Removal Waives Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Not General Sovereign Immunity; Equal Protection § 1983 Claims Require Specific Comparators and Impermissible Motive

Case: Bell v. University of the State of New York, No. 25-366-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2025) (Summary Order)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Parker, Carney, Nardini, JJ.)

Disposition: Affirmed. Dismissal of federal claims against State Defendants upheld; district court’s non-exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims left undisturbed.

Nonprecedential notice: The panel issued a Summary Order. Under FRAP 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, such orders are citable but do not have precedential effect.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a professional discipline dispute following a chaotic, understaffed overnight shift at a Buffalo skilled nursing facility. Plaintiff Nicole Bell, a nursing supervisor employed by Kaleida Health’s Highpointe on Michigan, was placed on leave after allegedly failing to administer medications. She told her supervisor she had not performed medication administration in 12 years and cited a documented anxiety disorder; she had also complained about chronic understaffing before and during the shift. The New York State Education Department’s Office of Professional Discipline (OPD) later commenced an enforcement process by letter to Bell’s counsel alleging negligence and gross negligence and indicating that disciplinary action was warranted.

Bell sued two groups of defendants: (1) the private actors associated with her employer (Kaleida Health and three employees); and (2) the “State Defendants,” consisting of the University of the State of New York (USNY), the Chancellor of the Board of Regents (Lester W. Young, Jr.), and the Commissioner of the New York State Education Department (Betty A. Rosa), both sued in their official capacities. Her complaint advanced state-law disability, labor, and tort theories and federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, chiefly under the Equal Protection Clause via selective enforcement and class-of-one theories.

The district court dismissed. As relevant here, it held the State Defendants were immune from suit and that Bell’s § 1983 claims failed to state a claim; it also concluded the private “Kaleida Defendants” were not state actors and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. On appeal, Bell challenged only the dismissal as to the State Defendants.

The Second Circuit affirmed. In doing so, it corrected a key doctrinal error by the district court: removal to federal court waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for both state-law and federal claims. But, crucially, the panel reiterated that removal does not waive a separate “general state sovereign immunity” from private damages suits that the State retains in its own courts. Applying New York’s immunity regime and Court of Claims framework, the court held the State remains immune from § 1983 damages claims; Ex parte Young-type relief remained theoretically possible, but Bell’s equal-protection pleadings were deficient.

