Rejecting “Presidential Tolling” and Weaponized Shotgun Pleadings: The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Trump v. Clinton / Habba v. Dolan

Rejecting “Presidential Tolling” and Weaponized Shotgun Pleadings: The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Trump v. Clinton / Habba v. Dolan

I. Introduction

This consolidated Eleventh Circuit opinion, authored by Chief Judge William Pryor, arises out of a high‑profile civil lawsuit filed by former President Donald J. Trump against Hillary R. Clinton and numerous other political, campaign, and law-enforcement actors. The case centers on alleged wrongdoing surrounding the “Russia collusion” narrative in the 2016 presidential election, and it culminates in a sweeping appellate ruling on:

  • The timeliness and sufficiency of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims;
  • The elements of Florida torts such as injurious falsehood and malicious prosecution;
  • The scope of personal jurisdiction under RICO’s nationwide service provision and the consequences of improper service abroad;
  • The standards and procedures for imposing sanctions under both Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority;
  • The limits of Rule 60(b)(6) reconsideration based on Special Counsel John Durham’s report;
  • The inability of a district court to entertain a new judicial disqualification motion while the case is on appeal; and
  • The high bar for appellate sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

The appeals include not only Trump as appellant, but also his lawyers Alina Habba, Michael Madaio, Peter Ticktin, Jamie Sasson, and their firms (Habba Madaio & Associates and The Ticktin Law Group), who challenge severe sanctions imposed by the district court, including nearly $1 million in attorneys’ fees and a separate Rule 11 penalty in favor of defendant Charles Dolan, Jr.

At its core, the opinion establishes a clear Eleventh Circuit position on two novel issues:

  1. No “presidential tolling” of civil statutes of limitations—a president’s official duties and political calculations do not equitably toll limitations periods on his private civil claims.
  2. Shotgun pleadings and knowingly unsupported factual allegations can, in context, constitute “bad faith” justifying large inherent‑power sanctions against both client and counsel, especially where the litigation appears to be weaponized for political purposes.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s key holdings can be summarized as follows:

  • Merits (RICO and state-law claims)
    • Trump’s civil RICO claims are time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Neither statutory tolling (via importation of the Clayton Act’s tolling rule) nor equitable tolling applies.
    • The court does not decide whether Clayton Act tolling applies to RICO, but holds that even if it did, the government proceedings Trump cites (FEC enforcement, and the Sussmann, Danchenko, and Clinesmith prosecutions) do not have the requisite “real relation” to his RICO claims.
    • Trump’s Florida injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit injurious falsehood claims fail because he did not adequately challenge independent grounds for dismissal, including his failure to plead “special damages.”
    • His claim for conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution fails because under Florida law conspiracy cannot stand without a viable underlying tort of malicious prosecution.
  • Personal jurisdiction
    • The court holds that the district court did have personal jurisdiction over defendants Rodney Joffe and Charles Dolan based on RICO’s nationwide service provision, because Trump’s RICO claims were not so insubstantial as to defeat federal jurisdiction.
    • However, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Orbis Limited under that same provision, because Orbis was served in England rather than in a U.S. judicial district. As a result, dismissal against Orbis had to be without prejudice.
  • Sanctions (inherent authority and Rule 11)
    • The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing nearly $1 million in fee‑shifting sanctions jointly and severally against Trump and Alina Habba (and her firm) under its inherent authority, upon a finding of bad faith.
    • It also properly sanctioned Trump’s counsel under Rule 11 in favor of Dolan, where the complaint contained demonstrably false allegations about his status and role and advanced legal theories with no chance of success.
    • Trump and his attorneys forfeited due process objections regarding lack of a hearing and “safe harbor” by not properly raising them below.
  • Reconsideration and the Durham Report
    • Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on the Durham Report is denied. The report does not present “extraordinary circumstances” and does not cure the legal defects in the claims.
  • Disqualification motion
    • The district court correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Trump’s second recusal motion against Judge Middlebrooks while the merits and sanctions orders were on appeal, except to the limited extent permitted by Rule 62.1 on the Rule 60(b) motion.
  • Appellate sanctions
    • Although some arguments were frivolous, the existence of nonfrivolous issues (e.g., the Orbis jurisdictional error) means the appeal as a whole was not frivolous. The court therefore denies Rule 38 sanctions sought by Orbis and Dolan.

