Rendon v. White Castle Systems, Inc.: Reversible Error to Conflate Tenant and Landowner Duties in Sidewalk Cases; Medical Expenses Limited to Amounts Actually Owed

Introduction

In Rendon v. White Castle System, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04925 (App Div, 2d Dept, Sept. 10, 2025), the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Kings County judgment entered after a bifurcated jury trial in a sidewalk trip-and-fall case. The plaintiff, Paula Rendon, alleged she tripped over a defect on the public sidewalk in front of a White Castle restaurant in Brooklyn, injuring her ankle. She sued the tenant, White Castle System, Inc. (White Castle), and the property owner, Leonardo Asaro, LLC (Asaro).

A first jury found both defendants negligent. After the Supreme Court denied defendants’ CPLR 4404(a) motion to set aside the liability verdict, a second jury awarded damages totaling $2,640,000 (past pain and suffering $600,000; future pain and suffering $1,800,000; past medical expenses $40,000; future medical expenses $200,000), with future damages over a 30-year period. The defendants appealed.

The Second Department held that while the liability case could go to the jury against both defendants, the trial court’s jury instructions failed to differentiate the distinct duties owed by the tenant versus the landowner, creating a risk of prejudice. Exercising its “interest of justice” authority, the court ordered a new liability trial and, if liability is found against either defendant, a new damages trial unless the plaintiff stipulates to a substantial remittitur. The decision also recalibrates the recoverable medical expenses to exclude a funded write-off and trims future medical expenses as partially speculative.

Summary of the Opinion

• Legal sufficiency: The court affirmed that sufficient evidence existed to allow a jury to find White Castle owed a duty under the “special use” doctrine and to find Asaro negligent as landowner. Thus, judgment as a matter of law was properly denied.
• Jury charge error: The liability charge failed to distinguish the separate duties of the tenant and the landowner. This conflation could have prejudiced one or both defendants. The court reversed “on the law and in the exercise of discretion” and ordered a new trial on liability in the interest of justice.
• Damages (conditional): If either defendant is found liable upon retrial, a new trial on damages is required unless the plaintiff stipulates to reduce the awards to:
  • Past pain and suffering: from $600,000 to $350,000
  • Future pain and suffering: from $1,800,000 to $400,000
  • Past medical expenses: from $40,000 to $18,501 (excluding a $20,316.21 funded write-off)
  • Future medical expenses: from $200,000 to $170,230 (eliminating speculative components)
• Standards applied: The court applied well-settled CPLR 4404(a) standards for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial in the interest of justice, and CPLR 5501(c)’s “deviates materially” standard for pain-and-suffering awards.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• CPLR 4404(a) framework
  • Lopes v Lenox Hill Hosp., 172 AD3d 699; Ramirez v Mezzacappa, 121 AD3d 770: Reaffirm that courts may set aside a verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence or order a new trial under CPLR 4404(a).
  • Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129; Sweet v Hazan, 220 AD3d 666; Williams v Ncho, 212 AD3d 687; Hiotidis v Ramuni, 161 AD3d 955; Wasserberg v Menorah Ctr., 197 AD3d 1130: Collectively articulate the “valid line of reasoning” test for legal sufficiency and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
• Interest of justice and jury instructions
  • Freed v Best, 203 AD3d 1143; Duran v Temple Beth Sholom, 155 AD3d 690; Guerra v Ditta, 185 AD3d 667; Daniele v Pain Mgt. Ctr., 168 AD3d 672: Define the “interest of justice” power to grant new trials for trial errors, including erroneous charges.
  • Kelly v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 194 AD3d 1032; Phillips v United Artists Communications, 201 AD2d 634: A charge must “adequately convey[] the sum and substance of the applicable law.” Failure can warrant a new trial.
  • Greenberg v Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch., 169 AD3d 878: Where instructions risk conflating distinct obligations among defendants, prejudice can arise and require a new trial. This case directly supports the remedy here.
• Tenant “special use” liability for sidewalk defects
  • Campos v Midway Cabinets, Inc., 51 AD3d 843; Adorno v Carty, 23 AD3d 590: A tenant may owe a duty for sidewalk conditions where it makes a special use of a sidewalk area and that use creates or contributes to the defect. These cases undergird the court’s rejection of White Castle’s bid for judgment as a matter of law.
• Damages standards and comparables
  • CPLR 5501(c); Angeles v County of Suffolk, 222 AD3d 923; Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, 164 AD3d 656; Lara v Arevalo, 205 AD3d 700; Miller v Weisel, 15 AD3d 458: Pain-and-suffering awards are reviewed for whether they “deviate materially” from reasonable compensation, with guidance from comparable cases.
  • Blair v Coleman, 211 AD3d 671; Sawh v Bally Contr. Corp., 148 AD3d 852; Williams v New York City Tr. Auth., 95 AD3d 1003; Fishbane v Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65 AD3d 1079; Ciano v Sauve, 42 AD3d 556: Collectively provide benchmarks for ankle/foot injuries and surgical interventions; the court relies on these to reduce the pain-and-suffering awards here.
  • Chung v Shaw, 175 AD3d 1237; Pilgrim v Wilson Flat, Inc., 110 AD3d 973: Medical expense awards must be supported by competent evidence of both “need” and “cost.”
  • Wynter v Transdev Servs., Inc., 207 AD3d 785; Tarpley v New York City Tr. Auth., 177 AD3d 929: Future medical expenses cannot be speculative; only costs tied to concrete, supported plans are compensable.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis unfolds in three layers: legal sufficiency, trial error in jury instructions, and damages.

