Rejecting “Presidential Tolling” and Sanctioning Politicized Shotgun Pleadings: Commentary on Donald J. Trump v. Hillary R. Clinton (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision arises from one of the most politically charged civil actions in recent memory. Between his presidential terms, Donald J. Trump sued Hillary R. Clinton, the Democratic National Committee (DNC), related entities, lawyers, consultants, and federal officials, alleging a sweeping conspiracy to fabricate and disseminate the “Russia collusion” narrative around the 2016 presidential election.

Trump framed his case principally as a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, supplemented by Florida tort claims such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. After the district court (Judge Donald Middlebrooks) dismissed the complaint with prejudice and imposed substantial monetary sanctions—nearly $1 million under the court’s inherent authority and additional sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11—Trump and several of his lawyers appealed.

While the appeals were pending, Special Counsel John Durham released his report on the origins of the FBI’s “Crossfire Hurricane” investigation. Trump and his attorneys invoked that report as a basis to reconsider the dismissal and sanctions and again sought the district judge’s disqualification. The district court refused, and the consolidated appeals reached the Eleventh Circuit.

Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for a unanimous panel, largely affirmed the district court. The court:

• Held that Trump’s RICO claims were time-barred and not saved by either statutory or equitable tolling.
• Rejected what is, in substance, a proposed doctrine of “presidential tolling,” holding that a president’s official duties do not pause private civil limitations periods.
• Affirmed the dismissal of Trump’s Florida tort claims based on forfeiture and substantive defects.
• Clarified the reach of RICO’s nationwide service of process, holding that service abroad does not confer personal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d), and correcting the district court’s error in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction with prejudice.
• Upheld significant sanctions under both the court’s inherent authority and Rule 11, grounded in bad-faith, shotgun pleadings and frivolous legal and factual contentions.
• Rejected reliance on the Durham Report as an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
• Clarified the limits of a district court’s power to address judicial disqualification while an appeal is pending.
• Declined to impose appellate sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, because the appeal was not wholly frivolous.

The decision is significant not because it resolves the political disputes surrounding the 2016 election—indeed, the panel is explicit that it does not—but because it develops doctrine in several areas:

• The rigor of RICO limitations and tolling, including the incompatibility of “presidential tolling” with existing law.
• The use of sanctions to deter politicized misuse of the courts through sprawling, “shotgun” pleadings.
• The interplay between nationwide service provisions, personal jurisdiction, and the merits of federal claims.
• The standard for Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on high-profile investigative reports.
• The jurisdictional limits on recusal motions once an appeal is underway.

II. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The panel consolidated four appeals arising from five district court orders:

1. Dismissal of the amended complaint. The court:
   • Affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against all defendants except Orbis Limited.
   • Held that the RICO claims were untimely under the four-year statute of limitations, not saved by statutory (Clayton Act) or equitable tolling.
   • Held that Trump forfeited key arguments necessary to revive his Florida injurious falsehood and conspiracy claims, which in any event failed on the merits under Florida law.
2. Personal jurisdiction rulings.
   • Held that the district court did have personal jurisdiction over Rodney Joffe and Charles Dolan under RICO’s nationwide service provision because Trump’s federal claims, while meritless, were not so insubstantial as to defeat federal jurisdiction.
   • Held that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Orbis Limited because it was served abroad, and § 1965(d) authorizes only domestic service “in any judicial district.” Accordingly, dismissal as to Orbis had to be without prejudice.
3. Inherent authority sanctions.
   • Affirmed a nearly $1 million fee award against Trump, Alina Habba, and her firm, based on a finding of subjective bad faith.
   • Held that Trump and Habba forfeited challenges based on lack of notice and lack of a sanctions hearing by failing to raise them in the district court.
4. Rule 11 sanctions in favor of Dolan.
   • Affirmed sanctions against Trump’s counsel for frivolous factual allegations and legal theories targeting Dolan, despite a pre-suit warning letter.
5. Denial of post-judgment motions.
   • Affirmed the denial of Trump’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), holding that the Durham Report was neither newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) nor an “extraordinary circumstance” under Rule 60(b)(6).
   • Affirmed the district court’s refusal to entertain a second disqualification motion during the limited remand, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider anything beyond the Rule 60(b) motion.

