Reliance on Unobjected PSR Convictions and Limits on Lifetime Federal Benefits Bans: Commentary on United States v. Goins (6th Cir. 2025)

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I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Jamar Goins, No. 24‑1700 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025), addresses two recurring sentencing issues:

1. How far a district court may rely on unverified prior convictions listed in a Presentence Report (PSR) when the defendant never objects; and
2. The proper application of the federal “drug conviction” ban on federal benefits under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a), particularly whether a conspiracy-to-distribute conviction can serve as a “third strike” that triggers a lifetime ban.

Although the opinion is “not recommended for publication,” it consolidates and clarifies Sixth Circuit doctrine in two important ways:

• It reiterates that a sentencing court may rely on undisputed PSR facts—even if the underlying state records are “unverified”—without committing procedural error.
• It applies the Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022), to hold that a conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances does not count as a “distribution” conviction under § 862(a)(1)(C) and therefore cannot be used as the third predicate to impose a lifetime bar on all federal benefits.

The court ultimately:

• Affirms the 78‑month prison sentence as procedurally reasonable despite the district court’s consideration of unverified prior convictions in the PSR; and
• Reverses the lifetime ban on federal benefits and remands for the district court to reconsider benefits ineligibility, including any possible action under § 862(b).

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II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Conviction and the PSR

Jamar Goins pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine, i.e., a conspiracy offense for distribution of controlled substances. The PSR:

• Calculated a base offense level of 27 after a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility;
• Placed Goins in Criminal History Category II based solely on a prior state conviction for delivery/manufacture of narcotics; and
• Listed ten additional prior convictions that did not count toward his criminal-history score under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Of these ten convictions:

• One was tied to an actual docket number with available court records; and
• Nine others could not be verified from court files because of the age of the cases. Their only trace was in earlier state presentence reports prepared in 2010 and 2013.

Critically, Goins:

• Did not file written objections to the PSR; and
• Did not object orally at the sentencing hearing to any of the listed convictions, verified or not.

B. The Sentencing Hearing

At sentencing, the district court:

• Calculated the advisory Guidelines range as 78–97 months’ imprisonment with three years of supervised release;
• Adopted the PSR’s conclusion that Goins was “permanently ineligible for all federal benefits” on the theory that he had been convicted of a “third or subsequent drug distribution offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(C); and
• Conducted a standard 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis, examining both mitigating and aggravating factors.

On the mitigation side, the court emphasized:

• Goins’s childhood housing and food instability;
• His part-time employment since January 2024;
• Nearly one year of sobriety; and
• Compliance with conditions of pretrial release.

On the aggravating side, the court stated that it was “pretty significant . . . to take a look back at where you’ve been,” and specifically:

• Noted “minor but repetitive issues” of driving on a suspended license or without a license;
• Referenced an unverified “domestic violence [conviction]”;
• Mentioned “several prior drug related convictions”; and
• Placed the most weight on what it described as the “most concerning” convictions—those described in PSR paragraphs 156 and 157, which were verified.

While the PSR recommended a mid-range 84‑month sentence, the district court:

• Characterized the case as a “heartland” guidelines case;
• Declined to vary downward; but
• Imposed a bottom-of-the-range sentence of 78 months.

In keeping with Sixth Circuit practice, the court then asked the parties whether they had any additional objections under United States v. Bostic (the so‑called “Bostic question”). Both sides answered no. Goins then filed a timely appeal.

C. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, Goins raised two principal challenges:

1. Procedural reasonableness: He argued that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly considered unverified prior convictions from the PSR when weighing aggravating factors under § 3553(a).
2. Federal benefits ban: He challenged the imposition of a lifetime ban on all federal benefits under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(C), arguing that his instant conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine could not serve as the necessary “third or subsequent” distribution offense.

Because Goins had not raised either issue in the district court or in response to the Bostic inquiry, the Sixth Circuit reviewed both claims for plain error.

