Relevant Conduct, Willful Blindness, and Supervised Release Conditions in Firearms Conspiracies:
United States v. Wilson Che Fonguh (4th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published opinion in United States v. Nji, Tita & Fonguh (captioned here as United States v. Wilson Che Fonguh) arises out of a clandestine effort by Cameroonian–Americans to ship firearms and ammunition from Maryland to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon, in support of an armed separatist conflict. Operating under the code name “the Peanut Project,” the group purchased firearms, obliterated their serial numbers, repackaged them in welded compressor tanks, and shipped them overseas in a container routed through Nigeria.

Three defendants – Wilson Nuyila Tita, Eric Fru Nji, and Wilson Che Fonguh – were tried and convicted in the District of Maryland of:

Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (to export arms without a license, to conceal and smuggle exports, and to transport firearms with obliterated serial numbers);
Transporting firearms with obliterated serial numbers under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and
Smuggling firearms, ammunition, and related items under 18 U.S.C. § 554(a).

Each received a 63-month sentence (bottom of the advisory range) and a two-year term of supervised release. On appeal, they attacked:

The sufficiency of the evidence (especially mens rea under § 922(k));
Key evidentiary rulings (exclusion of a defense expert about the Cameroonian conflict; and restrictions on using a co-conspirator’s prior proffer statement);
Jury instructions (Pinkerton vicarious liability, willful blindness, and the definition of “knowledge”);
Sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines; and
The supervised release conditions under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020).

The Fourth Circuit (Judge Niemeyer, joined by Judges Gregory and Harris) affirmed in all respects. While much of the decision applies settled doctrine to specific facts, it meaningfully clarifies:

How relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 operates in firearm conspiracies for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) (number of firearms) and § 2K2.1(b)(5) (trafficking); and
How district courts can validly impose standard conditions of supervised release after Rogers, by incorporating standing-order conditions and then merely summarizing them orally.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit’s principal holdings can be summarized as follows:

Sufficiency of the Evidence: The evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendants knew (or at least could be held liable via Pinkerton) that firearm serial numbers were obliterated, and that the shipped items were “firearms” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).
Exclusion of Defense Expert on Cameroonian Conflict: The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an expert who would have testified about the Cameroonian government’s abuses. The court reasonably concluded that such testimony risked confusing the jury and turning the case into a justification mini-trial, and that defendants could present state-of-mind evidence through lay testimony instead.
Co-conspirator’s Fifth Amendment Invocation and Residual Hearsay: The district court properly allowed co-conspirator Tse Bangarie (who had pled guilty but not yet been sentenced) to invoke the Fifth Amendment and not testify. His prior unsworn proffer statement was also properly excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 807 for lack of trustworthiness and because it was not more probative than other evidence.
Jury Instructions:
- The Pinkerton instruction was warranted: obliteration of serial numbers was reasonably foreseeable in the context of a small, secret firearms-shipping conspiracy.
- A willful blindness instruction was appropriate in light of evidence that defendants were deeply involved in the lab yet claimed ignorance of obvious grinding and defacing of serial numbers.
- The court’s explanation that knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence was proper and did not lower the government’s burden.
Sentencing Enhancements:
- The 6-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) (offense involved 25–99 firearms) was properly applied on the basis that the conspiracy involved 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers, all within the jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable under § 1B1.3.
- The 4-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) for “trafficking of firearms” was also properly applied because each defendant personally engaged in, or aided and abetted, the trafficking of at least two firearms, satisfying § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(B).
Supervised Release Conditions under Rogers: No Rogers error occurred. The district judge explicitly incorporated by reference the district’s standing-order “standard conditions” of supervision – which matched the written judgment – and then only summarized some of them. The fuller text in the written judgment did not create a conflict, because the controlling sentence was the orally incorporated set of standard conditions, not the judge’s summaries.