Summary of the Opinion

• Eleventh Amendment vs. general sovereign immunity: By removing the action to federal court, the State Defendants waived Eleventh Amendment immunity (contrary to the district court’s narrower view); however, they could still assert general sovereign immunity to damages claims because New York has only consented to damages suits in the Court of Claims, which lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 damages claims.
• Resulting effect: § 1983 damages claims against USNY and the official-capacity state officers were barred by New York’s general sovereign immunity (not the Eleventh Amendment).
• Ex parte Young window foreclosed by pleading defects: Even assuming the availability of prospective relief against the state officers, Bell’s equal-protection claims failed. The complaint alleged neither an impermissible discriminatory motive (for selective enforcement) nor sufficiently similar comparators (for class-of-one).
• Affirmance on alternative grounds: Although the district court misapplied Eleventh Amendment doctrine, the panel affirmed because the outcome was correct under general sovereign immunity and the insufficiency of the § 1983 pleadings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002): Establishes that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing a case to federal court. The district court treated Lapides as limited to state-law claims, but the Second Circuit, following its own precedent, clarifies that removal waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for removed federal claims as well.
• Beaulieu v. Vermont, 807 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2015): Crucial Second Circuit authority distinguishing Eleventh Amendment immunity from “general state sovereign immunity.” Beaulieu holds that removal waives the former but not the latter. A State that has not consented to private suit in its own courts may assert general sovereign immunity in federal court post-removal. The panel relies heavily on Beaulieu to correct the district court and to preserve New York’s damages immunity.
• Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2009): Confirms that “arms of the state,” including state instrumentalities, share the State’s immunity. USNY (through the Board of Regents) falls within this category.
• Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1993): Reinforces that official-capacity suits are in effect suits against the State and therefore trigger state sovereign immunity doctrines.
• Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977): Explains New York’s conditional waiver: the State consents to suit for damages only in the New York Court of Claims.
• Morell v. Balasubramanian, 70 N.Y.2d 297 (1987): Clarifies that official-capacity damages claims are deemed claims against the State and thus belong in the Court of Claims.
• N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 9(2), (2-a): Limits the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction; as applied here, New York has not consented to § 1983 damages claims in the Court of Claims. Consequently, there is no state consent to damages under § 1983 against the State.
• Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908): Creates an exception permitting suits for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against state officers to halt ongoing federal-law violations. The panel notes this pathway exists in principle but is unavailable here due to pleading deficiencies.
• Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1997): Bell invoked Kostok for the proposition that constitutional claims can pierce immunity. The panel corrects this: Kostok describes the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment (not a wholesale abrogation of general sovereign immunity), and it only authorizes prospective relief.
• Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2019): Sets out the two-part selective enforcement test: selective treatment and an impermissible motive. The panel finds Bell’s complaint lacks non-conclusory allegations of improper motive by the State Defendants.
• Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010): Articulates the class-of-one standard: intentional differential treatment from similarly situated comparators without rational basis. The panel finds Bell’s comparator allegations too vague and conclusory.
• NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2019): Emphasizes that the absence of comparator detail is “fatal” to class-of-one claims. The court deems Bell’s comparator pleadings insufficient under NRP.
• Neurological Surgery Practice of Long Island, PLLC v. HHS, 145 F.4th 212 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the standard of review on dismissal: de novo, accepting complaint allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
• Bowen v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 55 A.D.2d 235 (2d Dep’t 1976), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402 (1978): Mentioned to acknowledge New York’s partial relinquishment of immunity for declaratory relief; it does not alter the analysis of damages immunity under § 1983.

Legal Reasoning

1) Immunity framework and removal. The panel carefully separates two “species” of state immunity. First, the Eleventh Amendment restricts federal judicial power over suits against States (including arms of the State and official-capacity claims). Second, a broader “general state sovereign immunity” shields States from private suits in all courts unless the State consents or Congress validly abrogates that immunity.

Removal to federal court waives only the first species: the Eleventh Amendment bar. The district court erred by suggesting that Lapides was limited to state-law claims; Second Circuit precedent (Beaulieu) holds that removal waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for federal claims too. But post-removal, unless the State has consented to be sued for damages in its own courts on the claim at issue (or Congress validly abrogated immunity), it can invoke general sovereign immunity to defeat damages claims in federal court.

2) Application to New York and § 1983 damages. New York’s consent to suit for damages is narrowly channeled through the Court of Claims. That court lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 damages claims against the State. Therefore, New York has not waived its general sovereign immunity for § 1983 damages. As a result, even though the Eleventh Amendment immunity fell away by removal, general sovereign immunity independently extinguishes Bell’s damages claims against USNY and the official-capacity state officers.

3) Prospective relief and the merits of the § 1983 theories. Ex parte Young permits only prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against state officers for ongoing or imminent violations of federal law. The panel proceeds to the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, finding Bell’s equal-protection pleadings deficient under both selective enforcement and class-of-one theories:

• Selective enforcement: The complaint fails to allege non-conclusory facts showing the state actors had an impermissible discriminatory motive. The only concrete allegation about the State Defendants is that OPD sent a letter to Bell’s counsel setting out negligence allegations and stating a disciplinary proceeding was warranted. General references to “Defendants” acting with “animus” or in “retaliation” cannot be read to encompass the State Defendants where the pleaded facts attribute the initiation of discipline to the private Kaleida Defendants.
• Class-of-one: The complaint does not plead a sufficiently similar comparator with the required specificity. Merely asserting that “other nurses” were on duty is not enough. The complaint omits basic comparator attributes (job titles, duties, supervisory roles, medication responsibilities) and conduct (whether those nurses refused medication administration or asked to go home). Under Hu and NRP, such silence is fatal because a plaintiff must allege that no rational person could view the comparators as materially different in a way that justifies different treatment.