Finally, the court rejected motions by Orbis and Dolan for appellate sanctions under Rule 38. Although plaintiffs advanced some frivolous arguments, other aspects of the appeal (notably the challenge to Orbis’s dismissal with prejudice and to the Dolan personal jurisdiction ruling) had merit and produced relief.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Trump’s amended complaint alleged a broad conspiracy driven by Hillary Clinton and the DNC to fabricate and publicize a false narrative that Trump and his campaign colluded with Russia during the 2016 election. The alleged architecture of the scheme included:

• Retention of the law firm Perkins Coie, notably partners Marc Elias and Michael Sussmann.
• Engagement of opposition-research firm Fusion GPS, which in turn used Orbis Limited and Christopher Steele to compile the “Steele Dossier.”
• Use of Igor Danchenko and Charles Dolan as sources for the Dossier.
• Contracting with Neustar and Rodney Joffe to “manufacture” alleged connections between Trump Organization servers and Alfa Bank (Russia).
• Feeding this information to the FBI and media, purportedly prompting the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and related Alfa Bank inquiries.

Trump alleged that these activities, and subsequent public discussion of alleged collusion after the election, damaged him financially and reputationally, costing at least $24 million in legal fees and lost business. His amended complaint asserted 16 counts, including:

• Two civil RICO claims (substantive and conspiracy).
• Various federal statutory claims the appeal did not preserve.
• State-law claims including injurious falsehood, conspiracy to commit injurious falsehood, and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice (except as to the United States and certain personal jurisdiction rulings), characterizing it as a quintessential “shotgun pleading” and finding multiple independent legal defects. It then issued two rounds of sanctions:

• Rule 11 sanctions in favor of Dolan for false factual allegations that persisted despite his counsel’s warning letter.
• Inherent-power sanctions in favor of most other defendants, finding the suit to be a bad-faith, politically motivated misuse of the courts, supported by knowingly false allegations and frivolous legal theories.

During the appeal, the Durham Report was released. Trump sought to use it both in the court of appeals (via judicial notice) and in the district court (via an indicative ruling motion under Rule 62.1). The district court, on limited remand, denied reconsideration and declined to entertain a renewed disqualification motion. The Eleventh Circuit then resolved all consolidated appeals in this opinion.

B. Federal RICO Claims: Limitations, Tolling, and the Rejection of “Presidential Tolling”

1. The four-year statute of limitations

Civil RICO claims are governed by a four-year statute of limitations that accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury, not when he uncovers every element of the scheme. The Eleventh Circuit relied on its prior precedent (Lehman v. Lucom) to reaffirm this rule.

The district court had found that Trump was aware of the relevant conduct and his claimed injuries by October 2017. Trump did not challenge that factual finding on appeal. Because he filed suit in March 2022, the RICO claims were time-barred unless some form of tolling applied.

2. Clayton Act-style statutory tolling and the “real relation” requirement

RICO borrows the four-year limitations period from the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act also includes a statutory tolling provision, 15 U.S.C. § 16(i), which suspends limitations for private antitrust actions while the government pursues related antitrust proceedings.

The panel noted that neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court has yet decided whether this Clayton Act tolling provision also carries over into RICO. Trump asked the court to so hold. The court carefully avoided deciding that question, instead assuming arguendo that § 16(i) applies to RICO and then holding that Trump would not qualify for tolling even under that assumption.

Key to this analysis is the Supreme Court’s “real relation” test from Leh v. General Petroleum Corp. and the Eleventh Circuit’s elaboration in Morton's Market, Inc. v. Gustafson's Dairy, Inc.:

• There must be a “real relation” between the government proceeding and the private action.
• The facts alleged in the private suit must be “intertwined with and fundamentally the same as” those in the government action.
• Historically, tolling under § 16(i) has occurred when both proceedings alleged antitrust violations—or at least the same basic conspiracy theory—even if using different legal theories.

Trump pointed to several governmental proceedings as potential tolling triggers:

• The Federal Election Commission matter concerning the Clinton campaign and DNC’s misreporting of opposition-research expenditures through Perkins Coie.
• The federal prosecutions of Michael Sussmann, Igor Danchenko, and Kevin Clinesmith for false statements to federal officials or the FISA court.

The Eleventh Circuit held these proceedings did not satisfy the “real relation” requirement:

• None of them alleged RICO violations or even predicate RICO offenses in a way that mirrored Trump’s alleged enterprise and pattern of racketeering.
• At most, they involved “some of the conduct” Trump cited, but they did not address the overarching alleged racketeering enterprise.
• They were not antitrust cases, and Trump’s suit was not an antitrust suit, distinguishing the situation from prior Supreme Court tolling precedents under § 16(i).

