Remote Work for In‑Person K‑12 Teaching Requires Plausible, Specific ADA Pleadings; Denial of Accommodation Alone Is Not a Retaliatory Adverse Action

Introduction

In Bodie-Jernigan v. School Board of Broward County, Florida, the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, non-argument calendar, unpublished) affirmed dismissal of an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) suit brought by a K‑12 teacher who sought to continue working remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic due to significant health risks. The case sits at the intersection of pandemic-era workplace flexibility, the ADA’s core concepts of “qualified individual” and “reasonable accommodation,” and the scope of anti-retaliation protections when an accommodation request is denied.

Two issues were presented: (1) whether the plaintiff plausibly pled she was a “qualified individual” able to perform the essential functions of her in-person teaching job with the requested remote-work accommodation; and (2) whether the school board’s denial of remote work and subsequent events constituted a materially adverse action sufficient to support an ADA retaliation claim.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the complaint fell short on both fronts: it lacked factual allegations showing how essential, in-person classroom functions could be performed remotely, and it failed to allege a legally cognizable adverse action where the plaintiff chose unpaid leave and where denial of accommodation, standing alone, is not a materially adverse action for retaliation purposes.

Summary of the Opinion

The plaintiff, a long-time Broward County teacher with medical vulnerabilities (reduced kidney function, prior cardiac surgery, and prediabetes), requested remote work as an ADA accommodation when in-person classes resumed in October 2020. The school board initially allowed remote work until January 2021, then—following an arbitration decision between the district and the teachers’ union permitting in-person return based on operational needs—declined to extend the remote accommodation. The plaintiff opted for unpaid personal leave rather than return in-person and later filed suit alleging ADA discrimination (failure to accommodate) and retaliation.

Applying the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal:

• Discrimination (failure to accommodate): The plaintiff did not plausibly allege she was a “qualified individual” because she offered only conclusory assertions that she could perform essential functions remotely. The court emphasized essential teaching functions like maintaining classroom discipline and creating an active learning environment for in-person students—tasks not plausibly alleged as performable from home without specifics.
• Retaliation: The plaintiff did not plead an adverse employment action. She chose unpaid leave after the district required in-person attendance, and the denial of an accommodation request, by itself, is not a “materially adverse” action under the ADA’s retaliation provision.

The judgment of the district court dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning was anchored in familiar ADA and pleading precedents:

• Pleading standards:
  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): A complaint must present more than labels and conclusions; it must set out enough facts to state a plausible claim. The court applied this to reject conclusory assertions that essential teaching functions could be performed remotely.
  • Marquez v. Amazon.com, Inc., 69 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023): Reinforces that complaints lacking plausible factual allegations after removing legal conclusions must be dismissed.
• ADA discrimination elements and “qualified individual”:
  • Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007): Sets the three-element framework for ADA discrimination and explains reasonable accommodation as adjustments enabling performance of essential functions.
  • Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744 (11th Cir. 2023): Defines essential functions as the fundamental job duties actually required.
  • D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005): The ADA does not require elimination of essential job functions; the employer’s judgment about what functions are essential is entitled to consideration.
• Teaching-specific guidance from other circuits:
  • Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory School, 85 F.4th 670 (1st Cir. 2023): A K‑12 English teacher was not qualified where physical absence undermined essential instructional duties.
  • Smithson v. Austin, 86 F.4th 815 (7th Cir. 2023): Teacher not qualified where limited in-person attendance could not meet essential requirements.
• ADA retaliation:
  • 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a): Prohibits retaliation for opposing ADA violations or making charges under the ADA.
  • Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998): Elements for ADA retaliation: protected activity, adverse employment action, and causal connection.
  • Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2016): A request for accommodation qualifies as protected activity.
  • Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), and Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852 (11th Cir. 2023): Define “materially adverse” actions for retaliation as those that would dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in the protected activity.
  • Smith v. City of Atlantic City, 138 F.4th 759 (3d Cir. 2025): The Eleventh Circuit approvingly cited the Third Circuit’s reasoning that denial of an accommodation is an anticipated part of the process and, without more, is not a materially adverse action in retaliation.
  • Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997), and Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2001): Earlier Eleventh Circuit cases declining to treat failure-to-accommodate as a self-effectuating adverse action for retaliation purposes; the present opinion harmonizes with this tradition.

Collectively, these authorities shaped two dispositive conclusions: (a) pleading sufficiency is critical when claiming remote work enables performance of essential, in-person classroom duties; and (b) ADA retaliation claims cannot bootstrap the mere denial of accommodation into the “materially adverse” element.

Legal Reasoning

1) Discrimination: The “Qualified Individual” and Essential Functions

The ADA protects “qualified” individuals—those who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of their job. The court held the plaintiff’s complaint failed this element. While she alleged she could do her job remotely, she did not plead facts explaining how she could perform essential in-person classroom responsibilities—specifically, maintaining discipline and creating an active learning environment for students physically in the classroom—if she remained at home.

Two doctrinal touchstones drove the analysis:

• Essential functions are the core, not incidental, duties. The employer’s articulation of those functions is entitled to consideration, and the ADA does not require eliminating them.
• Plausibility at the pleading stage requires more than the assertion “I can do this remotely.” Plaintiffs must supply concrete, non-conclusory facts linking the accommodation to the ability to perform core duties.