In result, the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Vacates the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis and remands with instructions to dismiss without prejudice;
  • Affirms dismissal with prejudice for all other defendants on all claims at issue;
  • Affirms both sanctions orders (inherent-power and Rule 11);
  • Affirms denial of reconsideration and disqualification; and
  • Denies appellate sanctions under Rule 38.

III. Analysis

A. Procedural Context and Scope of the Consolidated Appeals

Trump’s original complaint was already sprawling—over 100 pages and 500+ paragraphs—naming 28 defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the DNC, law firm Perkins Coie, Fusion GPS, Christopher Steele, several FBI and DOJ officials, and Democratic operative Charles Dolan. After motions to dismiss, Trump filed an even lengthier amended complaint, adding defendants and counts.

The consolidated appeals encompass:

  • No. 22‑13410: Appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of Trump’s amended complaint.
  • No. 23‑10387 & No. 23‑13177: Appeals from sanctions orders—Rule 11 sanctions in favor of Dolan, and inherent‑authority sanctions in favor of numerous defendants.
  • No. 22‑14099: Appeal implicating Dolan specifically (including sanctions and personal jurisdiction issues).

While appeals were pending, the Durham Report issued. Trump and his counsel sought:

  • Judicial notice of the Durham Report in the Eleventh Circuit, or alternatively a stay to pursue a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court; and
  • Renewed disqualification of Judge Middlebrooks.

The Eleventh Circuit granted a limited remand to allow the district court to consider an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1. On remand, the district court:

  • Declined to reconsider its orders under Rule 60(b); and
  • Ruled it lacked jurisdiction to consider the new recusal motion.

These rulings, plus cross-motions for appellate sanctions, all came before the Eleventh Circuit in the consolidated appeals now decided.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. RICO Limitations and Tolling

  • Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) The Supreme Court there held that civil RICO borrows the four-year statute of limitations from the Clayton Act. The Eleventh Circuit uses this as the starting point: Trump’s civil RICO claims are governed by a four-year period.
  • Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) Lehman clarifies that RICO claims accrue when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury. The panel accepts the district court’s unchallenged finding that Trump was aware of his alleged injuries by October 2017, so the limitations period expired by October 2021. Filing in March 2022 was thus facially untimely.
  • Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965), and related Clayton Act cases The Supreme Court’s antitrust cases—Leh, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing v. New Jersey Wood Finishing, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine—interpret 15 U.S.C. § 16(i), which tolls antitrust claims during certain government proceedings that bear a “real relation” to the subsequent private claim. The Eleventh Circuit applies those concepts to Trump’s statutory tolling argument, stressing that:
    • Private claims and government proceedings must be “intertwined” and “fundamentally the same” in factual allegations (Morton’s Market, Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc.); and
    • Historically, tolling has applied only when both actions allege antitrust violations.
    Because Trump’s suit is not an antitrust case and the prior government proceedings are narrow false-statement matters and FEC accounting issues, the court holds there is no sufficient “real relation” even if Clayton Act tolling applied to RICO.

2. Equitable Tolling and Presidential Status

  • Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) Cited to underscore that equitable tolling is a “rare remedy.”
  • Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016) Provides the modern test for equitable tolling: (1) diligent pursuit of rights; and (2) an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond the litigant’s control that prevents timely filing. The Eleventh Circuit uses this to reject Trump’s plea to toll limitation periods during his presidency.
  • Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) Crucial for the “no presidential tolling” holding. The Supreme Court had rejected President Clinton’s argument that he should be immune from private civil suits while in office due to burdens on the presidency. The Eleventh Circuit draws a straightforward analogy: if a sitting president can be forced to litigate, he can also be required to timely file his own civil claims. Political prudence or optics do not qualify as circumstances “beyond [his] control.”

