Remoteness Alone Does Not Bar Admission of Prior Domestic Abuse Under Rule 404(2): State v. Adams

Introduction

In State v. Adams, 320 Neb. 316 (Neb. Nov. 14, 2025), the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, as modified, the first-degree murder conviction of Jeffrey S. Adams for the 2023 killing of his wife, Angela Adams. The appeal centered on the admission of two prior acts of domestic abuse—one from 1997 involving a former spouse and another from 2015 involving Angela—offered under Nebraska Evidence Rule 404(2) to prove intent, lack of mistake, premeditation, and (as to Angela) motive. Adams also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation, the district court’s refusal to instruct on self-defense, and the denial of a change of venue. The Court found no error on those issues and modified the sentence to correct plain error: a trial court may not apply credit for time served to a life sentence.

The opinion clarifies two practical points with systemic impact: first, that remoteness in time—even decades—does not, by itself, bar admission of prior bad acts when the acts are highly similar and probative for a non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(2); and second, that the nature and duration of manual strangulation can be powerful circumstantial evidence of premeditation. The decision also underscores Nebraska’s distinctive gatekeeping standard under Rule 404(3)—clear and convincing proof of the extrinsic act outside the jury’s presence—and standard-of-review principles that insulate trial court discretion in the 404/403 realm.

Summary of the Opinion

Rule 404(3) gatekeeping satisfied: The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Adams choked Angela during a 2015 incident and choked his then-wife, N.F., in 1997. Minor inconsistencies in witness recollection went to weight, not admissibility, under the sufficiency-like review standard (any rational trier of fact could find with a firm conviction that the act occurred).
Rule 404(2) admissibility upheld: The prior acts were offered for proper purposes—intent, lack of mistake, premeditation, and motive (as to Angela)—and not solely to show propensity. The trial court’s Rule 403 balancing—finding probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice—was not an abuse of discretion. Remoteness (26 and 8 years) did not, standing alone, warrant exclusion; limiting instructions were given.
Sufficiency of evidence of premeditation: Viewing the record in the State’s favor, the Court held that premeditation was supported by circumstantial evidence, including Adams’ jealousy and argument with Angela, two separate altercations with an intervening pause, defensive wounds, and the time required to kill by manual strangulation (consistent pressure over 2–6 minutes).
Self-defense instruction properly refused: The evidence did not support a legally cognizable theory of self-defense—no reasonable and good-faith belief that force was immediately necessary, and the manner of killing (blunt force head injuries plus strangulation) was not justified by the circumstances. Intoxication is not a justification or excuse for crime.
Change of venue denial affirmed: A spoofed email purporting to be from a court official did not demonstrate prejudice or contaminate the jury venire. Voir dire was the proper tool to explore any risk; the defense passed the jury for cause, waiving objections.
Sentence modified for plain error: A defendant cannot receive jail credit against a life sentence. The Court struck the 599 days of credit and affirmed the life sentence as modified.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s analysis is rooted in a familiar framework:

Rule 404(3) standard and review: The State must prove extrinsic acts by clear and convincing evidence outside the jury’s presence (see State v. Kofoed and State v. Payne‑McCoy). On appeal, the finding is affirmed if any rational factfinder could, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, find with a firm conviction that the act occurred. The Court reiterates that appellate courts do not reweigh credibility (State v. Perry).
Rule 404(2) and special relevance: Other-acts evidence is inadmissible to show propensity but admissible for non-propensity purposes such as intent, absence of mistake, motive, and premeditation (State v. Corral; State v. Almasaudi). The opinion uses the “independent” or “special” relevance shorthand (State v. Vazquez).
Rule 403 balancing: All relevant evidence remains subject to exclusion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice (State v. Oldson; State v. Moore; State v. Rush). Prejudice means an undue tendency to lead to decision on an improper basis, not merely damage to the opponent (State v. Pullens). Remoteness can weaken probative value, but is not per se exclusionary (also Pullens).
Sufficiency standard: The Court restates the familiar test: viewing the evidence in the State’s favor, could any rational juror find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt? (State v. Dat; Perry).
Premeditation and mental state: Premeditation may be instantaneous but must precede the act (State v. Scott). It may be proved circumstantially (State v. Yah). The manner of killing can support premeditation (State v. Kilmer), and the Court again cites authority that manual strangulation typically requires sustained pressure—supporting deliberation (State v. El‑Tabech).
Self-defense instruction threshold: Courts instruct on self-defense only when the evidence supports a legally cognizable claim—i.e., some evidence of a reasonable, good-faith belief that force was immediately necessary and that the force used was justified under the circumstances (State v. Johnson; State v. Rezac; State v. Case; State v. Urbano). Intoxication is not a justification (State v. Esch).
Venue and voir dire: Change of venue is discretionary; voir dire is the best tool to assess juror impartiality (State v. Gonzalez). Passing the jury for cause typically waives later challenges (State v. Clark).
Plain error and sentencing: Appellate courts correct plainly erroneous sentences; jail credit cannot apply to a life sentence (State v. Coomes; State v. Gleaton; State v. Jones).
Preservation and briefing: The Court underscores that issues must be both specifically assigned and argued; conclusory labels like “just propensity evidence” are insufficient (State v. Ramos).

