Refusal to Show ID as “Interference with Public Duties”: Fifth Circuit Affirms Qualified and Official Immunity in Martinez v. Harris County

Introduction

In Martinez v. Harris County, Texas, No. 24-20194 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment against Jose Martinez on a suite of federal and state claims arising from a late-night street encounter that escalated into his arrest for “interference with public duties.” The panel (Judges Wiener, Stewart, and Southwick) held that:

Sergeant Ybarra was entitled to qualified immunity on Martinez’s federal claims for malicious prosecution and excessive force;
Martinez’s false-arrest claim failed because probable cause existed to arrest him for interference under Texas Penal Code § 38.15 based on his refusal to provide identification during an active investigation;
Ybarra was entitled to Texas official immunity on Martinez’s state-law assault claim; and
Supervisory liability and Monell claims against Sheriff Ed Gonzalez and Harris County were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The opinion is especially noteworthy for its treatment of “interference with public duties” under § 38.15: the court concluded that refusing an officer’s lawful instruction to provide identification during an ongoing investigation can constitute interference, providing probable cause for arrest. The decision also reiterates the temporal nature of the “clearly established” inquiry for qualified immunity—foreclosing malicious prosecution claims based on a right not recognized until after the events in question.

Background

In February 2020, Martinez stopped to assist a minor lying face down in the street, bound at the hands and feet. The minor’s mother, Liliana Melendez, fetched an Aldine ISD officer from a nearby school. Harris County officers, including Sergeant L. Ybarra and trainee Deputy Henderson, arrived responding to a report that a mother had located her runaway son and had also made a “terroristic threat” claim. An AISD officer allegedly indicated that a male might have threatened a female with a gun and pointed out Martinez.

Ybarra approached Martinez, who remained in his vehicle, and asked for identification multiple times. Martinez refused. Ybarra then opened the door, cuffed Martinez, and detained him. Although Melendez later stated Martinez had not pulled a gun, she claimed he threatened her and refused to leave. Officers searched Martinez’s car and trunk and found no weapon. Martinez complained his cuffs were too tight; officers adjusted them, allegedly causing pain and minor injuries. He was charged with interference with public duties, bonded out, and the charge was dismissed on March 6, 2020, for lack of probable cause.

Martinez then filed an internal affairs complaint and later brought suit asserting: (1) federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution), (2) Texas assault, and (3) supervisory and municipal liability claims. The district court granted motions to dismiss on most claims and later granted summary judgment to Ybarra on the remaining claims, concluding qualified immunity (federal) and official immunity (state) applied. Martinez appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

Malicious Prosecution: Qualified immunity bars the claim. The federal right to be free from malicious prosecution was recognized in 2022 by Thompson v. Clark; the incident occurred in 2020. No “clearly established” right existed at the time.
Excessive Force: Qualified immunity applies. Martinez failed to identify controlling authority, a robust consensus, or an “obvious” violation that would have put the unlawfulness of the relatively limited force (removing from vehicle, handcuffing, cuff adjustment) “beyond debate.” The court found Solis v. Serrett more analogous than the higher-force cases Martinez cited.
False Arrest: Probable cause existed for interference with public duties under Texas Penal Code § 38.15 based on Martinez’s refusal to comply with repeated instructions to provide identification during an active investigation. Qualified immunity therefore bars the claim.
Texas Assault: Official immunity applies. The good-faith standard (akin to but broader than qualified immunity) was met; a reasonably prudent officer could believe the force used to remove and restrain Martinez was justified under the circumstances.
Supervisory and Monell Liability: Dismissal affirmed. Martinez’s theory that a policy delaying internal affairs investigations caused his arrest failed on causation—he filed his internal complaint only after charges were dropped. He did not plausibly allege an official policy that was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Qualified Immunity Framework

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), and Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2018): The two-prong qualified immunity inquiry (constitutional violation; clearly established right) may be addressed in any order.
Spiller v. Harris County, 113 F.4th 573 (5th Cir. 2024), and Joseph ex rel. Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020): Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to negate it, and the plaintiff’s version of the facts must amount to a violation of clearly established law.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004): Clearly established law requires either controlling authority, a robust consensus of persuasive authority with high factual specificity, or an “obvious” case.

