Regulatory Retrospection: Brown v. Mellekas – Retroactive Sex-Offender Registration and the Ex Post Facto Clause

Introduction

In Brown v. Mellekas (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether Connecticut’s retroactive application of its sex-offender registration statute (“Megan’s Law”) to an individual who entered an Alford plea in 1993 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural and substantive due process, or other constitutional protections.

Parties:

Plaintiff-Appellant: Ralston Brown (pro se)
Defendants-Appellees: Three Connecticut State Police officers sued in their individual capacities (including Officer Mellekas and Officer Garcia)

Key Issues:

Does retroactive application of Megan’s Law constitute an ex post facto punishment?
Are Brown’s procedural and substantive due process rights infringed by imposing registration without a hearing or by intruding on privacy?
Can individual officers be held liable for a 1993 conviction they had no part in?
Is judicial estoppel available against officers who were not parties to the underlying criminal case?

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. It held that:

Connecticut’s retroactive sex-offender registration requirement is regulatory, not punitive, and thus does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
No procedural due process violation arises because Connecticut law bases registration solely on conviction, not on an individualized finding of dangerousness.
No substantive due process right to privacy is violated: the registry scheme does not “shock the conscience.”
Brown failed to allege personal involvement of the individual officers in his 1993 plea or conviction, so they cannot be held liable in their individual capacities.
Judicial estoppel does not apply: the officers did not adopt an earlier inconsistent legal posture in the state criminal proceeding.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Standard for facial plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6).
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002): De novo review and liberal construction of pro se complaints.
Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2020): Mandate to interpret pro se submissions to raise the strongest arguments.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970): Nature and consequences of an “Alford plea.”
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003): Alaska’s non-punitive sex-offender registry; factors for determining punitive effect.
Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014): New York’s sex-offender registry held non-punitive.
Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997): Connecticut’s probation-based community notification not punitive.
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003): No procedural due process violation when registration is conviction-based.
Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2004): An Alford plea yields a valid conviction for collateral purposes.
Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2022): “Shocks the contemporary conscience” test for substantive due process.
Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): Personal involvement required to hold officers liable under § 1983.
Clark v. All Acquisition, LLC, 886 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2018): Elements of judicial estoppel, including party alignment.
United States v. Swartz Family Trust, 67 F.4th 505 (2d Cir. 2023): Judicial estoppel requires adoption of contradictory positions by the same party.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Ex Post Facto Analysis
The Court applied the two-pronged test for ex post facto violations:

Retrospectivity: Megan’s Law applies to convictions predating its enactment.
Punitiveness: Under Smith v. Doe, a law is non-punitive if its “intent and effect” are remedial or regulatory. The Second Circuit found Maine’s requirements analogous to previously upheld statutes in Alaska, New York, and Connecticut itself.

Because the statute is regulatory in purpose and effect, there is no ex post facto violation.

B. Procedural Due Process
Brown argued he was entitled to an individualized hearing on dangerousness before being placed on the registry. Relying on Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, the Court reiterated that Connecticut law conditions registration on the fact of conviction only, not on any later finding of dangerousness.

C. Substantive Due Process (Privacy)
The panel applied the “shocks the conscience” standard from Goe v. Zucker. It held that Connecticut’s requirements—periodic verification of address and disclosure of personal data—do not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.

D. Individual-Capacity Liability
Under § 1983, a defendant must be personally involved in the constitutional violation. Brown’s complaint contained no allegations that the named officers participated in his 1993 plea, conviction, or sentencing, so the claim against them in their individual capacities fails under Kravitz v. Purcell.

E. Judicial Estoppel
Judicial estoppel requires (1) a party’s prior position, (2) a later contradictory position, and (3) that the party’s prior tribunal adopted the prior position. Here, the officers were not parties to the state criminal prosecution and did not adopt any earlier pleading or argument. Thus, the district court correctly denied estoppel.

3. Impact

Brown v. Mellekas reaffirms the viability of retroactive sex-offender registry laws that are framed as regulatory, not punitive. It provides a blueprint for courts to analyze similar statutes under the Ex Post Facto Clause and underscores the limited circumstances in which procedural or substantive due process can invalidate a registration scheme. Finally, it reminds litigants of the strict personal-involvement requirement for § 1983 claims and the narrow scope of judicial estoppel against non-parties.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Alford Plea: A guilty plea where the defendant maintains innocence but admits that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to convict. Legally equivalent to a straight guilty plea.
Ex Post Facto Clause: Constitutional prohibition against laws that retroactively increase punishment or criminalize acts after the fact.
Regulatory vs. Punitive: A law is “punitive” if its primary purpose or effect is to punish; it is “regulatory” if designed to protect public safety or administer government functions.
Personal Involvement (§ 1983): To hold government officials liable, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant directly participated in or caused the constitutional violation.
Judicial Estoppel: Prevents a party from taking a legal position inconsistent with one successfully asserted in earlier litigation, but only if the party was actually involved before the earlier tribunal.

Conclusion

Brown v. Mellekas stands as a significant reaffirmation that retroactive sex-offender registration requirements may be applied without running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause so long as they are regulatory rather than punitive. The decision further clarifies procedural and substantive due process limits and highlights the necessity of demonstrating personal involvement for § 1983 individual-capacity claims. Practitioners confronting similar statutes will look to this ruling for guidance on structuring and defending public-safety legislation against constitutional challenge.