Rehabilitation, Revocation, and Sentence Length: The Seventh Circuit Refines Tapia in United States v. Richards

I. Introduction

In United States v. Timothy L. Richards, No. 25-1357 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted a recurring question at the intersection of sentencing law and supervised release: when, if ever, does a district judge’s reference to “correctional treatment” or rehabilitative programming turn a lawful revocation sentence into a prohibited “Tapia error”?

The panel (Judges Hamilton, St. Eve, and Kirsch; opinion by Judge St. Eve) affirmed a 36‑month prison term imposed upon revocation of supervised release, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the district court impermissibly lengthened his sentence to promote rehabilitation in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).

The opinion does not dramatically reshape the law, but it does:

• Clarify the evidentiary and analytical threshold for proving a Tapia violation.
• Confirm that a judge’s boilerplate reference to the “needed correctional treatment” factor in § 3553(a)(2)(D), even in an above‑Guidelines sentence, does not by itself establish error.
• Endorse the idea that a district court may, in effect, “trade” futile supervised release for additional imprisonment, so long as rehabilitation is not the driving force behind the extra time.
• Refuse to treat Supreme Court dicta in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), as silently overruling Seventh Circuit precedent on preservation of sentencing objections.

This commentary explains the facts, summarizes the holding, analyzes the legal reasoning (including the precedents cited), and explores the practical impact on federal revocation practice and sentencing litigation involving Tapia.

II. Case Background

A. Original Conviction and Supervised Release

In 2012, Timothy Richards was sentenced in the Northern District of Indiana to:

• 180 months (15 years) of imprisonment, and
• Six years of supervised release

following drug and firearm convictions.

Supervised release is a post‑incarceration monitoring period during which the defendant must comply with various conditions (e.g., employment, reporting, no drug possession). It is legally considered part of the original sentence, not a separate punishment.

Richards completed his prison term and began supervised release in 2022. His conditions included:

• Maintain lawful employment.
• Notify his probation officer of any change of address or employment.
• Refrain from possessing controlled substances (and implicitly, from using them, as enforced through drug testing).

B. Violations of Supervised Release

By 2024, Richards had committed numerous violations:

• He lived at a homeless shelter that suspended him in May 2024, but he failed to report this change to his probation officer.
• In July 2024, he affirmatively misrepresented his residence.
• Also in July 2024, he left his job without obtaining other employment and failed to report this change.
• He failed multiple drug tests.

In November 2024, his probation officer petitioned to revoke supervised release. At the February 2025 revocation hearing, Richards admitted the violations.

C. Guideline Range and Sentencing Positions

Using the Chapter 7 policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines (which provide advisory ranges for revocation), the district court determined that the applicable range was:

18–24 months’ imprisonment

based on the nature of the violations and Richards’s criminal history.

The parties took different positions:

• Government: Sought 30 months’ imprisonment followed by supervised release.
• Defense: Sought 18 months’ imprisonment with no further supervised release, arguing the violations were “not particularly serious” and that additional supervision would be futile.

Significantly, both the government and defense essentially agreed that additional supervision was unlikely to succeed: Richards wanted to live independently, even if that meant being homeless and jobless, and he openly expressed a preference for returning to prison over continued supervision.

D. The District Court’s Sentence

The district court revoked supervised release and imposed:

• 36 months’ imprisonment (12 months above the high end of the 18–24 month range), and
• No further supervised release after release from prison.

The court cited multiple reasons:

[C]onsidering the “seriousness of the admitted violations, the defendant's personal history and characteristics, the defendant's criminal history and the term of imprisonment and term of supervised release initially imposed … [and] the defendant's stated intention to not comply with the further term of supervised release if the Court were to impose one,” the court found that “a sentence of 36 months of imprisonment shall be imposed to hold the defendant accountable for the violations.”

The judge then added:

“While it is outside the guideline range, the Court nonetheless finds that it provides the defendant with needed correctional treatment in the most effective manner, and also adequately takes into account the history and characteristics of the defendant.”

The court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) designate a specific facility and offer Richards the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP), and then expressly ordered:

“It is ordered that upon release from imprisonment … the defendant shall be discharged from any further term of supervised release.”

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

On appeal, Richards argued that the district court committed a Tapia error by lengthening his prison term in order to provide “needed correctional treatment,” pointing especially to the above‑Guidelines sentence and the court’s explicit reference to that phrase.