Collectively, the opinion reinforces doctrinal lines on conspiracy liability, evidentiary discretion, and sentencing, and it further crystallizes how district courts should announce supervised release conditions in the Fourth Circuit.

III. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Knowledge Under § 922(k) and the Definition of “Firearm”

1. The standard of review

The court applied the familiar Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) standard, stressing the “heavy burden” on a defendant seeking reversal for insufficient evidence. The reviewing court:

Views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution;
Draws all reasonable inferences to the government’s benefit; and
Assumes the jury resolved testimonial conflicts in the government’s favor.

Reversal is reserved for the “rare case” where the prosecution’s failure is clear. Citing United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161 (4th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292 (4th Cir. 2024), the panel emphasized the deferential nature of this review.

2. Knowledge that serial numbers were obliterated

Section 922(k) criminalizes transporting a firearm “which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered,” and requires proof that the defendant knew of the obliteration. The defendants argued that the government failed to prove this mens rea.

The Fourth Circuit identified substantial circumstantial evidence of knowledge:

Nature and mission of the group. The Peanut Project was a small, tightly organized group whose express purpose was to send weapons to Anglophone fighters while concealing the origin of the firearms.
Past tracing incident. The group had a prior experience where a firearm had been traced back to the United States by its serial number, causing them to appreciate the importance of serial-number concealment.
The lab environment. Operations took place in a small basement (“the lab”), where members:
- Worked in close quarters;
- Used noisy grinders to remove serial numbers, an activity difficult to miss; and
- Handled firearms bearing obvious grinding marks where serial numbers had been located.
Bylaws emphasizing secrecy and concealment. Bylaws drafted by Tita included a section focused on “concealment methods,” underscoring that secrecy, including concealment of firearms’ origins, was a core part of their joint plan.
Testimony of former members. Witnesses Roger Akem and Alambi Muma testified that:
- Concealment of shipments was an “understanding of the group”; and
- Defendants frequently worked in the lab, packaged arms, and witnessed (and were present for instructions about) grinding operations.
Physical evidence. The jury saw actual seized guns and photos showing “highly visible” defacing where serials had been ground off – the sort of alteration any handler would notice.

On those facts, the court held a rational jury could find actual knowledge. Notably, the panel underscored that serial-number removal was not incidental; it was an “integral” element of the conspiracy’s design after the earlier tracing incident.

3. Pinkerton as an independent basis for liability

While finding ample evidence of actual knowledge, the court also relied on Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), as an alternative ground. Under Pinkerton, a conspirator is liable for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators when:

The acts are in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
The acts are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy.

The panel reasoned that, even if the jury harbored doubt about each defendant’s personal awareness of the serial number grinding:

Obliteration of serial numbers was itself a natural, foreseeable means to conceal firearms’ origin;
The conspirators’ bylaws and operating methods emphasized concealment; and
The conspiracy’s entire rationale (avoiding tracing by authorities) made serial-number obliteration a predictable step.

Thus, Pinkerton provided an independent basis supporting guilt on the § 922(k) count, and consequently on the smuggling (§ 554(a)) and conspiracy (§ 371) counts that incorporated that conduct.

4. Proof that the weapons were “firearms”

Defendants also argued that the government had not proven that the items shipped were “firearms” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), which includes weapons designed to or readily convertible to expel a projectile by explosive action.

The panel rejected this as insubstantial. The government:

Brought many of the guns to court for the jury’s inspection;
Officers testified to their manufacturer, make, and model; and
Ammunition was packaged with them.

Further, the entire purpose of the Peanut Project was to arm fighters; it would be implausible to suggest the group was shipping non-firearms. The evidence comfortably met the statutory definition.

B. Exclusion of Defense Expert on the Cameroonian Conflict

1. Proffered testimony and defense theory

The defense sought to call expert Efi Walters Tembon, an Anglophone Cameroonian who had fled government persecution. The proffer was that he would testify about:

The nature and causes of the Anglophone–Francophone conflict; and
The Cameroonian government’s violent suppression of dissent, even against non-violent protestors.