Legal Reasoning

Rule 404(3) Gatekeeping: Clear and Convincing Proof of Prior Acts

Nebraska’s Rule 404(3) demands clear and convincing proof, outside the jury’s presence, that the defendant committed the prior act. The district court credited testimony that:

In 1997, during an intoxicated argument, Adams straddled his spouse, placed both hands on her neck, and choked her on the bedroom floor until interrupted by a child; Adams was arrested and later convicted of assault.
In 2015, during a Fourth of July party at home, Adams, intoxicated and jealous, forced his way into a bathroom, grabbed Angela by the throat, and pushed her against a wall; contemporaneous witnesses observed her upset and a few days later “finger marks” on her neck.

The Court acknowledged minor inconsistencies in the 2015 witness accounts (e.g., who opened the door, whether a son intervened) but held that these affected weight, not admissibility. Applying the sufficiency-like lens to 404(3) findings, it affirmed that a rational factfinder could form a firm conviction the acts occurred.

Rule 404(2) Admissibility and Rule 403 Balancing

The prior acts were admitted for:

Intent and lack of mistake (countering Adams’s claim that he did not mean to kill Angela or that the fatal injuries were accidental),
Premeditation (by showing a pattern of escalating intimate-partner violence consistent with deliberate strangulation), and
Motive (jealousy and control, especially as to the 2015 incident with Angela).

The Court noted that Adams did not substantively challenge the non-propensity purposes on appeal; it therefore proceeded to Rule 403. On that balance, remoteness was Adams’s only argued point—26 years for the 1997 event and 8 years for 2015. The Court reiterated that remoteness can diminish probative force but is not a standalone exclusionary rule. Given the strong factual similarities—intoxication, jealousy, intimate-partner setting, hand-on-neck choking in a bedroom/bathroom context—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Limiting instructions before testimony and at the close further reduced any risk of improper propensity reasoning.

Premeditation and the Evidentiary Significance of Manual Strangulation

The sufficiency analysis assembled several circumstantial strands:

Jealous motive and escalating conflict: Adams accused Angela of infidelity at closing time; friends tried to calm him; the argument continued home.
Two separate altercations with an intervening lull: After the first altercation, Angela cleaned her wounds and changed clothes; Adams went outside to smoke; the fatal altercation then occurred in the bedroom.
Nature and manner of injuries: Extensive head and neck trauma; defensive wounds on Angela’s non-dominant hand; death by manual strangulation requiring sustained pressure over 2–6 minutes; Adams admitted being the only possible strangler.

From this, a rational juror could infer that Adams formed the intent to kill before finishing the fatal acts. Manual strangulation’s time component—requiring sustained pressure sufficient to cause unconsciousness and death—supports deliberation rather than instantaneous impulse. Nebraska does not demand any particular quantum of time for premeditation; an intent formed moments before the killing suffices if it precedes the act.

Refusal of Self-Defense Instruction

Although Adams and his son testified to mutual hitting, the Court emphasized that:

Self-defense requires some evidence that the defendant had a reasonable, good-faith belief that force was immediately necessary to protect against unlawful force and that the degree of force used was justified.
Adams’s own statements—describing Angela “tapping” or jabbing him and admitting he “stupidly hit her”—undercut immediacy and necessity.
The manner of killing—blunt force head injuries followed by manual strangulation—was disproportionate and not justified under the circumstances, even assuming Angela struck first.
Intoxication does not furnish a defense; it neither supplies nor substitutes for a reasonable belief in the necessity of force.

Because the record did not contain “any evidence in support of a legally cognizable theory of self-defense,” the court properly refused the instruction.

Change of Venue

A spoofed email, falsely purporting to be from a county court official and seeking recipients’ views on the parties, raised concern. A special prosecutor determined the email was not from the court; the sender was unknown. The district court denied venue change, reasoning that cyber spoofing is not geographically bounded and that voir dire could ferret out any contamination. The Supreme Court agreed, noting that the defense used a supplemental questionnaire, probed the panel in voir dire, and then passed the jury for cause—waiving objections to juror impartiality in the absence of evidence of actual prejudice.

Plain Error in Sentencing

The trial court awarded 599 days of credit for time served against a life sentence. That is plainly erroneous in Nebraska; jail credit cannot reduce a life sentence. The Supreme Court modified the sentence to strike the credit and otherwise affirmed.

