Rehabilitative Use of Child Forensic Interviews and the Limits of Arkansas’s Tender-Years Hearsay Exception:
Commentary on Minor Child v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 210

I. Introduction

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Minor Child v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 210, addresses two recurring and sensitive issues in juvenile sexual-assault adjudications:

What quantum and type of evidence is sufficient to sustain a delinquency adjudication for sexual assault, especially where the victim is a very young child and physical corroboration is weak or absent?
Under what circumstances may a trial court admit the entire recorded forensic interview of a child victim, particularly when the defense has used selected excerpts from that interview to impeach the child’s testimony?

The appellant, identified as “MC” (Minor Child), a teenager and the five-year-old victim’s half-uncle, was adjudicated delinquent for second-degree sexual assault after a bench trial in the Saline County Circuit Court, Juvenile Division. The core factual allegation was that MC digitally penetrated the child’s anus while they lay together on a couch on Thanksgiving morning 2022. The victim disclosed the assault the same day; a sexual-assault nurse examiner conducted an exam and collected forensic samples; a forensic interview of the child was later video-recorded.

On appeal, MC raised two principal claims:

The evidence was legally insufficient to support the delinquency adjudication.
The circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the entire recorded forensic interview of the child under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(25), the “tender-years” hearsay exception.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The majority held that substantial evidence supported the adjudication, and that, although the circuit court relied on the wrong evidentiary rule (Rule 803(25)), admission of the full interview was nonetheless proper as a rehabilitative, contextual response to the defense’s impeachment strategy. Concurring opinions by Chief Justice Baker and Justice Hudson agreed in the result but would have resolved the evidentiary issue on a narrower, prejudice-based ground and expressed concerns about how the court states and applies its standards of review and its willingness to sustain decisions on unargued theories.

Doctrinally, the case is most significant for:

Narrowly construing Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(25) to apply only to prior inconsistent statements by child victims, not to consistent statements; and
Authorizing the use of full child forensic interviews as prior consistent statements for rehabilitation and under principles of completeness once the defense “opens the door” by selectively using portions for impeachment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural and Factual Overview

The victim, then five years old, awoke early on Thanksgiving Day 2022 and joined MC, who was lying on the couch in her home. She testified that MC “put his finger in” her “butthole,” causing her to feel “sad and mad.” She tried to “scoot up” to alleviate discomfort, but MC digitally penetrated her anus again, stopping only when the child’s mother entered the room.

That evening, after MC had been taken home and the family returned from a Thanksgiving gathering, the child disclosed to her father that she did not like how MC had touched her. Her parents called police and took her to the hospital. Sexual-assault nurse examiner Kya Jones conducted a physical exam, finding no observable injury but collecting the child’s underwear and two rectal swabs—one at the entry and one slightly inside. Testing later showed the presence of male DNA on the underwear and both swabs, though there was insufficient material to generate a specific DNA profile or identify the donor.

About a week after the incident, the child participated in a roughly 45-minute recorded forensic interview with a forensic nurse, during which she again described the assault. The State filed a juvenile petition alleging second-degree sexual assault. At the bench trial:

The victim testified live, describing MC’s digital penetration of her anus and her feelings, and explaining how she tried to move away.
Her parents testified, corroborating the disclosure timeline and what the child reported to them.
Nurse Jones testified that the absence of physical injury was not unusual in cases of digital penetration.
DNA expert Christopher Glaze testified to the presence of male DNA on the underwear and rectal swabs, but could not attribute it to any particular individual.
MC testified and denied assaulting the victim.

A key evidentiary dispute arose during cross-examination of the child. Defense counsel sought to impeach her with alleged inconsistencies between her trial testimony and the forensic interview. Rather than confronting the child directly with specific prior statements (the usual impeachment method), counsel proposed to play selected portions—about one-third—of the forensic interview outside the child’s presence. The State objected and asked the court to admit the entire recording under Rule 803(25), Arkansas’s tender-years exception for child hearsay.

After viewing the full video in camera, the circuit court:

Found actual inconsistencies on collateral points (e.g., whether MC had kissed the child or covered her with a blanket);
Found the State had given adequate notice and that the recording bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness; and
Admitted the entire recording under Rule 803(25).