The defense argued this evidence would show that:

They concealed their activities not because they knew them to be illegal under U.S. law but to protect friends and family in Cameroon from retaliation; and
Thus, the concealment evidence did not support an inference of guilty knowledge under U.S. export or firearms laws.

2. District court’s rationale

The district court excluded the expert testimony, identifying two principal concerns:

State of mind cannot be proved by expert opinion. Under Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), an expert may not state an opinion about whether a defendant did or did not have a mental state that constitutes an element of the crime. While Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024), confirms that experts may provide contextual information from which jurors infer mental state, the court viewed Tembon’s testimony as too close to opining on defendants’ subjective beliefs.
Jury confusion and unfair prejudice. The court saw the risk of a “distracting, collateral mini-trial” about the merits of the Cameroonian conflict and the government’s abuses, which could invite the jury to “assume there is some justification” for defendants’ conduct. Under evidentiary principles akin to Fed. R. Evid. 403, that risk outweighed any limited probative value on state of mind.

Critically, the court did not bar defendants from explaining their own motives and fears. It expressly allowed them to present lay testimony about:

The nature of the conflict;
Their fear of the Cameroonian government; and
Why they wanted secrecy.

And the defense in fact elicited such testimony at trial.

3. Fourth Circuit’s conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that exclusion of Tembon’s testimony was well within the district court’s discretion. While acknowledging that expert context may sometimes be appropriate under Diaz, the panel emphasized:

The testimony’s limited relevance to U.S. criminal intent (knowledge of U.S. law and of obliteration, etc.);
The strong potential to confuse jurors or convert the case into a referendum on Cameroon’s internal conflict; and
The fact that alternative, less prejudicial channels existed (and were used) for defendants to present their state-of-mind narrative.

From a doctrinal perspective, this portion of the opinion:

Reinforces broad trial-management discretion under Rules 403 and 702, particularly where political or foreign-policy issues threaten to overshadow the criminal issues; and
Signals that courts may limit “cause-based” or “justification” narratives when they risk transforming a criminal case into a political trial, especially where the legal defenses do not include any recognized justification or necessity overlaying the charged conduct.

C. Co-Conspirator Testimony, the Fifth Amendment, and the Residual Hearsay Exception

1. Background: the Bangarie proffer

Co-conspirator Tse Bangarie had:

Pled guilty but had not yet been sentenced at the time of trial; and
Participated in a proffer session with the government where, according to the government’s notes, he said:
- He warned St. Michael (the group’s organizer) about the illegality of shipping arms;
- St. Michael assured him he had the “military training,” a “badge,” and the support of “military superiors”; and
- As a result, Bangarie felt there was “no need for concern” and might have believed he was guided by superiors.

Defendants wanted to call Bangarie solely to confirm this proffer statement, arguing that:

They, like Bangarie, relied on St. Michael’s supposed official connection and believed their conduct was lawful; and
Thus, proof of their concealment and participation should not be equated with knowledge of illegality.

But when brought to court, Bangarie (on counsel’s advice) asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege as to that topic.

2. Validity and scope of the Fifth Amendment invocation

The district court conducted the “proper and particularized inquiry” required by United States v. Oliver, 133 F.4th 329 (4th Cir. 2025), and Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1990), considering:

Bangarie’s guilty plea was not yet a final conviction – he had not been sentenced and could, at least in theory, attempt to withdraw his plea;
The government had not accepted the truth of his proffered statement, and there were inconsistencies between the proffer and the sworn factual basis of his plea, where he admitted he knew shipping defense items overseas was illegal; and
Testifying consistent with the proffer but contrary to his plea colloquy could expose him to:
- Perjury risk;
- Loss of acceptance-of-responsibility credit at sentencing; or
- Heightened sentencing exposure due to perceived lack of candor.