Because Bell failed to state an equal-protection claim, she could not obtain Ex parte Young-type prospective relief. That independently supports dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the state officers.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision reinforces several important practice points in Second Circuit litigation against New York State agencies and officials:

• Removal strategy clarified: State defendants who remove to federal court waive Eleventh Amendment immunity but may still defeat damages claims by asserting general sovereign immunity where the State has not consented to suit in its own courts. This is especially potent in § 1983 cases against New York because the State has not consented to § 1983 damages in the Court of Claims.
• Forum and remedy planning: Plaintiffs seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations by New York agencies must calibrate their pleadings and remedies accordingly. Damages against the State or its agencies will be barred; viable paths include:
  • Prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against state officers under Ex parte Young (but only if the complaint states a federal claim and an ongoing or imminent violation); and
  • Individual-capacity suits against state officials for damages under § 1983, where appropriate, which are not barred by the State’s sovereign immunity.
• Pleading rigor for equal protection: Selective enforcement claims require concrete factual allegations of impermissible motive by the relevant state actors; class-of-one claims demand detailed comparator facts showing an extremely tight fit in circumstances and duties. Conclusory labels or group pleadings that fail to differentiate between private and state defendants are insufficient.
• USNY as an arm of the State: The order implicitly reaffirms that USNY and the Board of Regents function as arms of New York State for sovereign immunity purposes.
• Limited precedential weight but practical signaling: While summary orders do not bind future panels, this ruling is consistent with and underscores the controlling principles in Beaulieu and related New York immunity jurisprudence (Trotman, Morell). Practitioners should expect district courts within the Circuit to follow the same analytical path.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Eleventh Amendment immunity vs. general sovereign immunity:
  • Eleventh Amendment immunity limits federal courts’ jurisdiction over suits against States. It can be waived by the State (e.g., by removing a case to federal court).
  • General state sovereign immunity is the broader principle that a State cannot be sued by a private party without consent. Whether in state or federal court, if the State has not consented to a particular category of claims, it can invoke this immunity. Removal does not waive it.
• New York’s consent to suit: New York consents to damages suits only in the Court of Claims. That court does not entertain § 1983 damages claims against the State, so New York has not consented to such damages actions anywhere.
• Ex parte Young: A plaintiff can sue state officers (not the State itself) in their official capacities for forward-looking relief to stop an ongoing violation of federal law. This route does not permit damages and still requires a well-pleaded federal claim.
• Selective enforcement (Equal Protection): To succeed, a plaintiff must plausibly allege both selective treatment compared to similarly situated persons and that the selection was motivated by an impermissible reason (e.g., retaliation for protected conduct, discrimination on forbidden grounds).
• Class-of-one (Equal Protection): A plaintiff must plead that she was treated differently than specific, similarly situated comparators with no rational basis for the difference. Courts require detailed comparator facts (roles, responsibilities, conduct) showing that no rational decisionmaker could view them as meaningfully different.
• Arms of the State: Agencies and instrumentalities that function as part of the State government (like USNY/Board of Regents) share the State’s immunity.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Bell accomplishes two things: it corrects a doctrinal misstep and it underscores rigorous pleading standards. First, it reaffirms that removal waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for both state and federal claims, yet leaves intact the separate defense of general sovereign immunity. In New York, that means § 1983 damages claims against the State and its arms are barred because the State has only consented to damages suits in the Court of Claims, which does not entertain § 1983 damages claims against the State.

Second, while Ex parte Young theoretically offers a path to prospective relief, Bell’s equal-protection claims faltered at the pleading stage. The complaint did not allege an impermissible motive by the State Defendants (for selective enforcement) and failed to identify sufficiently similar comparators with the specificity needed for a class-of-one theory. The panel thus affirmed dismissal on the merits.

For future litigants, the opinion is an instructive roadmap: carefully distinguish immunity doctrines; select remedies that are actually available against State defendants; and, for equal-protection claims, plead concrete facts demonstrating both discriminatory purpose (where required) and detailed comparator similarity. Although nonprecedential, Bell is firmly aligned with Beaulieu and the Second Circuit’s comparator jurisprudence, and it will likely guide district court practice across the Circuit.