Rehabilitation, Cooperation, and Fair Application of Brown II Factors in Attorney Reinstatement

Introduction

In No. 23-71, In re Petition for Reinstatement of C. Michael Sparks, Justice Walker (joined by Justice Trump) dissented from the West Virginia Supreme Court’s majority decision to deny reinstatement of a disbarred prosecutor. The petitioner, C. Michael Sparks, had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for aiding and abetting deprivation of constitutional rights. After serving his sentence, Mr. Sparks cooperated fully in a high-profile corruption investigation, resigned from office, and consented to disbarment. Over the following decade, he amassed letters of support, completed his supervision, and demonstrated unimpeachable conduct. The key question presented was whether he had “overcome the adverse effect of his admitted and serious misconduct by demonstrating a record of rehabilitation” under the five factors established in Brown II, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980).

Summary of the Judgment

The majority denied Mr. Sparks’s petition, concluding he had not “presently demonstrated the requisite rehabilitation, integrity, and fitness to be returned to the practice of law.” Justice Walker’s dissent, however, would have granted reinstatement under supervision for two years. The dissent emphasizes that:

• Mr. Sparks’s misdemeanor was not a career-ending felony, and his cooperation with the FBI was genuine and unassisted by any plea deal.
• The Hearing Panel Subcommittee (HPS) conducted a thorough Brown II analysis and found clear and convincing evidence of fitness, competence, and public-confidence preservation.
• Alleged inconsistencies in testimony concerned only the degree of fault, not the fact of wrongdoing, and credibility determinations are entitled to deference.
• The majority improperly relied on speculation about unproven misconduct and departed from the rule-of-law principles governing reinstatement proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Brown II (Syl. Pt. 1 & 2, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567): Established five factors for reinstatement petitions:
  1. Nature of the offense
  2. Character, maturity, and experience at disbarment
  3. Post-disbarment occupations and conduct
  4. Time elapsed since disbarment
  5. Present legal competence
• In re Reinstatement of diTrapano II, 240 W. Va. 612, 814 S.E.2d 275 (2018): Granted reinstatement to a second-time petitioner convicted of felonies, highlighting that rehabilitation can outweigh a serious criminal record.
• Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 195 W. Va. 27, 464 S.E.2d 181 (1995): Affirmed HPS’s unique vantage to assess witness credibility.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Walker’s dissent applies the Brown II factors rigorously and endorses the HPS’s findings:

1. Nature of the Offense: A misdemeanor under § 242 involving deprivation of rights—but contrasted to the more serious felonies in diTrapano II. Sparks’s offense does not create a permanent bar.
2. Character & Maturity: Over ten years of exemplary conduct, community service, and full cooperation in a major corruption probe demonstrate remorse and moral fitness.
3. Post-Disbarment Conduct: Letters from colleagues, prosecutors, and community leaders attest to his integrity, legal competence, and rehabilitation.
4. Time Elapsed: A decade without any new ethical or criminal issues weighs heavily in favor of reinstatement.
5. Present Competence: Continuous legal education and professional engagement confirm his readiness to return under supervised conditions.

The dissent criticizes the majority’s reliance on unsubstantiated insinuations—such as guilt by association with former Judge Thornbury—and procedural shortcuts that undermined due-process principles in reinstatement proceedings.

Impact

If adopted, Justice Walker’s approach would:

• Reaffirm that genuine cooperation with law enforcement and proven rehabilitation can overcome even serious misconduct in the reinstatement context.
• Ensure uniform application of Brown II factors, reducing arbitrary or ad hoc decision-making by a judicial majority.
• Signal to disbarred attorneys that a “path to redemption” remains open when clear and convincing evidence of reform exists.
• Strengthen public confidence by anchoring reinstatement decisions in transparent, evidence-based criteria rather than speculation about uncharged misconduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Clear and convincing evidence”: A standard requiring a high probability that the facts are true—stricter than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“Brown II factors”: Five guideline areas established in In re Brown for evaluating whether a former lawyer has been sufficiently rehabilitated.
“Deference to credibility findings”: Recognizes that the HPS, which directly hears witness testimony and observes demeanor, is best positioned to judge truthfulness.

Conclusion

Justice Walker’s dissent in In re Petition for Reinstatement of C. Michael Sparks crystallizes an important principle: a disbarred attorney’s sincere cooperation, full rehabilitation, and demonstrable competence satisfy the rigorous Brown II framework and warrant a supervised return to practice. By demanding evidence-based analysis, the dissent warns against letting conjecture or extraneous affiliations overshadow a petitioner’s proven transformation. This reasoning, if embraced by the majority, would reaffirm the rule of law and the promise of redemption in legal ethics governance.