In light of Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), which recognizes that a defendant awaiting sentencing may legitimately fear adverse consequences from further testimony, the district court found that:

The privilege was valid; and
Bangarie could properly decline to answer all relevant questions on the narrow topic (the proffer) that defendants sought to explore.

The court thus excused him from testifying without requiring a question-by-question invocation.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing:

No abuse-of-discretion occurred because the record showed:
- A focused inquiry into the scope of potential self-incrimination; and
- A reasonable conclusion that even limited testimony could be dangerous to the witness.
A defendant’s right to compulsory process and to present a complete defense does not override a witness’s valid Fifth Amendment privilege.

3. Exclusion of the proffer under Rule 807’s residual exception

Unable to call Bangarie, defendants sought to introduce the government’s report of his proffer under Fed. R. Evid. 807. That residual exception allows hearsay if:

The statement has “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness”; and
It is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence reasonably available.

The district court found neither requirement met:

Trustworthiness:
- The proffer statement was not under oath and not accepted by the government;
- It was inconsistent with Bangarie’s sworn plea colloquy; and
- It lacked independent corroboration (indeed, St. Michael denied making such assurances).
Relative probative value:
- St. Michael himself testified at trial and could be cross-examined directly on whether he ever claimed to have official authorization; and
- Defendants themselves could testify (and did) about what they were told and what they believed.

The Fourth Circuit agreed. The proffer was classic uncorroborated, unsworn hearsay with internal conflicts, offered primarily to bolster a claimed defense theory. It was neither especially trustworthy nor “more probative” than live testimony from participants. Thus, exclusion under Rule 807 was affirmed.

D. Jury Instructions: Pinkerton, Willful Blindness, and Knowledge

1. Pinkerton vicarious liability instruction

The defense did not claim the Pinkerton instruction misstated the law. Instead, it argued there was insufficient evidentiary basis to instruct that a co-conspirator could be held vicariously liable for substantive § 922(k) offenses committed by others.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, pointing to:

The group’s core mission to secretly ship arms and ammunition;
Their prior experience with a traced firearm;
Bylaws emphasizing “concealment methods”; and
Evidence that serial-number grinding was part of their packaging and concealment routine in the lab.

Given these facts, the court held it was at least reasonably foreseeable to any member that:

Coconspirators would obliterate serial numbers on weapons being shipped; and
Such obliteration would be in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objective (to arm fighters while avoiding detection).

The defense’s reliance on United States v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16 (1st Cir. 2022), where Pinkerton instructions risked confusion in a sprawling, multi-actor scheme inferred from disparate acts, was unpersuasive. Here, the conspiracy was compact, coherent, and centered around a single, unified weapons-shipping enterprise.

2. Willful blindness instruction

A willful blindness (or deliberate ignorance) instruction is appropriate when:

The defendant subjectively believed there was a high probability of a fact; and
The defendant took deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact.

(See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011); United States v. Hale, 857 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 2017)). Such instructions must be used with caution, as they should not permit conviction based on mere negligence or recklessness about a fact’s existence.

Here, the panel held the instruction was warranted because:

Defendants claimed lack of knowledge that serial numbers were obliterated;
Yet they were:
- Active participants in the lab, where grinding operations were noisy and obvious;
- Present when grinding assignments were given; and
- Involved in extensive packaging of firearms in a confined area.
The jury could conclude that, if they truly lacked actual knowledge, they did so only by deliberately avoiding handling the firearms at times when the grinding marks were apparent or by intentionally insulating themselves from details of the concealment process.

Because there was “evidence supporting an inference of deliberate ignorance” in the face of claimed lack of knowledge, the instruction fell squarely within accepted limits.