Thus, even if Clayton Act tolling theoretically applies to RICO, Trump’s case would not benefit. The panel thereby preserves the issue of whether § 16(i) is incorporated into RICO for another day, while clarifying that overlapping factual background alone does not suffice; there must be a substantive alignment of the alleged unlawful scheme.

3. Equitable tolling and the rejection of “presidential tolling”

Trump’s more far-reaching argument was for equitable tolling—a judge-made doctrine that pauses a limitations period when a litigant, despite diligent efforts, is prevented by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control from filing on time. The Eleventh Circuit invoked its own precedent and Supreme Court authority (Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, Wallace v. Kato) to restate the standard:

• Equitable tolling is a “rare remedy.”
• The circumstances must be “extraordinary.”
• Those circumstances must be beyond the litigant’s control and must actually prevent timely filing.

Trump asked the court to toll the limitations period for the entirety of his first presidential term, advancing two key themes:

1. The President’s “unique position in the constitutional scheme” and extraordinary workload.
2. The perceived impropriety of filing a civil suit against those under investigation by Special Counsel Mueller and later Special Counsel Durham; he argued that bringing suit then would have appeared to interfere with law enforcement.

The panel treated this argument—correctly—as an attempt to create a de facto doctrine of “presidential tolling”: that the president’s official responsibilities justify suspending normal civil limitations periods.

The court squarely rejected this notion, leaning heavily on Clinton v. Jones, where the Supreme Court held that a sitting president can be compelled to defend a private civil suit while in office. If a president can be haled into court as a defendant, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, he cannot claim incapacity to file suit as a plaintiff:

• The burdens on presidential time and attention acknowledged in Clinton v. Jones did not justify suspending judicial process.
• Trump’s generalized references to an “unprecedented” presidential workload did not distinguish his situation from that of any modern president.

More crucially, the panel highlighted Trump’s own characterization of his decision not to sue earlier as a choice:

• Trump conceded he made a “presidential decision to put constitutional duties and obligations to the country first” rather than institute litigation during his first term.
• By his own admission, the barrier to filing suit was not an external circumstance beyond his control; it was a discretionary political and strategic judgment.

That concession was fatal to equitable tolling. The opinion thus establishes a clear principle: voluntary political or strategic decisions, even by a president, do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances that justify equitable tolling. In other words, there is no special “presidential tolling” doctrine; presidents are bound by the same civil limitations rules as other litigants.

The court went further and labeled Trump’s equitable tolling theory “frivolous,” a characterization that later supported sanctions. By contrast, his statutory tolling theory, though rejected, was deemed not so implausible or foreclosed by precedent as to undermine jurisdiction.

C. Florida State-Law Claims: Injurious Falsehood and Conspiracy

1. Injurious falsehood and the requirement of special damages

Trump asserted a Florida-law claim for injurious falsehood—a tort related to defamation but focused on economic harm rather than reputational injury. Under Florida law (as summarized in Salit v. Ruden, McClosky and Bothmann v. Harrington), injurious falsehood requires:

• A false statement publicly made about the plaintiff.
• Knowledge (or reason to know) that the statement would induce others not to deal with the plaintiff.
• The statement must play a “material and substantial” role in causing others not to deal with the plaintiff.
• Special damages—specific, provable pecuniary losses caused by the statement.

The district court held that Trump failed to plead special damages adequately, a “crucial element” of the claim, and that many statements at issue were protected by the First Amendment (e.g., political speech, opinion, or commentary).

On appeal, Trump did not meaningfully challenge:

• The finding that he failed to plead special damages; or
• The conclusion that his conspiracy claim for injurious falsehood could not survive independently of a viable underlying injurious falsehood claim.

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent (Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.), when a district court’s judgment rests on multiple independent grounds, an appellant must challenge all of them. Failure to contest one independent ground is fatal: the judgment must be affirmed on that unchallenged basis alone.

Trump attempted belatedly, in his reply brief, to contest the special-damages issue. The panel refused to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. As a result, the district court’s dismissal of the injurious falsehood and related conspiracy claims stood, both as a matter of forfeiture and on the underlying law.

2. Conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution under Florida law

Trump also alleged a claim for conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution, even though the district court had dismissed his underlying malicious prosecution claim and he did not appeal that dismissal.

Florida treats civil conspiracy as a “derivative” claim: its viability ordinarily depends on the existence of an underlying tort. Cases such as Balcor Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ahronovitz and Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. make clear that:

• “The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is not the conspiracy itself but the civil wrong which was done pursuant to the conspiracy.”
• If the underlying wrong fails, the conspiracy claim typically fails with it.