The Seventh Circuit:

• Declined to resolve the lingering intra‑circuit conflict over whether Tapia claims are reviewed de novo or for plain error in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, but held there was no error under either standard.
• Reaffirmed that a Tapia violation occurs only when a district court focuses “exclusively or disproportionately on rehabilitation” in deciding sentence length, and that a defendant must show the sentence was made longer than it otherwise would have been because of rehabilitative concerns.
• Held that the record showed multiple legitimate sentencing grounds (violations, history, characteristics, unsatisfied portion of original sentence, stated refusal to comply with supervision) and that rehabilitation was not the driving force behind the 36‑month term.
• Emphasized that mere recitation of the § 3553(a)(2)(D) “correctional treatment” factor—essentially boilerplate—is not enough to show impermissible reliance on rehabilitation.
• Rejected, again, the government’s argument that dicta in the Supreme Court’s recent Esteras decision abrogated Seventh Circuit precedent on issue preservation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(a).

The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011)

Tapia is the foundation of this entire line of cases. The Supreme Court held that:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) instructs sentencing courts to recognize that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”
• Accordingly, a judge may not impose or lengthen a prison term for the purpose of making the defendant eligible for or able to complete a rehabilitation program (such as RDAP).

However, Tapia also makes clear that:

• Judges may discuss rehabilitation and recommend programming to the BOP.
• The prohibition is on using rehabilitation as the basis for the duration of incarceration, not on expressing a desire that the defendant improve.

2. Statutory Provisions: §§ 3582(a), 3553(a), 3583

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) – directs courts, when determining whether to impose imprisonment and its length, to consider the purposes of sentencing under § 3553(a), but also to “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” This is the statutory hook for Tapia.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) – lists the factors a court must consider in imposing a sentence, including:
  • § 3553(a)(2)(D): “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
  The tension is that § 3553(a)(2)(D) directs consideration of rehabilitation, while § 3582(a) forbids using imprisonment itself as the tool to promote it.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) – governs revocation of supervised release and cross‑incorporates many of the § 3553(a) factors. A revocation sentence must still be grounded in those factors (minus some that do not apply).

3. Seventh Circuit’s Tapia-Line Cases

The opinion cites and builds on a series of prior decisions that collectively define the scope of Tapia in this circuit:

• United States v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012)
  Confirmed that a district court may:
  • Recommend that the BOP place a defendant in a treatment program, but
  • May not make that recommendation the driving force behind the sentence length.
  The Richards panel relies on Lucas to underscore that recommendations are acceptable; only lengthening a sentence for program eligibility violates Tapia.
• United States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2019)
  A key case where the court did find Tapia error.
  • The district judge changed the sentence from 18 to 20 months so the defendant could participate in a drug program.
  • This explicit tie between “longer sentence” and “rehabilitation opportunity” crossed the line.
  Richards uses Kopp as the paradigm of what constitutes improper lengthening for rehabilitative purposes.
• United States v. Long, 79 F.4th 882 (7th Cir. 2023)
  Articulated the now‑repeated standard: a Tapia error occurs when the court focuses “exclusively or disproportionately on rehabilitation” in deciding how long the term should be. Richards quotes and tracks this formulation.
• United States v. Shaw, 39 F.4th 450 (7th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864 (7th Cir. 2024)
  These cases applied de novo review to Tapia challenges. They also reaffirmed that:
  • Courts may invoke rehabilitation as a factor under § 3553(a) and recommend programs,
  • But may not rely on rehabilitation to increase sentence length.
• United States v. Long, 79 F.4th 882 (7th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2019)
  In contrast to Shaw and Wilcher, these decisions applied plain error review when the defendant had not objected at sentencing. This discrepancy creates the intra‑circuit tension the Richards panel flags but does not resolve.
• United States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2020)
  Emphasized that appellate courts should consider the sentencing transcript “as a whole,” rather than isolating a single phrase, to determine the court’s actual reasoning. Richards follows that approach, analyzing the entire colloquy to infer that the district court’s main concern was accountability and completion of the original sentence—not rehabilitation.

4. Standard of Review Cases and Rule 51(a)

The footnote addresses a separate but important procedural issue: how sentencing errors must be preserved and reviewed.

• United States v. Wood, 31 F.4th 593 (7th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Pennington, 908 F.3d 234 (7th Cir. 2018)
  These cases deal with how and when defendants must object to sentencing errors (including Tapia errors) under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51. In substance, they constrain the government’s argument that certain failures to object should automatically trigger plain‑error review.
• United States v. Stewart, 148 F.4th 501 (7th Cir. 2025)
  The Seventh Circuit previously rejected the government’s assertion that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Esteras abrogated Wood and Pennington. Richards reiterates this rejection, noting that Esteras did not discuss Rule 51(a), so it cannot be read as silently overruling those precedents.
• Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)
  Although not described in detail, Esteras apparently contains dicta that the government has attempted to use to reshape issue‑preservation doctrine in sentencing appeals. The Seventh Circuit, in both Stewart and Richards, refuses to give Esteras that effect.