After hearing all the evidence, the circuit court found the victim “very credible,” “believable,” and “consistent,” and adjudicated MC delinquent of second-degree sexual assault.

B. Holdings

The Supreme Court issued three core holdings:

Sufficiency of the Evidence. Applying the ordinary criminal sufficiency standard to juvenile adjudications, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that MC committed second-degree sexual assault. The victim’s testimony alone would have sufficed; here it was corroborated by her parents’ testimony and by the presence of male DNA in her rectum and underwear.
Misapplication of Ark. R. Evid. 803(25). The court held that Rule 803(25) allows admission only of inconsistent out-of-court statements by a child under ten concerning sexual offenses. It does not authorize admission of consistent statements. Thus, the circuit court erred in relying on Rule 803(25) to admit the entire forensic interview, which the State offered primarily because it was consistent with the child’s testimony.
Alternative Ground for Admissibility — Rehabilitation and Completeness. Despite the misapplication of Rule 803(25), the court affirmed the evidentiary ruling because the full video was admissible on other grounds: as prior consistent statements used to rehabilitate the child’s credibility and to supply the necessary context (under principles akin to Rule 106 “verbal completeness”) after the defense used selective segments to impeach her.

Chief Justice Baker, joined in part by Justice Hudson, concurred in the judgment but criticized the majority for:

Stating an “incomplete” sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard; and
Affirming on an evidentiary theory the State had not advanced on appeal, contrary to the court’s usual practice of not raising arguments sua sponte (except jurisdictional issues).

Baker and Hudson would instead affirm because, even if the entire recording was erroneously admitted, MC could not show prejudice—the interview was merely cumulative of the child’s and parents’ testimony.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Juvenile Delinquency and Burden of Proof

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-419(h)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025). This statute requires proof of delinquency “beyond a reasonable doubt,” aligning juvenile adjudications with criminal trials on the standard of proof.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the constitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Arkansas Supreme Court cites Winship to confirm that the same constitutional safeguards govern juvenile cases.
S.C. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 344, 464 S.W.3d 477. The Arkansas Court of Appeals applied the ordinary criminal “substantial evidence” standard when reviewing a juvenile’s sufficiency challenge. The current opinion follows that approach.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). This seminal federal case established that the question on sufficiency review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any “rational trier of fact” could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The Arkansas Supreme Court references Jackson in reaffirming deference to the fact-finder’s role.
McDaniels v. State, 2025 Ark. 139, 720 S.W.3d 82. The majority quotes McDaniels for the idea that appellate courts do not second-guess credibility determinations and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the adjudication. Chief Justice Baker points out that McDaniels more precisely states that the court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State” and “may only consider evidence supporting the verdict,” a nuance she believes the majority omits.

2. Proof of Sexual Assault and Victim’s Testimony

Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-101(12), 5-14-125(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2021). These provisions define “sexual contact” as an act of sexual gratification involving touching the buttocks or anus of a person and make it second-degree sexual assault if the victim is under fourteen. The court applies these definitions directly to the facts (digital penetration of a five-year-old’s anus).
Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5. Breeden stands for the proposition that the victim’s testimony alone can constitute substantial evidence to support a sexual-assault conviction, even without corroboration. The court relies on Breeden to reject MC’s argument that DNA or physical findings were required.

3. Evidentiary Standards and Appellate Review

Humphry v. State, 2023 Ark. 16, 659 S.W.3d 691. Cited for the familiar rule that trial courts have “broad discretion” in evidentiary rulings and that an abuse of discretion occurs only when the court acts “improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.”
Keesee v. State, 2022 Ark. 68, 641 S.W.3d 628. This case underpins an important appellate principle: even if the trial court used the wrong evidentiary rule, an appellate court may affirm if the ruling reached the correct result on any proper basis. The majority in Minor Child uses Keesee to justify affirmance on rehabilitation/completeness grounds rather than Rule 803(25). Chief Justice Baker, by contrast, relies on Keesee (in dissent there) to reiterate that the court should not create new arguments for the State.