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III. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Larsen writing, joined by Judges Batchelder and Gilman) ruled as follows:

1. No procedural error in relying on unverified prior convictions.
   The court held that it is not error—let alone plain error—for a sentencing court to rely on unverified entries in a PSR where:
   • The defendant never objects to the accuracy of those entries; and
   • There is no affirmative indication that the PSR is factually wrong.
   Relying on Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) and prior Sixth Circuit cases, the panel concluded that the district court was entitled to accept undisputed PSR entries as factual findings and to consider them under § 3553(a). Accordingly, the 78‑month sentence was procedurally reasonable.
2. Lifetime federal benefits ban reversed as misapplication of § 862(a)(1)(C).
   Applying United States v. Gardner, the court held that conspiracy to distribute or possession with intent to distribute is not the equivalent of “distribution” for purposes of § 862(a). Therefore:
   • Goins’s instant conspiracy conviction could not serve as the “third or subsequent” distribution conviction required to trigger a lifetime ban under § 862(a)(1)(C); and
   • The district court plainly erred in imposing the permanent ban on all federal benefits.
   The panel reversed that part of the judgment and remanded for “reconsideration of that issue.”
3. Scope of the remand.
   The parties agreed that the lifetime ban had to be vacated, but disagreed on how directed the remand should be:
   • The government urged a remand explicitly instructing the district court to consider whether to impose penalties under § 862(b) (the provision addressing possession-related offenses), including “some or all of the penalties or conditions” listed in § 862(b)(1)(A)–(B) (mis-cited in one place as § 863(b)).
   • Goins sought a limited but open remand, leaving the next steps up to the district court “in the first instance,” and asked that the government be restricted to the “existing record” under United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2020).
   The panel declined to micromanage the remand, following Gardner, and left it to the district court to decide whether and how to apply § 862(b) on the existing record.

In the end, the court:

• Affirmed the 78‑month custodial sentence; and
• Reversed and remanded only the aspect of the judgment imposing lifetime ineligibility for federal benefits.

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IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and the Framing of the Appeal

1. Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness

The opinion starts from the well-established framework in United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), which divides sentencing reasonableness into:

• Procedural reasonableness: Did the district court properly:
  • Calculate the Guidelines range;
  • Treat the Guidelines as advisory;
  • Consider the § 3553(a) factors;
  • Avoid impermissible factors;
  • Base its decision on non-clearly-erroneous facts; and
  • Adequately explain the sentence?
• Substantive reasonableness: Is the resulting sentence, in length, “too long” (or, conversely, too short) in light of the § 3553(a) factors?

Because Goins complained that the district court had relied on inaccurate or unreliable information (the unverified PSR convictions), the court rightly characterized his argument as a claim of procedural unreasonableness, citing United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019).

2. Plain-error review

Goins did not object at sentencing to the PSR’s recitation of unverified convictions or to the application of § 862(a)(1)(C). Under United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2009), failure to raise a sentencing error in the district court limits the appellate court to plain-error review.

Under the plain-error standard (from Olano and applied in Aaron):

1. There must be an error;
2. The error must be “plain” (clear or obvious under current law);
3. The error must affect substantial rights (typically meaning it affected the outcome); and
4. Even then, the appellate court will correct the error only if it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

The Sixth Circuit applied this demanding standard to both issues. The differing outcomes (affirmance on the PSR issue, reversal on the benefits ban) underscore:

• How protective the Circuit is of unobjected PSR facts; and
• How strictly it enforces statutory requirements for harsh collateral penalties like lifetime benefits bans.

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B. Reliance on Unverified PSR Entries as Aggravating Factors

1. Rule 32 and the status of undisputed PSR facts

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(A) provides that the court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.” The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly interpreted this rule to mean that:

• Facts in a PSR are deemed admitted if the defendant fails to object;
• The district court is entitled to rely on those facts without opening its own evidentiary inquiry; and
• The defendant cannot later complain on appeal about the court’s reliance on those unchallenged facts.

In United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2021), the court explicitly quoted Rule 32(i)(3)(A), reinforcing that undisputed PSR portions can be treated as factual findings. Similarly, in United States v. Geerken, 506 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2007), the court held that when a defendant does not “contradict the facts set forth in the PSR, a district court is entitled to rely on those facts when sentencing the defendant.”

Goins applies these principles in a setting where the PSR itself labeled some entries as unverified because the underlying state court records were unavailable. The key point:

The lack of independent verification by the probation office did not, by itself, render reliance on those entries erroneous where the defendant never objected to their accuracy.

