• State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 2018‑Ohio‑3890 – Described voluntary abandonment as a bar to TTD where a worker voluntarily removes himself from his former position for reasons unrelated to the industrial injury.
• State ex rel. Ohio State Univ. v. Pratt, 2022‑Ohio‑4111 – Clarifies that Klein did not shift the focus away from abandonment of the workforce; the key inquiry remains whether the injured worker has abandoned the workforce, not merely the prior job.
• State ex rel. Sebring v. Indus. Comm., 2009‑Ohio‑5258 – Holds that a mistaken citation to voluntary abandonment case law in a refusal-of-suitable-work case is inconsequential where the substance of the decision rests on the statutory bar for refusal of offered work.
• State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2023‑Ohio‑2213 – Cited for the nature of voluntary abandonment as an affirmative defense in the TTD context.

The Court uses these cases to cabin the role of voluntary abandonment: it matters only in cases where a worker truly leaves the workforce for reasons unrelated to the injury; it does not govern statutory refusals of suitable employment under R.C. 4123.56(A).

The Court also notes the 2020 legislative amendment adding R.C. 4123.56(F), expressly superseding prior judicial voluntary-abandonment decisions for claims pending on or arising after September 15, 2020. That amendment does not apply here, but the Court’s analysis still uses the pre‑amendment doctrine narrowly.

G. Burden of Proof in Mandamus

• State ex rel. Byk v. Indus. Comm., 2025‑Ohio‑2044 – Reaffirms that a claimant seeking mandamus must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear right to relief and a clear duty on the Commission.

This authority is invoked specifically to reject the fourth proposition of law, where the claimant offered no meaningful legal support for his theory that the job offer was “legally deficient.”

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Proposition of Law No. 1 – The “Good-Faith” Job Offer Requirement

1. The Regulatory Framework

R.C. 4123.56(A) contains the core statutory rule: TTD shall not be paid when “work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer or another employer.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32 supplements the statute. The rule:

• Defines “suitable employment” as “work which is within the employee’s physical capabilities” (Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(A)(3)).
• Defines “job offer” as “a proposal, made in good faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker's residence” (Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(A)(6)).
• Provides that TTD “may be terminated” when the Commission finds that the employee has received a written job offer of suitable employment (Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(B)(2)(d)).

Thus, as Ellis, Pacheco, and Ryan Alternative Staffing emphasize, “job offer” carries both a “suitable” and a “good‑faith” component.

2. Papageorgiou’s Argument

Papageorgiou contended that the Commission was obligated to expressly determine whether Avalotis’s job offer was “made in good faith” and that its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion under the Ellis–Pacheco–Ryan line of cases.

3. The Court’s Response

The Court distinguishes between two distinct inquiries:

• Suitability: Whether the duties offered are within the worker’s physical restrictions.
• Good faith: Whether the employer’s motives and the structure of the offer demonstrate a genuine opportunity for the worker, as opposed to a manipulative or sham offer designed to force a denial of benefits or termination.

The Court observes that:

• In his merit brief, Papageorgiou’s only asserted “bad faith” was that the offer letter listed only “no heavy lifting,” failing to restate all of Dr. Dunne’s restrictions (bending, squatting, etc.).
• This is, in substance, a suitability challenge (does the job truly fit the limitations?), not a bad‑motive or sham-offer challenge.
• There is no indication in the record that he argued to the Commission that Avalotis structured the offer to ensure failure, knew he could not cover the shifts, or sought to humiliate or punish him — the kinds of allegations that triggered a good-faith analysis in Ellis, Pacheco, and Ryan Alternative Staffing.

Because no true good-faith issue was presented, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by failing to make an explicit “good‑faith” finding. Under Quarto Mining and Schlegel, the Commission is not required to consider and decide an issue that was not raised administratively, and a claimant cannot reserve such arguments for mandamus.

Critically, the Court also notes that the Commission did consider suitability: it relied on Dr. Dunne’s July 2 letter explicitly approving the offered work (with minor modifications) as within the claimant’s capabilities. That goes directly to the “suitable employment” prong and satisfies the statutory requirement.

Thus, the Court recasts proposition one as a mischaracterized suitability objection and finds no legal error.

B. Proposition of Law No. 2 – Use of Treating-Physician Opinion for Initial Denial of TTD

1. The Rule Language and the Claimant’s Theory

Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(B)(1)(b) identifies one ground on which TTD “may be terminated”:

“The employee's treating physician finds that the employee is capable of returning to his former position of employment or other available suitable employment.”