Malicious Prosecution

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022): Recognized a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution. Because Thompson post-dated the 2020 incident, the right was not clearly established at the time; qualified immunity therefore bars the claim.

Excessive Force

Martinez cited a line of Fifth Circuit decisions finding excessive force where significant or injurious force was employed: Trammell v. Fruge (tackling a non-fleeing, non-violent suspect), Darden v. City of Fort Worth (violent takedown), Doss v. Helpenstell (beating causing unconsciousness), Ramirez v. Martinez and Newman v. Guedry (tasing), Deville v. Marcantel (window break and violent extraction), Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi (broken shoulder). The panel distinguished these cases because the force used on Martinez—removal from his vehicle, handcuffing, and cuff adjustment—was materially less severe.
Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975 (5th Cir. 2022): Closest analogue. There, officers used more force (knee in back while handcuffing) than here, yet the court still found no clearly established violation. By a fortiori reasoning, Ybarra’s conduct was not clearly unlawful.

False Arrest and Probable Cause

Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2018): Freedom from arrest without probable cause is clearly established, but qualified immunity applies if probable cause existed or if an officer reasonably, though mistakenly, believed it existed.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018), and Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902 (5th Cir. 2000): Probable cause depends on the totality of circumstances known to the officer at the moment of arrest.
Texas Penal Code § 38.15 (interference with public duties): The court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent holding that interference requires more than speech and includes failure to comply with an officer’s instruction about physical conduct. See Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2017), and McCullough v. Wright, 824 F. App’x 281 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). The panel also cited Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667 (5th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that failure to comply with an officer’s instructions violates § 38.15 and is not protected speech, and contrasted Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2017), which recognized mere argument as protected speech.
Applying these authorities, the panel concluded that repeated refusal to present identification while officers investigated a reported “terroristic threat” impeded their duties and furnished probable cause under § 38.15.

Official Immunity (Texas Law)

City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994); Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002); Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011): Texas official immunity shields government employees acting within scope, performing discretionary duties, in objective good faith. The test mirrors qualified immunity but omits the “clearly established” requirement.
Given the active threat investigation and the limited force used, the court held a reasonably prudent officer could believe the conduct was justified; Martinez did not show otherwise.

Supervisory and Monell Liability

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985): Official-capacity claims are treated as claims against the entity.
Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1992), and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): No vicarious liability under § 1983; supervisors liable only for affirmative participation or unconstitutional policies causing the injury.
Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002); Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2010); Ford v. Anderson County, 102 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2024); Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997): Plaintiff must plausibly plead an official policy, a policymaker’s knowledge, and that the policy was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation, often via deliberate indifference. Single-incident liability requires “highly predictable” consequences.
Martinez’s theory that a policy delaying internal affairs investigations caused his arrest failed on causation and timing; he filed his internal complaint only after the criminal charges were dismissed, breaking any causal chain.

Legal Reasoning

Malicious Prosecution: The panel resolved the qualified immunity question at prong two. Because Thompson (2022) recognized the right two years after the 2020 arrest, the right was not “clearly established” when the conduct occurred. The claim fails without deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred.
Excessive Force: The court again resolved the case at prong two. Martinez’s authorities addressed substantially greater force or distinct tactics (tasing, violent takedowns, broken bones). Solis, where more force was used, had already found no clearly established violation. By analogy, Ybarra’s conduct fell short of the threshold needed to defeat qualified immunity.
False Arrest: The court found probable cause to arrest for interference based on Martinez’s refusal to comply with instructions to provide ID while officers were investigating a reported “terroristic threat.” Under Childers, McCullough, and Bailey, instructions tied to physical conduct—like producing identification—fall outside § 38.15’s speech protection. Once probable cause for interference existed, the false-arrest claim could not proceed.
Texas Assault and Official Immunity: The “good faith” analysis asks whether a reasonably prudent officer could think the conduct justified, not whether the officer was correct. The unfolding investigation, the witness report, and Martinez’s noncompliance made the force (removal, restraint, cuff adjustment) objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Supervisory and Monell Liability: The court emphasized pleading requirements and causation. An asserted internal affairs “delay” policy could not have “caused” an arrest that predated any complaint, nor was there any plausible allegation that the policy was the moving force of a constitutional violation. The supervisor claim against Sheriff Gonzalez also failed for lack of a non-speculative causal link and because supervisors are not vicariously liable under § 1983.

