“Required” Evidence and Unsworn Presentment Under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a): Flexible Immigration Proof Becomes “Required” Once Chosen

I. Introduction

United States v. Oluwatoyin Aborisade arises from a visa-fraud scheme involving self-petitions filed under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). Aborisade, operating an immigration-application preparation business (not as a licensed attorney), prepared and filed multiple VAWA Form I-360 petitions supported by fabricated “credible evidence,” including reused-and-edited psychological evaluations and forged residential lease agreements. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to commit visa fraud, multiple counts of visa fraud under the fourth paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.

On appeal, Aborisade raised two principal issues: (1) whether the forged psychological evaluations and leases were “other document[s] required by the immigration laws or regulations” for purposes of § 1546(a) when VAWA regulations describe such materials as examples of evidence that “may” be submitted; and (2) whether the § 1546(a) “knowingly presents” offense requires that the false statement be made “under oath.” He also sought resentencing under Fourth Circuit “Rogers” jurisprudence based on an asserted inconsistency between oral pronouncement and the written judgment’s supervised-release reporting condition.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed across the board. First, it held that although VAWA’s implementing regulation provides flexibility and does not mandate any particular evidentiary item (e.g., a lease or psychological evaluation), some evidence is necessary to establish eligibility; once a petitioner chooses a type of proof to satisfy an eligibility element, that proof becomes an “other document required” within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a). Second, the court adopted the Second Circuit’s interpretation that § 1546(a)’s “knowingly presents” clause does not carry an oath requirement; presentment of unsworn but knowingly false immigration documents is criminalized. Third, it found no reversible discrepancy under United States v. Rogers because the asserted inconsistency in the supervised-release reporting district was immaterial given Bureau of Prisons release practices.

Judge Heytens dissented, reasoning that § 204.2(c) repeatedly emphasizes “any credible evidence” and does not require any particular “document,” so the forged leases and evaluations were not “required” by regulation and could not sustain the § 1546(a) counts.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Briscoe

The majority invoked United States v. Briscoe, 101 F.4th 282 (4th Cir. 2024), for the standard appellate lens when reviewing denial of a Rule 29 motion: viewing facts in the light most favorable to the Government. Although not dispositive of the statutory questions, it frames why the court credited evidence of document fabrication and knowing submission.

2. Van Buren v. United States

Citing Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374 (2021), the court emphasized plain-text statutory interpretation as the starting point. This textualism anchors the majority’s expanded reading of “required” by focusing on ordinary meaning rather than importing a rigid “mandatory form-only” limitation.

3. United States v. Ryan-Webster

United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2003), is the majority’s principal Fourth Circuit analogue. Ryan-Webster interpreted “other document prescribed by statute or regulation” in the first paragraph of § 1546(a) to include documents that are necessary steps in the broader immigration process (even if not the final entry document itself).

The Aborisade majority extended Ryan-Webster’s functional/prerequisite logic: just as labor certification and a Form I-140 were necessary components in the employment-visa pathway, evidence used to establish VAWA eligibility functions as a prerequisite to approval. The dissent countered that Ryan-Webster involved documents actually required to complete the process, whereas VAWA’s “any credible evidence” regime requires proof of facts but not any particular document type.

4. United States v. Jimenez

United States v. Jimenez, 972 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2020), reinforced the majority’s approach to flexible evidentiary regimes: where regulations require that eligibility be “demonstrate[d]” but do not prescribe a specific document, whatever is submitted to satisfy that demonstration can qualify as an “other document required” for § 1546(a) purposes. The Fourth Circuit found Jimenez persuasive support for treating chosen proof as “required” once used to satisfy a regulatory showing.

5. United States v. Khalje and United States v. Ashurov

A circuit split exists on whether the oath requirement in paragraph four of § 1546(a) applies to the “knowingly presents” clause. The majority adopted United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1981), which held that the oath requirement attaches to “knowingly makes” (under oath/perjury) but not to “knowingly presents.” In contrast, United States v. Ashurov, 726 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2013), applied the oath requirement to presentment, partly to avoid rendering the oath language superfluous and to prevent prosecutorial end-runs.

The Fourth Circuit sided with Khalje, reasoning that Congress’s addition of “knowingly presents” in 1952 reflects an intent to criminalize the act of presenting knowingly false immigration materials, whether sworn or not, while still limiting liability to those with knowledge of falsity.

6. United States v. Rogers line (oral vs. written supervised-release conditions)

The sentencing issue is governed by United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and its progeny, including United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021) (unpronounced discretionary conditions in a written judgment are “nullities” and require remand), United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511 (4th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193 (4th Cir. 2024) (materiality of discrepancies). The court also cited United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185 (4th Cir. 2022) (government explanation can show discrepancy is not material), and United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629 (4th Cir. 2024) (a Rogers error requires vacatur and full resentencing).

Aborisade relied on United States v. Reyes, No. 23-4598, 2024 WL 4381162 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) (unpublished), involving a similar reporting-district mismatch. The majority also relied on United States v. Thompson, No. 23-4638, 2025 WL 2427192 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (unpublished), which treated similar language as not adding an “additional obligation.”

