Refusal of Reassignment Defeats ADA Claim: Eleventh Circuit holds offering a vacant alternative position is a reasonable accommodation even when the employee requests short-term leave

Introduction

This ADA employment-discrimination appeal arises from the termination of a sworn investigator with the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Department after he exhausted his FMLA leave and, still recovering from back surgery, sought a short extension of leave to a tentative return date. The Department declined to extend leave further but repeatedly offered reassignment to a vacant, non-sworn dispatcher position as an interim measure until medical clearance. The employee declined or failed to accept that option by the employer’s deadline and was terminated.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed two central questions within the ADA’s framework: (1) whether a jury question existed on whether the employee was a “qualified individual” at the time of the adverse action, and (2) whether the employer unlawfully discriminated by denying his requested accommodation (a brief leave extension), notwithstanding the employer’s offer of reassignment to a vacant position. The Court clarified the limits of district courts’ ability to dismiss “self-serving” testimony at summary judgment and reinforced that an employer’s duty is to provide a reasonable accommodation—not necessarily the employee’s preferred accommodation. Ultimately, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the Sheriff, concluding that offering reassignment to a vacant role was a reasonable accommodation and the employee’s refusal was dispositive.

Summary of the Opinion

• Qualified individual: The district court erred in concluding, at summary judgment, that the plaintiff could not be a “qualified individual” by his requested return date. The employee’s own sworn account that he had been cleared to return—and could pass the required Physical Abilities Test (PAT)—created a triable fact issue, even though medical notes pointed the other way. The Eleventh Circuit held that a court may not weigh credibility or disregard competent “self-serving” testimony unless it is blatantly contradicted by the record in the narrow Scott v. Harris sense (e.g., incontrovertible video).
• Unlawful discrimination (reasonable accommodation): The claim failed anyway because the employer provided a reasonable accommodation: reassignment to a vacant non-sworn dispatcher position during recovery. The ADA does not require the employer to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation (here, a short leave extension). The fact the reassignment would be a demotion and might require reapplication did not render it unreasonable. The employee’s refusal to accept the offered reassignment takes him outside the ADA’s protection on his failure-to-accommodate theory.
• Affirmance on alternative ground: The Court affirmed for a reason supported by the record even though the district court’s rationale (on the “qualified individual” element) was incorrect.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 2058, 2071 (2025): The Supreme Court emphasized that to prevail, the plaintiff must prove he could perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of the alleged act of disability-based discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit applied Stanley to frame the timing inquiry: the question is whether Mundt was qualified as of the termination decision in February 2023 (given his proposed March 14 return with claimed clearance).
• Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 (11th Cir. 2000); Collado v. UPS, 419 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2005): These cases set forth the ADA prima facie elements: disability, qualified individual, and unlawful discrimination because of disability. Collado clarifies that the prima facie elements are elements of the claim itself.
• Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007): Provides the framework for “essential functions” and “qualified individual” analysis under the ADA.
• Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2012); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016): Summary judgment standards: no weighing of evidence; a genuine dispute exists if a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant.
• A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts, 900 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012); Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2007): Reiterate that courts cannot weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations at summary judgment.
• United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc): Clarifies the burden at summary judgment and that competent evidence from the non-movant must be credited in their favor.
• Blanco v. Samuel, 91 F.4th 1061 (11th Cir. 2024); Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013): A party’s sworn, self-serving testimony can create a genuine issue of material fact unless “blatantly contradicted” by the record or incredible as a matter of law.
• Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): The narrow exception allowing courts to disregard testimony blatantly contradicted by incontrovertible evidence (famously, a video). The Eleventh Circuit underscored its reluctance to extend Scott beyond such situations.
• Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019); Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013): Medical and documentary records alone do not “utterly discredit” sworn testimony at summary judgment; absent definitive evidence (like a clear video), credibility disputes go to the jury.
• 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A): The ADA prohibits failing to make reasonable accommodations unless doing so would impose undue hardship.
• Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2000): The plaintiff must identify an accommodation that enables performance of essential functions and show it is reasonable; then the burden shifts to the employer on undue hardship.
• Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997): The employer need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation; providing some reasonable accommodation suffices.
• 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B): “Reassignment to a vacant position” is expressly recognized as a reasonable accommodation.
• Walden v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015); Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, 506 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007): In analogous accommodation contexts, an employer may meet its duty by encouraging the employee to seek another position and assisting in that process.
• Schmidt v. Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 1996); Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System, 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004): Reassignment may involve lower pay or grade and may require application; an employer need not guarantee a successful transfer, and an employee’s refusal to accept a reasonable accommodation defeats the claim.
• Williams v. Board of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007): The appellate court may affirm for any reason supported by the record even if the district court relied on a different rationale.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of Review and the “Self‑Serving Testimony” Problem