3. Florida Tort Principles

  • Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) and Bothmann v. Harrington, 458 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) These cases define injurious falsehood as a tort focused on intentional interference with economic relations via a false statement that proximately causes “special damages.” The district court relied on them to require specific pleading of special, pecuniary damages, which Trump failed to challenge on appeal.
  • Balcor Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ahronovitz, 634 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) and Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 206 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) These precedents hold that civil conspiracy claims are derivative—there must be an underlying actionable tort. The Eleventh Circuit applies them to affirm dismissal of conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit injurious falsehood once the underlying torts fail.

4. Shotgun Pleadings and RICO Complaints

  • Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) Provides the taxonomy of “shotgun pleadings,” including complaints where each count incorporates every preceding paragraph, making it impossible to discern which facts support which claims. The court finds Trump’s complaint fits this paradigm exactly.
  • Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) Confirms that RICO plaintiffs are not exempt from anti-shotgun pleading requirements; RICO claims can be dismissed for shotgun defects.
  • Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991) (abrogated on other grounds) and Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) These cases support using shotgun pleading both as a basis for dismissal and as evidence supporting sanctions, because the court is forced to “sift through” voluminous, redundant allegations.

5. Inherent Authority Sanctions and Bad Faith

  • Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) Landmark case confirming that federal courts have inherent power to impose sanctions, including attorney’s fees, for bad-faith conduct.
  • Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) Cited for the premise that courts must control their own processes to ensure orderly disposition.
  • Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015); Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2017); Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002); In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) These cases collectively define and elaborate the “subjective bad faith” standard for inherent-power sanctions. The Eleventh Circuit uses them to uphold the district court’s finding that Trump and his counsel:
    • Knowingly or recklessly advanced frivolous legal theories; and
    • Filed a shotgun complaint for an improper purpose (“to harass” and for political messaging) and with reckless disregard for factual accuracy.
  • Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2021) Important for the proposition that a court may consider a party’s similar litigation conduct in other cases to establish a pattern of abuse and support a bad-faith finding. The Eleventh Circuit affirms the district court’s reliance on Trump’s history of “frivolous lawsuits.”

6. Rule 11 Sanctions

  • Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935 (11th Cir. 2022); Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1998); Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) These cases provide the Eleventh Circuit’s framework for Rule 11: objective frivolousness and the requirement of reasonable pre‑filing inquiry, even if counsel subjectively believes in the claim. The court applies these standards to uphold sanctions for the factually baseless allegations against Dolan and patently defective legal theories.
  • Huggins v. Lueder, Larkin & Hunter, LLC, 39 F.4th 1342 (11th Cir. 2022) Explains the Rule 11 “safe harbor” requirement. The Eleventh Circuit notes that Trump’s counsel did not preserve any argument that inherent‑authority sanctions improperly circumvented this safe harbor.

7. Rule 60(b)(6), Durham Report, and Extraordinary Circumstances

  • BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612 (2025) The Supreme Court is cited for the stringent standard that “only ‘extraordinary circumstances’ can justify relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). The Eleventh Circuit finds that the public release of the Durham Report—anticipated and largely based on information already known to Trump—is not such a circumstance.
  • Johnson v. Miami-Dade County, 948 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020) Applied for the rule that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered. Trump’s attempt to characterize the Durham Report as “newly discovered evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2) in his reply is therefore ignored.

8. Jurisdiction While on Appeal and Recusal

  • Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) Establishes that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over “those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” The Eleventh Circuit uses Griggs to hold that the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain a fresh recusal motion once the merits and sanctions were on appeal—apart from the limited ability granted by Rule 62.1 regarding the 60(b) motion.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1 Governs “indicative rulings” when an appeal is pending and a party files a motion the district court otherwise lacks jurisdiction to grant. The Eleventh Circuit stresses that Rule 62.1 does not allow a party to trigger reassignment to a new judge or to reopen “all future proceedings” while an appeal is pending.
  • United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993) Trump and his attorneys cited Cooley for the idea of a “continuing duty” to recuse, even post-trial. The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes Cooley because there the district court still had plenary jurisdiction (post-trial motions), unlike here, where appellate jurisdiction had attached. Cooley does not override Griggs.

9. Appellate Sanctions

  • Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) Used again in the Rule 38 context: an appeal is frivolous if it lacks any factual basis or ignores governing law and relies on clearly frivolous arguments.
  • McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 769 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2014) The Eleventh Circuit approvingly quotes McCoy’s caution that Rule 38 sanctions should not be imposed “every time one or two arguments in an appeal might arguably be deemed frivolous” where other arguments have merit. This is the basis for denying Orbis’s and Dolan’s motions for appellate sanctions.

C. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. RICO Limitations and the Rejection of “Presidential Tolling”

Trump’s RICO claims accrued, at the latest, when he was fully aware of the alleged “Russian collusion” narrative and its associated investigations—by October 2017. The four-year civil RICO statute of limitations thus expired by October 2021. Filing suit in March 2022 was plainly late.

Trump advanced two tolling theories:

  1. Statutory tolling by importing the Clayton Act’s tolling provision into RICO; and
  2. Equitable tolling based primarily on the demands of the presidency and the risk that filing suit would appear to interfere with ongoing investigations.
a. Clayton Act–style statutory tolling rejected on facts

The court sidesteps the doctrinal question whether the Clayton Act tolling provision, 15 U.S.C. § 16(i), applies to RICO at all. Even assuming it did, the government’s proceedings must bear a “real relation” to the private action—meaning the factual allegations must be “intertwined with and fundamentally the same” as those in the federal enforcement action.

The FEC enforcement and the prosecutions of Sussmann, Danchenko, and Clinesmith did not satisfy that standard:

  • They did not allege any antitrust conspiracy; and
  • They concerned narrow false‑statement charges and campaign accounting irregularities, not the broad alleged RICO enterprise Trump pleaded.

Therefore, even if Clayton Act tolling were imported into RICO, it would not save Trump’s claims.

b. Equitable tolling and the “presidential tolling” argument

The more significant—and novel—holding is the rejection of any “presidential tolling” doctrine. Trump argued that:

  • His position as President created “historically-unprecedented circumstances,” including immense workload and constitutional duties;
  • Filing this lawsuit while the Mueller and Durham investigations were ongoing could have been perceived as impropriety or interference; thus he prudently waited; and
  • The extraordinary demands of his office should equitably toll limitations “for the term of his Presidency.”

The Eleventh Circuit responds in four key ways:

  1. Clinton v. Jones controls by analogy. The Supreme Court already rejected the idea that a sitting president is shielded from civil litigation burdens due to time and energy demands. If a president can be compelled to litigate as a defendant, he is not excused from timely filing suit as a plaintiff.
  2. The workload rationale is generic, not extraordinary. Being busy as President is not unique to Trump and is not “extraordinary” in the Menominee sense. Equitable tolling is reserved for rare and extreme situations (e.g., fraudulent concealment or credible fear of death-squad reprisals, as in NuVasive and Jean v. Dorélien).
  3. Optics and political strategy are within the litigant’s control. Trump expressly characterized his decision not to sue earlier as a “presidential decision” to prioritize official responsibilities and avoid the appearance of interfering with law-enforcement. By definition, that is a self-imposed constraint, not something “beyond [his] control.”
  4. Equitable tolling demands diligence plus impossibility. Trump did not show that he diligently pursued his rights but was prevented from filing by factors he could not control. Instead, he chose to wait for political and prudential reasons.

The court thereby rejects any claim that the presidency as such can toll limitations periods. This is a significant clarification for all future presidential litigants in the Eleventh Circuit.

2. State-Law Claims: Injurious Falsehood and Malicious Prosecution

The court largely affirms dismissal of Trump’s Florida tort claims on procedural grounds—specifically, forfeiture under the Sapuppo rule, which requires appellants to challenge each independent basis for the decision below.

a. Injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit injurious falsehood

The district court held that Trump failed to plead:

  • Special damages (the core of injurious falsehood); and
  • Respects in which the conspiracy claim could survive absent a viable underlying injurious falsehood claim.

On appeal:

  • Trump did not meaningfully engage these bases in his opening brief; and
  • He tried to raise arguments later in his reply brief, which the Eleventh Circuit refuses to consider.

