Refusal of the Warrant-Specified Chemical Test Alone Supports Criminal Test-Refusal in Minnesota

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Brian Russell Lueck, A24-0250 (Minn. Nov. 12, 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a recurring question at the intersection of impaired-driving enforcement, statutory interpretation, and the Fourth Amendment: when law enforcement has a warrant authorizing only one type of chemical test—blood or urine—what must the State prove to sustain a criminal test-refusal conviction? And does such a prosecution offend the Fourth Amendment if officers also offer a different, non-warranted test?

The State charged Brian Lueck with first-degree test refusal following a serious traffic crash. Officers obtained a warrant for a blood draw but not for urine. Lueck refused both. He argued that the governing statutes require refusal of both blood and urine when offered, and—because the officer lacked a urine warrant—his prosecution violated the Fourth Amendment under Birchfield v. North Dakota and its Minnesota progeny (Trahan and Thompson). The district court denied his motion; the court of appeals affirmed. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to resolve both statutory and constitutional issues.

The court’s decision clarifies the meaning of two key provisions: Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2) (criminal test refusal for blood/urine) and section 171.177, subdivision 2 (procedures for testing under a warrant). The opinion also squarely addresses the Fourth Amendment implications of prosecuting a refusal when the underlying test is authorized by warrant.

Summary of the Opinion

Statutory holding: When a warrant authorizes only one type of chemical test—only blood or only urine—refusal of that specific, warranted test is sufficient to support a conviction under Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), and 171.177, subd. 2. The State need not show refusal of the alternative type of test.
Scope of the “alternative test” requirement: The last two sentences of section 171.177, subdivision 2—requiring an officer to offer an alternative test if the person objects to the test and restricting action unless the alternative is offered—apply only when the warrant itself authorizes either blood or urine. They do not apply when the warrant authorizes just one type of sample.
Fourth Amendment holding: A test-refusal conviction premised on refusal of a warranted blood test does not violate the Fourth Amendment under Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson.
Disposition: Affirmed (on grounds differing in part from the court of appeals). Justice McKeig authored the opinion. Justice Hennesy took no part.

Background and Facts

After a head-on collision during a snowstorm in March 2023, police detained Lueck on suspicion of impaired driving and obtained a search warrant for his blood. They did not obtain a warrant for urine. The officer presented the blood warrant while transporting Lueck to the hospital, warning that refusal is a crime. At the hospital, Lueck refused the blood draw. The officer also offered urine and told Lueck refusal to test is a crime. Lueck refused urine as well. The State charged him with first-degree test refusal based on Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) and his criminal history.

Lueck moved to suppress his refusals and dismiss, arguing the statutes required refusal of both blood and urine to convict, and—because no urine warrant existed—his prosecution violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court rejected the argument; after a stipulated-facts trial, the court found him guilty and imposed a 48-month sentence. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review.

Statutory Framework

Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2): It is a crime to refuse a chemical test of “blood or urine” required by a search warrant under §§ 171.177 and 626.04–.18.
Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2: A peace officer who directs a test “shall direct a blood or urine test as provided in the warrant.” If the warrant authorizes “either” blood or urine, the officer may choose which to direct; if the person objects, the officer “shall offer” the alternative, and action may be taken only if the alternative was offered. By statute, exigent-circumstances exceptions can satisfy the warrant requirement where applicable. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3(b).

Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Plain language: “Blood or urine” means disjunctive options

The court applied familiar plain-language principles. Section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2) makes it a crime to refuse “blood or urine” as required by warrant. The court emphasized that “or” is read disjunctively absent contrary indicia, citing State v. Abdus-Salam. Therefore, refusing a single warranted test of blood or urine is enough; the statute does not say “blood and urine.”

2) Reading section 171.177, subdivision 2 as a whole

The first sentence of subdivision 2 requires the officer to direct a test “as provided in the warrant.” Two warrant configurations are contemplated:

Single-test warrant (only blood, or only urine): the officer must direct the one test specified.
Either-or warrant (blood or urine): the officer may select the test to direct.

