Regular Interstate Communications as “Engaged in Commerce” Under the FLSA: Commentary on Patrick Hearns, Jr. v. MEJ Plumbing, LLC

Regular Interstate Communications as “Engaged in Commerce” Under the FLSA: Commentary on Patrick Hearns, Jr. v. MEJ Plumbing, LLC

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Patrick Hearns, Jr., et al. v. MEJ Plumbing, LLC, et al., No. 24‑12551 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), provides an important—and notably expansive—application of what it means for an employee to be “engaged in commerce” for purposes of individual coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.

The plaintiffs were local Florida workers—plumbers, a plumber’s helper, and an office worker—who sued MEJ Plumbing, LLC and its officers for unpaid minimum wages and overtime. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, holding that the workers were not covered by the FLSA under either individual or enterprise coverage. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged only the ruling on individual coverage.

Relying heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s 2021 decision in St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, Inc., 991 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2021), and distinguishing Thorne v. All Restoration Services, Inc., 448 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2006), the panel holds that the plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were “engaged in commerce” because they regularly communicated by telephone with out‑of‑state entities—both clients and management. The court therefore reverses summary judgment and vacates the denial of reconsideration.

The key doctrinal point emerging from this opinion is:

  • Regular and recurrent interstate telephone communications—including communications with out-of-state managers and with out‑of‑state facilities-management companies—are sufficient to create a triable issue that a worker is “engaged in commerce” and thus may enjoy individual FLSA coverage.

Although the opinion is “not for publication” and therefore not binding precedent under Eleventh Circuit rules, it applies and subtly broadens existing circuit authority. It is likely to be cited persuasively in litigation involving local workers whose day‑to‑day tasks are supervised, coordinated, or transacted through out‑of‑state contacts.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Facts

  • Plaintiffs–Appellants:
    • Patrick Hearns, Jr.
    • Danel Phillips
    • Ernesto Demeritte (earlier filings misspelled his name as “Dimitrie,” noted as a scrivener’s error)
    • Craig Tonghini
    • Bonnie Dos Santos
  • Defendants–Appellees:
    • MEJ Plumbing, LLC
    • Jason Cohen (manager, resident in New York)
    • Eric Lazar
    • John Valenza

In 2022, the plaintiffs worked for MEJ Plumbing in Florida until the business closed that same year:

  • Hearns, Phillips, and Tonghini worked as plumbers.
  • Demeritte worked as a plumber’s helper.
  • Dos Santos worked as an office worker.

The opinion refers collectively to Hearns, Phillips, Tonghini, and Demeritte as the “Plumbers.”

Although all of the physical plumbing work occurred in Florida, the employment relationship had strong interstate dimensions:

  • Plaintiffs’ manager, Cohen, lived and worked from New York, regularly managing them via phone, email, and text. He addressed billing, scheduling, logistics, technical issues, and conflict resolution. Plaintiffs describe him as an “active and ‘hands‑on’ manager” in Florida operations while residing in New York.
  • The Plumbers performed work in Florida for facilities‑management companies located in New York and Georgia, which serviced national clients such as Wal‑Mart, Tesla, and Walgreens.
    • Hearns averaged three to five jobs per week for these interstate clients.
    • Other Plumbers attested that they did such work “regularly.”
  • When performing those jobs, the Plumbers were required to communicate with employees of the out‑of‑state facilities‑management companies and “report to them for each service call” they attended.
  • Dos Santos did not herself communicate with the out‑of‑state facilities‑management companies. Instead, she:
    • Onboarded MEJ personnel and trained them on the company’s internal operating systems.
    • Taught Cohen and Lazar the business systems.
    • Regularly fielded calls from Cohen or Lazar “any time there was a problem or issue.”
    • Thus, she regularly communicated across state lines with managers based in New York.

B. District Court Proceedings

In 2024, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, alleging violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, concluding that:

  • Plaintiffs were not entitled to individual coverage under the FLSA;
  • Plaintiffs were not entitled to enterprise coverage either.

The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. On appeal, plaintiffs pursued only the individual coverage theory.

C. Appellate Standards of Review

  • Summary judgment: Reviewed de novo (no deference), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‑moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor (McKay, Rosado, Ireland, Feliciano).
  • Motion for reconsideration: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. But any embedded legal issues—like the underlying FLSA coverage standard—are reviewed de novo (Guevara, Chicago Tribune).

D. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit:

  • Reverses the district court’s grant of summary judgment on FLSA individual coverage.
  • Vacates the order denying reconsideration, because it relied on the same incorrect legal standard.
  • Remands for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The panel does not hold that the plaintiffs are as a matter of law covered by the FLSA. Instead, it holds that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that they were “engaged in commerce” through regular and recurrent interstate communications:

  • Interstate telephone communications with out‑of‑state facilities-management companies and their personnel; and
  • Interstate communications with Cohen in New York, regarding ongoing management, logistics, and operations.

Because those facts, viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor, fit squarely within the statutory definition of “commerce” and the interpretive framework of St. Elien, summary judgment for the employer was improper.

III. Analysis

A. Legal Framework: FLSA Individual Coverage and “Engaged in Commerce”

The FLSA requires covered employers to pay minimum wages and overtime to covered employees:

  • Minimum wage: 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
  • Overtime (time-and-a-half): 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (for hours worked over 40 in a workweek).

Coverage can arise in two distinct ways:

  1. Individual coverage: The employee “in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” § 207(a)(1); St. Elien, 991 F.3d at 1198.
  2. Enterprise coverage: The employee is “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” § 207(a)(2); St. Elien, 991 F.3d at 1198.

The plaintiffs pursued only individual coverage on appeal. Thus the key statutory phrase is whether the employees were “engaged in commerce.”

The FLSA defines “commerce” broadly:

“Commerce means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (emphasis added).

Two core interpretive points emerge from this definition and from Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit decisions:

  • McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497 (1943): An employee is “engaged in commerce” when he is “actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be part of it.”
  • Thorne and St. Elien further specify that employees are “engaged in commerce” if they:
    • “directly participat[e] in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce” by
    • “regularly using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in [their] work, e.g., regular and recurrent use of interstate telephone, telegraph, mails, or travel.” Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266; St. Elien, 991 F.3d at 1200.

The focus, then, is on whether the employee’s own work involves regular and recurrent use of interstate channels—such as communications “among the several States”—as part of his or her job, not merely whether the employer is part of interstate commerce in some generalized way.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943)

McLeod provides the Supreme Court’s classic formulation that to be “engaged in commerce,” an employee must be:

“actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be part of it.”

The Eleventh Circuit invokes this statement to anchor its analysis in the Supreme Court’s understanding: coverage hinges not on abstract economic effects but on the employee’s concrete relationship to the movement of goods, persons, or communications across state lines.

The practical import in Hearns is that regular interstate communications, by phone or otherwise, can themselves be part of the “movement of commerce.” This is reinforced by the statutory inclusion of “communication” in the definition of “commerce.”

2. Thorne v. All Restoration Services, Inc., 448 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2006)

In Thorne, the Eleventh Circuit rejected FLSA individual coverage for a Florida employee who:

  • Performed mold and water damage restoration work solely within Florida.
  • Two or three times per week used his employer’s credit card to buy gas and materials from Home Depot.

The Thorne plaintiff argued he was engaged in commerce because the goods he purchased at Home Depot had previously traveled in interstate commerce. The court held this insufficient:

  • Merely purchasing goods that have already come to rest in the state is not “engaged in commerce.”
  • The employee did not regularly use “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” (such as interstate phone calls or travel) in his job.

In Hearns, the employer relies on Thorne to argue that local service work in Florida does not qualify. But the panel distinguishes Thorne sharply:

  • In Thorne, there was no evidence of regular interstate communications or travel as part of the employee’s job.
  • Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs presented sworn evidence of regular and recurrent interstate telephone communications with out‑of‑state facilities-management companies and a New York-based manager.

The court emphasizes that the Thorne plaintiff’s activities “did not satisfy the FLSA’s definition of ‘commerce’”—unlike the communications alleged in this case, which do fall squarely within § 203(b) as “communication among the several States.”

3. St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, Inc., 991 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2021)

St. Elien is the decisive authority in this appeal. There, the plaintiff:

  • Worked in Florida for a pest-control company.
  • Made interstate telephone calls to out‑of‑state customers and vendors three to five times per week.

The Eleventh Circuit in St. Elien held that those facts could lead a reasonable jury to find the plaintiff “engaged in commerce”:

  • Using the statutory definition of “commerce,” the court held that “communication . . . between any State and any place outside thereof” is literally “commerce” under the FLSA.
  • It clarified its earlier language in Thorne, explaining that regular use of interstate telephone communications is itself direct participation in the “actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce,” because the FLSA defines “commerce” to include communication.