3. The “knowledge” instruction

The defendants further attacked the court’s explanation that “[t]he defendant’s knowledge, again, it’s a matter of inference. It’s a matter you may infer from the facts that have been proved.” They claimed this language unduly emphasized inferential reasoning and diluted the requirement of proving knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed. It noted that:

Courts routinely instruct juries that mental states, like knowledge, are rarely proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from circumstantial evidence; and
The instruction used permissive language (“may infer”), not a mandatory presumption.

Accordingly, the instruction did not lower the burden of proof or misstate the law.

E. Sentencing: Relevant Conduct and Firearm Enhancements under § 2K2.1

1. The 6-level enhancement for 25–99 firearms (§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(C))

The presentence reports recommended – and the district court applied – a 6-level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C), which applies when “the offense involved” 25 to 99 firearms. The PSR stated that “the offense involved 28 firearms,” based on:

Physical and photographic evidence of 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers found in the container; and
The jury’s finding of a conspiracy to transport and smuggle such firearms.

Nji and Fonguh objected that:

The government had not shown how many firearms each defendant personally knew about; and
The jury verdict, especially given the Pinkerton instruction, did not specify the number of firearms each defendant was directly involved with.

They argued the district court improperly conflated Pinkerton conspiracy liability (for conviction) with the narrower “jointly undertaken criminal activity” standard of relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument on two levels:

Pinkerton vs. § 1B1.3: The district court had not actually invoked Pinkerton when applying the enhancement. Instead, it focused on the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which makes a defendant accountable for:
- All acts and omissions of others that were:
  - Within the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake;
  - In furtherance of that activity; and
  - Reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity.
“Offense involved” language: Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) looks to the number of firearms the offense involved, not what each defendant subjectively knew or personally handled. Where the proved conspiracy involved 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and that conduct fell within the scope, furtherance, and foreseeability prongs of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the entire 28-count was properly attributed to each conspirator.

The panel also observed:

The 28 firearms number was uncontested – the government introduced each gun or its photograph, and the PSR documented that count;
The defendants did not persuasively challenge the factual finding that 28 firearms were involved; and
The district court correctly rejected the argument that each defendant must “know the exact number” of firearms to be accountable for them at sentencing.

This portion of the opinion clarifies in concrete terms how § 1B1.3 operates in a firearms conspiracy:

It does not automatically track the full scope of Pinkerton liability;
But once a conspiracy’s scope is defined, the number of firearms within that jointly undertaken activity – if in furtherance and reasonably foreseeable – may be attributed to each conspirator for § 2K2.1(b)(1) purposes even absent individualized proof of precise numerical awareness.

2. The 4-level enhancement for “trafficking of firearms” (§ 2K2.1(b)(5))

At the time of sentencing, § 2K2.1(b)(5) provided a 4-level increase if “the defendant engaged in the trafficking of firearms.” The commentary (Note 13(B)) states:

The term “defendant,” consistent with § 1B1.3, limits accountability to:
- The defendant’s own conduct, and
- Conduct that the defendant aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.

Defendants argued that this language pointed to a narrower standard than typical conspiracy/relevant-conduct rules – that is, they could not be enhanced merely based on co-conspirator conduct absent proof of personal involvement or active assistance.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with the interpretation of Note 13(B) – the enhancement is defendant-specific – but held that, on the facts, it was still properly applied:

Evidence showed each defendant personally participated in, or aided and abetted, the trafficking of at least two firearms; and
They all worked in the lab, packaged firearms for shipment, and were actively involved in the logistics of the arms trafficking scheme.

As a result, even under the stricter reading of “defendant” in Note 13(B), the enhancement comfortably applied.

Doctrinally, this confirms:

§ 2K2.1(b)(5) is not purely co-conspirator-based: it requires a link to a defendant’s own or aided-and-abetted acts;
But where participating conspirators personally handle and ship multiple firearms, the trafficking enhancement is straightforwardly triggered.