Impact

State v. Adams will matter in several recurring contexts:

Rule 404(2) in domestic violence and intimate-partner homicide: Prosecutors can rely on Adams to argue that even very old prior domestic abuse—particularly acts of choking/strangulation—may be admissible when highly similar and tied to non-propensity purposes such as intent, lack of mistake, premeditation, and motive. Defense counsel should be prepared to engage Rule 403 beyond “remoteness,” focusing on dissimilarities, risk of cumulative or inflammatory detail, and the need for tightly crafted limiting instructions.
Proving premeditation circumstantially: Adams highlights the evidentiary force of manual strangulation. Expect more expert testimony on the physiology and timing of strangulation to support deliberation. Defense teams may counter with evidence about interruptions, loss of consciousness, or situational dynamics—but should recognize that Nebraska allows premeditation to be instantaneous yet still prior to the act.
Self-defense instructions: The case reaffirms that courts must withhold the instruction where the only evidence shows mutual combat without a reasonable belief in immediate necessity or where the ultimate force used was not justified. Intoxication cannot substitute for the required mental state and reasonableness.
Venue challenges in the digital age: Mere existence of a spoofed or suspicious communication, without evidence of jury pool taint, is unlikely to warrant venue change. Robust voir dire is essential; failing to renew a venue motion after voir dire and passing the panel waives later complaints.
Sentencing hygiene: Trial courts and counsel should ensure jail credit is not applied to life sentences. Appellate courts will correct this as plain error without remand.
Appellate preservation: Adams is a reminder that arguments must be both specifically assigned and analytically developed. Unsupported assertions—for example, simply labeling other-acts evidence “propensity”—risk forfeiture.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear and convincing evidence: A higher civil standard requiring the factfinder to be firmly convinced the fact is true. Nebraska imposes this burden on the State to prove prior acts at a 404(3) hearing. By contrast, the federal rule uses a lower “preponderance” standard under Huddleston.
Propensity vs. independent relevance: Propensity evidence says, “He did it before so he did it again”—that is forbidden. Independent relevance means the prior act tends to prove something else that matters—intent, motive, absence of mistake, plan, identity, etc.—regardless of any character inference.
Unfair prejudice under Rule 403: All adverse evidence is “prejudicial”; the question is whether it risks a verdict based on emotion, shock, or improper reasoning rather than on probative value.
Remoteness: How long ago the prior act happened. It can diminish probative value but is not, by itself, a bar to admission—especially when the old act is highly similar to the charged conduct.
Premeditation: The formation of an intent to kill before the act—not necessarily long before. Nebraska allows this intent to be formed in an instant, so long as it precedes the lethal act.
Strangulation and premeditation: Because manual strangulation generally requires sustained pressure over minutes, it often supports an inference that the killing was deliberate.
Self-defense threshold for an instruction: The defendant must point to some evidence that he reasonably and in good faith believed immediate force was necessary and that the force used was justified. Mutual blows or anger, without immediate necessity and proportionality, is insufficient. Intoxication is not a defense.
Voir dire and venue: Voir dire is the primary method to uncover bias. Passing the jury for cause typically waives later claims that jurors were biased.
Plain error in sentencing: An obvious legal mistake apparent on the record that undermines fairness; appellate courts can modify a sentence to fix such errors—e.g., removing jail credit from a life sentence.

Conclusion

State v. Adams is a thorough reaffirmation—and a practical sharpening—of Nebraska’s approach to other-acts evidence, premeditation, affirmative defenses, and sentencing error. The Court held that:

Highly similar prior acts of domestic abuse—even decades old—may be admitted under Rule 404(2) for non-propensity purposes where the State proves them by clear and convincing evidence and Rule 403’s balance favors admission, with limiting instructions to cabin use.
The totality of circumstances, including the duration and nature of manual strangulation, can provide powerful circumstantial proof of premeditation.
Self-defense instructions are reserved for cases with evidence supporting a legally cognizable claim; intoxication neither excuses conduct nor lowers the threshold.
Venue challenges require more than speculative digital anomalies; voir dire remains the best safeguard of impartiality, and passing the panel waives later complaints.
Jail credit cannot be awarded against a life sentence; such errors are corrected as plain error on direct appeal.

For prosecutors, Adams invites careful development of a robust Rule 404(3) record and thoughtful linkage of prior acts to non-propensity purposes, especially in intimate-partner violence cases. For defense counsel, it emphasizes the need for targeted Rule 403 arguments beyond remoteness, precise limiting instructions, and evidentiary foundations if self-defense is to reach the jury. For trial courts, it is a reminder to conduct the 404(3) hearing, deliver clear limiting instructions, and avoid applying jail credit to life sentences. In short, Adams refines the evidentiary and instructional contours of Nebraska homicide trials while preserving the central role of the jury in assessing mental states through circumstantial proof.