Reining In Post‑Settlement Vacatur in Texas: Commentary on Megatel C90‑2, Inc. v. Bank of Utah

I. Introduction

The concurring opinion by Justice James P. Sullivan in Megatel C90‑2, Inc., et al. v. Bank of Utah, No. 24‑0206 (Tex. May 16, 2025), marks an important moment in the Supreme Court of Texas’s ongoing effort to clarify and discipline the use of vacatur—the setting aside of lower‑court decisions—when a case becomes moot due to settlement after it has reached the high court.

Although formally a concurrence, the opinion comes in the context of the Court’s denial of parties’ joint efforts to erase court of appeals opinions in this case and three unrelated cases:

Megatel C90‑2, Inc., et al. v. Bank of Utah, No. 24‑0206;
Extreme Tactics & Solutions, LLC v. Garcia, No. 24‑0954;
ETC Texas Pipeline, Ltd. v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 24‑0987;
Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., No. 25‑0063.

Justice Sullivan uses the Megatel case as a vehicle to deliver a broader message about Texas practice under Rule 56.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and to signal that routine post‑settlement vacatur of court of appeals opinions will not be entertained except in rare, exceptional circumstances.

The commentary below:

Sets out the factual and procedural background to the extent it appears in the concurrence;
Summarizes the Court’s action and Justice Sullivan’s concurring opinion;
Explains the legal framework for vacatur (including federal Munsingwear/Bancorp doctrine and Texas Rule 56.3);
Analyzes the precedents cited and the Court’s legal reasoning;
Assesses the likely impact on Texas appellate practice and settlement strategy; and
Clarifies complex procedural concepts for non‑specialist readers.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and dispute

The named parties in the lead case are:

Petitioners: Megatel C90‑2, Inc.; Armin Afzalipour; and Megatel Homes, LLC f/k/a Megatel Homes, Inc. (collectively, “Megatel”); and
Respondent: Bank of Utah.

The concurrence, focused on appellate procedure, does not recount the substantive details of the underlying dispute (likely related to real estate or financing, given the parties), because by the time the Supreme Court addressed the case, the controversy between the parties had been resolved by settlement. What remained was a procedural dispute about the status of the court of appeals’ published opinion.

B. Procedural history and timing

The timing of events is crucial to Justice Sullivan’s analysis:

June 21, 2024 – Megatel files a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas, seeking review of an adverse judgment from the court of appeals.
August 2, 2024 – The Supreme Court requests a response to the petition—an initial indication that the case has drawn judicial attention.
October 14, 2024 – The respondent, Bank of Utah, files its response.
January 2, 2025 – Megatel files a reply.
After this full round of briefing, the parties then file a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal Pursuant to Settlement” under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.3.
The Court reviews that motion and the existing briefing and then orders supplemental briefing specifically directed to the parties’ request to vacate the court of appeals’ opinion.
The Court considers all papers in conferences on March 4 and April 1, 2025.

By this point, both the Supreme Court and the court of appeals have already expended substantial resources:

The court of appeals has decided the case on the merits and issued a written opinion explaining its reasoning.
The Supreme Court has engaged in preliminary merits review (requesting a response, considering full merits briefing, and ordering supplemental briefing on vacatur).

It is only at this relatively late stage—after the judicial system has substantially “invested” in the case—that the parties reach a private settlement and jointly ask the Supreme Court not only to dismiss the petition, but also to erase the court of appeals’ opinion from the law books.

C. The issue before the Supreme Court

The central procedural question is:

When a case becomes moot due to a voluntary settlement while a petition for review is pending in the Supreme Court of Texas, under what circumstances, if any, should the Court grant a joint motion to vacate the court of appeals’ opinion?

The parties did not merely ask that their dispute be dismissed as settled under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.3. They specifically asked that the court of appeals’ opinion—the public explanation of the judgment—be vacated, effectively removing its precedential and persuasive force.

The Court denied vacatur in Megatel and in three other cases involving similar motions. Justice Sullivan joins that outcome and writes separately to explain why litigants should no longer anticipate that they can “trade away” appellate precedent in exchange for settlement, especially late in the appellate process.