F. Supervised Release Conditions After Rogers: Incorporation and Summarization

1. The Rogers framework

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3:

Certain mandatory conditions of supervised release must be imposed in every case (e.g., no new crimes, drug testing in some circumstances);
Discretionary conditions (standard and special) may be imposed if they:
- Are reasonably related to sentencing factors;
- Involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary; and
- Are consistent with Sentencing Commission policy.

In United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit held that:

Mandatory conditions need not be orally pronounced; but
All discretionary conditions must either be:
- Orally pronounced at sentencing, or
- Clearly incorporated by reference (for example, via a standing order listing standard conditions).

If a discrepancy arises between oral pronouncement and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls, and the presence of additional unannounced discretionary conditions in the written judgment is generally reversible error requiring resentencing. That principle was reaffirmed in cases such as United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629 (4th Cir. 2024).

2. What the district court did here

The District of Maryland had promulgated Standing Order 2020-13, adopting 13 “standard conditions” of supervised release that mirror U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). Among them:

Standard Condition 6: The defendant must allow the probation officer to visit at any time at home or elsewhere and must permit seizure of prohibited items observed in plain view.
Standard Condition 7: The defendant must work full-time at lawful employment (or seek such employment), with various notice obligations to the probation officer regarding changes.

The PSRs provided to each defendant listed these standard conditions. At sentencing, the district court:

Explicitly told each defendant that it was imposing:
- “Mandatory and standard conditions” (Tita);
- “Mandatory conditions, which I must go over with you clearly, and standard conditions, and additional conditions” (Nji); and
- “All those conditions, both the mandatory and standard conditions, as well as certain additional conditions” (Fonguh).
Stated that it was incorporating those conditions by reference.
Then summarized some of them orally, including:
- The essence of Condition 6 (probation officer visits) – but not the full text about seizing prohibited items observed in plain view; and
- The essence of Condition 7 (work requirements) – again, in shorter form than the standing order language.

The written judgments later issued reproduced the full text of all standard conditions, including Conditions 6 and 7.

3. Defendants’ Rogers argument and the Fourth Circuit’s response

Defendants argued that because the written judgments contained fuller text than the oral summaries, there was a Rogers inconsistency: the written judgment imposed discretionary conditions in more rigorous terms than had been orally pronounced.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this as a misreading of Rogers and its progeny. It emphasized:

The key event at sentencing was the judge’s clear incorporation by reference of all “standard conditions” previously provided in the PSR and embodied in the standing order.
Once those standard conditions were validly incorporated, the fact that the judge later summarized or paraphrased some of them did not cancel or limit the formally incorporated conditions.
The written judgment’s verbatim recitation of the standard conditions was a “word-for-word match” with the incorporated standard conditions, satisfying Rogers as explained in United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2024).

The court further explained:

Summarizations are not themselves the legal imposition of a condition; the incorporated set is;
While in other cases ambiguous or contradictory summarizations might cause trouble (see United States v. Bullis, 122 F.4th 107 (4th Cir. 2024)), here there was no such conflict or ambiguity; and
Given that each defendant had the PSR and was explicitly told that the “standard conditions” were being imposed, they received adequate notice and an opportunity to object.

As a result, the panel held there was no Rogers error and no basis to vacate the sentences for plenary resentencing.

Doctrinally, this opinion reaffirms and refines the Fourth Circuit’s supervised-release jurisprudence:

District courts in the Fourth Circuit may comply with Rogers by:
- Expressly incorporating a known set of standard conditions (by reference to a standing order or PSR); and
- Optionally summarizing or highlighting conditions without reading each verbatim.
The key is:
- Clear oral incorporation of a definite, externally documented condition set; and
- No conflict between the incorporated set and the written judgment.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Conspiracy and Pinkerton liability

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime. Once a defendant joins a conspiracy, the Pinkerton doctrine says that:

He can be held liable not only for the crime of conspiracy itself, but also for substantive offenses (like unlawful gun transportation) that:
- His co-conspirators commit;
- Are in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
- Are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy.