In Hearns, the panel leans heavily on St. Elien:

  • It quotes St. Elien’s interpretation that “one who . . . ‘regularly uses the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in his work, e.g., regular and recurrent use of interstate telephone . . .’ is one who ‘directly participates in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce.’”
  • It notes that in St. Elien, the plaintiff’s three to five weekly calls to out‑of‑state customers and vendors sufficed to create a jury question on individual coverage.
  • It then analogizes the Hearns plaintiffs’ level of interstate communications to those in St. Elien, especially where Hearns himself testified to three to five such communications a week and the others “regularly” engaged in such contacts.

This is the foundation for the panel’s core conclusion: if regular interstate calls to out‑of‑state vendors and customers can satisfy the “engaged in commerce” requirement (as in St. Elien), then regular interstate calls to out‑of‑state facilities-management companies and managers also can.

4. Summary Judgment and Procedural Precedents

A cluster of precedents guide the panel’s approach to summary judgment and reconsideration:

  • Rosado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of the Navy, 127 F.4th 959 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Instructs the court to view the record in the light most favorable to the non‑moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
  • McKay v. Miami-Dade County, 36 F.4th 1128 (11th Cir. 2022)
    Confirms that orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de novo.
  • Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022)
    Defines a “genuine” dispute of material fact as one where the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find for the non‑moving party.
  • Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013)
    Reinforces the requirement to construe evidence and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non‑moving party.
  • Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824 (11th Cir. 2025) & Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001)
    Establish that denials of reconsideration are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but purely legal questions within that context are reviewed de novo. A district court abuses its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard.

These cases matter here because the plaintiffs’ testimony about their interstate communications must be accepted as true for summary judgment purposes, and all reasonable inferences must favor coverage, not defeat it, at this stage. The district court effectively weighed the evidence or imposed a narrower legal standard than allowed by St. Elien.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Applying the FLSA’s Textual Definition of “Commerce”

The panel begins by focusing on the FLSA’s textual definition of “commerce” in § 203(b), emphasizing the explicit inclusion of “communication among the several States.” It then harmonizes that text with:

  • McLeod’s “part of the movement of commerce” formulation, and
  • Thorne and St. Elien’s focus on regular use of the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”

St. Elien had already clarified that “regular and recurrent” interstate phone calls are themselves part of the “actual movement” of commerce, because the statute defines “commerce” to include interstate communication.

The panel then applies this framework directly:

  • Hearns alleged he communicated with out‑of‑state customers (facilities-management companies and their personnel) three to five times a week.
  • The other Plumbers testified that they “regularly” communicated with those out‑of‑state entities.
  • All plaintiffs—Plumbers and office worker alike—regularly communicated via telephone with Cohen in New York.

On those facts, the panel concludes that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient use of interstate communications to qualify as “engaged in commerce” under the statute’s plain text.

2. The Role of St. Elien as Controlling Analogy

The panel’s reasoning is largely syllogistic:

  1. In St. Elien, three to five weekly interstate calls to out‑of‑state customers and vendors were enough for a jury to find the plaintiff “engaged in commerce.”
  2. Here, Hearns made three to five weekly calls to out-of-state facilities-management companies; others did so “regularly.” Further, all plaintiffs regularly communicated with a manager located in another state.
  3. Therefore, under St. Elien, a reasonable jury could find that these plaintiffs were “engaged in commerce.”

The court explicitly says that St. Elien “requires the conclusion” that plaintiffs have raised a material issue of fact regarding individual coverage. The significance is twofold:

  • Quantitative: The volume and frequency of interstate communications here are comparable to St. Elien.
  • Qualitative: The communications are integral to the performance of plaintiffs’ jobs—reporting on service calls, receiving instructions, resolving technical issues, etc.—not incidental or purely personal.

3. Distinguishing Thorne

The employer relied on Thorne to argue that local service work and routine purchases do not amount to engagement in commerce. The panel responds by highlighting a critical difference:

  • In Thorne, the employee presented no evidence of interstate communications or travel.
  • His only proffered nexus to interstate commerce was that the goods he bought at local retailers had once moved across state lines.
  • The Eleventh Circuit held that this was not enough to be “engaged in commerce.”

By contrast, in Hearns:

  • The employees themselves regularly used an instrumentality of interstate commerce (the telephone) to communicate across state lines as a routine part of their job duties.
  • Those communications fall squarely within the statutory phrase “communication among the several States.”