Under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Insurance Co., when a district court’s judgment rests on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must show error as to each. Trump did not, so the judgment is affirmed without need to reach alternative First Amendment or other elements-based rationales.

b. Conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution

Florida law (Balcor, Buchanan) is clear: conspiracy is derivative; if the underlying tort fails, so does the conspiracy. Trump conceded below that he lacked an underlying malicious prosecution claim (there was no judicial proceeding initiated against him). On appeal, he tried to argue that a “combination to cause prosecution” could suffice even absent completion of a judicial proceeding, but he:

  • Failed to address the controlling Florida precedents the district court relied on; and
  • Did not show any authority allowing a free‑standing conspiracy claim in this context.

Again, Sapuppo dooms the appeal: failure to tackle the district court’s central legal premise compels affirmance.

3. Personal Jurisdiction under RICO’s Nationwide Service Provision and the Orbis Error

Trump argued for personal jurisdiction over Joffe, Dolan, and Orbis based on RICO’s nationwide service provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d), which allows process “on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”

a. Joffe and Dolan

The Eleventh Circuit explains an important jurisdictional nuance from Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings:

  • Nationwide service of process under RICO can provide personal jurisdiction if the underlying federal claim is not “wholly insubstantial or frivolous.”
  • Although Trump’s equitable tolling argument is frivolous, his statutory tolling argument (about Clayton Act tolling) is not so implausible as to be non‑justiciable. Therefore, the RICO claims are not jurisdictionally defective in the Panama sense.
  • Accordingly, the district court had personal jurisdiction over Joffe and Dolan under § 1965(d).

The district court erred in concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Dolan. However, that error does not change the outcome because the Eleventh Circuit affirms dismissal of all claims against him on other grounds (limitations and failure to state a claim).

b. Orbis and the importance of proper service

Orbis, a U.K.-based entity, was served in England. The Eleventh Circuit accepts Orbis’s argument that:

  • RICO’s nationwide service provision authorizes service in a “judicial district” where the person “resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs”—that is, within the United States;
  • Service abroad does not satisfy § 1965(d).

Trump conceded service was made in England. Thus:

  • The district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Orbis entirely; and
  • Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without prejudice, not with prejudice (citing Posner v. Essex Insurance Co.).

The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacates the dismissal as to Orbis and remands with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. This is a technical but important correction: a jurisdictional defect cannot be resolved “on the merits.”

4. Inherent-Power Sanctions: Shotgun Pleadings, Factual Recklessness, and Political Motive

The court upholds an extraordinary inherent‑power sanctions award of $937,989.39 against Trump and Habba (and her firm), jointly and severally. The analysis proceeds in several stages.

a. Forfeited procedural objections

Trump and Habba argued on appeal that:

  • They lacked adequate notice that inherent authority sanctions were being considered; and
  • Due process required a hearing.

The Eleventh Circuit notes that:

  • They did not sufficiently develop a “notice” objection in the district court beyond a cursory citation to “fair notice” in one Supreme Court quote, without applying it to the facts.
  • They requested a hearing only “to the extent” sanctions might be imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, not for inherent‑authority sanctions.

Under standard forfeiture principles (BUC Int’l Corp., Sapuppo), these objections cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

b. Bad faith: three main pillars

A finding of subjective bad faith, reviewed for clear error, unlocks the court’s inherent power to shift fees. The district court’s bad-faith determination rested on three interrelated aspects of the complaint:

  1. Shotgun pleading for improper purposes – The complaint was “quintessential” shotgun: extremely long, incorporating hundreds of paragraphs into each count, forcing the court and defendants to guess which facts supported which legal theories. The district court found this was done to harass and to advance a political narrative, not to plead claims in good faith.
  2. Knowingly false or recklessly indifferent factual allegations – Particularly as to Charles Dolan, Trump’s amended complaint repeated factual assertions (e.g., that Dolan was a former DNC chairman, a “senior Clinton Campaign official,” and a Florida‑related actor) that Dolan’s counsel had already demonstrably refuted in a Rule 11 warning letter. Maintaining those allegations showed at least reckless disregard for the truth.
  3. Frivolous legal theories – Several claims had no plausible legal basis even on a generous reading (e.g., a “malicious prosecution” claim without any prosecution; a “trade secret” claim without identified trade secrets; extra counts that did not actually allege causes of action). Trump did not even appeal many of those claims (11 out of 16 counts were effectively abandoned), reinforcing the district court’s assessment of their frivolity.