7. Authorities cited in dissent (context for the interpretive dispute)

Judge Heytens’ dissent grounded its interpretive method in textual contrasts within the regulations and cited Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), to infer intentional omission: where other immigration regulations expressly require specific documents, § 204.2(c)(2) does not. The dissent also cited Julmice v. Garland, 29 F.4th 206 (4th Cir. 2022), for the proposition that policy concerns cannot overcome text, and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), criticizing the majority’s reasoning as insufficiently grounded. It also discussed forfeiture principles referencing United States v. Newby, 91 F.4th 196 (4th Cir. 2024).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. What “required” means in § 1546(a) when regulations allow “any credible evidence”

The core statutory move is the majority’s functional definition: although the VAWA regulation does not mandate particular evidentiary items, it does require a petitioner to establish eligibility elements; therefore, evidence (of some sort) is necessary to make a prima facie case. The majority then makes a second move: once an applicant (or preparer) selects a particular type of evidence to satisfy an element (e.g., “abuse” via psychological evaluation; “residence” via lease), that chosen evidence becomes “required” in the sense that it is “stipulated as necessary” to the showing as submitted. The opinion analogizes this to selecting a specific option among alternatives: selection makes the chosen item necessary to satisfy the chosen evidentiary pathway.

The dissent rejects that “choice transforms optional evidence into required documents” theory, insisting that § 1546(a) asks whether the regulation required those documents (leases/evaluations), not whether the applicant had to prove the underlying facts. In the dissent’s view, a flexible evidentiary regime that accepts “any credible evidence” is the opposite of a “document required” regime; the Government’s interpretation effectively rewrites “required” to mean “helpful” or “submitted.”

2. Whether “knowingly presents” requires an oath

The majority reads paragraph four as containing two distinct offenses: (i) “knowingly makes under oath / under penalty of perjury” false statements and (ii) “knowingly presents” documents containing such false statements. It holds the oath requirement attaches only to the former. The court relied on the 1952 statutory amendment adding “knowingly presents” and reasoned that knowledge-of-falsity, not the presence of an oath, is what limits the presentment offense and aligns it with Congress’s purpose to protect immigration adjudication from fraud even where forms or attachments are not sworn.

This resolves a question the Fourth Circuit had not previously answered and expressly aligns the circuit with Khalje rather than Ashurov.

3. “Rogers error” and the materiality filter

On supervised release, the court reiterated that unannounced discretionary conditions in the written judgment (or material discrepancies) can require vacatur and full resentencing (Rogers, Singletary, Lassiter). But it also emphasized the limiting principle that only “material” discrepancies trigger that remedy (Turner, Mathis).

Here, the oral pronouncement incorporated a standing order requiring reporting to the district “where you are authorized to reside,” while the written judgment also included language requiring reporting to the district “to which the defendant is released.” The majority characterized this as a facial but immaterial inconsistency because Bureau of Prisons policy and probation practices typically make the release district and authorized-residence district functionally identical. Accordingly, there was no Rogers error and no resentencing.

C. Impact

1. Expanded exposure under § 1546(a) for “supporting evidence,” not just core forms

Aborisade meaningfully broadens the practical reach of the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a) within the Fourth Circuit. In immigration benefit processes that invite varied evidence—especially humanitarian programs like VAWA self-petitions—fraudulent “supporting documents” can be treated as “required” if they are used to satisfy eligibility elements, even where neither regulations nor form instructions mandate that specific kind of attachment.

This may increase prosecutorial leverage in cases involving fabricated narratives and attachments (letters, leases, evaluations, photographs, invoices) because defendants can no longer argue that flexibility in evidentiary submissions removes those documents from § 1546(a)’s coverage.

2. Circuit alignment (and divergence) on the oath question

By adopting Khalje and rejecting Ashurov, the Fourth Circuit deepens an existing circuit split on whether unsworn presentment is criminal under § 1546(a). Unless resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress, venue may matter substantially in prosecutions where false statements appear in unsworn attachments or submissions.

3. Rogers litigation: continued focus on “materiality” and functional equivalence

Aborisade reinforces a materiality screen in Rogers challenges: where differing words do not change the defendant’s real-world obligations, the Fourth Circuit may deny resentencing. The opinion also signals that external administrative practices (here, BOP release policy) can be used to show functional equivalence, even when the written judgment contains internally conflicting formulations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• VAWA self-petition (Form I-360): A process allowing certain abused noncitizen spouses (and certain parents/children) to seek immigration relief without the abusive spouse filing for them.
• “Any credible evidence”: A flexible evidentiary standard—USCIS may consider many types of proof, not only a fixed checklist.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (paragraph four): Criminalizes (a) making certain false immigration statements under oath/perjury and (b) presenting immigration applications/affidavits/other required documents containing materially false statements.
• “Knowingly presents”: Submitting or causing submission of a document to immigration authorities while knowing it contains a material lie; the Fourth Circuit held no oath is necessary for this clause.
• Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal: A post-evidence motion arguing no rational jury could convict because the evidence is insufficient.
• Rogers error: A sentencing error when discretionary supervised-release conditions appear in the written judgment without being orally pronounced (or are materially different from what was pronounced), implicating the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing.
• Material discrepancy (Rogers context): A difference that actually changes the defendant’s obligations; mere clarifying or functionally equivalent wording may not qualify.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Oluwatoyin Aborisade establishes two significant Fourth Circuit rules: (1) in immigration processes permitting multiple types of proof, supporting evidence becomes an “other document required” under the fourth paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) once it is selected and submitted to satisfy eligibility elements; and (2) the “knowingly presents” offense under that same paragraph does not require that the false statement be sworn under oath. The opinion also narrows the practical range of Rogers resentencing claims by treating certain oral/written wording differences as immaterial when administrative practice makes them functionally identical.

The dissent underscores an enduring interpretive fault line—whether “required” should be limited to documents expressly demanded by regulation. Given the circuit split on both the “required document” concept (in flexible-evidence regimes) and the oath question, Aborisade is likely to influence charging decisions, litigation strategy, and potential future en banc or Supreme Court review in immigration-fraud prosecutions.