Thus Thorne does not foreclose coverage; it simply clarifies that purchasing goods locally, absent interstate communications or travel, falls short. When employees cross that threshold and regularly use interstate communication channels, the case moves into St. Elien territory.

4. Inclusion of the Office Worker: Interstate Management Communications

One of the most notable aspects of the opinion is how it treats plaintiff Dos Santos, the office worker:

  • She did not testify that she communicated directly with the out‑of‑state facilities-management companies.
  • Her role involved onboarding staff, training on internal systems, and being the primary problem-solver for Cohen and Lazar.
  • She regularly received calls from Cohen (in New York) and Lazar about issues and system use.

Instead of treating her differently or limiting coverage to those who directly contact out‑of‑state customers, the panel emphasizes that:

“all Plaintiffs asserted that they regularly communicated by telephone with Cohen, who was in New York at the time. Based on these interstate communications in the regular course of Plaintiffs’ duties, we must conclude that Plaintiffs alleged that they ‘engage[d] in commerce’ under the FLSA’s plain text.”

This is subtle but important. It indicates that:

  • Regular interstate communications with out‑of‑state management, not just customers or vendors, can qualify as “communication among the several States.”
  • Internal operational or supervisory communications across state lines can be enough to satisfy the “engaged in commerce” requirement, at least to survive summary judgment.

This pushes the logic of St. Elien one step further:

  • St. Elien involved calls to external economic actors (customers, vendors).
  • Hearns confirms that calls to internal out‑of‑state supervisors, central to how the work is performed and coordinated, also fit the statutory definition and can ground individual coverage.

5. Summary Judgment Error and Reconsideration

Because the panel must accept the plaintiffs’ testimony as true at the summary judgment stage, their statements that they:

  • regularly communicated with out-of-state facilities-management companies, and
  • regularly communicated by phone with Cohen in New York,

are sufficient to defeat summary judgment in light of St. Elien. The question is not whether the court ultimately believes plaintiffs or how it weighs their evidence but whether a reasonable jury could find for them under the applicable legal standard.

The district court effectively applied too narrow a view of “engaged in commerce,” ignoring or discounting the significance of these interstate communications. That misapplication of law compelled:

  • Reversal of the summary judgment ruling on individual coverage; and
  • Vacatur of the denial of reconsideration, which “rested on the same incorrect legal standard as the summary-judgment order.”

On remand, the district court must apply the correct legal framework—recognizing that regular, job-related interstate phone communications are sufficient to create a triable issue about individual coverage—and then proceed with the case accordingly (whether through trial, renewed motions grounded in the proper standard, or settlement).

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Expansion (in Application) of Individual FLSA Coverage in the Eleventh Circuit

Even though this opinion is unpublished and not formally precedential, its application of St. Elien has clear practical consequences:

  • It confirms that local employees whose work appears intrastate in a physical sense (e.g., plumbers working on Florida properties) can still be “engaged in commerce” if:
    • They regularly coordinate work with out-of-state entities, or
    • They are directed and supervised by out-of-state managers via regular interstate communications.
  • It signals that courts in the Eleventh Circuit should be cautious about granting summary judgment against plaintiffs on individual coverage where there is any substantial evidence of recurrent interstate communications.

This may be particularly consequential in:

  • Gig-economy and app-based work where local workers receive assignments and report via out-of-state platforms or supervisors.
  • Franchised or decentralized operations where corporate management is located outside the state but directs local employees via email, phone, or online systems.
  • Construction, maintenance, and service trades that perform physical work locally but interact with out-of-state general contractors, facilities-management firms, or national chains.

2. Litigation Strategy: Pleading and Proof of Interstate Communications

The case underscores the importance of detailed factual development regarding interstate communications:

  • For plaintiffs:
    • Complaints and declarations should specify:
      • Frequency (e.g., “three to five times per week”),
      • Nature (e.g., scheduling, reporting, technical consultation), and
      • Counterparties (e.g., out‑of‑state customers, vendors, supervisors).
    • It is helpful to frame such communications as integral to job performance, not incidental.
  • For employers:
    • To contest individual coverage, employers may attempt to:
      • Show that interstate calls are rare, de minimis, or outside the employee’s regular duties.
      • Characterize cross-border interactions as isolated or personal rather than part of the employment relationship.
    • However, in light of Hearns and St. Elien, summary judgment will be difficult where employees credibly testify to recurrent interstate communications.