4. Prior Consistent Statements, Rehabilitation, and Completeness

Carpenter v. State, 58 Ark. 233, 24 S.W. 247 (1893). An early Arkansas case reflecting the common-law rule that prior consistent statements may be admissible to rehabilitate a witness’s credibility after impeachment.
Cooper v. State, 317 Ark. 485, 879 S.W.2d 405 (1994). The court allowed additional evidence to clarify confusion or misapprehension created by cross-examination of a minor victim. Cooper is cited to show that principles of fairness and completeness sometimes justify admission of additional contextual statements when the defense has selectively impeached a child witness.
George v. State, 270 Ark. 335, 604 S.W.2d 940 (1980). George cautions that prior consistent statements should not be admitted merely to “corroborate or sustain” in-court testimony; rather, their admission must be tethered to addressing a specific credibility attack or clarifying an incomplete picture. The majority leans on George to stress that context matters and that courts must limit admission to portions necessary for fairness.
Doucoure v. State, 2024 Ark. 162, 698 S.W.3d 643 (Wood, J., concurring). Justice Wood’s concurrence, cited by the majority, discusses the “rule of verbal completeness,” acknowledging that juries may sometimes hear otherwise inadmissible statements where necessary to explain earlier testimony or avoid misleading impressions.
Ark. R. Evid. 106. The “rule of completeness” provides that when one party introduces part of a writing or recorded statement, the opposing party may require introduction of other parts “which in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.” The majority uses Rule 106 by analogy (and with supporting case law) to justify admitting more of the child’s interview in response to selective impeachment.

5. Federal and Sister-State Authorities on Prior Consistent Statements and Child Interviews

The majority draws heavily on federal and out-of-state authority to reinforce the admissibility of prior consistent statements and full forensic interviews for rehabilitation and completeness:

United States v. Begay, 116 F.4th 795 (8th Cir. 2024); United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 1997). These cases (and others collected in Ellis) affirm the admissibility of prior consistent statements to rebut attacks on credibility.
United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring). Judge Friendly discusses how prior consistent statements used for rehabilitation are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to evaluate the integrity of a witness’s testimony in light of alleged inconsistencies.
United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986). Recognizes that “completeness” and “rehabilitation” are overlapping doctrines; prior consistent statements may be admissible to prevent a misleading impression created by partial use of a statement.
United States v. Spotted Bear, 920 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2019). The Eighth Circuit noted that a defendant who uses a child’s forensic interview to impeach cannot then complain when the State introduces more of that interview—the defendant has “opened the door.”
State v. Flores, 2 N.W.3d 287 (Iowa 2024). Iowa’s high court affirmed admission of a child’s entire forensic interview where the defense cross-examined the child extensively about specific statements from that interview. Flores is cited both to support the majority’s decision and to warn that parties should still be prepared to limit video use to portions “necessary for context, fairness, or to otherwise clear up misleading impressions.”
People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1999); Moreland v. State, 701 N.E.2d 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Church, 708 A.2d 1341 (Vt. 1998). These decisions collectively support allowing prior consistent statements to rehabilitate child witnesses whose credibility has been attacked.

6. Tender-Years Hearsay Provisions in Other Jurisdictions

In a footnote, the majority contrasts Arkansas’s tender-years rule with more expansive statutes and rules in other jurisdictions (e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia). Those provisions often allow more general admission of child victims’ out-of-court statements, not limited to inconsistencies. The court uses this comparison to underscore that Arkansas Rule 803(25) is textually narrower and cannot be stretched to cover consistent statements.

7. Concurring Authorities on Prejudice and Appellate Restraint

Conte v. State, 2015 Ark. 220, 463 S.W.3d 686. Cited by Chief Justice Baker for the principle that erroneous evidentiary rulings are reversible only upon a showing of prejudice.
Lard v. State, 2014 Ark. 1, 431 S.W.3d 249. Holds that no prejudice exists where erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.
Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 178; City of Little Rock v. Circuit Court of Pulaski County, 2017 Ark. 219, 521 S.W.3d 113. These cases stand for the proposition that the Arkansas Supreme Court does not raise new arguments sua sponte on behalf of a party, except for issues of subject-matter jurisdiction, which it must address on its own initiative. Baker invokes these to criticize the majority’s reliance on a new admissibility theory not pressed by the State on appeal.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The court first addressed whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that MC committed second-degree sexual assault under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-101(12) and 5-14-125(a)(5)(A). The elements required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that MC engaged in an act of sexual gratification involving touching the buttocks or anus of a person under fourteen years old.