Applying de novo review and the familiar Rule 56 standards, the Eleventh Circuit admonished the district court for impermissibly weighing credibility and choosing between conflicting inferences. The district court had disregarded the plaintiff’s sworn account (that he had been cleared to return without restrictions and could complete the PAT by March 14) as “self-serving,” instead crediting medical notes suggesting ongoing pain and a lack of readiness. Under Blanco, Price, and Feliciano, sworn testimony—even if self-serving—can create a genuine issue. Under Sears and Morton, medical records do not “blatantly contradict” testimony in the Scott v. Harris sense. The opinion emphasizes that only evidence of the type Scott contemplates (e.g., a clear, definitive video) permits a court to reject sworn testimony at summary judgment. Because this case simply pitted “the doctors’ word against [Mundt’s] word,” credibility was for the jury.

2) Qualified Individual Under the ADA at the Time of the Decision

Stanley v. City of Sanford (U.S. 2025) serves as the lodestar: the plaintiff must be able to perform the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of the alleged discriminatory act (here, termination). The parties agreed that medical clearance and passing the PAT were essential to returning to sworn duty. The employee’s affidavit and deposition—if credited—could support that he was likely to be ready by his proposed March 14 return. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held there was a genuine dispute on “qualified individual,” and summary judgment could not stand on that ground.

3) Reasonable Accommodation and Employee’s Refusal

The claim nevertheless fails on the separate “unlawful discrimination” element. The ADA’s accommodation duty is to provide a reasonable accommodation, not necessarily the one the employee prefers. Stewart makes this point explicit. Congress expressly lists reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Here, the Sheriff, through Major Tait, repeatedly offered reassignment to a vacant, non-sworn dispatcher job and represented that leadership “would absolutely support” the transfer and was “more than happy to extend” the role during recovery.

It did not matter that the employee would have to reapply or that the position was a “demotion” in his view. Citing Morrissette-Brown and Hedrick, the Court explained that reassignment may entail some cost to the employee, including lower pay or prestige, without becoming unreasonable. Nor did the ADA require the employer to guarantee a successful transfer (Schmidt). Offering reassignment, encouraging the employee to take it, and facilitating it satisfied the ADA’s duty to accommodate.

Because the employee declined to accept the reassignment and instead pressed for an extension of leave, the claim fails as a matter of law. Under Earl, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to show the reasonableness of his requested accommodation. Even assuming arguendo that a short, finite leave extension could be reasonable, the employer’s offer of another reasonable accommodation ends the analysis: the ADA does not require the employer to choose the employee’s preferred option. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment on this alternative ground (Williams).

