Reliability as the Decisive Safeguard: Connecticut Upholds a Showup Identification Even Assuming Unnecessary Suggestiveness

Introduction

In State v. McLaurin (officially released July 22, 2025), the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed whether due process required suppression of a one-on-one “showup” identification obtained shortly after a 2018 armed robbery of a Milford Smashburger restaurant. The defendant, Gregory E. McLaurin, challenged a restaurant employee’s identification made in a nearby car-dealership parking lot while he was detained. The central issue on certification was whether the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the showup identification.

Although the Appellate Court had affirmed on the ground that the showup was not “unnecessarily suggestive” due to investigative exigencies, the Supreme Court affirmed on a different path: it assumed, without deciding, that the showup was unnecessarily suggestive and held the identification admissible because it was reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the conviction. Even if the showup procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the identification was reliable under the Neil v. Biggers / Manson v. Brathwaite framework. The court emphasized substantial evidence supporting reliability: the witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrators during the robbery, her attentiveness reflected in detailed contemporaneous descriptions, the match between her initial description and the defendant’s appearance, her strong certainty in the body-camera recording, and the short time (about 86 minutes) between crime and identification.

The court also rejected arguments—framed through “estimator variables” discussed in State v. Harris—that the identification was undermined by marijuana use, stress, weapon focus, and the lack of a double-blind sequential procedure, noting conflicting evidence about intoxication, insufficient support for weapon-focus impairment in the record, and social-science evidence suggesting showups within two hours do not increase misidentification risk compared to lineups.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Federal constitutional foundation: reliability as the “linchpin”

Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite: These United States Supreme Court cases supply the governing federal due process test: (1) whether the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and, if so, (2) whether the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of circumstances. The Connecticut Supreme Court treated these as controlling and decisive, quoting that “reliability is the linchpin.”
Stovall v. Denno: Cited chiefly because the defendant urged a narrow, “true exigency” view of permissible showups. The court avoided adopting the defendant’s proposed prophylactic exclusionary rule (limiting admissible showups to circumstances like a gravely injured witness), because it affirmed on reliability grounds even assuming suggestiveness.
Simmons v. United States: Used to rebut the notion that due process requires categorical prohibitions; the opinion invoked Simmons for the Supreme Court’s reluctance to ban identification procedures via supervisory or constitutional rulemaking, reinforcing that the admissibility inquiry remains case-specific.

2) Connecticut’s showup jurisprudence: exigency and prompt on-scene identifications

State v. Wooten: Cited for the proposition that a prompt, geographically proximate showup may be reasonable to test a suspect while memory is fresh and to quickly eliminate innocent parties, thereby minimizing delay in the investigation.
State v. Revels: Reiterated as a leading Connecticut decision upholding showups where police face immediate public-safety and investigative needs (a possibly armed fugitive “on the run”). Although the defendant asked the court to overrule this line of cases, the court found it unnecessary to reach that request.
State v. Ledbetter: Cited alongside Wooten for Connecticut’s endorsement of prompt identifications that serve investigative efficiency and public safety, notwithstanding inherent suggestiveness.
State v. Ruiz: Functioned as a key methodological precedent: the court relied on Ruiz to justify assuming suggestiveness arguendo and resolving the appeal on reliability, thereby bypassing a definitive ruling on the “unnecessarily suggestive” prong.
State v. Marquez and State v. St. John: These cases framed the standard of review—plenary review of the mixed constitutional question, “scrupulous” record review for substantial evidence, and deference to subordinate factual findings absent clear and manifest error.

3) Connecticut’s state-constitutional reliability framework and eyewitness science

State v. Harris: Central to the opinion’s discussion of “system variables” and “estimator variables” (derived in part from State v. Henderson), though the court expressed skepticism that a fully developed state-constitutional claim was properly presented below. Still, it addressed the defendant’s Harris-based arguments and found them unpersuasive on this record.
State v. Guilbert: Cited for the scientific proposition that many factors affecting eyewitness accuracy are counterintuitive to jurors, supporting the availability of expert testimony. The opinion underscored that the defendant offered no expert testimony to operationalize these variables in this case.
State v. Henderson: Invoked as the New Jersey decision from which Connecticut drew parts of its state-constitutional approach in Harris, including the notion (also echoed by the majority’s cited study) that showups conducted within two hours may not be categorically more error-prone than lineups.
State v. Perez-Lopez: Referenced for the Harris burden-shifting framework (defendant’s initial showing tied to system variables; then the state’s reliability showing; then defendant’s ultimate burden), highlighting that litigants must actually invoke and build the state-constitutional record.