III. Summary of Justice Sullivan’s Concurring Opinion

Justice Sullivan’s concurrence has three main themes:

Judicial resources and timing. He emphasizes that courts—both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals—are “busy people,” and that late‑stage settlements that seek to undo already‑completed judicial work are problematic. Parties should not assume the ability to “trade away judicial work product” after the system has borne the cost of deciding and explaining the case.
Strong presumption against vacatur after settlement. He traces federal doctrine (especially U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership) and Texas law (including Rule 56.3 and Morath v. Lewis) to underscore that:
- Vacatur is an equitable, discretionary remedy, not a matter of right;
- Mootness caused by settlement “ordinarily” does not justify vacatur of a judgment or opinion; and
- Texas practice now includes a “default presumption against vacatur” of opinions in settled cases.
Systemic concern about “buying up” precedent. He warns that granting vacatur whenever sophisticated parties jointly request it—particularly repeat players with resources—would invite gamesmanship, allow parties to “buy up” judgments they dislike, and undermine the public interest in having stable, accessible legal precedent. He notes that Texas has, at most, two recent instances in which the Supreme Court allowed or facilitated vacatur in unusual circumstances, and he urges that this list “ought to stay that way.”

In the end, Justice Sullivan:

Concurs in the Court’s denial of vacatur of the four courts of appeals opinions; and
Expresses hope that fewer such motions will be filed in the future, reminding practitioners that “a private agreement between litigants should not operate to vacate a court's writing on matters of public importance.”

IV. Legal Framework: Vacatur, Mootness, and Texas Rule 56.3

A. Vacatur and the federal Munsingwear/Bancorp doctrine

The concurrence situates Texas practice within a broader framework developed in the U.S. Supreme Court:

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)
Munsingwear established that when a case becomes moot through happenstance—not due to the actions of the parties—while on appeal, it may be appropriate for the appellate court to vacate the lower court’s judgment to prevent it from having legal consequences without appellate review.
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)
In Bancorp, the Court refined the doctrine and drew an important line:
“[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review,” though “exceptional circumstances may conceivably counsel in favor of such a course.”
In other words:
- If the parties’ voluntary actions (settlement) cause mootness, the losing party is generally not entitled to have the judgment erased.
- Vacatur remains available as an extraordinary equitable remedy in genuinely exceptional cases.

Leading commentary echoes this position. Justice Sullivan cites Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure for the proposition that once an appellate decision on the merits has been entered, settlement “ordinarily should not be the occasion for vacating opinions or judgment.”

B. Evolution of Texas practice: from routine vacatur to Rule 56.3

Justice Sullivan notes that Texas historically had a more permissive approach, but has deliberately moved away from automatic vacatur when parties settle.

1. Earlier practice and Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood West Civic Association

In Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood West Civic Ass’n, 860 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam), the Texas Supreme Court:

Announced that it had “recently adopted a procedure” reflecting a change from earlier practice of vacating opinions below upon settlement; and
Emphasized that, while settlement is encouraged, “a private agreement between litigants should not operate to vacate a court’s writing on matters of public importance.”

This opinion marks a key turning point away from a “vacatur-on-demand” model.

2. Codification in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.3

In 1997 (amended in 2002), the Supreme Court adopted Rule 56.3, which now governs settled cases in the Supreme Court. Justice Sullivan reproduces the crucial language:

If a case is settled by agreement of the parties and the parties so move, the Supreme Court may grant the petition if it has not already been granted and, without hearing argument or considering the merits, render a judgment to effectuate the agreement. The Supreme Court's action may include setting aside the judgment of the court of appeals or the trial court without regard to the merits and remanding the case to the trial court for rendition of a judgment in accordance with the agreement. . . . [T]he Supreme Court's order does not vacate the court of appeals' opinion unless the order specifically provides otherwise. An agreement or motion cannot be conditioned on vacating the court of appeals' opinion.