2. The nature of the unverified convictions and how the district court used them

The unverified convictions:

• Did not affect Goins’s criminal history category (Category II); and
• Were used only as part of the § 3553(a) contextual assessment of his background.

When discussing aggravating factors, the district court characterized the unverified matters as:

• “Minor but repetitive issues” involving driving on a suspended license or without a license;
• An unverified domestic violence conviction; and
• Several prior drug-related convictions.

The court largely emphasized that these “minor” but repeated infractions suggested a pattern of noncompliance. It then focused most heavily on two “most concerning” prior convictions (in PSR paragraphs 156 and 157), which were verified.

On appeal, Goins did not expressly claim that the unverified convictions were false, either in the district court or in the Sixth Circuit. His argument was instead essentially procedural: the probation officer did not verify them, so the court should not have considered them.

The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that:

• Rule 32 authorizes reliance on “any undisputed portion” of the PSR;
• There was no objection or contradiction by Goins at any point;
• Absent an objection, the sentencing court is “entitled” to rely on the PSR; and
• There was therefore no error—much less plain error—in doing so.

3. Distinguishing Hatcher and the “speculation” line of cases

Goins relied heavily on United States v. Hatcher, 947 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2020), where the Sixth Circuit held that a district court had plainly erred by relying on “[m]istaken [c]riminal [h]istory.” But as the panel explains, Hatcher and the cases it cited involved a very different problem: judicial speculation or misreading of the record, not reliance on unchallenged PSR entries.

The opinion canvasses several examples:

• Hatcher itself – The district court inferred that the defendant participated in a shooting based on an unsworn assertion about a shell casing matching a gun later found on him, even though the government admitted that his involvement in the shooting was unknown.
• United States v. Van, 541 F. App’x 592 (6th Cir. 2013) – The court inferred involvement in a broader fraud “scheme” beyond the established facts explaining the use of an invalid Social Security number.
• United States v. Blackman, 625 F. App’x 231 (6th Cir. 2015) – The district court inferred that the defendant used a firearm in a drug-trafficking conspiracy based largely on a photograph of him with a gun on a different occasion, at another location.
• United States v. Wright, 426 F. App’x 412 (6th Cir. 2011) – The district court speculated that the defendant must have committed other crimes before getting caught.
• United States v. Mooningham, 762 F. App’x 313 (6th Cir. 2019) – The court invoked a nonexistent firearm conviction, apparently the product of misreading the PSR.

In all those cases, the problem was either:

• Inference of uncharged or unproven conduct; or
• Plain misreading of what the record actually showed.

By contrast, in Goins:

• The PSR affirmatively listed prior convictions, albeit unverified due to the age of the cases; and
• The defendant never disputed that these convictions actually occurred.

The panel notes that neither Goins nor the court has identified any case holding that a district court errs by relying on unobjected PSR entries simply because the probation office could not obtain certified records. The absence of such authority reinforces the conclusion that the district court did not act improperly.

4. Practical effect and boundaries of the holding

The key takeaway is not that probation officers may be lax about verification, but that:

Absent a defense objection, courts may treat PSR-listed convictions as true, even if the PSR acknowledges that the underlying court records were not located.

Several practical implications arise:

• Defense counsel must object early. If a defendant believes that an old conviction listed in the PSR is inaccurate, incomplete, or non-existent, counsel must object in writing or at sentencing. Silence will be treated as acceptance of those facts.
• District courts are not required to sua sponte verify old records. The sentencing judge has no obligation to launch independent investigation into each PSR entry in the absence of a dispute.
• The scope of reliance matters. Here, the disputed convictions did not drive the Guidelines calculation; they were one part of a broader § 3553(a) narrative. A harder question might arise if unverified and inaccurate convictions were central to criminal-history scoring, but the opinion does not reach that issue.

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C. Misapplication of the Lifetime Federal Benefits Ban under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)

1. The statutory framework: § 862(a) vs. § 862(b)

Section 862 of Title 21 establishes a system of penalties related to ineligibility for federal benefits for those convicted of drug offenses:

• § 862(a) – Focuses on distribution offenses and, under § 862(a)(1)(C), provides:

  “[U]pon the third or subsequent conviction for any Federal or State offense consisting of the distribution of controlled substances, an individual shall . . . be permanently ineligible for all Federal benefits.”