In practice, this means a conspirator can be convicted of acts he did not personally commit, so long as those acts are part of the shared criminal plan.

2. Willful blindness (deliberate ignorance)

Willful blindness is a way to prove knowledge when a defendant:

Thinks there is a high chance a fact exists (e.g., that serial numbers are being removed), and
Deliberately avoids confirming it (e.g., by never looking at the firearms closely or steering away when grinding is happening).

The law treats willful blindness like actual knowledge because a person should not escape liability by deliberately keeping himself in the dark about what he strongly suspects is true.

3. Relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3

At sentencing, judges do not look only at the exact facts found by the jury; they consider a broader set of “relevant conduct.” For conspiracies, that includes:

Acts of others that were:
- Within the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to jointly undertake;
- Done to advance that activity; and
- Reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.

This is narrower than full conspiracy liability (which can be very broad), but broader than just what the defendant personally did with his own hands.

4. Residual hearsay (Rule 807)

Most hearsay (out-of-court statements offered for their truth) is inadmissible unless it fits a specific exception (e.g., business records). Rule 807 is a “catch-all” that allows hearsay if:

It is very trustworthy (because of the circumstances under which it was made); and
It is more probative (more useful and important) on the topic than any other available evidence.

Courts use this rule sparingly. Statements made in unsworn proffers that contradict sworn plea admissions tend to be seen as unreliable and therefore not admissible under Rule 807.

5. Proffer sessions

A proffer session is a meeting between a suspect or defendant, his counsel, and prosecutors, where the defendant provides information in hopes of a cooperation agreement or a favorable plea. Typically:

The statements are protected from direct use in the government’s case-in-chief, but may be used for impeachment or in other limited ways, depending on the agreement;
They are usually unsworn; and
They do not carry the same reliability presumption as sworn testimony under oath in court.

6. Supervised release and Rogers

Supervised release is a period of supervision after a prison term. It comes with:

Mandatory conditions that always apply (by statute); and
Discretionary conditions (standard and special) that the judge chooses based on the case.

Under Rogers in the Fourth Circuit:

Judges must either:
- Read discretionary conditions aloud at sentencing, or
- Clearly say they are imposing a particular known set of conditions (e.g., “the standard conditions in our standing order”).
If the written judgment later adds discretionary conditions that were not orally imposed or clearly incorporated, that’s generally error and the sentence must be fixed.

This ensures that defendants know, at sentencing, what rules will govern them on supervised release.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. Firearms and export prosecutions

This opinion provides a roadmap for the government in future firearms and export-control prosecutions:

Proving knowledge circumstantially: The Fourth Circuit endorses reliance on:
- The scope and purpose of the conspiracy;
- Physical layout of facilities (small lab, noisy grinding);
- Group bylaws and internal communications emphasizing concealment; and
- Visible physical alterations to weapons.
Pinkerton as a backstop: Even where direct proof of personal knowledge is contested, prosecutors can rely on Pinkerton vicarious liability when the conduct (e.g., serial number obliteration) is a natural step in the conspiracy’s concealment plan.

For defense counsel, the case highlights the importance of:

Challenging not only substantive counts but also the foreseeability and scope components of conspiracy and relevant conduct; and
Understanding that “political” or “humanitarian” motives will not negate the knowledge element where objective concealment measures are substantial and coordinated.

2. Evidentiary discretion and political/conflict context

The court’s treatment of the proposed Cameroonian-conflict expert underscores that:

Federal courts may limit expert contextual testimony about foreign conflicts when it risks:
- Encouraging jurors to see defendants’ conduct as morally justified; or
- Producing an unwieldy mini-trial on a political conflict not squarely within the elements of the charged offenses.
Defense counsel seeking to use political or geopolitical context should be prepared to:
- Demonstrate tight linkage to specific mens rea elements; and
- Offer streamlined, non-inflammatory presentations, often via lay rather than expert witnesses.