In assessing MC’s sufficiency challenge, the Supreme Court:

Reiterated that delinquency proceedings require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-419 and In re Winship);
Applied the “substantial evidence” standard of review used in criminal cases, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the adjudication and deferring to the fact-finder on credibility (citing Jackson and McDaniels); and
Emphasized that resolving conflicts and inconsistencies in testimony is the exclusive domain of the fact-finder.

Applying these principles, the court identified three layers of support for the adjudication:

The victim’s testimony. The child explicitly testified that MC “put his finger in” her “butthole” while they lay on the couch, and that he did so twice. This testimony directly established sexual contact with the anus of a child under fourteen. The court underscored that, under Breeden, a victim’s testimony alone can constitute substantial evidence of sexual assault.
Corroborating testimony from the parents. Both parents credibly confirmed the child’s immediate disclosure that same evening, consistent with her trial testimony and the later forensic interview.
Forensic evidence of male DNA. Although the DNA could not be traced to MC, the presence of male DNA on the child’s underwear and in her rectum was consistent with her account. The court rejected MC’s argument that the absence of a definitive DNA match undermined the case, reasoning that the law does not require source attribution and that the “undisputed presence of male DNA in the victim’s rectum supports the adjudication.”

The court also addressed three specific defense points:

Inconsistencies in the victim’s statements. MC pointed to discrepancies between the child’s trial testimony and her forensic interview (e.g., whether MC kissed her or used a blanket). The court held that such inconsistencies are classic matters for the fact-finder to resolve and did not preclude reliance on her core allegation of digital penetration.
Lack of physical injury. Nurse Jones’s exam found no physical trauma. The court, however, credited Jones’s expert testimony that “it would be perfectly normal” to have no observable injury after digital penetration and thus found no diminution of the State’s proof.
Inconclusive DNA. The court rejected the claim that inconclusive DNA testing (no profile, no attribution to MC) rendered the evidence insufficient. Substantial evidence can exist even without such forensic precision; and, here, the combination of victim testimony, corroboration, and general DNA findings more than satisfied the standard.

Chief Justice Baker’s concurrence takes issue not with the sufficiency outcome, but with the way the majority recites the standard: she stresses that McDaniels says the court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only evidence supporting the verdict, not all evidence “in the light most favorable to the adjudication.” While largely semantic in this case, her point signals concern about maintaining a consistent and prosecution-focused sufficiency standard.

2. The Tender-Years Exception — Ark. R. Evid. 803(25)

The pivotal evidentiary issue concerns Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(25), which permits admission of:

“a statement made by a child under the age of ten (10) years concerning any type of sexual offense … which is inconsistent with the child’s testimony and offered in a criminal proceeding.”

The circuit court invoked this rule to admit the entire 45-minute forensic interview after finding some inconsistencies and concluding the recording was trustworthy. The Supreme Court, however, construed the rule narrowly:

The text expressly covers only statements “inconsistent with the child’s testimony.”
In this case, the State’s purpose was not to introduce inconsistent statements (which existed but were collateral); rather, it wanted the entire recording because it was consistent with the child’s trial testimony on the central allegation, to blunt the defense’s selective impeachment argument.
Nothing in the text of Rule 803(25) authorizes admission of consistent out-of-court statements by a child.

The majority bolstered this textual analysis by comparing Arkansas’s rule to broader tender-years provisions in other jurisdictions, which do not contain the “inconsistent” limitation. By contrast, Arkansas’s rule is intentionally narrower; reading it to cover consistent statements would effectively erase that limiting word from the rule.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court’s reliance on Rule 803(25) to admit the entire forensic interview was legally erroneous.

3. Alternative Basis: Rehabilitation and Completeness

Despite finding Rule 803(25) inapplicable, the court affirmed the admission of the complete recording under a different theory: as admissible prior consistent statements used to rehabilitate the child’s credibility and to provide necessary context in fairness after the defense’s selective use of the interview for impeachment.

a. Prior Consistent Statements as Non-Hearsay Rehabilitation

At common law (and in Arkansas practice), a prior consistent statement is not barred by the hearsay rule when used solely to rehabilitate a witness’s credibility after impeachment. It is not offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted” (Ark. R. Evid. 801(c)) but rather:

To show that the witness’s account has remained generally consistent over time; and
To enable the fact-finder to assess the significance, if any, of alleged inconsistencies.