The Eleventh Circuit finds that each of these rationales is “plausible in light of the full record,” so the bad-faith finding is not clearly erroneous.

c. Considering Trump’s broader litigation history

The district court also considered Trump’s broader pattern of filing other “frivolous lawsuits” around the country. Relying on Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, the Eleventh Circuit affirms that this is legitimate:

  • Prior similar cases can be examined to demonstrate a pattern of abusing judicial processes and to support a conclusion that the current filing is not a one‑off misjudgment.
  • Trump and Habba offered only conclusory assertions that those others suits were brought in good faith and did not address the district court’s similarity analysis.
d. Reasonableness of the fee award

The district court conducted a detailed, line‑by‑line review of defendants’ fee submissions, making reductions where billing records were vague or block‑billed. On appeal, Trump and Habba argued for the first time that defendants double‑billed by spending similar amounts of time on motions to dismiss the original and amended complaints.

Because that specific objection was not raised below, it is forfeited. The Eleventh Circuit has no basis to find the overall fee award unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.

5. Rule 11 Sanctions in Favor of Dolan

Separate from inherent authority sanctions, the court affirms a Rule 11 award of:

  • A $50,000 penalty; and
  • $16,274.23 in Dolan’s attorneys’ fees.

Under Rule 11, the test is objective: were the filings frivolous and was a reasonable pre‑filing inquiry made?

The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes:

  • Dolan’s counsel had directly notified Trump’s lawyers that key allegations were false and threatened Rule 11 sanctions if Dolan was not dropped;
  • Despite this, the amended complaint continued to misstate Dolan’s role and status (e.g., as a former DNC chair, which he was not) and even his state of residence; and
  • The theory tying Dolan to a vast RICO enterprise lacked factual support after those corrections were provided.

As with inherent‑power sanctions, the combination of knowingly or recklessly maintained false allegations and baseless legal theories amply supports Rule 11 sanctions.

6. Rule 60(b)(6) Reconsideration and the Durham Report

Trump and his attorneys framed the Durham Report as newly emergent evidence justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6)’s catch‑all “any other reason” provision.

The Eleventh Circuit notes:

  • The Supreme Court in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman demands “extraordinary circumstances” for Rule 60(b)(6) relief; this is a very high bar.
  • The Durham Report’s existence was long anticipated, and the amended complaint already referred to the Durham investigation and related prosecutions.
  • Trump and his counsel failed to identify any material factual assertion in the Report that was both new and would have cured the core legal defects (limitations, failure to plead requisite elements, etc.).

Instead, they reverted to their equitable tolling theory—arguing the ongoing federal investigation justified delay. That argument had already been rejected and, in any event, the fact of the investigation was already known and pleaded.

On that basis, the court finds no abuse of discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. The Durham Report does not reset the litigation clock or rehabilitate legally defective claims.

7. Disqualification Motion and Jurisdiction While Appeals Are Pending

Trump and his attorneys filed a second motion to disqualify Judge Middlebrooks, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (impartiality reasonably questioned). They did so while the merits and sanctions orders were on appeal.

The Eleventh Circuit holds:

  • Under Griggs, the district court was divested of jurisdiction over the appealed orders once the notices of appeal were filed, except as to an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 on the Rule 60(b) motion.
  • Section 455 imposes a duty to recuse where appropriate, but that duty must be exercised within the court’s jurisdictional limits. It does not confer independent jurisdiction after an appeal is lodged.
  • Cooley’s statement about a “continuing duty” to recuse does not apply where the district court no longer has substantive control over the case (as in the Rule 62.1 context).

Thus, the district court correctly ruled it lacked authority to decide the recusal motion at that stage. The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirms the denial.

8. Appellate Sanctions Under Rule 38

Finally, Orbis and Dolan sought sanctions against Trump and his counsel for a frivolous appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that some of Trump’s arguments were frivolous (e.g., equitable tolling based on presidential duties), the court emphasizes three points:

  • The appeal also raised valid, nonfrivolous issues, such as the improper with‑prejudice dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over Orbis and the misapplication of personal jurisdiction principles to Dolan.
  • Per the Seventh Circuit’s McCoy decision, Rule 38 is not meant to sanction parties “every time one or two arguments” are frivolous if others have merit.
  • Given these nonfrivolous points, the appeal as a whole cannot be labeled frivolous.