Several important points flow from this:

The Supreme Court’s role is discretionary: it “may” act to effectuate the settlement.
It may set aside the judgment of the lower court to align the formal outcome with the settlement, without reaching the merits.
By default, the court of appeals’ opinion remains intact—it is not vacated unless the Supreme Court’s order explicitly says so.
Parties are prohibited from conditioning their settlement on the vacatur of the court of appeals’ opinion. Vacatur is not a tradable commodity; it is solely within the Court’s equitable discretion.

3. Morath v. Lewis and the “default presumption against vacatur”

Justice Sullivan cites Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam), which interprets Rule 56.3 and expressly acknowledges the federal Bancorp doctrine. Morath underscores that:

Rule 56.3 “provides a default presumption against vacatur of the opinion for cases that have been mooted by settlement.”
Vacatur is a “discretionary equitable remedy,” and the Court must “carefully scrutinize parties’ attempts to manipulate judicial precedent by settlement.”

Justice Sullivan notes that, other than two limited situations, the Court has been extremely sparing in exercising its discretion to vacate opinions in settled cases:

Brazos River Authority v. City of Houston, No. 21‑0642, 2022 WL 4099236 (Tex. Sept. 2, 2022) – The Court vacated the opinion below “because the State was not a party to the settlement and the issues presented may be of consequence in other contexts.” In other words, there were significant non‑party governmental interests at stake that made the continued existence of the opinion problematic.
Farley v. Miranda, No. 22‑0113, 2023 WL 2358183 (Tex. Jan. 13, 2023) – The Court did not itself vacate the opinion; it “remand[ed] . . . to the court of appeals for consideration of the parties' request that the court withdraw its opinion.” This defers to the intermediate court’s own assessment of whether withdrawal is appropriate.

Justice Sullivan characterizes these as, at most, two precedents where the Court either granted or facilitated vacatur in light of unusual considerations. He calls this “a short list, and it ought to stay that way.”

4. A notable Texas–federal difference

Justice Sullivan observes an interesting divergence from federal practice:

In the federal system, vacatur of a judgment generally goes hand‑in‑hand with vacatur of the corresponding opinion. By contrast, under Texas practice, “a court of appeals’ judgment may be vacated without also vacating the corresponding opinion.” This means:

The judgment (the formal operative result) may be set aside to match the parties’ settlement; yet
The opinion—the court’s explanatory reasoning—may remain on the books as guidance to the bar and public.

Justice Sullivan notes that the reasons for this divergence “warrant further study,” but their existence reinforces the idea that opinions have an independent public value apart from the judgment itself.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited: Their Role in the Opinion

A. Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

Justice Sullivan opens with a quote from Judge Posner in Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999):

“Our system of justice is adversarial, and our judges are busy people.”

This sets the tone: the adversarial system depends on parties to frame and litigate disputes, and courts allocate scarce judicial resources among a heavy docket. Late efforts to undo judicial work product via settlement‑conditioned vacatur undermine that allocation.

B. Las Misiones De Bejar Television Co. v. FCC

Justice Sullivan next quotes then‑Judge Scalia in Las Misiones De Bejar Television Co. v. FCC, 772 F.2d 979, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1985):

“Steps-of-the-courthouse settlements should be encouraged on the steps of the courthouse, not after the parties have put the court to the trouble of reading briefs, hearing argument, deciding, and preparing opinions in the case.”

The lesson is that:

Settlements early in the process are highly desirable—they conserve judicial resources.
But late settlements that seek to unwind already‑expended judicial labor by erasing decisions are another matter entirely and should not be encouraged.

C. William Baude, “The Judgment Power”

Justice Sullivan cites William Baude’s article, “The Judgment Power,” 96 Geo. L.J. 1807 (2008), for the idea that:

“Opinions merely explain the grounds for judgments, helping other people to plan and order their affairs.”

This underscores the public‑facing function of judicial opinions. Even after the parties settle their private dispute, the opinion remains a vital tool for:

Lawyers advising clients;
Individuals and businesses planning their conduct; and
Courts achieving consistency in future decisions.

D. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership

Bancorp is the linchpin of the modern federal vacatur doctrine. Justice Sullivan relies on it extensively for two propositions:

Settlement‑caused mootness does not justify vacatur as a rule.
“Mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review,” though “exceptional circumstances may conceivably counsel in favor of such a course.”
Vacatur is an extraordinary equitable remedy to be granted sparingly.
Granting the “extraordinary remedy of vacatur” when the parties’ own voluntary acts mooted the case would invite gamesmanship, “disturb the orderly operation of [our] judicial system,” and could “deter settlement at an earlier stage.”

Justice Sullivan’s opinion strongly suggests that Texas is now aligning its approach to post‑settlement mootness with Bancorp, even as it retains some structural differences (for example, the possibility of leaving an opinion standing while vacating a judgment).

E. DFPS v. N.J.

He cites Texas Department of Family and Protective Services v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 193 n.2 (Tex. 2022), for the recognition that:

Motions of this kind impose significant demands on “the Court and its dedicated staff.”

This citation resonates with his opening theme: each motion for vacatur—especially after full merits briefing—requires time and attention, diverting resources from other pending cases.

F. Hart & Wechsler and Professor Fallon

Justice Sullivan also invokes the leading federal courts casebook, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (7th ed. 2015), authored by Fallon and others. He quotes a pointed passage:

“Isn't there something unseemly about letting repeat players ‘buy up’ judgments that they dislike by settling cases pending on appeal and seeking vacatur?”

This rhetorical question encapsulates a core fairness concern: allowing parties, especially repeat institutional litigants, to systematically erase adverse decisions through settlement threatens the integrity and transparency of the judicial system.

VI. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Judicial resources, adversarial system, and timing of settlement

Justice Sullivan begins and ends with the reality of limited judicial resources. He:

Describes the Supreme Court of Texas’s heavy docket—over a thousand new cases per year;
Details the procedural chronology in Megatel (petition, response, reply, motion to dismiss under Rule 56.3, supplemental briefing, multiple conferences); and
Observes that by the time settlement occurs in these cases, both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court have already invested substantial effort.

The thrust of his reasoning is:

Settlements should be encouraged, but they should not negate already‑expended public resources devoted to producing judicial opinions that serve the broader legal community.
Allowing routine vacatur at this late stage would send the wrong incentives: parties could litigate fully, see how the wind blows, and then settle and demand that the opinion be erased if it turns out unfavorable.
Such a regime would encourage strategic delay in settlement, precisely the opposite of what resource‑conscious policy would dictate.

B. Vacatur as a “discretionary equitable remedy” with a presumption against use

Justice Sullivan repeatedly frames vacatur not as an entitlement but as a discretionary equitable remedy. Equity historically looks to fairness and the balance of interests, not merely the wishes of the immediate parties.

Several factors drive the strong presumption against vacatur after settlement:

Voluntary mootness. When the outcome is mooted by the parties’ own voluntary act (settlement), they are not facing an uncontrollable “happenstance” that deprived them of appellate review; they chose to give it up. Justice Sullivan stresses that these parties have “voluntarily forfeited their right to appellate review.”
Public interest in precedent. As Baude’s article and Houston Cable highlight, opinions serve not just the litigants but the general public. The Court acts for the entire legal system, not merely the two parties currently before it.
Potential for manipulation. The risk of “manipulat[ing] judicial precedent by settlement,” as expressed in Morath and echoed by Fallon and Hart & Wechsler, is a central concern. Routine vacatur would:
- Allow powerful or repeat players to erase adverse decisions;
- Make the body of published case law a less reliable guide, since important decisions could disappear without explanation; and
- Undermine transparency and equal access to law.

Under this reasoning, the equitable balance weighs heavily against vacatur once a court of appeals has fully decided a case and written an opinion, and the Supreme Court has already invested time in reviewing the petition.

C. Distinguishing exceptional circumstances

Justice Sullivan does not say vacatur is never appropriate after settlement. Rather, he:

Adopts Bancorp’s language that “exceptional circumstances may conceivably counsel in favor of such a course”; and
Points to Brazos River Authority and Farley as examples where the Court found reasons to treat the case differently (significant non‑party state interests; remand for the court of appeals to consider withdrawal).

