Reinforcing the “Harm-Threshold”: Salvador Galvan v. Sandra Malone, 2025 WY 65

1. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Wyoming Supreme Court’s recent decision in Galvan v. Malone, 2025 WY 65, a case that revisits the constitutional limits of court-ordered grandparent visitation. The dispute arose after the tragic death of ALG’s mother in an ATV accident for which the child’s father, Salvador Galvan, accepted criminal responsibility. The maternal grandmother, Sandra Malone, sought court-ordered visitation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101, contending that Father’s cessation of contact was harmful to ALG. The district court agreed and granted visitation, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grandmother failed to satisfy the “harm” prong that must precede any best-interest inquiry.

Key Issues

• Does the death of a parent, standing alone, constitute sufficient “harm” to overcome the constitutional presumption that a fit parent’s visitation decision is in the child’s best interests?
• What quantum and type of evidence must a grandparent produce to establish “clear and convincing” proof that a parent’s visitation decision harms the child?
• May a trial court rely on its own knowledge of psychological concepts not in evidence?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Justice Gray writing) unanimously reversed the visitation order. It held that:

• The district court clearly erred in finding that Father’s decision to suspend visitation was harmful to ALG; there was no record evidence supporting that conclusion.
• Grandmother bore the burden of proving harm by clear and convincing evidence before the court could consider best interests; she produced none.
• The lower court improperly shifted the burden and relied on personal assumptions about “reactive attachment disorder,” contravening evidentiary rules.
• Because the harm threshold was not met, the State lacked a compelling interest to infringe Father’s fundamental parental rights under the Due Process Clause.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)
   Established that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The Court in Galvan continues to give “special weight” to parental decisions as Troxel requires.
2. Ailport v. Ailport, 2022 WY 43
   Articulated Wyoming’s two-step analysis: (1) grandparents must prove parental unfitness or child harm by clear and convincing evidence; (2) only then may the court proceed to a best-interest balancing. Galvan reaffirms and applies this framework.
3. Bowman v. Study, 2022 WY 139
   Provided examples of circumstances that may support a finding of harm, such as restriction of contact after a parent’s death. Galvan clarifies that these examples are illustrative, not dispositive, and case-specific evidence is required.
4. Ward v. Belden, 2023 WY 111
   Addressed the standard for reviewing factual findings post-trial; the same “clear error” test guided the Supreme Court’s assessment here.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional Presumption
   Parental autonomy enjoys a presumption of validity. Governmental interference (including judicial orders) is permissible only if a compelling state interest—here, the child’s protection from harm—is first established with clear and convincing evidence.
2. Harm vs. Best Interests
   The Court distinguishes the threshold question (harm or unfitness) from the best-interest analysis. Without surpassing the threshold, the court lacks power to evaluate or impose a visitation schedule.
3. Evidentiary Deficiency
   Grandmother presented no expert or lay testimony demonstrating psychological, emotional, or developmental harm caused by Father’s visitation decision. Conversely, Father’s expert warned visitation might be detrimental unless hostilities subsided. Therefore, the only evidence on harm weighed against visitation.
4. Judicial Fact-Finding Boundaries
   The district court improperly imported its understanding of “reactive attachment disorder,” in contravention of W.R.E. 201(b) and precedent disallowing judicial supplementation of the record (Price; Prestige Homes). The Supreme Court censured this practice as exceeding the fact-finding authority.
5. Misapplication of Bowman
   The lower court treated the mere fact of Mother’s death as presumptive harm. The Supreme Court clarified that Bowman mandates an individualized inquiry; the death of a parent is a trigger for scrutiny, not conclusive proof of harm.

C. Impact of the Decision

• Tightening the Gateway – Grandparents must now marshal specific, child-focused evidence—often expert testimony—showing why deprivation of contact is harmful, not merely that contact formerly existed or that a parent died.
• Judicial Discipline – Trial courts are reminded to confine themselves to the record and to articulate findings separately on harm and best interests.
• Litigation Strategy – Expect increased emphasis on psychological evaluations, affidavits from pediatricians, counselors, or teachers, and perhaps guardian-ad-litem reports to meet the “clear and convincing” standard.
• Parent–Grandparent Negotiations – The decision may incentivize voluntary, mediated visitation agreements by making judicial relief more difficult to obtain.
• Statutory Interpretation – Although Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101 remains intact, its application is now firmly tethered to constitutional strict-scrutiny principles.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Fundamental Parental Rights

The Constitution recognizes parents’ paramount right to direct the upbringing of their children. Courts treat parental choices as presumptively valid unless a compelling reason exists to override them.

Clear and Convincing Evidence

A higher burden than “preponderance.” The fact-finder must have a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations—roughly 70-75 % certainty.

Harm Threshold vs. Best Interests

Think of a locked gate: The harm threshold is the key that unlocks judicial review. If the key is missing (no harm proven), the gate (parental presumption) remains shut and the court cannot enter the garden of “best-interests” balancing.

Judicial Notice (W.R.E. 201)

Allows courts to accept indisputable facts (e.g., calendar dates) without evidence. Psychological diagnoses like “reactive attachment disorder” are not the sort of facts eligible for judicial notice.

5. Conclusion

Galvan v. Malone fortifies Wyoming’s commitment to parental autonomy by insisting on a rigorous, evidence-based showing of child harm before grandparents may obtain court-ordered visitation. The decision clarifies that:

• The death of a parent does not automatically satisfy the harm requirement.
• Trial courts must avoid reliance on personal knowledge or generalized assumptions.
• The “best-interest of the child” analysis is procedurally subsequent—never a substitute—for the harm finding.

Going forward, litigants and courts must adhere to a disciplined framework: prove harm with clear and convincing evidence, respect the constitutional presumption in favor of parental decision-making, and conduct a structured best-interests review only when warranted. This ruling thus serves as a critical precedent, reinforcing the narrow circumstances under which state power may intrude upon family autonomy in Wyoming.

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