Papageorgiou argued that this provision, by its terms, governs only the termination of ongoing TTD and therefore cannot be used to deny an initial application for TTD.

2. The Court’s Reasoning

The Court rejects this argument on multiple levels:

1. The Commission did not actually rely on this rule. Neither the Commission nor the Tenth District cited Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(B)(1)(b) as the basis for denying TTD. Instead, they relied on the statute, R.C. 4123.56(A), which bars TTD when the employer makes work within the worker’s capabilities available.
2. The statute controls; the rule cannot narrow it. Under Wymsylo and Amoco, rules cannot “add to or subtract from” the statute. Even if 4121‑3‑32(B) speaks in terms of “termination,” that cannot limit the situations in which the Commission may apply the statutory bar on TTD in the first instance.
3. Circumstances permitting “termination” are not exclusive of initial denial. The Court expressly declines to read the list of “may be terminated” circumstances as barring the Commission from considering those same or similar facts in other contexts. The rule does not convert the statute’s mandatory “shall not be made” into a conditional, termination‑only rule.

In short, Dr. Dunne’s July 2 letter—stating that the light-duty job was within the claimant’s physical capabilities—constituted “some evidence” that “work within the physical capabilities of the employee” had been made available, triggering the statutory bar in R.C. 4123.56(A). Administrative rules cannot be read to nullify or shrink that statutory command.

C. Proposition of Law No. 3 – Voluntary Abandonment vs. Refusal of Suitable Employment

1. The Doctrines Distinguished

The Court carefully distinguishes between:

• Voluntary abandonment of the workforce (pre‑2020 judicial doctrine): An affirmative defense to TTD where a worker leaves the workforce for reasons unrelated to the injury (e.g., quitting or being fired for misconduct unrelated to the injury).
• Statutory refusal of suitable employment (R.C. 4123.56(A)): A legislative bar on TTD when the employer (or another employer) makes work within the worker’s physical capabilities available and the worker refuses it.

As the Court notes, the latter defense:

“is a direct result of R.C. 4123.56(A)’s language prohibiting the payment of TTD compensation ‘when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer or another employer.’”

Under this statutory bar, it is the worker’s refusal that breaks the causal chain between the injury and the wage loss.

2. The Role of Pratt

In Pratt, the Court clarified that Klein had not transformed the voluntary-abandonment inquiry into one about leaving the position rather than the workforce. The key remains whether the worker effectively abandoned the workforce as such.

Papageorgiou argued that the Commission erred by finding “voluntary abandonment” (of employment) without determining that he had abandoned the entire workforce, contrary to Pratt.

3. Why the Voluntary-Abandonment Doctrine Was Inapplicable

The Court resolves this objection by focusing on substance over labels:

• The SHO’s order did use the phrase “voluntary abandonment of employment,” but the essence of the reasoning was that the claimant refused a light-duty job within his restrictions, as validated by his own doctor.
• This fact pattern fits squarely within the statutory bar on TTD when available suitable work is offered and refused, not within voluntary abandonment doctrine.
• As in Sebring, where mis‑citation to voluntary abandonment case law in a refusal-of-work scenario was held “inconsequential,” the SHO’s use of that phrase here did not render the decision unlawful or an abuse of discretion.

Because voluntary abandonment was not the true basis of the Commission’s decision, the Commission had no obligation to conduct a Pratt-style inquiry into whether Papageorgiou abandoned the workforce at large.

D. Proposition of Law No. 4 – Alleged Legal Deficiency of the Job Offer

1. The Rule Text Relied Upon

The claimant relied on part of Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(A)(6), which provides, in relevant part:

“If the injured worker refuses an oral job offer and the employer intends to initiate proceedings to terminate temporary total disability compensation, the employer must give the injured worker a written job offer at least forty-eight hours prior to initiating proceedings. The written job offer shall identify the position offered and shall include a description of the duties required of the position and clearly specify the physical demands of the job.”

He argued that because the written offer did not “clearly specify the physical demands,” it was “legally deficient,” and Dr. Dunne could not reasonably approve it as suitable.