The district court concluded that because there had been no “judicial proceeding” initiated against Trump—a necessary element of malicious prosecution—and because the underlying tort failed as a matter of law, a conspiracy-to-commit-malicious-prosecution claim could not stand on its own.

On appeal, Trump argued that alleging “an illegal combination to cause prosecution” should be sufficient, but he did not grapple with the Florida authorities cited by the district court. The Eleventh Circuit regarded this as another instance of Sapuppo-style forfeiture. Even absent forfeiture, Florida law would not support an independent stand-alone conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution where no actual prosecution occurred.

D. Personal Jurisdiction, RICO’s Nationwide Service, and Foreign Defendants

1. RICO’s nationwide service provision and the “non-frivolous claim” threshold

Trump attempted to ground personal jurisdiction over several out-of-state defendants (Orbis, Joffe, Dolan) in RICO’s nationwide service provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d), which allows service “on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, particularly Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, the analysis proceeds in two steps:

1. Is there a federal claim substantial enough to support federal-question jurisdiction?
   • Federal jurisdiction is lacking only if the claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”
2. If so, and if the statute provides for nationwide service, does due process permit jurisdiction over the defendant in the United States?
   • Once nationwide service is validly invoked, the relevant due process inquiry concerns contacts with the United States as a whole, not just the forum state.

Importantly, even though the panel ultimately held Trump’s RICO claims time-barred and meritless, it distinguished between meritlessness and being “so insubstantial” as to fail the jurisdictional threshold. Trump’s equitable tolling argument was declared frivolous, but his statutory tolling argument, while unsuccessful, was not “so implausible, nor foreclosed by precedent” as to destroy the existence of a federal controversy.

This meant the court could properly exercise nationwide service jurisdiction over domestic defendants (Joffe and Dolan) and proceed to dismiss on the merits, consistent with Republic of Panama.

2. Orbis Limited and the territorial limit of § 1965(d)

Orbis Limited, a U.K.-based firm, was served in England, not within any U.S. judicial district. Orbis argued that § 1965(d)’s nationwide service is expressly limited to service “in any judicial district” of the United States, and cannot reach foreign service. Trump conceded that Orbis was served abroad.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Orbis: § 1965(d) does not authorize extraterritorial service. Because Orbis was never served within any U.S. judicial district, the nationwide service provision could not be used to obtain personal jurisdiction over it. Trump had also argued personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute in the district court, but he failed to press that argument in his opening appellate brief, raising it only in reply—too late under Eleventh Circuit practice.

The consequence was jurisdictional: the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Orbis and therefore erred by dismissing the claims against Orbis with prejudice. Under Eleventh Circuit law (Posner v. Essex Insurance Co.), dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without prejudice, leaving plaintiffs free to refile in an appropriate forum if they can properly serve the defendant.

The panel thus:

• Vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis; and
• Remanded with instructions to dismiss the Orbis claims without prejudice.

This portion of the opinion reinforces two distinct but interlocking principles:

• Nationwide service provisions like § 1965(d) are domestic in scope; they do not themselves authorize service abroad.
• Personal-jurisdiction defects mandate dismissal without prejudice, regardless of the substantive weakness of the underlying claims.

E. Inherent Authority Sanctions: Bad Faith and Politicized Shotgun Pleadings

1. The scope of inherent authority and the bad-faith requirement

Federal courts possess inherent authority to “fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process,” as recognized in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. and Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.. This power is distinct from, and supplemental to, rule-based sanctions (like Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927).

To wield this inherent power against a party or counsel, a court must find subjective bad faith—that is, that the litigant or attorney:

• Knowingly or recklessly pursued a frivolous claim;
• Or pressed even a potentially meritorious claim for an improper purpose (such as harassment);
• Or made egregious factual assertions without reasonable inquiry.

The district court concluded that Trump and Alina Habba (and her firm) acted in bad faith and imposed nearly $1 million in attorney’s fees as a sanction. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the finding of bad faith for clear error and found none.

2. Forfeited procedural challenges: notice and hearing

On appeal, Trump and Habba argued that the district court effectively used its inherent authority to circumvent Rule 11’s procedural protections, particularly the 21-day “safe harbor” period and the opportunity for a sanctions hearing. They contended that the court unfairly imposed inherent-authority sanctions tied to pleadings that would ordinarily be regulated by Rule 11.

