Refusal Plus Alcohol Indicators Equals Probable Cause – Fifth Circuit Clarifies DWI Arrest Standard in Wood v. Bexar County

1. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has issued an opinion in Wood v. Bexar County, No. 24-51006 (Aug. 6, 2025), affirming summary judgment for a sheriff’s deputy and for Bexar County on a host of constitutional and state-law claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas tort law.

Amanda Wood, arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) after refusing field-sobriety tests, alleged violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as state torts. The district court granted qualified immunity to Deputy Joe Gereb and rejected Wood’s Monell claims against the County. On appeal, Wood challenged only a subset of rulings. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion cements a new, express precedent: within the circuit, an officer possesses probable cause to arrest for DWI when a motorist refuses standardized field-sobriety testing and the officer also observes objective signs of intoxication such as the odor of alcohol, slurred speech, or glassy eyes.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Qualified Immunity Upheld. The panel held that Deputy Gereb did not violate clearly-established law when he arrested Wood, sought a blood-draw warrant, or completed the warrant affidavit.
• No Constitutional Violations Found. The court rejected Wood’s false-arrest, retaliatory-arrest, malicious-prosecution, Franks, Terry-stop, and excessive-force theories.
• Monell Liability Denied. Because Wood failed to show any underlying constitutional deprivation, her municipal-liability claims necessarily failed.
• Evidentiary Rulings Affirmed. The panel sustained the district court’s admission of body-cam footage, jail videos, law-enforcement records, and the husband’s affidavit, clarifying the reach of the “sham-affidavit” doctrine and the limits of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree rule in § 1983 litigation.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Kinlin v. Kline, 749 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2014); Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810 (10th Cir. 2007); Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006).
   These cases articulate that refusal to submit to sobriety tests, coupled with indicia of alcohol consumption, can create probable cause. The Fifth Circuit explicitly aligned itself with this tri-circuit consensus, filling a doctrinal gap inside the circuit.
2. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
   The court applied the two-prong Franks test (intentional falsity/reckless disregard and materiality) to the warrant affidavit, finding any alleged misstatements immaterial because probable cause existed independently.
3. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019).
   Under Nieves, a First-Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim fails where probable cause is present, absent proof of differential treatment. The panel relied on Nieves to dispose of Wood’s retaliation claim.
4. Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2023) and Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741 (5th Cir. 2024).
   These cases confirm that, before 2021, there was no clearly-established constitutional tort of malicious prosecution in the Fifth Circuit, foreclosing Wood’s claim arising from a 2019 arrest.
5. Rodriguez v. City of Corpus Christi, 129 F.4th 890 (5th Cir. 2025).
   Cited to explain the “sham affidavit” doctrine’s limited reach to prior sworn testimony.

3.2 Core Legal Reasoning

The panel broke its analysis into two tracks—individual liability and municipal liability:

• Probable Cause Determination. Viewing body-cam footage and undisputed sensory observations (odor of alcohol, slurred speech, glassy eyes, refusal of sobriety tests), the court held a “fair probability” existed that Wood drove while intoxicated. The new holding explicitly states that refusal + observable alcohol cues satisfies the constitutional minimum in the Fifth Circuit.
• Qualified Immunity Framework. Because no constitutional right was violated—or at least not clearly established—the deputy was shielded. The court stressed the burden-shifting aspect: once the officer invoked the defense, Wood had to negate it, which she failed to do.
• Nieves Application. The same probable-cause finding defeated the retaliatory-arrest theory; Wood offered no comparator evidence showing non-arrest of similarly situated, non-filming drivers.
• Materiality in Franks. Even assuming certain check-box errors (e.g., “swaying”) were false, the affidavit would still establish probable cause; hence, no Fourth Amendment violation.
• Monell Causation. Without an underlying federal wrong, the claimed customs—“no-refusal” DWI policy, lack of deputy body-cams, jail extraction procedures—could not be an actionable “moving force.”
• Terry-Stop Duration. There is no bright-line time limit; 35 minutes was reasonable in light of evolving suspicion and coordination of a specialized DWI unit.

3.3 Potential Impact

The opinion is poised to affect DWI litigation, § 1983 practice, and municipal-policy suits within the Fifth Circuit:

• Probable-Cause Threshold in DWI Stops. Defense counsel defending officers now have a clear, circuit-level statement on when probable cause solidifies—even without field tests or an immediate breathalyzer.
• Limiting Retaliatory-Arrest Claims. By tying First-Amendment protection to the absence of probable cause or demonstrable differential treatment, the court narrows viable retaliation suits where video corroborates incriminating facts.
• Constrained Use of Franks. Minor affidavit inaccuracies will rarely survive summary judgment if video or undisputed facts independently support probable cause.
• Evidentiary Practice. Litigants should note the rejection of fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree arguments in civil rights damages suits and the clarification that unsworn, in-the-moment statements do not trigger the sham-affidavit bar.
• Municipal-Liability Pleading. The case re-emphasizes the necessity of pleading and proving an underlying constitutional violation before reaching policy analysis.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A common-sense standard asking whether, given the facts known to the officer, a reasonable person would think a crime is probably being committed—not certainty, but more than a mere hunch.
• Qualified Immunity: A two-part shield for government officials. Even if an officer makes a mistake, he avoids liability unless (a) he violated the Constitution, and (b) existing precedent made the violation obvious at the time.
• Terry Stop: A brief, investigative detention justified by “reasonable suspicion” (a lower standard than probable cause) that criminal activity is afoot.
• Franks Challenge: A mechanism to void a warrant if the officer intentionally or recklessly lied in the affidavit and the lie was essential to the magistrate’s probable-cause finding.
• Monell Liability: Municipalities are not vicariously liable for employees’ misdeeds; plaintiffs must show an official policy/custom and a constitutional injury caused by it.
• Sham-Affidavit Doctrine: Prevents a litigant from defeating summary judgment by submitting an affidavit that blatantly contradicts the affiant’s own prior sworn testimony. The doctrine does not apply to casual, unsworn conversations.
• Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree: An exclusionary rule in criminal trials; it does not suppress evidence in civil § 1983 suits seeking damages.

5. Conclusion

Wood v. Bexar County delivers a multifaceted precedent:

1. It explicitly joins other circuits in holding that refusal to perform field-sobriety tests, when combined with objective signs of alcohol impairment, establishes probable cause for a DWI arrest.
2. It re-affirms stringent burdens for plaintiffs opposing qualified immunity and municipal liability, underscoring that constitutional injury is the indispensable predicate.
3. It clarifies evidentiary doctrine in § 1983 practice, circumscribing both the sham-affidavit and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree arguments.

Practitioners, law-enforcement agencies, and trial courts in the Fifth Circuit should recalibrate their approaches to DWI arrests, warrant affidavits, and civil-rights pleadings in light of this decision. Ultimately, Wood tightens the analytical link between objective, video-corroborated facts and the legal thresholds that govern arrests, immunity, and municipal responsibility.