2. The Court’s Analysis

The Court rejects this argument on two grounds:

1. No authority, no developed argument. The Court notes that Papageorgiou did not meaningfully develop this argument or support it with authority. Under Byk, a relator seeking the extraordinary remedy of mandamus must carry a heavy burden, which he failed to do here.
2. The triggering conditions of the rule were not shown. The “clear specification” requirement applies only when:
   • The worker has previously refused an oral job offer, and
   • The employer intends to “initiate proceedings to terminate temporary total disability compensation.”

   There was no proof that these preconditions existed in this case. Accordingly, the heightened content requirement for written offers in that context did not govern the light-duty offer Avalotis made.

Since the rule’s special written-offer requirements did not apply on these facts, their absence from the letter does not render the offer legally defective. And regardless, Dr. Dunne’s independent review of the described duties, followed by his written approval that Papageorgiou could perform them (subject to modest caveats), provided the Commission with sufficient evidence of suitability.

VI. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

A. Temporary-Total-Disability (TTD) Compensation

TTD is a form of wage-loss compensation in Ohio’s workers’ compensation system. It is intended to replace wages when:

• The worker cannot return to his or her former position of employment because of the industrial injury, and
• The injury is the reason for the loss of earnings (i.e., the worker did not voluntarily stop working for other reasons).

TTD is paid as a percentage of the worker’s average weekly wage. It stops, or cannot be awarded, in several statutory situations — including when the worker has returned to work, reached maximum medical improvement, been certified able to return to the prior job, or when the employer offers work within the worker’s physical capabilities and the worker refuses it.

B. Wages in Lieu of TTD

Sometimes an employer will continue paying the worker’s full regular wages even while the worker is unable to perform the usual job. That period is treated as “wages in lieu of TTD.” The worker receives income, but not TTD benefits for that period, because TTD exists to replace lost earnings; where there is no loss, TTD is unnecessary.

In this case, both the DHO and the SHO found that Avalotis paid Papageorgiou wages in lieu of TTD from May 25 through June 28, 2018. The dispute concerned only whether TTD should begin after June 28.

C. Mandamus and the “Some Evidence” Standard

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy ordering a governmental body (here, the Industrial Commission) to perform a legal duty. It is not a routine appeal or a chance to reweigh evidence.

The Supreme Court defers heavily to the Commission’s factual determinations. The Commission’s decision will be upheld if:

• It is adequately explained, and
• It is supported by “some evidence,” even if substantial evidence points the other way.

“Some evidence” means more than zero but less than “overwhelming” — any evidence upon which reasonable minds might rely.

Here, Dr. Dunne’s July 2 letter provided that evidentiary support: a treating physician affirmatively stating that the offered light-duty work was within the worker’s capabilities.

D. “In Pari Materia” and the Relationship Between Statutes and Rules

To read R.C. 4123.56(A) and Ohio Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32 “in pari materia” means to interpret them together as parts of a single, coherent regulatory scheme on TTD. The rules help fill in details the statute does not specify (definitions of “suitable employment,” procedures, etc.).

But administrative rules cannot contradict, narrow, or expand the statute. The statute is supreme; rules must implement it, not rewrite it.

E. Good-Faith Job Offer vs. Suitable Employment

Under Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32:

• A “job offer” must be both:
  • Suitable – The job is within the worker’s physical capabilities (no duties that conflict with medical restrictions).
  • Made in good faith – The offer is genuine in motive and structure; the employer is offering actual work the employer plausibly intends the worker to do, not a sham set-up.

Disputes about “suitability” usually center on medical evidence and job descriptions. Disputes about “good faith” center on employer motives and business realities (e.g., was this a real job, did the employer schedule impossible hours, etc.).

In Papageorgiou, the Supreme Court essentially says: if only suitability is challenged, and the Commission addresses that question (here, through the treating physician’s approval), there is no need for an explicit separate “good‑faith” finding — unless the claimant actually puts good faith in issue at the Commission level.

F. Voluntary Abandonment vs. Refusal of Work

Before the 2020 statutory amendment, Ohio courts recognized a judicial “voluntary abandonment” doctrine: if a worker voluntarily leaves the workforce for reasons unrelated to the injury (e.g., incarceration, resignation, discharge for unrelated misconduct), TTD is unavailable because the injury is no longer the cause of wage loss.

By contrast, refusal of suitable employment is a statutory defense: R.C. 4123.56(A) specifically prohibits TTD when the employer offers work within the worker’s capabilities and the worker refuses it. The worker’s wage loss now stems from the refusal, not the injury.