The majority cites Carpenter, George, and federal authority (Begay, Ellis, Rubin) for this principle. The critical idea is that when the defense uses a prior statement to suggest that the witness is unreliable, the opposing party may respond with other portions of the same or related statements to show that, overall, the witness has remained consistent and that the alleged “discrepancies” are minor or explainable.

In Minor Child, the defense:

Proposed to play roughly one-third of the child’s forensic interview—spliced into sixteen intervals—in order to highlight supposed inconsistencies, confusion, or coaching; and
Relied in closing on those clips to argue the child had “just made up” the attack, been coached, or was confused.

Once the defense took that step, the State was entitled to introduce prior consistent statements drawn from the same interview to rehabilitate the child’s credibility. Because those statements were introduced not to prove the assault (the victim had already testified live to that) but to evaluate the credibility attack, they functioned as non-hearsay rehabilitative evidence.

b. Principle of Completeness and Avoiding Misleading Impressions

The court further relied on the principle of completeness, embodied in Ark. R. Evid. 106 and elaborated in cases like Cooper, George, Doucoure, and Pierre. Rule 106 allows an adverse party to require introduction of other parts of a written or recorded statement “which in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously” with the portion introduced by the opponent.

The rationale:

Selective use of snippets from a longer recording can distort meaning or imply a degree of inconsistency or coaching that is not supported when the full context is considered.
Especially with young children, short excerpts may be highly misleading, as children may make stray, unclear, or developmentally typical statements that need surrounding context for proper interpretation.

Thus, when defense counsel proposed to show only about one-third of the interview, in carefully chosen segments, the State could invoke “fairness” to argue for admission of additional portions—or, as here, the whole recording—to ensure that the fact-finder saw the child’s demeanor, questioning process, and overall narrative.

The majority acknowledges that this does not mean:

Prior consistent statements are always admissible, or
Entire recordings must automatically be introduced whenever a snippet is used.

Instead, the court emphasizes that:

Context matters; trial courts should consider, among other factors, the child’s age, maturity, and the nature and extent of the impeachment;
Only portions “necessary for context, fairness, or to otherwise clear up misleading impressions” should be admitted; and
Parties should be prepared to limit video use accordingly (citing Flores).

In this case, however, the majority concluded that the full recording was reasonably necessary because:

The defense had sliced the interview into sixteen segments to focus exclusively on alleged inconsistencies;
The State’s theory of the case was that, in totality, the child’s statements were consistent and uncoached; and
The circuit court, as fact-finder, expressly relied on the full context in assessing the child’s understanding and credibility, finding she “understood what she was talking about then, as she does today,” did not appear coached, and told a “very credible” and “consistent” story.

4. Concurrences: Standards of Review, Appellate Restraint, and Prejudice

a. Chief Justice Baker’s Concurrence

Chief Justice Baker agreed with affirming the adjudication but wrote separately for two reasons:

Clarifying the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.
- She notes that the majority quotes McDaniels as stating that the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the adjudication.
- In fact, she points out, McDaniels says the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and may only consider evidence that supports the verdict.
- She reiterates the concern (also expressed in her concurrence in Matthews v. State, 2025 Ark. 213) that the court should not dilute or alter this standard.
Objection to the majority’s evidentiary analysis.
- Although she agrees that Rule 803(25) was misapplied, she would not engage in the majority’s extended discussion of alternative admissibility based on rehabilitation and completeness.
- She emphasizes that the court has “been resolute” in refusing to make arguments for a party or raise issues sua sponte, except for subject-matter jurisdiction (citing Sullivan and City of Little Rock).
- On appeal, the State did not argue that the video was admissible on rehabilitation/completeness grounds, but rather that any error was harmless because MC could not show prejudice.
- She would therefore confine the analysis to the parties’ actual appellate arguments and conclude:
  - Even assuming error, under Conte, an evidentiary error is not reversible without a showing of prejudice.
  - Under Lard, there is no prejudice when improperly admitted evidence is cumulative of properly admitted evidence.
  - Here, both the child and her parents testified to the same basic facts as in the interview; thus the video was cumulative and any error in its admission was harmless.

b. Justice Hudson’s Concurrence

Justice Hudson joins the portion of Chief Justice Baker’s opinion that finds no reversible error because of lack of prejudice. She agrees that the circuit court’s ruling should be affirmed on that narrower ground, without endorsing the majority’s broader evidentiary analysis.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Clarifying the Scope of Arkansas’s Tender-Years Exception

The decision establishes an important textual principle: Ark. R. Evid. 803(25) is limited to inconsistent statements by child victims. It cannot be used as a catch-all to admit all child hearsay relating to sexual offenses, particularly where the statements are consistent with in-court testimony.