Impact and Implications

For Employers

• Offering any reasonable accommodation suffices: If an employer offers a reasonable accommodation—like reassignment to a vacant position—the ADA does not require it to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation (e.g., a short leave extension). Documenting such offers and the employee’s response is critical.
• Reassignment can include demotions and reapplications: The Eleventh Circuit accepts that reassignment may involve lower grade/pay and an application process, and that a guarantee of placement is not required, so long as the position is vacant and the employer provides genuine support.
• Interactive engagement matters: The Department repeatedly engaged the employee, requested updated medical information, and offered a concrete alternative role—facts that strongly supported the employer’s compliance.
• Summary judgment caution: Employers should not expect “self-serving” affidavits to be disregarded at summary judgment; credibility disputes ordinarily go to the jury unless incontrovertibly contradicted by record evidence in the narrow Scott v. Harris sense.

For Employees

• Do not reflexively decline reassignment: Where an employer offers reassignment to a vacant role during recovery, rejecting that option can be fatal to a failure-to-accommodate claim—even if the employee prefers a short leave extension.
• Build the record: If the dispute centers on medical readiness, contemporaneous provider notes, clearances, and consistent testimony can be decisive. But expect the court to treat credibility issues as jury questions, not summary dispositions.

For Courts and Practitioners

• Timing under Stanley (2025): Courts must analyze “qualified individual” status as of the adverse action date. The plaintiff’s “likely return” shortly after that date can be relevant, but the key is capability at the time of termination with or without reasonable accommodation.
• Scott v. Harris remains narrow: This decision reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s reluctance to extend Scott’s “blatantly contradicted” rule beyond definitive records like video; medical notes and documentation typically do not suffice to “utterly discredit” sworn testimony.
• Affirmance on alternative grounds: Appellate courts may uphold results on different legal grounds supported by the record; district courts should consider all elements and alternative theories to minimize remands.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Individual: A person who can perform the essential duties of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time the employer took the alleged discriminatory action.
• Essential Functions: Fundamental job duties—not marginal tasks—that the position requires. For sworn law-enforcement roles, passing a Physical Abilities Test (PAT) and obtaining medical clearance can be essential prerequisites to duty.
• Reasonable Accommodation: A change that enables a disabled employee to perform essential job functions without imposing undue hardship on the employer. Examples include leave, modified duties, or reassignment to a vacant position. The employer is not required to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.
• Reassignment to a Vacant Position: Moving the employee into a currently available job they are qualified to hold. It can be a lateral or lower-grade role and may require application. The employer does not have to create a new job, displace another employee, or guarantee the transfer’s success.
• Undue Hardship: Significant difficulty or expense that would be caused by the accommodation. If an employer offers a reasonable accommodation, it need not prove undue hardship unless the plaintiff first shows the accommodation sought is reasonable and was denied.
• Summary Judgment: A judgment without trial when there is no genuine dispute over material facts. Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and cannot make credibility determinations. Sworn, self-serving testimony can create a triable issue unless incontrovertibly contradicted by the record.

Conclusion

Mundt v. Sheriff, Okaloosa County reinforces two important ADA and procedural principles in the Eleventh Circuit. First, consistent with Stanley v. City of Sanford, whether an employee is “qualified” is assessed at the time of the employer’s action, and credibility disputes about medical readiness are for the jury unless irrefutably contradicted. The district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s sworn testimony as “self-serving” in the face of conflicting medical notes. Second—and outcome determinative here—the ADA’s accommodation duty is satisfied when the employer offers a reasonable accommodation, such as reassignment to a vacant position. The employer need not grant the employee’s preferred accommodation (even a short leave extension) if another reasonable option is offered, and the employee’s refusal of that option defeats a failure-to-accommodate claim.

The decision, though unpublished, offers practical guidance: public safety agencies and other employers can meet ADA obligations by offering bona fide reassignment to a vacant role during recovery and documenting the interactive engagement. Employees seeking to preserve ADA claims should carefully consider interim reassignment options; declining them can be dispositive even when a brief leave might soon restore full capacity. Finally, district courts should resist weighing credibility at summary judgment and apply Scott v. Harris sparingly; absent definitive contradiction, “self-serving” sworn testimony remains evidence that a jury may credit.