Refusal to Accept COVID-19 Vaccination Precludes Compassionate Release Under Amended Guideline § 1B1.13

Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Marcus Pryor, 6th Cir. (June 13 2025)

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in United States v. Pryor addresses the increasingly frequent requests by federal prisoners for compassionate release based on COVID-19 risks. Although the case is “Not Recommended for Publication,” it is doctrinally significant for three reasons:

1. It is one of the first post-2024 decisions to apply the amended Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13—which now governs inmate-filed motions—to COVID-19-based compassionate release requests.
2. It re-affirms and sharpens the Sixth Circuit’s earlier holdings (Lemons, Brownlee) that refusal to be vaccinated undercuts any claim that COVID-19 poses an “extraordinary and compelling reason.”
3. It emphasizes that medical conditions considered at sentencing cannot later be “re-packaged” as extraordinary post-sentencing developments.

Defendant–Appellant Marcus Pryor, serving 140 months for a large-scale oxycodone conspiracy, is a long-term sufferer of type-1 myotonic dystrophy. Having previously lost two rounds of compassionate release motions (and an earlier appeal in 2021), Pryor tried again in 2024, citing new COVID-19 variants and worsening health. The district court denied relief and the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Readler, affirmed.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pryor failed to show an “extraordinary and compelling reason” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The panel therefore affirmed the denial of compassionate release without reaching the Guideline-consistency and § 3553(a) steps.
• Key Facts Driving the Decision.
  • Pryor had refused the COVID-19 vaccine when offered.
  • FMC Butner, a dedicated medical facility, had only two active COVID-19 cases.
  • Pryor provided no medical evidence that reinfection would be catastrophic.
  • His progressive disease had already been taken into account at the original sentencing, resulting in a substantial downward variance.

III. Analytical Discussion

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747 (6th Cir. 2021) – Established that vaccine access “substantially undermines” COVID-based release requests. Pryor’s panel quoted Lemons almost verbatim to frame the core rule.
2. United States v. Brownlee, 2022 WL 35404 (6th Cir. Jan. 4 2022) – Added the proposition that inmates who decline vaccination “cannot plausibly” claim extraordinary risk. Pryor’s refusal neatly fit within this doctrine.
3. United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021) – Warned against “re-packaging” sentencing facts. The Pryor court relied on Hunter in rejecting reliance on a condition that had already produced a dramatic variance.
4. United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2025) – Interpreted “extraordinary and compelling” under the amended § 1B1.13; though Pryor’s panel stopped at step one, it cited Bricker to reaffirm the narrower universe of permissible reasons.
5. United States v. Washington, 122 F.4th 264 (6th Cir. 2024) – Clarified that revised § 1B1.13 applies to defendant-filed motions. Provides the procedural backdrop.

B. Legal Reasoning

The panel walked through the familiar three-step framework under § 3582(c)(1)(A) but resolved the matter at the first step.

1. Step One – Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons.
   • The court adopted a two-pronged factual approach: (a) objective risk (COVID-19 prevalence at the facility) and (b) self-help mitigation (vaccine availability and refusal).
   • Pryor’s refusal to vaccinate rendered his asserted risk self-inflicted, collapsing his grounds for relief under Lemons and Brownlee.
2. Skipping Steps Two & Three. Because the first element was not met, the panel declined to examine consistency with § 1B1.13’s five enumerated categories or to balance the § 3553(a) factors.
3. Sentencing-Considered Illness Doctrine. Applying Hunter, the court explained that Pryor’s muscular dystrophy had been “anticipated” at sentencing, resulting in a 50-percent variance and designation to a medical center. Therefore, its current progression is neither “extraordinary” nor “unanticipated.”

C. Likely Impact of the Decision

• Cementing Vaccine Refusal as Dispositive. Although earlier Sixth Circuit cases expressed this idea, Pryor intertwines it with the updated § 1B1.13 framework, signalling district courts that they may deny at step one without extensive policy-statement or § 3553 analyses.
• Guidance on Re-litigation of Sentencing Factors. By treating progression of an acknowledged chronic illness as not extraordinary, the panel provides a template for future courts to draw a clear line between worsening conditions (predicted) and truly new developments (e.g., an unexpected cancer diagnosis).
• Administrative Efficiency. District courts may rely on readily obtainable BOP vaccine data and infection statistics to resolve motions swiftly, limiting the need for expensive evidentiary hearings.
• Persuasive Authority Beyond the Sixth Circuit. Even as unpublished, the decision adds to a body of persuasive authority nationwide, especially given the near-identical fact patterns arising from lingering COVID-19 concerns.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate Release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A))

An exception allowing a judge to reduce a final sentence if (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist, (2) the reduction aligns with Sentencing Commission policy, and (3) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor release.

Amended Guideline § 1B1.13 (2024)

Lists five exhaustive categories (terminal illness, serious medical deterioration, caregiver needs, victimization by BOP error, and age/time-served criteria). Defendant-filed motions are now expressly covered.

Abuse of Discretion Standard

The appellate court will reverse only if the lower court applied the wrong law, misapplied the right law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.

“Re-packaging” Doctrine

Defendants cannot recycle facts already considered at sentencing as new “extraordinary” reasons; the rationale is to preserve the finality of sentences and avoid second-guessing the sentencing judge.

V. Conclusion

Pryor crystallizes three principles now governing compassionate release in the Sixth Circuit: (1) access to, and refusal of, COVID-19 vaccination is virtually fatal to virus-based claims; (2) the amended § 1B1.13 strictly cabins what counts as an extraordinary reason; and (3) chronic illnesses contemplated at sentencing cannot serve as fresh justifications for early release. Although unpublished, the opinion offers clear, pragmatic guidance for judges, litigants, and the Bureau of Prisons, and it will likely inform future jurisprudence on post-pandemic compassionate release motions nationwide.