS 25.24.150(c)(7), the domestic violence factor. Because a history of multiple domestic violence incidents triggers a rebuttable presumption against joint legal or physical custody, the court vacated the custody order and remanded for explicit findings on how the DVPO findings affect the custody determination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Parks v. Parks (214 P.3d 295 (Alaska 2009)): Recognized that each violation of a protective order is a separate incident of domestic violence and directed courts to inquire into such incidents even if the parties fail to raise them fully.
Sarah D. v. John D. (352 P.3d 419 (Alaska 2015)): Held that superior courts must make specific findings about alleged domestic violence incidents to allow appellate review of factor (c)(7).
Adam F. v. Caitlin B. (551 P.3d 553 (Alaska 2024)): Confirmed that repeated DVPO violations constitute a “history of perpetrating domestic violence” under AS 25.24.150(h).
Ebertz v. Ebertz (113 P.3d 643 (Alaska 2005)): Restated that custody determinations enjoy broad discretion and are overturned only for abuse of discretion or clear factual error.
Husseini v. Husseini (230 P.3d 682 (Alaska 2010)) and Wilson v. Wilson (271 P.3d 1098 (Alaska 2012)): Addressed the circumstances under which bifurcation of divorce issues is permissible, requiring good cause and no prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Presumption Against Joint Custody AS 25.24.150(g) establishes a rebuttable presumption that a parent with a history of multiple domestic violence incidents “may not” be awarded joint legal or physical custody. A “history” arises if the court finds “more than one incident of domestic violence,” including separate violations of a protective order.

2. Superior Court’s Oversight Although the magistrate judge’s long-term DVPO order expressly rested on Jasmine’s testimony about “numerous incidents of contact” in violation of the ex parte order, the superior court’s post-trial findings and conclusions make no mention of those incidents when analyzing factor (c)(7). Without explicit consideration, there is no way for the appellate court to determine whether the presumption was triggered or, if triggered, whether it was properly rebutted.

3. Remand for Explicit Findings Under Parks and Sarah D., the trial court must revisit the record, specifically address the factual findings underlying the DVPO, decide if they amount to a “history of perpetrating domestic violence,” and then weigh factor (c)(7) in its best-interests calculus.

Impact

This decision underscores that even in a non-precedential memorandum, Alaska trial courts must diligently incorporate protective-order findings into custody analyses. Going forward:

Superiors courts will need to parse magistrate-level DVPO records for distinct incidents and make clear written findings on those incidents when weighing the domestic violence factor.
Parties relying on DVPO violations cannot assume courts will automatically consider them; explicit argument and careful record-building remain essential.
Appellate challenges to custody awards on DVPO grounds will hinge on whether the trial court’s findings and reasoning display a transparent consideration of AS 25.24.150(c)(7) and (g). Remand is likely where that transparency is absent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO) A court order aimed at preventing domestic violence by restricting contact. Each knowing violation—such as an unauthorized phone call—can be a separate “incident” of domestic violence under Alaska law.
Rebuttable Presumption A legal rule that starts with a presumed fact (here, that joint custody is improper if there is a history of domestic violence) but allows a party to introduce evidence to “rebut” or overcome that presumption.
Abuse of Discretion vs. Clear Error Trial courts have broad discretion in custody matters. An “abuse of discretion” requires more than a mere disagreement—it exists if the court considered improper factors or failed to consider mandatory ones. “Clear error” refers to a factual finding so wrong that the appellate court has a firm conviction a mistake was made.
Bifurcation of Divorce Proceedings Courts may split issues (such as deciding custody and postponing property division) only with good cause and assurances that neither side is prejudiced by the delay.
Hearsay and Foundation Out-of-court statements offered for their truth generally require the declarant’s testimony or an applicable exception. A party must lay the proper foundation—showing a witness’s competence to testify to the facts—in order for such evidence to be admitted.

Conclusion

Jasmine R. v. Cornell R. reaffirms that Alaska courts must explicitly tie domestic violence protective-order findings into the best-interests analysis under AS 25.24.150(c)(7) and the statutory presumption in (g). By vacating and remanding the custody award for corrective findings, the Supreme Court safeguards the judiciary’s duty to protect children in domestic violence contexts and ensures transparency in custody decision-making. Trial courts and practitioners alike should take heed: in every custody dispute involving DVPOs, meticulous fact-finding and reasoned analysis are not optional—they are indispensable.