Impact

Clarifying the scope of § 38.15 “interference”: The court’s application of Childers/McCullough, reinforced by the 2025 Bailey v. Ramos citation, signals that in Texas, refusing to comply with officer instructions that govern physical conduct (including producing identification at an active scene) may constitute interference with public duties. That provides a path to probable cause even when a “failure to identify” offense is not independently available.
Qualified immunity’s temporal shield post-Thompson: The opinion confirms that Thompson-based malicious prosecution claims cannot overcome qualified immunity for pre-2022 incidents because the right was not clearly established at the time. Plaintiffs with pre-2022 events face a categorical barrier on this theory.
Excessive force litigation in the Fifth Circuit: The decision deepens the circuit’s insistence on high factual specificity. Plaintiffs must cite cases involving materially similar levels and types of force to defeat qualified immunity; citing more egregious force cases is insufficient.
Official immunity remains robust in Texas: By framing good faith objectively and without the “clearly established” overlay, Texas official immunity often tracks (and can exceed) federal qualified immunity in protective scope for on-scene decisions.
Monell and supervisory pleading rigor: The court’s causation-focused dismissal underscores that a policy must be plausibly connected as a moving force to the injury. Timing matters; post-event internal-affairs policies generally cannot cause earlier arrests or force.
Practical policing takeaway: Officers investigating violent or weapon-related reports may lawfully instruct bystanders or suspects to provide identification and, upon refusal, may have probable cause for interference. Nonetheless, departments should ensure training aligns with Texas law distinguishing physical conduct directives from protected speech.
Practical civil-rights takeaway: Plaintiffs challenging § 38.15 arrests should develop evidence that the officer’s instruction was unlawful, outside the officer’s duty, or purely speech-directed; and they should marshal fact-matched precedent on force to overcome qualified immunity. For municipal theories, plead and prove contemporaneous policies that plausibly caused the arrest or force.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: Protects officials from damages unless (1) they violate a federal right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time. “Clearly established” typically requires prior cases with very similar facts or an “obvious” violation.
Clearly Established (Timing): The law is assessed as of the date of the conduct. A right recognized after the incident (like malicious prosecution under Thompson) does not strip immunity for earlier events.
Probable Cause: A practical, common-sense standard based on the totality of facts known to the officer at the time. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Texas Penal Code § 38.15 (Interference): Criminalizes interrupting/impeding an officer’s duties. Speech alone is protected, but refusing instructions about physical conduct (e.g., moving back, providing ID, presenting hands) may be interference.
Official Immunity (Texas): Shields government employees from personal liability if, within their authority and performing discretionary duties, they act in objective good faith—i.e., a reasonable officer could think the conduct was justified.
Supervisory Liability vs. Monell: Supervisors are not automatically liable for subordinates. A plaintiff must show affirmative participation or an unconstitutional policy that caused the injury. For municipalities, liability attaches only if a policy/custom was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.
“Moving Force” and Deliberate Indifference: The policy must not just exist; it must plausibly cause the violation, often shown by a pattern of violations or, in rare cases, a single incident rendering harm highly predictable.

Conclusion

Although unpublished, Martinez v. Harris County offers a clear, practical synthesis of Fifth Circuit doctrine on qualified immunity, Texas official immunity, and municipal/supervisory liability. Its most salient contribution is the application of § 38.15 to refusals to provide identification during an active criminal investigation—a holding that, in tandem with recent circuit authority, affirms that noncompliance with physical conduct directives can amount to interference and support probable cause.

The opinion also underscores two recurring themes. First, the “clearly established” inquiry is both demanding and time-bound: plaintiffs must match facts closely, and rights recognized after the event (such as Thompson’s malicious prosecution right) cannot retroactively unsettle immunity. Second, municipal and supervisory claims hinge on rigorous causation: policies invoked must be plausibly alleged—and ultimately proven—to have been the moving force of the alleged constitutional harm.

For law enforcement, the case validates measured control at volatile scenes where threats of violence are reported. For civil-rights litigants, it is a cautionary map: identify precise, factually aligned precedent and plead causation with specificity, or risk dismissal at early stages. In the broader legal landscape, Martinez is another signal from the Fifth Circuit that the bar for overcoming immunity defenses remains high—particularly where force is limited and officer instructions relate to the physical management of an unfolding investigation.