The motions for Rule 38 sanctions by Orbis and Dolan are therefore denied.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Presidents as Litigants: No Special Tolling Privilege

The most doctrinally significant aspect of the opinion is its explicit rejection of a de facto “presidential tolling” rule:

  • Presidents—current or former—have no special entitlement to suspend civil statutes of limitations on personal claims because of the burdens of office or political considerations.
  • The decision reinforces Clinton v. Jones and extends its spirit: the presidency does not confer special timing privileges in civil litigation beyond what all litigants already possess.
  • For future presidential litigants in the Eleventh Circuit, this decision forecloses arguments that the demands of the office justify late filing of private claims.

2. RICO Litigation: Timeliness, Predicates, and Tolling

The case underscores how strictly courts will police timeliness and substantive sufficiency in complex, politically charged civil RICO actions:

  • RICO plaintiffs must act within four years of discovering injury; the clock is not easily stopped.
  • Government enforcement actions must bear a tightly defined “real relation” to private claims before any Clayton Act tolling can even be considered.
  • Attempting to bootstrap discrete false‑statement prosecutions or FEC accounting issues into a generalized RICO tolling theory is unlikely to succeed.

3. Sanctions and Politicized Litigation

The opinion sends a pointed message to litigants and lawyers contemplating broad, politically charged suits:

  • Courts will scrutinize factual accuracy and legal coherence especially closely when high-profile, politically explosive allegations are involved.
  • Shotgun pleadings that appear designed to harass opponents or create media narratives rather than genuinely plead viable claims can justify substantial inherent-power sanctions.
  • Lawyers cannot shield themselves behind clients’ political status; they have an independent duty to verify facts and research law before filing.

4. Procedural Rigour: Forfeiture and Preservation

The court’s repeated application of forfeiture and waiver rules—Sapuppo on independent grounds of decision, the prohibition on raising new issues in reply briefs, and the bar on arguments not raised below—reinforces that:

  • Even high-profile appellants must strictly comply with preservation rules;
  • Failure to address each independent basis of a ruling in the opening brief can be fatal; and
  • Federal appellate practice demands careful, issue-by-issue briefing, not broad political argumentation.

5. Jurisdictional Precision: Service Abroad and Limited Remands

The Orbis ruling and the recusal holding highlight two jurisdictional lessons:

  • Service abroad under RICO – Nationwide service does not extend to foreign service. Plaintiffs relying on § 1965(d) must ensure service occurs in a U.S. judicial district; otherwise, personal jurisdiction is lacking and dismissal must be without prejudice.
  • Limited remand and recusal – Once an appeal is docketed, district courts are strictly confined to the scope of any limited remand (here, an indicative ruling on Rule 60(b) under Rule 62.1). Recusal motions cannot be used to broaden that remit or to re-open final orders still under appellate review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Civil RICO

RICO (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) allows private plaintiffs to sue for damages caused by a “pattern” of certain criminal acts (“predicate acts”) done as part of an “enterprise.” Think of it as a civil remedy for systematic, organized wrongdoing.

  • Predicates: Specific crimes (e.g., mail fraud, wire fraud) listed in the statute.
  • Pattern: At least two related predicate acts that amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.
  • Enterprise: A group of individuals or entities associated in fact for a common illegal purpose.

Civil RICO has a four‑year statute of limitations, starting when the plaintiff knows or should know of his injury.

2. Statutory Tolling and the Clayton Act

“Statutory tolling” refers to a pause in the limitations period created by a statute. The Clayton Act (governing antitrust cases) has a provision pausing the statute of limitations on private claims while the federal government is investigating or prosecuting related antitrust violations.

Trump tried to argue that this antitrust tolling rule should import into RICO and be triggered by various federal proceedings (FEC, Durham prosecutions). The Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that the rule could apply but held that the underlying proceedings were too different from his RICO claims to qualify.

3. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling is a judge‑made doctrine that can pause a limitations period in rare, exceptional circumstances. To get it, a plaintiff must show:

  1. He diligently pursued his rights; and
  2. Some extraordinary circumstance, beyond his control, prevented timely filing.