First, the defendants’ push for judgment as a matter of law failed. Applying the “valid line of reasoning” standard, the court held that the plaintiff presented evidence from which a rational jury could find that (1) White Castle made a “special use” of the portion of sidewalk where the defect existed and that its use caused or contributed to the defect; and (2) Asaro, as landowner, was negligent. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concluded there was a rational process to support the jury’s liability findings against each defendant. Thus, the Supreme Court correctly denied judgment as a matter of law.

Second, the Appellate Division exercised its CPLR 4404(a) “interest of justice” authority to set aside the liability verdict and order a new trial, due to a significant jury charge error. The trial court “failed to differentiate between White Castle and Asaro, and failed to identify how their duties differed as tenant and as landowner, respectively.” That failure meant the instructions did not adequately convey the governing law. Because the conflation could have prejudiced either or both defendants, each was entitled to a new liability trial against it. This remedy is consistent with the court’s approach in Greenberg and underscores the obligation to tailor charges to the distinct roles of multiple defendants in premises-liability cases.

Third, the panel turned to damages to guide the retrial. Invoking CPLR 5501(c), it found the pain-and-suffering awards excessive in light of comparable cases. While acknowledging the plaintiff’s torn ankle ligaments and tendons, one surgery to repair them, ongoing pain affecting daily life and work, and likely need for two additional ankle surgeries, the court nevertheless concluded that $600,000 (past) and $1,800,000 (future over 30 years) “deviate materially” from reasonable compensation. It reduced those awards to $350,000 and $400,000, respectively.

On economic damages, the court emphasized evidentiary rigor. The admitted billing records showed $38,817.21 in past medical charges but also reflected a $20,316.21 “funded write off,” an amount the plaintiff did not owe. Because awards must be supported by competent proof of amounts actually incurred or owed, the permissible past medical award could not exceed $18,501. For future medical expenses, the court reduced the $200,000 verdict to $170,230 after identifying speculative components not tied to concrete evidence.

In procedural terms, because the court ordered a new liability trial, it issued a conditional directive on damages: if liability is found against either defendant, there will be a new damages trial unless the plaintiff stipulates to the specified remittitur amounts within 30 days of a liability verdict, in which event the reduced damages verdict will be affirmed. This structure promotes efficiency by pre-setting bounds for damages on remand.

