Reid Clarifies Eleventh Circuit’s “Time-of-State-Conviction” Rule for Career-Offender Enhancements

Introduction

In United States v. Antonio Reid, No. 24-11000 (11th Cir. June 11, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit revisited the definition of a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) career-offender enhancement, § 4B1.1. The panel, sitting on the non-argument calendar and writing per curiam, affirmed a 188-month sentence imposed by the Middle District of Georgia.

The appeal raised familiar but recurring questions in federal sentencing: When evaluating prior state drug convictions, should federal courts (1) look to federal drug schedules, (2) look to state drug schedules, or (3) compare the two and require an exact match? And if state law later changes, should the court apply the schedules in effect at the time of the state conviction or at the time of the federal sentencing?

Building on the Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), the panel made three clarifying moves:

It confirmed—without qualification—that state, not federal, schedules govern whether a prior state conviction is a “controlled substance offense.”
It reiterated the “time-of-state-conviction” rule: the relevant schedules are those in effect when defendant was convicted in state court, even if the substance is later de-listed federally or by the state.
It rejected arguments that minor textual differences (e.g., Georgia’s inclusion of “conformational isomers” of cocaine) disqualify a state statute under the categorical approach if those differences would not plausibly support a conviction.

Because these holdings further entrench and clarify Dubois, the case is notable for federal practitioners, probation officers, and district judges assessing career-offender status.

Summary of the Judgment

Antonio Reid, convicted federally of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, challenged the district court’s decision to sentence him as a career offender. He asserted that his three 2005 Georgia convictions—sale of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana—should not count as “controlled substance offenses.”

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Employing the categorical approach and following Dubois:

Marijuana conviction: Georgia criminalized marijuana (including hemp) in 2005; therefore, the conviction is a qualifying controlled-substance offense.
Cocaine convictions: Even if Georgia’s definition of cocaine arguably reached some isomers not federally listed, those isomers could not have formed the basis for Reid’s convictions under Georgia’s own “dual-listing” rule. Regardless, Dubois holds that federal-state mismatches do not matter if the substance was covered by state law at the time of conviction.

Having at least two predicate offenses (one federal, one state), Reid was correctly classified as a career offender. The panel affirmed the 188-month sentence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024)
– Established that state law, not federal law, determines whether a drug is a “controlled substance” under § 4B1.2(b); adopted the “time-of-state-conviction” rule.
Hollis v. United States, 958 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2020)
– Reaffirmed the categorical approach for predicate offenses.
United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019)
– Articulated the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-panel precedent rule.
C.W. v. Department of Human Services, 836 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)
– Georgia state authority suggesting a dual-listing requirement, invoked by Reid but ultimately distinguished.
Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2 and commentary.

Legal Reasoning

Categorical Approach, Reaffirmed. The panel applied the “least culpable conduct” test; if the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute would be a controlled-substance offense, the conviction counts.
State-Law Source of “Controlled Substance”. Relying on Dubois, the court explained that § 4B1.2(b) refers to “an offense under federal or state law,” so the word “controlled substance” reasonably looks to the legal regime that made the conduct criminal—here, Georgia law. A federal schedule comparison is unnecessary.
Time-of-Conviction Rule. Even though hemp has since been removed from Georgia’s and the federal schedules, marijuana (including hemp) was listed in 2005. Therefore, looking “backward” to that date is proper. The decision distinguishes the ex-post-facto context: § 4B1.2’s inquiry is historical, not punitive for new conduct.
Distinguishing the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in C.W. The panel noted that federal courts are bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent, not intermediate state-court dicta, especially where state authority does not speak directly to criminal liability for drug offenses.
Isomer Mismatch Argument. Reid’s argument that Georgia covers “conformational isomers” fails because (a) under his own reading they would not be a “controlled substance” under Georgia’s dual-listing definition, so no prosecutable conduct exists; (b) Dubois forecloses any need to match federal schedules.

Impact of the Decision

Fortifies Dubois. By applying Dubois over fresh attack lines (marijuana/hemp changes; isomer mismatch), the panel broadcasts that Dubois is stable law.
Predictability in Career-Offender Litigation. Defendants in the Eleventh Circuit can no longer reasonably argue for a federal schedule cross-match when their predicate convictions are state-based.
Sentencing Practice in Georgia and Beyond. Georgia defendants with pre-2019 marijuana convictions (when hemp was still scheduled) remain exposed to career-offender enhancements—even though hemp is now legal.
Possible Inter-Circuit Tension. The Ninth Circuit (e.g., United States v. Bautista) and others require federal schedule congruence. Reid accentuates a growing circuit split, heightening potential for Supreme Court review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Career Offender (§ 4B1.1): An enhancement that substantially raises a defendant’s advisory Guidelines range if he/she has (1) at least two prior convictions for “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense,” and (2) is at least 18 when the instant offense was committed.
Categorical Approach: Court examines the statute of conviction, not the underlying facts, to determine whether it necessarily involves elements matching the federal definition of the predicate offense.
Time-of-State-Conviction Rule: The substance must have been regulated by the state when the defendant was convicted in state court, even if later decriminalized or removed from schedules.
Isomers (Optical, Geometric, Conformational): Chemically similar variants of a molecule. Federal schedules list certain isomers; state schedules may list more. Differences can create “mismatch” arguments in categorical analysis.
Prior-Panel Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a three-judge panel must follow an earlier panel’s published decision unless it is overturned by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc.

Conclusion

United States v. Antonio Reid adds a critical layer of clarity to the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of state drug convictions under the Guidelines. By doubling down on state schedules and the time-of-conviction rule, the court signals that post-conviction developments—whether legislative (hemp legalization) or chemical (isomer debates)—do not disturb the historical fact that the defendant’s conduct violated state controlled-substance law at the relevant moment.

Practitioners should:

Expect state-law schedules to control in the Eleventh Circuit.
Anticipate resistance to mismatch arguments based on later legal changes.
Monitor potential Supreme Court intervention given diverging circuit positions.

In the broader sentencing landscape, Reid consolidates a defendant-unfriendly trajectory: past drug felonies remain potent sentencing multipliers, even as drug laws evolve. The decision underscores the enduring consequences of state convictions and the importance of strategic litigation—or legislative reform—when clients confront the specter of career-offender status.