Remand Pursuant to Settlement Does Not Confer Prevailing-Party Status Under EAJA

Introduction

Avdeeva v. Tucker (1st Cir. 2025) addresses whether a plaintiff who brings a § 1447(b) action for failure to adjudicate a naturalization application and then obtains a remand pursuant to a settlement can be deemed a “prevailing party” under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Diana Avdeeva, a Russian citizen married to a U.S. national, filed for naturalization after a lengthy delay in removing the conditions on her permanent residence. When U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) failed to act, she sued in the District of Massachusetts. The parties settled and the district court remanded her case to USCIS. After she was naturalized on remand, Avdeeva sought attorney’s fees under EAJA. The district court denied fees for lack of “prevailing party” status and because special circumstances would render an award unjust. She appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a settlement-driven remand lacks the “judicial imprimatur” necessary to qualify as a prevailing party under EAJA.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Howard, affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees. Although Avdeeva secured the relief she sought—termination of removal proceedings, approval of her I-751 petition, and a prompt naturalization interview—the court held that:

Under EAJA a “prevailing party” must show (1) a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties, and (2) a “judicial imprimatur” on that change.
Here the legal relationship changed only because USCIS voluntarily agreed to act under the settlement, not because the district court ordered relief on the merits.
The remand order simply acknowledged the settlement and did not (a) resolve the merits of Avdeeva’s § 1447(b) claim, (b) impose injunctive or contempt-enforceable obligations, or (c) expressly retain jurisdiction over enforcement.

Accordingly, Avdeeva was not a “prevailing party” under EAJA, and she was not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res. (532 U.S. 598, 2001). Established that “prevailing party” under fee-shifting statutes requires a court-ordered change in the legal relationship—either a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree—and rejected the “catalyst theory” by holding that a mere voluntary change by the defendant does not suffice.
Aronov v. Napolitano (562 F.3d 84, 1st Cir. 2009). Clarified the three factors for “judicial imprimatur” (court-ordered relief, merits-based approval, and enforceable oversight) and applied Buckhannon strictly against EAJA claims. Held that a remand order entered “pursuant to” a settlement without retaining jurisdiction or incorporating settlement terms does not confer prevailing-party status.
Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick (636 F.3d 1, 1st Cir. 2011). Distinguished between court-triggered changes and government-voluntary changes, reaffirming that only the former qualifies under Buckhannon’s judicial imprimatur requirement.
Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools (401 F.3d 16, 1st Cir. 2005). Emphasized that the “catalyst theory” is dead and that voluntary government conduct prompted by suit does not make a plaintiff a prevailing party.
Ge v. USCIS (20 F.4th 147, 4th Cir. 2021). Held that a § 1447(b) remand does not alter the legal relationship between applicant and agency, because USCIS remains the decision-maker and no merits determination is made by the court.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. (511 U.S. 375, 1994). Explained that a district court retains ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement only if the dismissal order explicitly incorporates or retains jurisdiction over settlement terms.
F.A.C., Inc. v. Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de P.R. (449 F.3d 185, 1st Cir. 2006). Reaffirmed Kokkonen’s rule in the First Circuit: mere awareness or reference to a settlement in a dismissal order does not incorporate its terms or preserve enforcement jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps, tracking Buckhannon’s requirement of judicial imprimatur:

Court-Ordered Change? Although Avdeeva obtained the relief she sought, that relief resulted from USCIS’s voluntary performance under the settlement, not from any affirmative command in the remand order. The remand order merely “remanded … in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement.” That is classic Buckhannon: voluntary change lacking judicial imprimatur.
Merits-Based Approval? The district court never ruled on the merits of the § 1447(b) claim. The motions to dismiss were pending when the parties settled, and the court expressly disclaimed any analysis of the merits. Without a merits decision or consent decree, there is no judicial finding that the government’s position was unjustified.
Enforceable Oversight? The remand order did not incorporate the settlement’s terms nor retain jurisdiction to enforce them by contempt. Under Kokkonen and its progeny, an order that simply notes a settlement without explicit jurisdictional or enforcement language is insufficient to create a consent decree.

Impact

Avdeeva v. Tucker cements the requirement that EAJA fee-award claimants demonstrate more than a settlement-driven remand from an immigration court. Practitioners should note:

A § 1447(b) action will not yield fees unless a district court independently orders relief on the merits or enters a consent decree with clear enforcement and jurisdictional provisions.
Settlement agreements that trigger agency action—absent incorporation into the court’s order—do not satisfy the “prevailing party” requirement.
Immigration litigants must plan to secure a merits adjudication or a carefully crafted consent decree if they intend to seek EAJA fees.
Federal courts will strictly construe EAJA against fee petitioners, consistent with sovereign-immunity principles.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA): Statute that permits fee awards against the government if a party prevails in a civil case and the government’s position was not substantially justified.
Prevailing Party: In EAJA context, a party who obtains a change in the legal relationship through a court‐ordered judgment or court‐ordered consent decree.
Judicial Imprimatur: The “stamp” of court authority on relief—requiring (a) court-ordered relief, (b) judicial merits review, and (c) enforceable oversight.
Catalyst Theory: The discredited notion that a plaintiff “prevails” for fee purposes simply by filing suit that prompts voluntary government compliance.
Consent Decree: A judicially approved settlement that (1) resolves the merits, (2) imposes injunctive or specific relief, and (3) remains enforceable by the court (often via contempt).
Ancillary Jurisdiction: Court’s power to enforce settlements only if the dismissal or remand order explicitly incorporates the settlement terms or retains jurisdiction for enforcement.

Conclusion

Avdeeva v. Tucker reaffirms that under EAJA a plaintiff must secure a judicially ordered, merits-based, and enforceable remedy to qualify as a prevailing party. A simple remand order entered in pursuance of a private settlement—even one that fully achieves the plaintiff’s goals—does not satisfy Buckhannon’s judicial imprimatur requirements. For immigration litigants seeking fees, the case underscores the necessity of structuring settlement orders (or litigated judgments) to include explicit jurisdictional retention, merits findings or consent-decree language, and enforcement mechanisms.