The controversy centered on the last two sentences of subdivision 2 (the “alternative-test” sentences). Lueck argued those sentences mean the State can prosecute only if the person refused both tests; the State argued only refusal of the first test matters. The court rejected both readings as applied to single-test warrants because they would require an officer to offer a test not “provided in the warrant,” violating the statute’s opening command.

Instead, the court held the “alternative-test” sentences apply only when the warrant authorizes either blood or urine. In that context, an officer who directs one test and meets objection must offer the alternative also authorized by the warrant. That construction harmonizes the entire subdivision and preserves the “as provided in the warrant” directive.

3) Application to Lueck

Because the warrant authorized only a blood draw, the State was required to prove only that Lueck refused the blood draw. The officer’s offer of urine was not required by statute and, importantly, is immaterial to the elements of criminal test refusal in this single-test-warrant scenario. Likewise, Lueck’s refusal of urine is immaterial to the charged offense.

4) Fourth Amendment analysis

Under Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that breath tests may be conducted incident to arrest but blood tests typically require a warrant or a recognized exception (like exigent circumstances). Minnesota’s Trahan and Thompson cases applied Birchfield to invalidate prosecutions predicated on refusal of warrantless blood and urine tests.

Here, Lueck’s conviction rests on his refusal of a warranted blood draw. Birchfield and Trahan expressly permit criminalizing refusal of a blood test when a warrant is present (or an exception applies). Thus, the conviction does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State did not rely on any exigent-circumstances exception; it did not need to because it had a warrant for blood.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016): Distinguishes breath from blood; criminal penalties for refusing a warrantless blood draw are unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances.
State v. Trahan (Minn. 2016): Applying Birchfield, refusal of a warrantless blood test cannot be criminalized under Minnesota law as applied.
State v. Thompson (Minn. 2016): Same principle applied to warrantless urine testing.
Nash v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Minn. 2024): Interprets section 171.177, subdivision 2 when the warrant authorizes either blood or urine; stresses officer discretion to choose, and discusses the alternative-test requirement in that setting. This opinion characterizes its holding as consistent with Nash and limits the alternative-test sentences to the “either” scenario.
State v. Abdus-Salam (Minn. 2024): Confirms “or” is read disjunctively, undergirding the court’s reading of § 169A.20, subd. 2(2).
State v. Gaiovnik (Minn. 2011): Statutes are read as a whole and in context; courts avoid reading sentences in isolation.
Roberts v. State (Minn. 2020); State v. Fugalli (Minn. 2021); State v. Latino (Minn. 2025): Reinforce de novo review, plain-meaning methodology, ambiguity inquiry, and legislative-intent principles.
State v. Barrow (Minn. 2023); State v. Rey (Minn. 2018): Standards for Fourth Amendment reasonableness and de novo constitutional review.

Impact and Practical Significance

A. Clarifies statutory elements for criminal test-refusal in single-test warrants

The decision eliminates uncertainty created by readings that would require refusal of both blood and urine across the board. When a warrant authorizes only blood or only urine, the State must prove refusal of that one test; nothing more is required. Offers of—and refusals to provide—samples not authorized by the warrant are legally irrelevant to the criminal test-refusal charge in that posture.

B. Sharpens the “alternative test” obligation in either-or warrants

The court confines the alternative-test sentences in section 171.177, subdivision 2 to warrants that authorize either blood or urine. That preserves officer discretion to choose the initial test while ensuring a structured fallback: if the person objects to the chosen test, the officer must offer the alternative expressly permitted by the warrant. The opinion signals alignment with Nash in this respect, while leaving for another day any granular questions about the precise proof needed in an either-or scenario to sustain a criminal refusal charge.

C. Fourth Amendment certainty

The opinion reaffirms that Minnesota’s post-Birchfield statutory scheme is constitutional as applied where a warrant exists for the test the person refused. Prosecutors can proceed on refusals of warranted tests without running afoul of Birchfield, Trahan, or Thompson. Conversely, attempting to predicate criminal liability on refusal of a test for which no warrant exists (and no exception applies) remains constitutionally problematic.