By flagging but not resolving the inconsistency (de novo vs. plain error) and explicitly reaffirming Wood, Pennington, and Stewart, the panel preserves the existing (somewhat muddled) state of the law while signaling that any reconciliation must come from an en banc court or a future panel squarely addressing the clash.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. What Constitutes a Tapia Error?

The court restates the governing test as follows:

A Tapia error occurs when a district court focuses “exclusively or disproportionately on rehabilitation in deciding … how long a [prison] term should be.”

The key elements are:

1. Focus on rehabilitation – The judge must treat rehabilitation (such as access to drug treatment) as a primary determinant of sentence length.
2. Effect on sentence length – There must be some indication that the sentence is longer than it otherwise would have been because of that rehabilitative focus.

The court elaborates using Lucas and Kopp:

• It is not enough merely to mention rehabilitation, § 3553(a)(2)(D), or “needed correctional treatment.”
• Rather, the record must show that rehabilitation drove the choice of length—for example, by explicitly increasing months “to get into” or “complete” a program.
• This may occur even within the Guidelines range—Kopp shows that staying within the range does not immunize a sentence from Tapia scrutiny.
• Conversely, the fact that a sentence is above the Guidelines range does not by itself imply a Tapia error.

Essentially, the inquiry is counterfactual: “Would the judge have imposed a shorter sentence if rehabilitation were not a factor?” If the answer is yes and the record shows that, Tapia is violated.

2. Defendant’s Argument and Its Rejection

Richards’ argument hinged on two propositions:

1. His violations were “not particularly serious,” so the only plausible reason for an above‑Guidelines sentence was rehabilitation.
2. The district court explicitly justified going above the Guidelines because the sentence “provides the defendant with needed correctional treatment.”

The Seventh Circuit rejected both positions.

(a) Seriousness and multiplicity of violations

The panel notes that:

• Even if each violation were individually “not serious,” there were many of them.
• They included:
  • Dishonesty (misrepresenting residence),
  • Repeated failures to report,
  • Drug use (as evidenced by failed tests), and
  • Complete disregard for supervisory structure.

Moreover, the district court explicitly weighed:

• Richards’s personal history and characteristics,
• His criminal history and original sentence (180 months + 6 years of supervision),
• The seriousness and number of the violations, and
• His stated intention not to comply with any future term of supervised release.

In light of this, the panel concludes that the sentence had ample non‑rehabilitative support. The fact that both parties and the judge recognized that supervision was futile further supports the idea that the court was not aiming at rehabilitation in the classic sense, but at accountability and finality.

(b) The “correctional treatment” language

The arguably most damaging phrase for the government was the court’s statement:

“While it is outside the guideline range, the Court nonetheless finds that it provides the defendant with needed correctional treatment in the most effective manner…”

The panel treats this as:

• A restatement of the statutory factor in § 3553(a)(2)(D), not a standalone or predominant justification.
• An example of what the court is required to consider (rehabilitation) when imposing any sentence, including a revocation sentence.

In other words, dropping the § 3553(a)(2)(D) language into a sentencing explanation is not inherently suspicious; it becomes problematic only if the record shows that the judge lengthened imprisonment to promote rehabilitation.

3. The “Compromise” Rationale: Converting Supervision to Prison

Perhaps the most novel analytical move in the opinion is the panel’s reading of the transcript as reflecting a conscious trade‑off by the district court:

• The judge was “struggling” with the fact that Richards:
  • Had six years of supervised release originally,
  • Had only completed two years, and
  • “Really has four years of supervised release that he hasn’t satisfied.”
• Recognizing that supervision was fruitless and that Richards refused to comply, the court:
  • Eliminated further supervised release altogether (as Richards requested),
  • But imposed a 36‑month prison term to “hold him accountable” and to bring him close to having fully “satisfied” the original sentence.

The panel explains:

“It would make sense then for the district court to make this compromise: there was no supervised release after Richards's term of imprisonment—as Richards desired—but Richards would serve three years' imprisonment, meaning he would nearly satisfy his original sentence.”

From this perspective, the 36‑month term is not best understood as a rehabilitation‑driven increase above 24 months, but as a structural decision about how to account for the unserved portion of the original six‑year supervisory term.

This is analytically significant because it:

• Supplies a plausible non‑rehabilitative rationale for the above‑Guidelines sentence; and
• Demonstrates that rehabilitation was, at most, a secondary or incidental consideration.