Papageorgiou confirms that:

• These doctrines are distinct, and
• Mis‑labeling a refusal-of-work situation as “voluntary abandonment” is harmless where the substance of the ruling rests on the statutory refusal-of-suitable-employment bar.

VII. Impact and Future Significance

A. For Employers and Insurers

The decision gives employers and insurers several important clarifications:

• Refusal of suitable light-duty work can bar initial TTD. An employer need not wait until TTD is in pay status before invoking the statutory defense. If wages are paid in lieu of TTD during the acute phase, and a suitable light-duty job is then offered and refused, the Commission may deny TTD from that point forward.
• Treating-physician approval is powerful “some evidence.” Having the claimant’s own treating physician review the job offer and attest in writing that the duties are within the worker’s restrictions is very persuasive and will strongly support the Commission’s denial of TTD based on refusal of work.
• Good-faith findings are fact-driven and issue-dependent. The Commission is not obligated to make an express “good‑faith” determination in every case. It must do so when the claimant properly raises and supports a dispute over the employer’s motives (as in Ellis, Pacheco, Ryan Alternative Staffing). When no genuine good-faith issue is raised, the Commission can focus on suitability alone.
• The written-offer detail requirements of Adm.Code 4121‑3‑32(A)(6) are limited. Employers must satisfy the heightened requirements (clear description of duties and physical demands) only if there was a prior oral offer and they are moving to terminate existing TTD. That provision does not apply to every written offer of light-duty work.

B. For Injured Workers and Claimant Counsel

For claimants, the case carries cautionary lessons:

• Refusing or ignoring light-duty offers is risky. If the offered work is medically approved as within restrictions, refusal may bar TTD, even for an initial period following an injury.
• Raise “good faith” issues early and clearly. If a worker believes an offer is a sham (e.g., impossible shifts, humiliating duties, or non‑existent job), those facts and arguments must be raised at the Commission level. Courts will not entertain such theories for the first time in mandamus.
• Develop the record on suitability. If the job’s duties truly exceed medical restrictions, claimant’s counsel must press for detailed job descriptions and, ideally, medical opinions tying specific tasks to the restrictions. Otherwise, treating-physician approvals like Dr. Dunne’s will weigh heavily.

C. For the Law of Workers’ Compensation in Ohio

The opinion’s legal significance lies in several clarifications:

1. R.C. 4123.56(A) is self-executing and not confined by termination-specific rules.
   The statute independently bars TTD when suitable work is made available — in initial entitlement situations as well as in termination contexts. Administrative rules cannot restrict that bar.
2. Good faith and suitability are conceptually distinct.
   Courts and practitioners must differentiate between:
   • Medical/functional suitability (duties vs. restrictions), and
   • Good‑faith motives (is the offer genuine?).
   The Commission must address good faith expressly only where properly put at issue by the evidence and arguments.
3. Voluntary abandonment doctrine is narrow and not a default label.
   After Pratt and this case, courts should reserve voluntary abandonment analysis for true abandonment-of-workforce scenarios, not for refusal-of-suitable-work situations that are fully addressed by the statute.
4. The “some evidence” standard remains robust.
   Treating-physician letters approving specific light-duty offerings will usually meet the Commission’s evidentiary threshold. Overturning such findings in mandamus will be difficult absent clear legal error.

VIII. Conclusion

State ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp. reinforces a straightforward but powerful rule in Ohio workers’ compensation law: when an employer offers light-duty work within an injured worker’s documented physical capabilities, and the worker’s treating physician confirms that suitability, refusal of that offer may bar TTD compensation under R.C. 4123.56(A), even at the outset of the claim.

The decision also sharpens doctrinal boundaries:

• “Good-faith” job-offer analysis is fact-specific and required only when genuinely raised; it is not automatically implicated by every dispute over physical restrictions.
• Administrative rules, including those addressing termination of TTD and content of written job offers after oral refusals, cannot narrow the clear statutory bar in R.C. 4123.56(A).
• Voluntary abandonment and refusal-of-suitable-work are distinct concepts; mislabeling the latter as the former is harmless where the statutory bar clearly applies.

For future cases, Papageorgiou will serve as an important precedent confirming that:

If an injured worker, while still medically restricted from former duties, is offered medically-approved light-duty work and chooses not to report, the resulting wage loss is due to that choice, not the injury — and TTD is not available.

In the broader legal context, the case underscores the primacy of statutory text in TTD entitlement questions, the limited role of administrative rules, and the demanding nature of mandamus review of Industrial Commission decisions.