The panel refused to consider these objections because Trump and Habba had not properly raised them below:

• In their opposition to the sanctions motion, they did not argue that inherent-authority sanctions required Rule 11-type notice or that the absence of a hearing violated due process.
• They referred only obliquely to “fair notice” and, even then, only in the limited context of being sanctioned solely for shotgun pleading.
• They requested a hearing only in connection with potential sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, not for inherent-authority sanctions.

Applying its usual rule that issues not argued in the district court are forfeited on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit declined to entertain the due process challenge. The upshot is doctrinal but also practical: litigants who wish to contest the procedures by which sanctions are imposed must raise those objections contemporaneously in the trial court.

3. Shotgun pleading as affirmative evidence of bad faith

The Eleventh Circuit has long condemned “shotgun pleadings”—complaints or counterclaims that are excessively long, confusing, and drafted in a way that makes it nearly impossible to discern which facts relate to which legal claims. Typical hallmarks include:

• Each count incorporating all preceding paragraphs, regardless of relevance.
• Multiple claims based on different legal theories lumped together without clear factual demarcation.
• Repetitive factual allegations scattered across counts.

In this case, the district court described Trump’s amended complaint (over 188 pages including the additions) as a “quintessential shotgun pleading.” For example, the count for injurious falsehood incorporated 633 prior paragraphs and did not clearly identify which specific statements were alleged to be injurious falsehoods, forcing the court and defendants to sift through numerous candidates.

Trump and Habba argued that any RICO complaint addressing a complex, “interwoven” conspiracy risks looking like a shotgun pleading and that dismissal, not sanctions, is the appropriate remedy. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this defense:

• RICO plaintiffs are not exempt from the requirement to plead in a clear, non-shotgun manner; cases such as Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets confirm that shotgun RICO pleadings can be dismissed with prejudice.
• Shotgun pleading can itself be evidence of bad faith when it unjustifiably burdens the court and obscures the claims in a manner consistent with harassment, as recognized in Pelletier v. Zweifel.

The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in treating Trump’s shotgun pleadings, in combination with other factors, as evidence that the lawsuit was brought “to harass” and as an “abusive litigation tactic” that obstructed the efficient administration of justice.

4. Frivolous legal theories and failure to narrow claims

The district court also found that multiple legal theories in the amended complaint were plainly frivolous—so much so that “basic legal research” would have revealed their futility. Examples include:

• A malicious prosecution claim without any underlying judicial proceeding.
• A trade secrets claim without adequately identifying any trade secret.
• Counts that did not allege any recognized cause of action at all (seven such counts were appended and later abandoned entirely on appeal).
• The equitable tolling theory, effectively seeking special treatment for a sitting president contrary to existing precedent.

On appeal, Trump did not attempt to defend 11 of his original 16 claims, including those most obviously frivolous. That abandonment itself corroborated the district court’s assessment that large portions of the case were legally insupportable.

The panel agreed that such a cluster of weak and legally incoherent claims supports a finding of subjective bad faith—particularly in light of the political context and the complaint’s breadth.

5. Considering Trump’s broader litigation history

To bolster its bad-faith finding, the district court noted Trump’s broader “pattern of misusing the courts” in other cases. Trump and Habba argued that viewing this case through the lens of other litigation was improper.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Citing Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., where the court affirmed sanctions after reviewing “similar cases” brought by the same plaintiff and counsel, the panel held that examining prior, comparable litigation is a permissible way to assess pattern and intent. Trump and Habba offered only a conclusory assertion that the other cases were brought for “good faith reasons,” without persuasive explanation.

This aspect of the opinion confirms that a district court may consider a litigant’s broader litigation record as circumstantial evidence of bad faith when imposing inherent-authority sanctions.

F. Rule 11 Sanctions and Counsel’s Duty of Reasonable Inquiry

Separately from the inherent-authority sanctions, the district court granted Rule 11 sanctions in favor of Charles Dolan. Rule 11 requires:

• That an attorney conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of any pleading.
• That factual contentions have, or are likely to have after discovery, evidentiary support.
• That legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for a change in law.

A filing is sanctionable if:

• It has “no reasonable factual basis”; or
• It rests on a legal theory that has “no reasonable chance of success” and cannot reasonably extend existing law; or
• It is filed for an improper purpose, such as harassment or unnecessary delay.

The district court found multiple factual assertions about Dolan to be “knowingly false or made in reckless disregard for the truth,” including:

• Labeling him a former “chairman of the Democratic National Committee” when he was not.
• Describing him as a senior Clinton campaign official without factual basis.
• Misstating his state of residence.