By attributing this rationale to the district court, the panel strengthens the conclusion that there was no Tapia violation.

4. Rehabilitation as a Required—but Constrained—Consideration

The panel emphasizes an important and sometimes under‑appreciated point:

“The district court was required to consider rehabilitation before revoking Richards's supervision and imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Shaw, 39 F.4th at 459.”

Thus:

• Considering and even articulating the rehabilitation factor is not only permissible—it is mandatory under § 3553(a).
• The prohibition of § 3582(a) (as interpreted by Tapia) is narrower: it prohibits using imprisonment as the means of delivering rehabilitation—i.e., “We will lock you up longer so you can get treatment.”

The district court:

• Stated the rehabilitation factor,
• Recommended RDAP, and
• Committed no error so long as those considerations did not dictate the length of the sentence.

This distinction between considering rehabilitation and using imprisonment as a tool of rehabilitation is central to understanding Tapia and its progeny, and Richards reinforces that line.

5. Standard of Review and the Unresolved Tension

The parties disagreed over the proper standard of appellate review—plain error versus de novo—likely based on whether any objection to the alleged Tapia error was properly preserved at sentencing.

The panel notes that its own precedents are inconsistent:

• De novo review in Shaw, Wilcher.
• Plain error review in Long, Kopp.

Rather than resolve that conflict, the panel states that the district court did not err under either standard, making it unnecessary to choose between them.

The panel then:

• Addresses the government’s argument that Supreme Court dicta in Esteras undermines Wood and Pennington.
• Reasserts the position taken in Stewart, that Esteras did not discuss Rule 51(a) and thus did not abrogate those circuit precedents.

Practically, this means:

• Defense counsel should still object explicitly at sentencing if they believe the court is inflating a sentence for rehabilitative reasons—both to clarify the record and to maximize appellate review.
• Appellate courts in the Seventh Circuit remain free to apply either plain error or de novo review depending on the specific case and panel, until the conflict is squarely resolved.

C. Impact on Future Cases and Sentencing Practice

1. The Evidentiary Burden for Proving a Tapia Violation

Richards makes explicit something that had been implicit in cases like Lucas and Kopp: to demonstrate a Tapia error, a defendant must do more than:

• Point to a sentence above the Guidelines, and
• Highlight the judge’s use of § 3553(a)(2)(D) language.

Instead, the defendant must offer:

• Textual or contextual evidence that the judge lengthened the term to enhance rehabilitative opportunities—e.g., statements like:
  • “I’m giving you more time so you can complete RDAP”; or
  • “If I only gave you 18 months, you couldn’t enter this program, so I’m imposing 24.”
• Or a strong inference from the overall reasoning that, absent the rehabilitative objective, the sentence would have been materially shorter.

This raises the practical threshold for defendants claiming Tapia error and provides district judges with some protection when they use standard § 3553(a) language.

2. Comfort for District Judges: Boilerplate and Recommendations Are Safe

District judges regularly use boilerplate formulations referencing all the § 3553(a) factors, including “needed correctional treatment” and “the most effective manner.” Some have worried that this language might trigger automatic appellate suspicion post‑Tapia.

Richards reassures:

• Boilerplate recitation of § 3553(a)(2)(D) is not, standing alone, a problem.
• Explicit recommendations for RDAP or other programming remain lawful, so long as they do not drive sentence length.
• The presence of multiple, clearly articulated non‑rehabilitative reasons for the sentence will typically defeat a Tapia claim.

3. Strategic “Conversion” of Supervised Release into Imprisonment

The opinion tacitly blesses a particular sentencing approach in revocation cases:

• When continued supervised release is plainly futile (e.g., repeated noncompliance; defendant’s stated refusal to comply),
• A district court may:
  • Impose a substantial prison term upon revocation,
  • Forgo any additional supervised release, and
  • Justify that choice as a way of effectively “completing” the original sentence and “holding the defendant accountable.”

This is not literally trading supervision days for prison days—the statutes do not prescribe a specific conversion ratio—but Richards shows that the Seventh Circuit is comfortable with this conceptual framing.

As a result:

• Probation officers and prosecutors may increasingly argue for longer revocation sentences to substitute for additional supervision when compliance is unlikely.
• Defense counsel should be prepared to engage this “completion of the original sentence” rationale and to argue, where appropriate, that:
  • The violations do not warrant such equivalence, or
  • Less drastic modifications of supervision conditions could suffice.