3. Cooperator management and defense use of proffer statements

The handling of the Bangarie issue illustrates:

The strong protection unsentenced cooperators retain under the Fifth Amendment, especially when their prior statements conflict with plea admissions; and
The judiciary’s reluctance to use the residual hearsay rule to admit unsworn, unadopted proffers that are inconsistent with sworn pleas.

Defense strategies that rely heavily on proffer statements – particularly to establish favorable mental-state narratives – will face high admissibility hurdles unless:

The statements are sworn or corroborated; and
The witness can safely testify without valid Fifth Amendment concerns (for example, after sentencing and with adequate immunity or other protections).

4. Sentencing: sharpening the Pinkerton/relevant-conduct distinction

In conjunction with prior cases like United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257 (4th Cir. 2024), this decision helps refine the line between:

Pinkerton liability (for conviction); and
Relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 (for Guidelines calculations).

Here, the court is careful to ground the § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) enhancement in:

The defined scope of the “Peanut Project” conspiracy; and
Reasonably foreseeable conduct within that scope.

For practitioners, the message is:

Sentencing enhancements in conspiracy cases still require a particularized relevant-conduct analysis under § 1B1.3;
But where the conspiracy is tightly organized and focused (as here), it will often be easy for courts to conclude that all major conduct (e.g., all shipped guns) was within the agreement and reasonably foreseeable; and
Defendants need concrete evidence to argue that some co-conspirator conduct (e.g., extra shipments, unshared methods) went beyond the scope of their own jointly undertaken activity.

5. Supervised release practice after Rogers

Finally, this decision is particularly instructive for district courts and probation offices in the Fourth Circuit on supervised release:

It approves a practical method for imposing standard conditions:
- Adopt a standing order listing standard conditions; and
- At sentencing, explicitly incorporate those conditions, referencing the standing order or the PSR.
Judges may then:
- Summarize or paraphrase certain conditions for emphasis; but
- Need not read all standard conditions verbatim, so long as incorporation is clear and no conflicts are created.

This clarifies that Rogers does not demand ritualistic reading of every condition; rather, it demands clear oral notice of which set of discretionary conditions are being imposed. That clarification reduces the risk of technical resentencing based purely on form, while still protecting defendants’ rights to know their obligations.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Nji, Tita & Fonguh (here, United States v. Wilson Che Fonguh) is an important Fourth Circuit decision at the intersection of firearms law, conspiracy doctrine, sentencing, and supervised release practice. Its key contributions include:

Confirming that knowledge of serial-number obliteration in § 922(k) prosecutions can be proved through extensive circumstantial evidence tied to a conspiracy’s mission and methods, with Pinkerton liability as a robust alternative basis;
Affirming broad but principled trial-court discretion to exclude expert testimony on foreign conflicts where it risks confusing jurors or being used to justify otherwise illegal conduct;
Reinforcing protections for unsentenced cooperators invoking the Fifth Amendment and setting a high bar for admitting their unsworn proffer statements under Rule 807;
Clarifying the proper use of Pinkerton and willful blindness instructions in compact, mission-focused conspiracies;
Elaborating how relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 functions in firearm conspiracies for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) and § 2K2.1(b)(5), including the individualized “defendant” limitation in Note 13(B); and
Further developing the Rogers line of cases to hold that explicit incorporation of standard supervised release conditions – even when followed by brief summaries – satisfies the requirement of oral pronouncement for discretionary conditions.

In sum, the opinion affirms the convictions and sentences of three individuals who secretly funneled arms to an overseas conflict, while simultaneously reinforcing doctrinal clarity on conspiracy liability, evidentiary boundaries, sentencing enhancements, and supervised-release procedure in the Fourth Circuit.

Relevant Conduct, Willful Blindness, and Supervised Release Conditions in Firearms Conspiracies: United States v. Wilson Che Fonguh (4th Cir. 2025)