Dolan’s counsel had sent Trump’s lawyers a detailed letter identifying these factual errors and threatening Rule 11 sanctions if Dolan was not dismissed. Despite this warning—the essence of Rule 11’s “safe harbor”—the amended complaint repeated or repackaged many of the same erroneous allegations.

The Eleventh Circuit, applying the same factual record it considered under the inherent-authority analysis, affirmed the Rule 11 order. It highlighted that:

• Good faith alone is not a defense to Rule 11 if counsel fails to perform a reasonable factual inquiry.
• Persisting in false factual allegations after direct correction from opposing counsel strongly supports a finding of unreasonableness.

The Rule 11 sanctions thus reinforce the central theme: even in highly politicized, high-profile litigation, counsel must adhere to basic standards of factual accuracy and legal plausibility.

G. Rule 60(b) Reconsideration and the Durham Report

After judgment and during the appeal, Trump and his attorneys invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking relief from the judgment based on the release of the Durham Report. They primarily relied on Rule 60(b)(6), which allows relief for “any other reason that justifies relief” beyond the specific grounds in Rule 60(b)(1)–(5).

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman (2025) tightened the standard: Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available only in truly “extraordinary circumstances.” The Eleventh Circuit applied that standard and also addressed Rule 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence).

The court held:

• The Durham Report was not “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(2), in part because Trump and his lawyers had long known about the underlying investigations and did not identify specific, material facts in the Report that were previously unavailable.
• The mere release of a highly anticipated public report is not an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, especially where:
  • The supposed “new” facts were either already available or cumulative; and
  • Even if taken at face value, they could not cure independent legal defects such as statutes of limitations and structural pleading problems.

Trump attempted to recast the timing issue via the Durham Report, arguing that continuing federal investigations during his presidency contributed to his decision not to sue earlier. But the Eleventh Circuit noted that the existence of those investigations was “already evident” and explicitly referenced in the amended complaint itself. The Report, therefore, added nothing that could change the equitable-tolling calculus.

The ruling underscores a broader point: post-judgment developments, even if politically significant, do not easily qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6) unless they introduce genuinely new, material facts that would likely alter the legal outcome.

H. Judicial Disqualification While an Appeal Is Pending

After the Rule 60(b) motion was filed and the Eleventh Circuit issued a limited remand under Rule 62.1 to allow the district court to consider that motion, Trump and his counsel filed a second motion to disqualify Judge Middlebrooks.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Trump argued that this duty is ongoing and not extinguished by the filing of a notice of appeal.

The district court refused to consider the new disqualification motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to do so under the limited remand. The Eleventh Circuit agreed:

• Once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over aspects of the case involved in the appeal (Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.).
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 permits the district court to take limited action on a Rule 60(b) motion during an appeal: it may deny the motion, defer it, or state that it would grant the motion if the appellate court remands for that purpose.
• Nothing in Rule 62.1 or the limited remand authorized broader action, such as granting a new recusal motion or reassigning the case wholesale to another judge.

Trump cited a Tenth Circuit decision, United States v. Cooley, for the idea that the duty to recuse can persist even after judgment. But the Eleventh Circuit distinguished that case as involving a different procedural posture (post-trial motions still within the district court’s plenary jurisdiction) and emphasized that a non-jurisdictional, waivable duty to recuse cannot expand a district court’s power beyond the jurisdictional constraints imposed by an active appeal.

The holding is narrow but important: while a case is on appeal, a district court may act only within the confines of any remand order; it may not use a recusal motion as a vehicle to enlarge its jurisdiction.

I. Rule 38 Appellate Sanctions

Finally, Orbis and Dolan sought appellate sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which allows an appellate court to award “just damages and single or double costs” if an appeal is frivolous.

An appeal is frivolous when it lacks any factual basis or ignores governing law while relying on clearly frivolous arguments. The Eleventh Circuit noted that:

• Trump’s appeal did contain some frivolous arguments, particularly regarding equitable tolling and other meritless legal theories.
• However, other aspects of the appeal were not frivolous—indeed, they were vindicated:
  • The challenge to Orbis’s dismissal with prejudice succeeded; the court agreed that dismissal should be without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
  • The challenge to the personal jurisdiction ruling regarding Dolan also had merit in light of the RICO nationwide service framework.