4. Ongoing Uncertainty Over Standard of Review

By sidestepping the de novo vs. plain‑error question, the panel leaves sentencing litigants in a familiar but unsatisfying posture:

• Defendants must assume that failure to object at sentencing might trigger plain‑error review, which is significantly harder to satisfy.
• Judges and practitioners must live with some uncertainty about how rigorously appellate courts will scrutinize future Tapia claims.

At the same time, the reaffirmation of Wood, Pennington, and Stewart indicates the Seventh Circuit is resisting reading too much into Esteras and is preserving room for robust appellate review of unpreserved sentencing errors in appropriate cases.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is Supervised Release?

Supervised release is:

• A period of community supervision following a term of imprisonment.
• Part of the original criminal sentence (not a new punishment).
• Enforced by a probation officer and governed by court‑ordered conditions.

If a person violates those conditions, the court may:

• Continue supervised release, sometimes with modified conditions;
• Extend its duration (within statutory caps); or
• Revoke it and impose a term of imprisonment (the path chosen for Richards).

2. “Revocation” of Supervised Release

Revocation is essentially:

• A finding that the defendant has violated conditions of supervised release, and
• An imposition of a new custodial sentence (and sometimes a new period of supervised release).

That sentence must be:

• Within statutory maximums for revocation; and
• Guided (though not strictly bound) by the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 policy statements, which offer advisory ranges based on the “grade” of the violation and the defendant’s criminal history category.

3. Sentencing Guidelines Range vs. Above‑Guidelines Sentence

The Guidelines provide an advisory range (here, 18–24 months). A judge may:

• Impose a sentence within that range,
• Impose a lower (below‑Guidelines) sentence, or
• Impose a higher (above‑Guidelines) sentence.

An above‑Guidelines sentence:

• Is not automatically unlawful; but
• Requires the judge to explain the reasons for the departure or variance, grounded in § 3553(a) factors.

Richards confirms that an above‑Guidelines revocation sentence is not presumptively a Tapia problem; the key is why it is above the range.

4. Tapia Error in Simple Terms

In plain language, a Tapia error occurs when:

• The judge says (or clearly implies): “I am giving you a longer prison sentence so that you can get treatment, vocational training, or other rehabilitative services.”

What is allowed:

• Talking about your need for treatment or training.
• Recommending you for RDAP or educational programs.
• Considering your rehabilitation needs among the many § 3553(a) factors.

What is not allowed:

• Adding extra months or years of prison so that:
  • You become eligible for a program, or
  • You have time to complete a program.

5. Standards of Review: De Novo vs. Plain Error

These terms describe how strictly an appeals court reviews alleged errors:

• De novo review:
  • The appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.
  • It decides for itself whether the law was correctly applied.
• Plain error review (applies when there was no timely objection at sentencing):
  • The defendant must show:
    1. There was an error,
    2. The error is “plain” (clear or obvious),
    3. The error affected his substantial rights (usually meaning it affected the outcome), and
    4. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • This is a much harder standard for defendants to meet.

In Richards, the court said that even if it used the defendant‑friendly de novo standard, there was no error—so it did not have to decide between the two standards.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

United States v. Richards is a classic example of incremental, but important, doctrinal refinement in federal sentencing law.

Key takeaways include:

• Clarified Tapia Standard: The Seventh Circuit requires a concrete showing that rehabilitation was the driving force behind a longer sentence. A mere above‑Guidelines term plus an invocation of “needed correctional treatment” is not enough.
• Rehabilitation as Permissible Factor: Judges must consider rehabilitation under § 3553(a) and may recommend specific programs. Tapia only bars using imprisonment itself as the instrument to promote rehabilitation.
• “Completion” of the Original Sentence: The court endorses, in effect, a model where a judge facing futile supervised release can impose a longer revocation sentence and eliminate further supervision, rationalizing this as ensuring the original sentence is substantially “satisfied.”
• No Silent Overruling by Esteras: The panel rejects the government’s attempt to use Supreme Court dicta in Esteras to unsettle existing circuit law on issue preservation under Rule 51(a); Wood, Pennington, and Stewart remain good law.
• Unresolved Standard of Review: The court acknowledges, but leaves unresolved, the conflict between cases applying de novo and those applying plain error review to Tapia claims. For practitioners, this underscores the importance of contemporaneous objections to sentencing rationales.

In the broader legal landscape, Richards further stabilizes the post‑Tapia regime: district courts remain free to speak candidly about rehabilitation and to tailor revocation sentences to the realities of defendant behavior and the futility of supervision, so long as they do not transparently trade prison time for treatment opportunities. For defendants, it clarifies that successful Tapia appeals will typically require a clear link—textual or inferential—between added months of imprisonment and the judge’s desire to promote rehabilitation.