3. Internal vs. External Contacts: A Broader Reading

Perhaps the most impactful nuance is the recognition that internal operational calls with out-of-state management can suffice. This suggests that:

  • Coverage is not limited to employees who sell or buy across state lines; it can reach workers who operate within an interstate management structure.
  • Human resources, administrative support, dispatch, and coordination roles may all now have stronger arguments for FLSA coverage when their supervisors or counterparts are out-of-state.

This approach moves closer to recognizing that modern business operations—especially those that are remote or multi‑state by design—are functionally interstate even when workers’ physical presence and tasks are local.

4. Relationship to Enterprise Coverage

The panel did not decide the question of enterprise coverage, because plaintiffs chose not to press that issue on appeal. Nonetheless, the opinion is instructive:

  • Where enterprise coverage may be difficult to establish (e.g., because of revenue thresholds or disputes about the enterprise’s scope), individual coverage based on employee‑level interstate communications may be a viable and often more straightforward path.
  • Litigants should consider developing both theories in the district court and strategically pursuing the stronger one on appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Engaged in Commerce”

Under the FLSA, an employee is “engaged in commerce” if:

  • He or she personally takes part in activities that cross state lines or are so closely tied to interstate trade that they are part of it—such as:
    • Regularly calling or emailing people in other states about work matters;
    • Traveling across state lines for work; or
    • Shipping or receiving goods across state lines as a core part of the job.

It is not enough to be employed by a company that is somehow connected to interstate commerce or to handle goods that may have, at some point in the past, moved across state lines.

B. “Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce”

This phrase refers to the tools and channels through which interstate commerce takes place, including:

  • Telephone systems (including cell phones) used for cross‑state calls;
  • Mail and package delivery systems transmitted across states;
  • Internet communications that cross state boundaries;
  • Interstate highways, railroads, and air transport.

Regular, job-related use of these channels—especially to contact people or entities in other states—count as participation in interstate commerce.

C. Individual vs. Enterprise Coverage

  • Individual coverage: Focuses on the employee’s own work. Does this particular employee engage in commerce (e.g., through interstate communications or travel) in a given workweek?
  • Enterprise coverage: Focuses on the business entity as a whole. Does the business meet certain criteria (e.g., revenue level, nature of operations) that make all of its employees covered, regardless of their individual activities?

In Hearns, only individual coverage was at issue on appeal.

D. “Summary Judgment” and “Genuine Dispute of Material Fact”

  • Summary judgment is a way to resolve a case without a trial if there is no real dispute about the important facts and the law clearly favors one side.
  • A “genuine dispute of material fact” means that:
    • Some fact that could affect the outcome is reasonably contested; and
    • A reasonable jury could believe either side’s version of that fact.

When reviewing summary judgment, the appellate court must:

  • Assume the non‑moving party’s evidence is true; and
  • Give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

In Hearns, this meant the Eleventh Circuit had to credit the plaintiffs’ statements that they regularly communicated across state lines as part of their jobs.

E. “Unpublished” and “Per Curiam” Opinions

  • Unpublished: The opinion is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION.” In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished opinions generally are not binding precedent, though they may be cited as persuasive authority.
  • Per curiam: The opinion is issued in the name of the court (“By the Court”) rather than by a named judge, signaling that the panel views it as straightforward enough not to warrant a signed, precedential opinion.

Even so, because Hearns applies and extends a published decision (St. Elien), it will likely influence how district courts in the circuit handle similar FLSA coverage disputes.

V. Conclusion

Hearns v. MEJ Plumbing, LLC reinforces and subtly expands the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudence on FLSA individual coverage. Applying St. Elien, the court holds that plaintiffs created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether they were “engaged in commerce” by:

  • Regularly performing job-related interstate telephone communications with out‑of‑state facilities‑management companies; and
  • Regularly communicating by phone with an out-of-state manager (Cohen in New York) about core operational matters.

The decision underscores that:

  • The statutory definition of “commerce” explicitly includes interstate “communication.”
  • Employees who regularly use interstate communication channels as part of their work—even if their physical labor is confined to one state—may fall within FLSA individual coverage.
  • Internal communications with out-of-state supervisors can be as legally significant as external communications with out-of-state customers or vendors.

For practitioners, Hearns offers a concrete roadmap: plaintiffs should carefully document and allege the frequency and nature of interstate communications they engage in; employers should recognize that such evidence may be sufficient to defeat summary judgment on individual coverage. In an era of remote management and multi‑state operations, the opinion illustrates how the FLSA’s text and modern workplace realities intersect—and why even “local” workers may be protected by federal wage-and-hour law when their work is embedded in interstate communication networks.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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