Citing the Seventh Circuit’s observation in McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., the panel stressed that courts do not (and should not) grant Rule 38 sanctions “every time one or two arguments in an appeal might arguably be deemed frivolous.” Because there were legitimate grounds for appeal that produced partial relief, the court denied Rule 38 sanctions.

IV. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

1. RICO and civil RICO claims

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is best known as a criminal statute targeting organized crime, but it also creates a civil cause of action. A civil RICO plaintiff must typically prove:

• Conduct
• Of an enterprise
• Through a pattern
• Of racketeering activity (predicate crimes listed in the statute)
• That causes injury to the plaintiff’s business or property.

Even if those elements are plausibly alleged, a civil RICO claim must be brought within four years of when the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the injury.

2. Statute of limitations and tolling (statutory vs. equitable)

• Statute of limitations: A law that sets the outer time limit within which a lawsuit must be filed.
• Statutory tolling: Suspension of that time limit based on specific statutory provisions (such as 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) for certain antitrust-related government actions).
• Equitable tolling: A judge-made doctrine allowing courts to pause the limitations period in extraordinary circumstances where the plaintiff, despite diligence, was prevented by external forces from suing in time.

This case emphasizes that equitable tolling is exceptional and that a litigant’s own strategic choices—such as deferring suit to avoid the appearance of conflict—do not qualify.

3. Shotgun pleading

A “shotgun pleading” is not a term of art in the Federal Rules but a label the Eleventh Circuit uses for complaints that:

• Are excessively long and convoluted;
• Incorporate all prior allegations into each subsequent count;
• Make it impossible to match specific factual allegations to particular legal claims; and
• Force courts and defendants to guess which facts support which theories.

Shotgun pleadings waste judicial resources and can be dismissed, often with leave to replead—and, as this case illustrates, can contribute to findings of bad faith supporting sanctions.

4. Injurious falsehood vs. defamation

Both injurious falsehood and defamation involve false statements, but they protect different interests:

• Defamation (libel/slander) focuses on reputational harm—a person’s standing in the community.
• Injurious falsehood (sometimes called “trade libel”) centers on economic harm—such as loss of business, sales, or specific economic opportunities.

As a result, injurious falsehood requires the plaintiff to plead and prove “special damages”—actual, quantifiable economic losses directly caused by the falsehood, not merely generalized reputational injury.

5. Malicious prosecution and conspiracy

Malicious prosecution generally requires:

• That a judicial or criminal proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff;
• Without probable cause and with malice;
• That terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; and
• That caused damage to the plaintiff.

A conspiracy claim in this context is usually derivative: without an underlying malicious prosecution claim (for example, because no actual proceeding was ever filed), a conspiracy-to-commit-malicious-prosecution claim typically fails as well.

6. Inherent authority vs. Rule 11 sanctions

• Rule 11:
  • Applies specifically to “presentations to the court” (pleadings, motions, papers).
  • Includes a “safe harbor”: a motion for sanctions must be served on the opponent 21 days before filing, giving them a chance to correct or withdraw the offending filing.
• Inherent authority:
  • Broad power to address abuses of the judicial process not fully covered by rules or statutes.
  • Requires a finding of subjective bad faith.
  • Does not have a built-in safe harbor, though due process requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard—issues that must be timely raised.

This case confirms that both tools may be used in tandem and that failure to assert procedural objections to inherent-authority sanctions in the district court will forfeit those objections on appeal.

7. Rule 60(b) relief from judgment

Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for limited reasons (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, etc.) and, under subsection (6), for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Courts apply subsection (6) sparingly: only “extraordinary circumstances” justify reopening a final judgment.

This decision makes clear that:

• A widely anticipated government report is not “newly discovered evidence” if the relevant facts were already known or knowable.
• Even significant political developments rarely amount to the kind of extraordinary circumstances that displace the strong interest in finality.

8. Personal jurisdiction and nationwide service

Personal jurisdiction concerns a court’s power over a defendant. Some federal statutes, like RICO, permit nationwide service of process, which can in turn justify nationwide personal jurisdiction—but only:

• If the statute’s service provision is properly invoked (here, only for defendants served within a U.S. judicial district); and
• If the federal claim is at least substantial enough not to be wholly insubstantial or frivolous.

For foreign defendants like Orbis, RICO’s nationwide service does not authorize service outside the United States, so traditional jurisdictional analysis (such as a state long-arm statute) must be satisfied instead.