D. Law enforcement and drafting implications

Warrant scope matters. Choosing a single-test warrant simplifies the prosecution burden (the State need only prove refusal of that test). Choosing an either-or warrant unlocks the alternative-test procedures but adds operational steps if the person objects.
Officers should avoid offering a test not authorized by the warrant in single-test cases. As this opinion observes, such an offer is not required and is immaterial to the crime of refusal; it risks confusion and litigation.
Advisories should track the statute precisely. Overbroad warnings (e.g., suggesting refusal of a non-warranted test is criminal) may provoke challenges, even if immaterial to elements in single-test warrants.

E. Defense strategy and litigation posture

Identify the warrant type early. In single-test warrants, challenge any attempt to premise criminal liability on refusal of a non-warranted test; the State must tie the refusal to the warranted test.
In either-or warrants, scrutinize compliance with the alternative-test requirement if the client objected to the first directed test; Nash and this opinion support limiting principles grounded in the warrant’s scope.
Preserve Fourth Amendment challenges where a refusal charge is linked to a test for which no warrant or exception existed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Disjunctive “or”: When a statute says “blood or urine,” it means one or the other is sufficient—not both—unless the context shows otherwise.
“As provided in the warrant”: Officers must stick to what the warrant authorizes. If it authorizes only blood, they cannot demand urine under the authority of that warrant.
Single-test vs. either-or warrants:
- Single-test warrant: authorizes only blood or only urine. Refusal of that one test suffices for criminal test-refusal.
- Either-or warrant: authorizes both options, giving the officer discretion to choose. If the person objects to the chosen test, the officer must offer the other option also authorized by the warrant.
Dicta vs. holding: A holding is the legal rule necessary to decide a case. Dicta are statements not strictly necessary to the decision. The court here reads its prior statements in Nash as consistent with today’s holding and cabins the alternative-test requirement to either-or warrants.
Birchfield/Trahan/Thompson in a nutshell: The Constitution generally forbids criminalizing the refusal of warrantless blood or urine tests. But if a warrant is obtained (or an exception applies), refusal can be criminalized.
Exigent circumstances: A recognized exception to the warrant requirement that can justify a warrantless search in emergencies. The statute expressly recognizes such exceptions, but the State did not rely on them here because it had a warrant.

Practical Roadmap

If the warrant authorizes only blood:
- The officer must direct a blood test.
- No statutory duty to offer urine.
- Refusal of blood alone supports conviction.
If the warrant authorizes only urine:
- The officer must direct a urine test.
- No statutory duty to offer blood.
- Refusal of urine alone supports conviction.
If the warrant authorizes either blood or urine:
- The officer may choose one to direct.
- If the person objects, the officer must offer the alternative authorized by the warrant.
- Prosecution should be prepared to prove compliance with this sequence if the defense raises it.

Open Questions and Future Litigation

Either-or warrants: While this opinion signals alignment with Nash, future cases may clarify precisely what proof the State must offer in a criminal test-refusal prosecution if the person objects to the officer’s initial selection under an either-or warrant.
Advisory content: Nash addressed the sufficiency of the advisory under section 171.177, subdivision 1. Additional litigation may refine how advisories should be phrased when warrant scope is narrow to avoid overstatement.
Edge scenarios: Partial compliance (e.g., failed attempts), medical contraindications, or practical infeasibility may test how “refusal” is defined in specific contexts within the statutory scheme.

Conclusion

State v. Lueck delivers a clear and pragmatic rule: when a warrant authorizes only one type of chemical test, refusing that specific test is enough to support a criminal test-refusal conviction. The court harmonizes sections 169A.20 and 171.177 by reading “or” disjunctively and confining the alternative-test requirement to cases where the warrant itself authorizes either blood or urine. On the constitutional question, the court reaffirms Birchfield and its Minnesota counterparts: a refusal conviction based on a warranted blood test does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The decision provides needed guidance to law enforcement about warrant drafting and to courts about the elements of criminal test-refusal. It curbs confusion created by mixing single-test warrants with either-or procedural steps and ensures that Minnesota’s impaired-driving enforcement mechanisms continue to operate within constitutional bounds while maintaining prosecutorial clarity.