Impact and Implications

• Tailored jury instructions are mandatory in multi-defendant premises cases. Trial courts must clearly distinguish between a landowner’s duties and a tenant’s potential duties (e.g., via special use or creation of a hazard). Conflating those duties is reversible error in the interest of justice.
• Tenant liability for sidewalk defects remains viable under the “special use” doctrine. Plaintiffs need evidence that a tenant’s particular use of a sidewalk area caused or contributed to the defect. Defendants should be prepared to rebut special-use causation with fact-specific evidence.
• Damages calibration: The decision tightens guardrails on pain-and-suffering awards for ankle ligament/tendon injuries with one surgery and likely future interventions, signaling that mid-to-high six-figure totals, not millions, are the appropriate range in the Second Department absent extraordinary complications.
• Medical expense proof must reflect net, non-speculative amounts. Juries may not award past medical expenses that the plaintiff does not owe, such as funded write-offs shown on billing records. Future medical awards must be grounded in concrete, quantified medical plans.
• Appellate case management: Setting conditional remittitur amounts in the same decision that orders a new liability trial can streamline remand and reduce serial appeals.
• Preservation vs. interest of justice: Even where charge errors might not be perfectly preserved, the Appellate Division’s “interest of justice” power can correct instructions that do not “adequately convey” the applicable law—though litigants should still object contemporaneously to preserve issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CPLR 4404(a)
  • Judgment as a matter of law: Set aside a verdict only if there is no “valid line of reasoning” by which a jury could find for the nonmoving party.
  • New trial (weight of evidence): Granted if the verdict cannot be reconciled with the weight of the credible evidence.
  • New trial (interest of justice): Granted to rectify trial-level errors such as misleading charges, prejudicial evidentiary rulings, or other circumstances undermining confidence in the verdict.
• “Special use” of a sidewalk
  • A tenant or occupier may be liable for a sidewalk defect when it makes a particular use of the sidewalk that confers a special benefit and that use causes or contributes to the defect. The duty arises from the tenant’s use, not from general ownership of the sidewalk.
• Distinct duties: Tenant vs. landowner
  • Landowners have a primary duty to maintain adjoining sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition under New York law; tenants may incur duties based on special use or if they affirmatively create a hazard. Proper jury instructions must segregate these duties.
• “Deviates materially” standard (CPLR 5501[c])
  • Appellate courts reduce or increase a jury’s pain-and-suffering awards to bring them into line with reasonable compensation as indicated by comparable cases and the specific facts proved at trial.
• Remittitur
  • An appellate court may condition affirmance on the plaintiff’s consent to reduce excessive damages. If the plaintiff does not consent, a new trial on damages is ordered.
• Medical expense proof
  • Past: Awards must be supported by competent evidence of costs actually incurred or owed. Amounts written off or not owed cannot be recovered based solely on gross charges.
  • Future: Awards must be supported by medical testimony and reliable cost estimates for specific, reasonably certain future care; speculative items must be excluded.

Practical Guidance for Retrial

• Jury charge specificity
  • Separate and explain: (a) the landowner’s duty to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition, and (b) the tenant’s potential duty only if the tenant created the defect or made a special use that caused or contributed to the condition.
  • Clarify causation and notice: Distinguish what proof is required for each defendant (e.g., creation of the hazard, notice, causation), and avoid language that could impute one defendant’s duty or breach to the other.
• Proof of tenant “special use”
  • Develop concrete evidence linking the tenant’s particular use of a specific sidewalk area to the defect (e.g., patterns of use, load, placement of equipment), and show causation, not mere proximity.
• Damages proof
  • Past medicals: Introduce net billing evidence and clarify any adjustments, write-offs, or payments to match the amounts actually owed.
  • Future medicals: Present detailed medical testimony identifying procedures, timelines, frequency of care, and quantified costs to avoid speculation.
  • Pain and suffering: Anchor testimony to functional limitations, work impact, and medical prognosis, while being mindful of Second Department comparables.
• Appellate preservation
  • Request tailored charges in writing and object specifically after the charge is delivered to ensure preservation, even though the “interest of justice” safety valve exists.

Conclusion

Rendon v. White Castle is significant in two respects. First, it crystallizes a clear procedural rule for multi-defendant premises cases: jury instructions must delineate the distinct duties of tenants and landowners, especially in sidewalk defect cases where a tenant’s duty may arise only via special use or creation of a hazard. Conflation is reversible error in the interest of justice. Second, it tightens evidentiary requirements for medical expense awards and recalibrates pain-and-suffering awards to align with comparable Second Department verdicts for similar ankle injuries.

On remand, the trial court must conduct a new liability trial with corrected instructions. If liability is found, the court must either accept a stipulated remittitur to the specific amounts set by the Appellate Division or conduct a new damages trial. Beyond the parties, the decision will guide trial judges and litigants in crafting precise, role-specific charges, in proving tenant “special use,” and in presenting non-speculative, net medical expense evidence—practices that will enhance the accuracy and fairness of verdicts in New York premises liability litigation.