Requirement of Particularized Findings and First Amendment Balancing for Supervised Release Prohibitions on Adult Pornography

Requirement of Particularized Findings and First Amendment Balancing for Supervised Release Prohibitions on Adult Pornography

Introduction

United States v. Caraballo, 10th Cir. No. 24-5029 (Apr. 4, 2025), arises from the Northern District of Oklahoma. Carlos Caraballo was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in Indian country and production of child pornography after engaging in sexual acts with a 13-year-old girl and photographing her performing oral sex. He was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release that included an unusual condition: a prohibition on possession of any sexually explicit material involving adults. On appeal, Caraballo challenged two aspects of his sentence:

  • Whether the district court properly applied the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for using a computer “for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material” (U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)); and
  • Whether the court lawfully imposed a special supervised‐release condition banning all adult pornography without specific findings and balancing of First Amendment interests (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the enhancement but vacated and remanded the adult‐pornography prohibition, holding that district courts must make particularized, record-based findings and explicitly balance significant liberty interests when imposing broad First Amendment–implicating conditions.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellate court’s decision has two core holdings:

  1. Sentencing Enhancement Affirmed – The district court’s findings (and Caraballo’s plea admission) directly addressed the requisite “purpose” element of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B). Caraballo had used his cell phone to desensitize and normalize sexual conduct with the minor in order to induce her to produce explicit images.
  2. Supervised-Release Condition Vacated – The lifetime prohibition on adult sexual material intruded on a substantial First Amendment and liberty interest. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the district court failed to:
    • Link the ban to any evidence that Caraballo had ever viewed adult pornography or that such material fueled his offense;
    • Show how the restriction was reasonably necessary to deter future criminality, protect the public, or address correctional needs; and
    • Balance the governmental interests against Caraballo’s significant liberty interest in accessing lawful adult material.
    Accordingly, the court vacated that condition and remanded for further particularized findings and balancing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Eddington, 65 F.4th 1231 (10th Cir. 2023) – Standard of de novo review for legal challenges to sentencing guideline applications.
  • United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2001) & United States v. Gallegos, No. 23-1147 (10th Cir. Dec. 2023) (unpublished) – Illustrations of using digital lures “for the purpose of producing sexually explicit materials.” Caraballo asserted misapplication, but the court concluded those citations neither dictated nor altered the core “purpose” inquiry.
  • United States v. Englehart, 22 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2022) & United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719 (10th Cir. 2020) – Recognizing a significant liberty interest in viewing adult pornography and requiring special-condition findings.
  • United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007) – Courts vacating broad bans on adult materials where no evidence tied such materials to the offense or to risk of recidivism.
  • United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008) – Requirement that special conditions be justified on the record to permit meaningful appellate review of substantive reasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

Enhancement for Computer-Facilitated Solicitation: Under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B), an additional two-level enhancement applies if the defendant used a computer (or cell phone) “for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material” involving a minor. Caraballo argued on appeal that the district court never explicitly addressed this “purpose” element. The Tenth Circuit disagreed:

  • The court’s factual findings—Caraballo’s sending of explicit messages to “normalize” exploitation and its alignment with his guilty plea language—demonstrated that the court did consider and find the requisite purpose.
  • Citings of Reaves and Gallegos were descriptive rather than outcome-determinative; they did not detract from the court’s express findings on purpose.

Supervised-Release Prohibition on Adult Pornography: Because adult pornography is fully lawful for most persons, its blanket prohibition implicates a “particularly significant liberty interest.” Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and Tenth Circuit precedent, any such restriction must:

  1. Be reasonably related to sentencing goals (e.g., deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation);
  2. Be supported by record evidence showing that the condition is needed to advance those goals;
  3. Deprive liberty no more than necessary; and
  4. Balance the governmental interest against the offender’s First Amendment rights.

The district court’s two offered rationales—(1) that any sexually explicit material might tempt reoffending, and (2) that distinguishing adult from child content can be challenging—were unsupported by evidence in the record. Caraballo had no history of adult pornography use tied to his crime, no documented difficulty differentiating minors from adults in images, and no testimony or expert opinion justifying the broad ban. Crucially, the court never balanced the ban’s asserted benefits against Caraballo’s significant liberty interest. Under Englehart and Martinez-Torres, these failures mandated vacatur and remand.

Impact

This decision refines Tenth Circuit sentencing law in two respects:

  • Enhancement Clarity: Courts must clearly anchor guideline enhancements—such as § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)’s “purpose” element—in explicit findings or in the defendant’s plea colloquy.
  • Supervised-Release Conditions: Any prohibition on lawful adult pornography requires:
    • Record evidence linking the material to criminal risk or rehabilitative need;
    • Particularized, fact-based findings; and
    • An explicit balancing of First Amendment interests.

Future district courts in the Tenth Circuit must therefore avoid boilerplate language when crafting supervised-release conditions that intrude on fundamental liberties. Absent a strong, case-specific record basis, such conditions risk reversal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • U.S.S.G. Enhancement (§ 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)): A sentencing increase when a defendant uses any electronic device to coax a minor into producing explicit images.
  • Supervised Release vs. Probation: A period of correctional supervision after imprisonment, subject to statutory conditions in 18 U.S.C. § 3583.
  • First Amendment Balancing: Even convicted offenders retain constitutional rights; a court must weigh governmental objectives against an individual’s right to receive and view lawful materials.
  • Particularized Findings: Specific, record-based factual determinations that justify restricting fundamental rights, enabling meaningful appellate review.

Conclusion

United States v. Caraballo delivers two key lessons:

  1. Sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines require clear, purposeful findings, whether drawn from the record or the defendant’s plea.
  2. Broad supervised-release bans on adult pornography—an activity protected by the First Amendment for lawfully age-qualified adults—demand particularized, evidence-based justifications and an explicit constitutional balancing test.

This decision will guide district courts and practitioners by reinforcing the need for precision and thorough justification when sentencing and supervising individuals convicted of sex offenses, preserving both public safety and fundamental liberties.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Comments