• § 862(b) – Addresses certain offenses “involving the possession of a controlled substance” and authorizes the court to impose more limited penalties, including:
  • Temporary ineligibility for federal benefits for a defined number of years; and/or
  • Conditions such as completion of a drug treatment or testing program.

The district court in Goins believed it was dealing with the “third or subsequent” distribution offense under § 862(a)(1)(C), and therefore imposed the most severe collateral consequence: a permanent ban on “all Federal benefits.”

2. Gardner and the distinction between “distribution” and “conspiracy to distribute”

In United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022), the Sixth Circuit squarely held that:

“[C]onspiring to distribute or possessing with intent to distribute is not the equivalent of actual distribution.” Id. at 533.

Accordingly, a “drug conspiracy conviction falls outside of § 862(a)’s reach and cannot serve as the predicate for a lifetime ban on federal benefits.” Id.

Gardner arose in the same statutory context as Goins and provides the controlling interpretation: the phrase “conviction . . . consisting of the distribution of controlled substances” is narrowly construed to include only crimes whose elements require proof of actual distribution, not merely agreement to distribute or possession with intent to distribute.

3. Application to Goins

Given Gardner, the panel readily concludes that the district court plainly erred:

• Goins’s instant federal conviction is for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, not for actual distribution;
• Under Gardner, that conspiracy conviction cannot serve as the required “third or subsequent” distribution offense under § 862(a)(1)(C); and
• Absent that third distribution conviction, the statutory trigger for a lifetime ban is not satisfied.

Because the error is clear under existing Sixth Circuit law and involves a severe and enduring collateral penalty, the court treats it as plain error justifying relief, even though Goins did not object below.

4. Nature and scope of the remand

Both parties agreed that the lifetime ban must be vacated. The dispute centered on how specific the remand instructions should be:

• The Government’s position: The government maintained that, even though § 862(a)(1)(C) was misapplied, Goins’s record still met the threshold for potential penalties under § 862(b) (offenses “involving the possession of a controlled substance”). It asked the Sixth Circuit to direct the district court to decide whether to impose “some or all of the penalties or conditions” listed in § 862(b)(1)(A)–(B) (mis-cited as § 863(b)).
• Goins’s position: Goins resisted a “directed” remand and instead requested:
  • A limited remand that leaves the district court free to decide in the first instance whether to revisit the benefits issue at all; and
  • A restriction that the government be limited to “resentencing on the existing record,” invoking United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526, 540 (6th Cir. 2020).

The panel’s response has two parts:

1. No need to build a new record for § 862(b). The panel notes that the existing record already contains the two verified convictions necessary to assess § 862(b). Thus, any concern about new evidence on remand is somewhat misplaced in this context.
2. Reluctance to micromanage the remand. Citing Gardner, 32 F.4th at 534 n.4, the court declines to instruct the district court precisely how to handle § 862(b). Instead, it holds that:
   • The district court may decide whether to consider § 862(b) at all; and
   • If it chooses to do so, it may select any penalty or condition within that subsection, in its discretion, based on the existing record.

Thus, the mandate provides a limited remand on the benefits issue, but with broad discretion for the district court to determine the next steps “in the first instance.”

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D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is built on and clarifies several strands of Sixth Circuit doctrine. The main precedents and their roles are:

1. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018)

Rayyan is cited for the standard definitions of procedural and substantive reasonableness in federal sentencing. It frames Goins’s challenge—complaints about the consideration of certain facts—as a claim of procedural unreasonableness.

2. United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019)

Both decisions reinforce that reliance on inaccurate or unproven facts at sentencing implicates procedural reasonableness. The panel cites them to anchor the characterization of Goins’s first claim.

3. United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2009)

Aaron articulates the plain-error standard and the requirement that an error affect substantial rights and seriously affect the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings before an appellate court will intervene in an unpreserved sentencing issue. Goins applies this framework to both the PSR and federal-benefits issues, reaching opposite conclusions under the same standard.

4. United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Geerken, 506 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2007)

These cases establish that sentencing courts may rely on any undisputed portion of the PSR as factual findings. In Geerken, the court held that where the defendant does not “contradict the facts” in the PSR, the district court can rely on them. Small explicitly quotes Rule 32(i)(3)(A).

Goins relies on these decisions to hold that the failure to object to unverified PSR entries defeats a later procedural challenge to their consideration at sentencing.