Mere strategic delay, busy schedules, or concern about political optics are not enough.

4. Shotgun Pleadings

A “shotgun pleading” is a complaint that is so poorly organized that it:

  • Incorporates all previous paragraphs into every count;
  • Mixes multiple, unrelated claims into single counts; or
  • Fails to specify which facts support which legal claim.

Courts dislike such pleadings because they obscure the issues, waste time, and unfairly burden defendants. They are typically subject to dismissal and can, in extreme cases, justify sanctions.

5. Inherent Authority vs. Rule 11 Sanctions

  • Rule 11 sanctions Apply to specific filings (like complaints or motions). They are based on an objective standard: whether a reasonable investigation would have revealed that the filing:
    • Lacks factual support;
    • Relies on untenable legal theories; or
    • Was filed for an improper purpose.
    Rule 11 has procedural safeguards, such as the “safe harbor” period to correct problems before a motion is filed.
  • Inherent authority sanctions Are broader. Courts can punish bad-faith conduct that abuses the judicial process, even if no specific rule applies. These sanctions usually require a showing of “subjective bad faith” and can include fee-shifting or other measures. They do not require Rule 11’s “safe harbor.”

6. Rule 60(b) and Rule 62.1

  • Rule 60(b) Allows a party to ask the trial court to relieve them from a final judgment for limited reasons (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, etc.) or, under 60(b)(6), for “any other reason” that is truly extraordinary.
  • Rule 62.1 When a case is already on appeal, the district court generally cannot change its judgment. Rule 62.1 permits the court to indicate whether it would be inclined to grant a Rule 60(b) motion if the appellate court remands. It does not allow the district court to fully reopen the case or address unrelated matters like a new recusal motion.

7. Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service

“Personal jurisdiction” is a court’s power over a particular defendant. Normally, it depends on the defendant’s ties to the state where the court sits.

  • Nationwide service (RICO § 1965(d)) allows a plaintiff in a RICO case to serve a defendant in any U.S. judicial district, thereby giving the court personal jurisdiction, so long as the federal RICO claim is not frivolous.
  • But serving a defendant in another country (like Orbis in England) does not count as service in a U.S. judicial district and does not trigger nationwide service jurisdiction.

8. Rule 38 Appellate Sanctions

Under Rule 38, a federal appellate court can award damages or double costs to an appellee if an appeal is frivolous—that is, if it:

  • Has no basis in law or fact; or
  • Ignores controlling law and relies solely on obviously meritless arguments.

However, the presence of some frivolous arguments does not automatically make an entire appeal frivolous if other arguments legitimately raise legal errors (as here, with Orbis’s jurisdictional dismissal).

V. Conclusion

This Eleventh Circuit opinion in the Trump v. Clinton / Habba v. Dolan consolidated appeals is a comprehensive blueprint for how federal courts will handle politically charged mega‑litigation that attempts to convert complex political narratives into sprawling RICO and tort claims.

Its principal contributions to the law include:

  • A clear rejection of any notion that the presidency warrants equitable tolling of civil limitations for personal claims.
  • A firm articulation that complex RICO cases are still bound by strict timeliness and pleading standards, and that attempts to stretch antitrust-style tolling or ongoing investigations to salvage untimely claims will be closely scrutinized.
  • An emphatic warning that shotgun pleadings, factual recklessness, and politically motivated legal theories can support substantial inherent-power and Rule 11 sanctions against both litigants and counsel.
  • Doctrinal clarity on RICO’s nationwide service of process, emphasizing the need for domestic service and proper jurisdictional analysis.
  • A reminder of the procedural discipline required in appellate practice: forfeiture rules, limits on district court jurisdiction during appeals, and modest use of Rule 38 sanctions.

Taken together, the decision reinforces the message that even high‑profile parties and hot‑button political disputes are subject to ordinary—and rigorous—civil procedure, jurisdictional norms, and sanctions doctrine. The federal courts are not a forum for unchecked political score‑settling; they remain governed by rules designed to ensure that only timely, properly pleaded, factually grounded, and legally viable claims proceed.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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