From these, we can infer what might qualify as “exceptional”:

Situations where an opinion threatens to impair the rights or interests of significant non‑parties (particularly the State) who did not participate in the settlement;
Cases where some external circumstance, beyond the parties’ control, makes the continued existence of the opinion especially problematic; or
Instances where the court of appeals itself, on remand, concludes that withdrawal is more appropriate in light of changed circumstances.

By contrast, ordinary private settlements between adverse parties—especially after full merits briefing—do not fall within these exceptional categories.

D. Concern about “buying up” judgments and systemic integrity

Justice Sullivan explicitly endorses the skepticism raised by Hart & Wechsler and Professor Fallon about the “unseemliness” of letting repeat players “buy up” judgments they dislike. This reflects several systemic concerns:

Inequality: Larger, resource‑rich parties could systematically cleanse the law of adverse precedents by making settlement offers conditioned (albeit formally prohibited in writing) on seeking vacatur.
Opacity: Important doctrinal developments might vanish from the public record, depriving lawyers, judges, and citizens of guidance.
Unpredictability: If opinions can routinely disappear, future courts and litigants cannot rely on them as stable building blocks of the law.

Rule 56.3’s last sentence—“An agreement or motion cannot be conditioned on vacating the court of appeals’ opinion”—is the Court’s formal response to this very concern. Justice Sullivan’s concurrence insists that this rule be understood not as a formality but as a substantive constraint: vacatur is off the bargaining table, reserved only to the Court’s independent equitable judgment.

E. Alignment with federal practice while preserving Texas-specific features

Justice Sullivan acknowledges that Texas has “charted a somewhat different vacatur path over the years,” but he stresses that the Court is now “trending toward Bancorp’s approach to the mootness‑through‑settlement issue.”

In practical terms, that means:

Post‑settlement vacatur of judgments and opinions will be rare and disfavored absent exceptional circumstances;
The Court will give significant weight to concerns about gamesmanship and systemic integrity, not just the parties’ shared wishes; and
Texas’s unique ability to decouple judgments from opinions does not lessen the Court’s reluctance to erase appellate work product.

VII. Impact on Future Cases and Texas Appellate Practice

A. Settlement strategy and timing

This opinion (and the Court’s underlying denial of vacatur) sends a clear signal to Texas practitioners:

Early settlements are still highly encouraged. They conserve judicial resources and allow the parties to avoid the risks and costs of appeal.
But once a case has been:
- Decided by a court of appeals with a written opinion, and
- Briefed in the Supreme Court (or reached an advanced stage there),
parties should not expect that a late‑stage settlement will entitle them to erasure of the court of appeals’ opinion.
Lawyers advising clients should understand that an unfavorable court of appeals opinion is likely to remain on the books, even if the case settles while a petition for review is pending.

This may affect:

Appeal decisions – A party contemplating appeal must appreciate that if the court of appeals’ decision is adverse and is published, settlement on appeal will not automatically remove that opinion from the law.
Settlement negotiations – Parties can no longer credibly hold out vacatur as a bargaining chip; any such condition is invalid under Rule 56.3 and disfavored in light of this concurrence.

B. Stability and availability of court of appeals precedent

From a systemic perspective, Justice Sullivan’s concurrence reinforces the idea that:

Opinions are public goods. They are not the private property of the litigants. Once written, they belong to the legal system.
Public reliance interests matter. Lawyers and judges may already be relying on a court of appeals opinion by the time a case reaches the Supreme Court. Routine vacatur would disrupt that reliance.

The likely long‑term effect is:

Greater stability in intermediate appellate case law;
More reliable citation practices, as fewer opinions will disappear post‑settlement; and
Reinforcement of the principle that courts write for the public, not just the parties.

C. Effects on government and non‑party interests

By highlighting Brazos River Authority—where the State was not a party to the settlement but had significant interests in the issues—Justice Sullivan suggests that:

Government interests and the interests of absent parties will weigh heavily in the equitable calculus.
Where vacatur would prejudice or unfairly affect non‑parties (especially sovereign or regulatory interests), the Court is likely to resist it.