4) Other cited authorities reinforcing the court’s approach

Brisco v. Ercole: Acknowledged the general condemnation of single-suspect confrontations as inherently suggestive, reinforcing why the analysis must pivot to necessity and/or reliability.
United States v. Bautista: Supported the proposition that indicia of custody (handcuffs, police presence, illumination) do not necessarily render a prompt identification “unnecessarily suggestive” when the on-scene identification is necessary to confirm or release a suspect.
Van Pilon v. Reed and Bonderer v. Jones: Cited for the analytical move used here: courts may assume suggestiveness arguendo and decide the constitutional question on reliability.
Morris v. Carey: Cited as an example where a showup about an hour after the crime was upheld, reinforcing the significance of short temporal distance.
State v. Whelan: While not the core constitutional holding, Whelan mattered to the evidentiary posture: the witness’s signed contemporaneous statement was admitted as substantive evidence after she claimed lack of memory at trial, allowing the jury (and the suppression record) to rely on her near-contemporaneous description.
State v. Scott: Used to rebut the claim that fear or “panic mode” alone renders identification unreliable.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s doctrinal core is procedural and substantive:

Procedural/doctrinal move—assume suggestiveness, decide reliability: Rather than re-litigate the Appellate Court’s exigency-based “not unnecessarily suggestive” holding, the Supreme Court chose a narrower basis for decision. It assumed the showup was unnecessarily suggestive and asked whether the identification was nevertheless reliable. This approach both (a) fits comfortably within the two-prong federal due process framework and (b) avoids issuing a broad rule about showups or “exigency” that would bind future cases.
Substantive application—Biggers factors strongly favored admissibility: The court walked through each factor and found substantial evidentiary support: (i) Brinkley had meaningful opportunity to view the perpetrators (front and back of restaurant; standing next to the defendant), (ii) her attention was demonstrated by her detailed account and interaction with police, (iii) her description matched the defendant’s general appearance and clothing, (iv) her certainty was captured contemporaneously on body-camera footage, and (v) only about 86 minutes elapsed. On this record, reliability overcame the assumed taint of suggestiveness.
Handling “estimator variables” without expert testimony: The court acknowledged Harris/Guilbert science, but emphasized the absence of expert evidence and the weakness or conflict in the factual record supporting the defendant’s “high stress/weapon focus/intoxication” narrative. It also relied on literature suggesting that a showup within two hours is not more likely than a lineup to produce misidentification—an empirical point that, while not formally adopted as a categorical rule, substantially supported the court’s confidence in reliability here.

Impact

Reinforces “reliability-first” adjudication in showup challenges: State v. McLaurin underscores that Connecticut appellate courts may affirm admission of a showup identification without definitively resolving whether the showup was “unnecessarily suggestive,” so long as the record supports reliability under Neil v. Biggers/Manson v. Brathwaite. This can make suppression harder where witnesses provide strong contemporaneous descriptions and certainty, and the identification is prompt.
Raises the practical premium on building a scientific record for state-constitutional attacks: The opinion signals that Harris-based “estimator variable” arguments are most persuasive when backed by developed evidence (often expert testimony) and when the Harris burden-shifting framework is clearly invoked at the suppression stage.
Bolsters prompt-showup acceptance (especially under two hours) without adopting a new categorical rule: By citing research and State v. Henderson regarding showups within two hours, the court provides prosecutors and police a litigation-ready empirical response to broad claims that showups are per se more error-prone—while still keeping the inquiry case-specific.
Leaves major policy questions open: The defendant’s request for a federal “prophylactic” exclusionary rule limiting admissible showups to narrow “true exigencies” was not reached. Thus, the broader debate over exigency versus convenience remains for a case that requires it.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Showup vs. lineup: A “showup” presents a single detained person to a witness for identification; a “lineup” presents multiple people. Showups are inherently suggestive because they imply police suspicion, but they may be used promptly after a crime.
“Unnecessarily suggestive”: Even if a procedure is suggestive, due process focuses on whether the suggestiveness was gratuitous—i.e., whether it created a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” without sufficient justification or safeguards.
Reliability (the “Biggers factors”): Courts assess whether an identification is trustworthy by examining viewing opportunity, attention, accuracy of prior description, certainty at the identification, and the time elapsed.
System variables vs. estimator variables (from State v. Harris): “System variables” are within law enforcement control (e.g., lineup instructions, double-blind administration). “Estimator variables” come from the witnessing conditions (e.g., stress, weapon focus, memory decay). Many are counterintuitive, which is why expert testimony can matter.
State v. Whelan statements: When a witness later claims lack of memory at trial, a prior signed statement may be admitted substantively if it meets Whelan’s requirements, letting the factfinder consider what the witness said closer in time to the event.

Conclusion

State v. McLaurin cements a practical appellate template for showup-identification litigation in Connecticut: even where a showup’s suggestiveness is assumed, the identification may remain admissible if the record strongly supports reliability under the Neil v. Biggers / Manson v. Brathwaite factors. The decision also illustrates that Harris-style eyewitness-science critiques are most effective when properly raised, evidentially developed, and (often) supported by expert testimony. In the broader legal landscape, the opinion strengthens the role of contemporaneous descriptions, promptness, and documented certainty (here, via body-camera footage) in sustaining identification evidence against due process challenges.

Reliability as the Decisive Safeguard: Connecticut Upholds a Showup Identification Even Assuming Unnecessary Suggestiveness (State v. McLaurin)