The court’s reliance on First and Seventh Circuit teacher cases underscores an emerging consensus that physical presence can be essential in K‑12 settings. Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit did not announce a categorical rule that remote work is never a reasonable accommodation for teachers; rather, it required factual specificity explaining how the essential functions would be satisfied in the particular in-person context. Because those specifics were absent, the discrimination claim was not plausibly pled.

2) Retaliation: No “Materially Adverse” Action Alleged

The retaliation claim failed at the “adverse action” element. The complaint itself established that the school board directed an in-person return and the plaintiff chose unpaid personal leave because of COVID-19 concerns. The court found this sequence did not amount to employer-imposed, materially adverse action—particularly where the alleged harms (inactive status and loss of bonuses/benefits) flowed from the plaintiff’s own decision to take leave rather than comply with the in-person requirement.

The panel also addressed an increasingly litigated question: is the denial of an accommodation request, by itself, a materially adverse action for ADA retaliation? It answered no, adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning that denial is an inherent possibility in the accommodation process and, standing alone, is not the kind of action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from requesting an accommodation. Treating denial as per se adverse would collapse the retaliation element and effectively duplicate failure-to-accommodate claims—contrary to the structure of ADA retaliation doctrine and consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedents like Stewart and Lucas.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Heightened Pleading Demands for Remote-Work Accommodations in In‑Person Roles

This opinion reinforces a demanding plausibility threshold for plaintiffs seeking remote work in inherently in-person jobs such as K‑12 teaching. Future plaintiffs should:

• Identify the job’s essential functions with specificity and allege concrete methods for performing each from home (e.g., on-site classroom aides/proctors to manage discipline, interactive technologies, reconfigured class formats).
• Plead facts showing the accommodation does not eliminate essential functions, but enables their performance.
• Where relevant, plead the availability of reassignment to vacant, fully remote roles as an alternative accommodation, if that is what is sought. The plaintiff here did not allege reassignment.

B. Retaliation: Denial Alone Will Not Suffice

For ADA retaliation claims, this decision will be invoked by district courts to dismiss suits where the only alleged adverse action is the accommodation denial itself. Plaintiffs will need to identify materially adverse employer conduct beyond the denial—such as discipline, demotion, pay cuts, materially negative schedule changes, or other actions that would dissuade a reasonable employee from requesting accommodation. Voluntary leave choices will not typically qualify as employer-imposed, materially adverse action.

C. Education Sector and Pandemic Legacy

While anchored in pandemic-era facts, the court’s analysis is forward-looking. School districts can lean on this reasoning to resist remote-work accommodations for in-person instruction absent detailed, workable allegations. Union memoranda and arbitrations may shape operational decisions, but they neither expand nor contract ADA duties; the court relied on core ADA doctrine, not labor instruments, to resolve the case.

D. Persuasive, Not Binding

The opinion is unpublished and therefore non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit. Nonetheless, it is likely to be persuasive in trial courts within the circuit, especially given its alignment with decisions from the First and Seventh Circuits and its doctrinal harmony with Eleventh Circuit retaliation jurisprudence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified individual: A person who can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation. If an accommodation would remove or replace an essential function, the employee is not “qualified” for that specific role under the ADA.
• Essential functions: The fundamental duties of a job—not marginal tasks. Employers’ judgments and job descriptions matter, as do how the job is actually performed in practice.
• Reasonable accommodation: A change to the work environment or how the job is done that enables a qualified person with a disability to perform essential functions (e.g., modified schedules, assistive technology, reassignment to a vacant position). It is not “reasonable” if it would eliminate essential functions or impose an undue hardship on the employer.
• Materially adverse action (retaliation): For retaliation claims, the action must be serious enough that it would dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity (like requesting an accommodation). Not every workplace disappointment qualifies.
• Interactive process: The back-and-forth dialogue between employer and employee to identify workable accommodations. While important, failure to engage in this process is not an independent ADA violation without a showing that a reasonable accommodation existed.
• Plausibility pleading (Twombly/Iqbal): Complaints must include enough facts to make the claim facially plausible. Conclusory statements (e.g., “I can do my job remotely”) without factual support (how each essential function would be performed) are insufficient.

Conclusion

Bodie-Jernigan clarifies two critical ADA points in the Eleventh Circuit’s trial courts. First, when the job is inherently in-person—like classroom teaching—plaintiffs must plead concrete, non-conclusory facts showing how each essential function can still be performed remotely; mere assertions will not survive dismissal. Second, the denial of an accommodation request, by itself, is not a materially adverse action for ADA retaliation. Where an employee chooses unpaid leave rather than complying with an in-person directive, the leave consequences generally will not be attributed to the employer for retaliation purposes.

The decision does not foreclose remote work as a reasonable accommodation in education; it insists on specificity at the pleading stage and fidelity to the concept of “essential functions.” Nor does it immunize employers from retaliation claims; it requires a materially adverse action beyond the fact of denial. As schools and other employers continue to evaluate remote-work accommodation requests, this opinion will serve as a practical roadmap for drafting, defending, and adjudicating ADA claims in the post-pandemic workplace.