Practical consequences:

Prosecutors may no longer assume they can use Rule 803(25) to introduce an entire forensic interview of a child solely to bolster or duplicate trial testimony.
Trial courts must strictly enforce the “inconsistent” requirement and apply the rule only when the out-of-court statement conflicts with the child’s testimony and the other rule prerequisites (e.g., notice, trustworthiness) are met.
Defense counsel should be alert to misapplications of Rule 803(25) and prepared to argue that purely consistent statements are outside its scope.

At a broader policy level, the contrast drawn with other states’ more expansive tender-years provisions underscores that Arkansas has made a deliberate choice for a narrow, text-driven exception. If the legislature or rulemakers wish to permit more expansive admission of reliable child-hearsay statements, they must do so explicitly.

B. Rehabilitative Use of Forensic Interviews and “Opening the Door”

The majority’s alternative holding is equally significant: once the defense uses selective portions of a child’s forensic interview to impeach her credibility, the State may respond by introducing additional portions—even the entire recording—so long as the purpose is rehabilitation and fairness, not mere corroboration.

For future cases:

Defense strategy. Counsel should carefully weigh the costs of using clipped segments of child interviews. Doing so may “open the door” to:
- Admission of broader portions or the full interview;
- Exposure of the child’s demeanor and narrative to the fact-finder, which may ultimately strengthen the State’s case; and
- A robust completeness-based response that blunts the impact of the selective impeachment.
Prosecution strategy. Prosecutors should:
- Vigilantly object to highly selective use of forensic interviews as misleading;
- Request admission of necessary portions for context under Rule 106 and rehabilitation principles; and
- Be prepared to justify why full or partial admission is required in each scenario, guided by the majority’s caution that entire recordings are not automatically admissible.
Trial court management. Judges must:
- Consider age and maturity of the child, nature of impeachment, and potential for confusion or prejudice;
- Decide whether partial or complete admission is required to avoid misleading impressions; and
- Remain alert to the distinction between permissible rehabilitation and impermissible bolstering.

C. Reinforcing That Victim Testimony Alone Can Sustain Sexual-Assault Findings

On the sufficiency front, the decision reinforces a longstanding—and controversial in some quarters—rule: a sexual-assault conviction or juvenile adjudication in Arkansas may rest solely on the victim’s testimony, even in the absence of physical injury, DNA proof linking the accused, or eyewitnesses (consistent with Breeden).

In Minor Child, the court went further and held that:

The absence of physical findings in a sexual-assault exam is not unusual and does not undermine the verdict when expert testimony explains why injuries are often absent.
Inconclusive DNA (presence of male DNA without source attribution) can still support the verdict by being consistent with the victim’s narrative, even though it does not specifically implicate the accused.

This strengthens the prosecutorial position in cases involving very young victims where forensic evidence is limited or non-specific, but where the victim is able to provide a coherent narrative.

D. Appellate Practice: Standards of Review and Harmless Error

The concurring opinions highlight two ongoing tensions in Arkansas appellate practice:

Stating the sufficiency standard. Chief Justice Baker’s repeated insistence on the precise formulation (“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State; consider only evidence supporting the verdict”) reflects a desire for strict adherence to precedent and for clear communication about the deference given to fact-finders.
Scope of appellate review and new theories. Baker and Hudson object to the majority’s willingness to affirm on a theory of admissibility (rehabilitation/completeness) that was not urged by the State on appeal, arguing that the court typically does not make arguments on a litigant’s behalf except on jurisdictional questions.