5. United States v. Hatcher, 947 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2020) and related cases (Van, Blackman, Wright, Mooningham)

Hatcher is invoked by Goins to argue that the district court’s reliance on the PSR was akin to relying on “mistaken criminal history.” The panel distinguishes Hatcher and its progeny on the ground that they involve:

• Speculation about uncharged or unproven conduct; or
• Plain misreading of the PSR (such as invoking a non-existent conviction).

By contrast, Goins involves:

• Concrete prior convictions listed in the PSR;
• Express acknowledgment that underlying court records were not located due to age; but
• No objection or contradiction by the defendant, and no indication that the convictions were imaginary or misdescribed.

Thus, Hatcher is treated as a distinct line of cases about improper inferences or mistakes, not about the evidentiary weight of an undisputed PSR.

6. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008)

Vonner is the Sixth Circuit’s leading en banc decision on preserving sentencing objections. It encourages district courts to ask parties, after pronouncing sentence, whether they have any remaining objections (the “Bostic question”), and holds that failing to object at that stage triggers plain-error review on appeal.

In Goins, both parties waived further objections when asked, solidifying the use of plain-error review for both claims.

7. United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022)

Gardner provides the crucial substantive rule about § 862(a): conspiracy to distribute—or possession with intent to distribute—does not count as “distribution” for purposes of triggering benefits ineligibility. Goins applies this rule to invalidate a lifetime ban, and also adopts Gardner’s approach to remand management, declining to instruct the district court on precisely how to proceed under § 862(b).

8. United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2020)

Mukes is cited by Goins for the proposition that the government should be limited to “resentencing on the existing record” upon remand. The Goins panel notes that in this specific context, the record already contains all the convictions needed to assess § 862(b), so no new evidence is required. The panel also intimates that Goins has not adequately briefed any broader claim about prohibiting new legal theories on remand.

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E. Impact and Implications

1. For defense counsel: Object—or live with the PSR

Goins sends a clear signal to defense practitioners:

• If you do not object to the factual content of the PSR—including “unverified” prior convictions—you will almost certainly forfeit any argument that the sentencing court should not have considered those facts.
• Even where the PSR indicates that underlying state records were not obtainable, the absence of an objection allows the court to accept those entries as true under Rule 32.
• This principle applies both to Guidelines calculations and to broader § 3553(a) considerations.

Given that criminal history and background heavily influence sentencing outcomes, counsel must carefully review and, where appropriate, challenge PSR entries, especially older, poorly-documented convictions.

2. For sentencing courts and probation officers: No duty to verify in the absence of dispute

The opinion does not encourage laxity, but it does clarify:

• Sentencing courts may rely on undisputed PSR entries, even if labeled unverified;
• There is no independent obligation to obtain underlying docket materials when the defendant does not dispute the PSR’s description; and
• Concerns about the age of records go to weight and potential challenge—not to an inherent bar on consideration.

At the same time, prudent practice for probation officers may still be to document verification efforts and to flag any gaps clearly in the PSR. That documentation may help courts and counsel assess whether to press or waive any challenges.

3. For federal benefits jurisprudence: Tightening statutory fidelity under § 862

On the federal benefits side, Goins reinforces and extends Gardner:

• Conspiracy ≠ distribution. A conviction for conspiracy to distribute—or possession with intent to distribute—cannot be treated as a “distribution” conviction for purposes of the lifetime ban under § 862(a)(1)(C).
• Third-strike severity demands strict statutory compliance. Because the lifetime ban permanently cuts off access to “all Federal benefits,” the Sixth Circuit insists on precise adherence to statutory triggers and element-based analysis.
• Remand flexibility under § 862(b). Even when a § 862(a) lifetime ban is vacated, the district court retains considerable discretion on remand to consider whether lesser, possession-related penalties under § 862(b) should be imposed based on the existing record.

For prosecutors and judges, the message is that collateral penalties of this magnitude cannot rest on broad readings of statutory terms; they must be anchored in the elements of the offenses of conviction.

4. For the development of Sixth Circuit law

Though unpublished and nonprecedential, Goins is likely to be cited for persuasive value in future Sixth Circuit briefing because it:

• Clarifies the interaction of Rule 32(i)(3)(A) with “unverified” PSR entries;
• Collects and distinguishes the “speculation” cases (Hatcher, Van, Blackman, Wright, Mooningham); and
• Shows how Gardner applies to vacate a lifetime federal-benefits ban where the third conviction is a conspiracy offense.