Conversely, in rare cases where an opinion creates systemic problems or conflicts with unresolved governmental interests, the Court may be more open to carefully tailored relief (though, even there, the presumption remains against vacatur).

VIII. Clarifying Complex Concepts and Terminology

A. What is “vacatur”?

Vacatur is a legal action by which a court nullifies or sets aside a prior judgment or opinion. In appellate practice, it often arises when:

An appellate court vacates a lower court’s judgment and remands for further proceedings; or
An appellate court vacates both the judgment and the opinion because the case has become moot or for other equitable reasons.

Vacatur can have powerful effects:

A vacated judgment typically has no legal effect between the parties.
A vacated opinion no longer carries precedential or persuasive authority since it is as though it were never issued.

B. Mootness by settlement vs. mootness by happenstance

A case becomes moot when a justiciable controversy no longer exists—i.e., there is no live dispute for the court to resolve.

Mootness by happenstance occurs when external events beyond the parties’ control (for example, a statute is repealed, or the property at issue is destroyed) make the case non‑justiciable. Under Munsingwear, vacatur of the judgment may be appropriate to prevent a party from being bound by an unreviewable decision.
Mootness by settlement happens when the parties voluntarily choose to resolve their dispute and ask the court to dismiss the case. Under Bancorp and Texas Rule 56.3 as interpreted by Morath and Justice Sullivan, voluntary settlement generally does not justify vacatur of the judgment or opinion absent exceptional circumstances.

C. The difference between a “judgment” and an “opinion”

Justice Sullivan and Rule 56.3 distinguish between:

Judgment – The formal, legally operative decision of the court: who wins, what relief is granted or denied, and on what ultimate disposition (affirmed, reversed, remanded, dismissed, etc.).
Opinion – The court’s written explanation of its reasoning: the facts, law, analysis, and rationale supporting the judgment.

Texas practice, unlike the usual federal approach, contemplates that:

The Supreme Court may set aside the judgment of the court of appeals to effectuate a settlement (for example, by remanding for entry of a different judgment consistent with the parties’ agreement);
Yet the opinion need not be vacated and, by default under Rule 56.3, is not vacated unless the Supreme Court expressly orders otherwise.

D. Petition for review and Texas Supreme Court procedure

In the Texas system:

After a court of appeals decides a case, the losing party may file a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas.
The Supreme Court may:
- Deny the petition, leaving the court of appeals’ judgment and opinion in place;
- Request a response and, if appropriate, grant the petition and decide the case on the merits (with or without oral argument); or
- In the context of a settlement under Rule 56.3, grant the petition and render a judgment to effectuate the parties’ agreement without reaching the merits.

In Megatel, the Court:

Received a petition, ordered a response, and received a reply—indicating serious consideration of the merits;
Then received a Rule 56.3 settlement motion requesting dismissal and vacatur; and
Requested supplemental briefing specifically on the vacatur question before ultimately denying that relief.

IX. Conclusion: The Significance of Megatel in the Broader Legal Context

Justice Sullivan’s concurrence in Megatel C90‑2, Inc. v. Bank of Utah is more than a case‑specific explanation; it is a clear statement of the Supreme Court of Texas’s institutional stance on a recurring procedural issue:

Vacatur of court of appeals opinions after settlement is an extraordinary remedy, not a routine entitlement.
Rule 56.3 creates a strong presumption that opinions will remain on the books even when judgments are set aside to effectuate settlements.
Parties cannot bargain for vacatur; any such condition is invalid, and the Court will independently and skeptically assess motions seeking to erase appellate work product.

By aligning Texas practice more closely with the federal Bancorp doctrine—while preserving Texas’s distinctive ability to decouple judgments from opinions—the Court:

Protects judicial resources and discourages strategic late‑stage settlements aimed at erasing precedent;
Promotes stability and transparency in the development of Texas law; and
Affirms that judicial opinions are public goods, not private property to be traded away in settlements.

Going forward, Megatel and the companion cases send a clear message: Texas appellate opinions generally will not vanish simply because the parties have decided, privately, that they no longer wish to litigate. The law, once written, largely remains for the benefit of all.