The majority, however, regards its approach as consistent with Keesee and the broader doctrine that an appellate court may affirm a judgment when it reaches the correct result, even if the trial court’s reasoning (or cited rule) was flawed. Going forward:

Litigants should not assume that failure to press a particular evidentiary theory on appeal will prevent the court from invoking it if the record supports affirmance on that basis.
At the same time, the concurrences may encourage more explicit briefing on all plausible theories at the appellate level to hedge against this type of judicial initiative.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in the opinion can be briefly explained in plainer language:

Juvenile Delinquency Adjudication vs. Criminal Conviction
A delinquency adjudication is a finding in juvenile court that a minor committed an act that would be a crime if done by an adult. Although the setting and consequences differ (the focus is formally more rehabilitative), the State must still prove the act beyond a reasonable doubt, just as in adult criminal trials.
“Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” vs. “Substantial Evidence”
At trial, the State must convince the judge or jury that there is no reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offense. On appeal, the court does not retry the case; it asks instead whether there was “substantial evidence” — enough evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the State’s favor.
Hearsay
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of what it says. Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless a specific exception applies. However, if a prior statement is used for another purpose—such as assessing credibility or providing context—it may not be hearsay at all.
Prior Inconsistent vs. Prior Consistent Statements
A prior inconsistent statement is when a witness earlier said something different from what they say in court; it’s often used to impeach their credibility. A prior consistent statement is when a witness earlier said essentially the same thing as in court; it can be used to show they have been telling a consistent story and to respond to challenges that they are fabricating or confused.
Tender-Years Exception (Ark. R. Evid. 803(25))
This is a special hearsay rule allowing certain out-of-court statements by young children (under ten) about sexual offenses to be admitted in criminal cases if those statements are inconsistent with what the child says in court, and if other safeguards (notice, trustworthiness) are satisfied. It does not cover consistent out-of-court statements.
Impeachment and Rehabilitation
“Impeachment” means attacking a witness’s credibility—by showing inconsistency, bias, poor memory, etc. “Rehabilitation” means repairing that damage, often by showing the witness has otherwise been consistent, honest, or had a good opportunity to perceive events.
Rule of Completeness (Ark. R. Evid. 106)
When one side introduces part of a written or recorded statement, the other side can insist that other relevant parts be introduced at the same time so the court or jury is not misled by a fragment taken out of context.
“Opening the Door”
When a party introduces certain evidence or arguments, it may “open the door” for the opposing party to introduce additional evidence that otherwise might have been excluded. Here, by using selective video excerpts to impeach the child, the defense opened the door to more of the interview being shown.
Abuse of Discretion
An appellate court will overturn a trial judge’s evidentiary decision only if the decision was unreasonable—made “improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Mere disagreement with the ruling is not enough.
Prejudice and Harmless Error
Even if a trial court makes a mistake in admitting or excluding evidence, an appellate court will not reverse unless the mistake likely affected the outcome—that is, unless it caused prejudice. If the same information was already properly before the fact-finder, or the mistake did not materially change the case, the error is considered “harmless.”

VI. Conclusion

Minor Child v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 210, is an important decision at the intersection of juvenile justice, sexual-assault prosecutions, and evidentiary law. The court affirms that:

A young child’s testimony, even with minor inconsistencies and without physical injury or conclusive DNA, can provide substantial evidence of sexual assault, especially when corroborated by timely disclosure and forensic context.
Arkansas’s tender-years hearsay rule, Rule 803(25), is narrowly confined to inconsistent statements and cannot be stretched to allow admission of consistent forensic interviews as substantive evidence.
Nonetheless, when the defense selectively uses portions of a child’s interview to impeach her—particularly in a way that risks misleading the fact-finder—the State may counter with prior consistent statements from that same interview for purposes of rehabilitation and completeness, potentially including the entire recording.

The concurring opinions underscore ongoing debates about how strictly appellate courts should adhere to parties’ arguments and how they should articulate standards of review and harmless-error analysis. Collectively, the opinions offer a detailed roadmap for Arkansas trial and appellate courts dealing with child sexual-assault cases, clarifying both the limits of tender-years hearsay and the availability of common-law tools—prior consistent statements and the rule of completeness—to ensure fair and accurate credibility assessments of very young victims.

Rehabilitative Use of Child Forensic Interviews and the Limits of Arkansas’s Tender-Years Hearsay Exception: Commentary on Minor Child v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 210