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V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness

• Procedural reasonableness concerns the steps the district court takes in arriving at the sentence. Errors include miscalculating the Guidelines, relying on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to consider § 3553(a) factors.
• Substantive reasonableness addresses whether the length of the sentence is justified by the reasons given and the statutory factors. Even a procedurally correct sentence can be substantively unreasonable if it is unduly harsh or lenient.

Goins raised only a procedural challenge regarding the use of unverified PSR entries.

2. Presentence Report (PSR) and Rule 32(i)(3)(A)

The PSR is a comprehensive report prepared by a probation officer prior to sentencing, detailing:

• The offense conduct;
• The defendant’s criminal history;
• Personal and family background;
• Employment and educational history; and
• Any other factor relevant to sentencing.

Under Rule 32(i)(3)(A), any portion of the PSR that is not disputed by the parties may be accepted by the court as fact. To challenge a PSR entry, defense counsel must make a specific, factual objection; general dissatisfaction or silence is not enough.

3. Plain-error review

Plain-error review applies when a party fails to preserve an issue by objection in the trial court. The appellant then bears the burden of showing:

1. An error occurred;
2. The error was “plain” (obvious under existing law);
3. The error affected substantial rights (likely changed the outcome); and
4. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

This is a high bar. In Goins, it was not met on the PSR issue, but was met on the lifetime ban, due in part to the clear intervening rule in Gardner.

4. The “Bostic question” and preservation of sentencing objections

Following Vonner, district courts in the Sixth Circuit often end sentencing hearings with a “Bostic question” (from United States v. Bostic): asking counsel whether they have any additional objections to the sentence not previously raised. Failure to raise an issue in response to this invitation typically triggers plain-error review on appeal. In Goins, both parties answered that they had no objections, which locked in plain-error review.

5. Federal benefits ineligibility under 21 U.S.C. § 862

Section 862 authorizes or mandates denial of “federal benefits” to certain drug offenders. “Federal benefits” generally include:

• Grants;
• Contracts;
• Loans; and
• Professional or commercial licenses provided by the federal government.

Under § 862(a)(1)(C), “upon the third or subsequent conviction for any Federal or State offense consisting of the distribution of controlled substances,” an individual is “permanently ineligible for all Federal benefits.” This is a mandatory lifetime ban once the statutory conditions are met.

Section 862(b), by contrast, allows the court to impose lesser, more flexible sanctions for offenses involving possession of controlled substances, such as:

• Temporary disqualification from federal benefits for a specified number of years; and/or
• Conditions like successful completion of drug treatment programs.

Goins, via Gardner, makes clear that conspiracy to distribute does not satisfy the “distribution” requirement of § 862(a)(1)(C), and thus cannot be used as the third predicate for a lifetime ban.

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VI. Conclusion

United States v. Goins offers two central lessons for federal sentencing practice in the Sixth Circuit:

1. Undisputed PSR facts—verified or not—are fair game at sentencing.
   The court reaffirms that, under Rule 32 and established Sixth Circuit precedent, a district court may rely on any undisputed portion of the PSR as a factual basis for sentencing. A defendant who fails to object to “unverified” prior convictions in the PSR cannot later claim procedural error simply because the probation office did not obtain underlying court records.
2. Lifetime federal benefits bans require strict adherence to § 862(a)’s text.
   Applying Gardner, the court invalidates a lifetime ban imposed on the mistaken premise that a conspiracy-to-distribute conviction constitutes a “distribution” offense. It underscores that only convictions whose elements require actual distribution can serve as predicates under § 862(a)(1)(C), and that conspiracy or possession-with-intent offenses fall outside that scope.

Although unpublished, the decision meaningfully clarifies the boundaries of procedural reasonableness in the context of PSR reliance and enforces a rigorous, element-based approach to statutory collateral sanctions under § 862. For defense counsel, it highlights the necessity of precise, timely objections to PSR content. For courts and prosecutors, it cautions that severe sanctions like lifetime benefit ineligibility must rest on solid statutory footing, not on expansive readings of offense labels.