V. Broader Implications and Impact

1. No special tolling rules for presidents

The most salient doctrinal message is the outright rejection of any notion of “presidential tolling.” The Eleventh Circuit extended the logic of Clinton v. Jones from defensive posture (president as defendant) to offensive posture (president as plaintiff):

• If a president can be compelled to defend a private suit while in office, he likewise can—and must—protect his own rights within ordinary limitations periods.
• Political or strategic concerns about optics, including avoiding the appearance of interference with investigations, do not transform a choice not to sue into an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond the president’s control.

Future presidents contemplating civil litigation during their terms cannot rely on their office to suspend limitations. Counsel advising such clients must plan litigation timelines accordingly.

2. Limits on using official investigations to toll RICO

Although the court left open whether Clayton Act tolling applies to RICO, it drew a clear line on what kinds of government proceedings can toll a private civil action:

• There must be a “real relation” between the government’s case and the private suit, meaning a close alignment between the alleged unlawful scheme in each.
• Merely sharing some common facts—such as involvement of the same individuals or overlapping background events—is not enough.

Practically, plaintiffs cannot simply point to any federal investigation or prosecution touching on similar subject matter and claim tolling. The government case must, in substance, attack the same conspiracy or scheme underlying the civil claim.

3. Sanctions and the weaponization of litigation in political disputes

The opinion is notable for its willingness to affirm large sanctions in a politically sensitive context. Its message to litigants and lawyers is plain:

• The courts are not a platform for unchecked political theater dressed up as sprawling conspiracy litigation.
• Shotgun pleadings, especially when coupled with frivolous legal theories and demonstrably false factual allegations, will not only be dismissed but may also trigger serious financial consequences.
• High-profile status of a party does not relax professional obligations; if anything, the court’s scrutiny may be sharper.

For practitioners, the case serves as a cautionary tale about the risks of filing large, rhetorically charged complaints without rigorous factual and legal vetting, particularly against numerous defendants in high-stakes political controversies.

4. Appellate practice: preserving issues and avoiding forfeiture

The decision also highlights several recurrent appellate practice principles:

• An appellant must challenge every independent ground supporting the judgment; failure to do so results in automatic affirmance on that ground (Sapuppo).
• Arguments not raised in the district court—such as complaints about notice, lack of hearings, or scope of sanctions—are ordinarily forfeited.
• Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally ignored.

In short, counsel must:

• Fully develop legal theories and procedural objections in the trial court;
• Preserve all necessary issues in the opening appellate brief; and
• Avoid reliance on reply briefs to introduce new substantive arguments.

5. Procedural regularity in high-profile cases

Finally, the opinion underscores that even in cases involving former presidents, major political parties, and nationally prominent figures, the Eleventh Circuit will approach questions of jurisdiction, sanctions, and post-judgment relief using established doctrinal frameworks.

By:

• Modifying the Orbis dismissal to be without prejudice;
• Declining to impose Rule 38 sanctions despite the presence of some frivolous arguments; and
• Policing its own and the district court’s jurisdictional boundaries during the pendency of appeals;

the court demonstrates an institutional insistence on regular order, not outcome-driven improvisation. This, too, is part of the opinion’s legacy.

VI. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Donald J. Trump v. Hillary R. Clinton is not a referendum on the truth or falsity of the 2016 “Russia collusion” narrative. Rather, it is a comprehensive application—and in some respects clarification—of core civil-procedure and remedies doctrines in an extraordinarily high-profile setting.

Key takeaways include:

• RICO claims remain subject to strict four-year limitations, and neither Clayton Act tolling nor equitable tolling will easily excuse late filing.
• There is no special “presidential tolling”: a president’s official role and strategic decisions do not pause private civil limitations periods.
• Florida injurious falsehood and conspiracy claims require careful pleading, especially of special damages and the underlying tort; failure to preserve these issues on appeal is fatal.
• RICO’s nationwide service provision does not extend abroad, and any dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without prejudice.
• Courts may impose substantial inherent-authority and Rule 11 sanctions for bad-faith, shotgun pleadings and frivolous legal positions, even in politically sensitive cases, and may consider similar litigation history as evidence of a pattern.
• High-profile reports like the Durham Report do not, without more, constitute “extraordinary circumstances” for reopening final judgments under Rule 60(b)(6).
• District courts’ recusal obligations are constrained by jurisdictional rules once an appeal is pending, and cannot be used to expand the scope of a limited remand.

Taken together, the decision reinforces the principle that the federal courts are governed by rules designed to promote clarity, timeliness, and good faith—rules that apply with full force regardless of the political stature of the litigants.