Refining the RLUIPA Substantial-Burden Threshold and Establishment-Clause Neutrality in Prison: A Commentary on Lumsden v. Collier (5th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Lumsden v. Collier, No. 24-50605 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit revisited a familiar but evolving intersection of prisoners’ rights: religious accommodation under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), First Amendment protections, and Eighth Amendment claims targeting prison conditions. Raymond E. Lumsden, a Native-American inmate at the Hughes Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), challenged a wide array of policies that he alleged burdened his religious exercise, endangered his health, and subjected him to intolerable heat. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants; the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam.

While the panel designated its opinion “not for publication,” the reasoning nonetheless sharpens two doctrinal points of recurring importance:

The threshold showing of a “substantial burden” under RLUIPA requires specific evidence of denied requests or compelled conduct, not merely generalized allegations of unequal treatment.
An ostensibly faith-specific prison program (here, a Christian-based Field Minister School) does not violate the Establishment Clause if it is non-coercive, privately funded, and open to other faiths, even when its curriculum is overtly sectarian.

Beyond the religious-liberty questions, the decision also re-affirms the Fifth Circuit’s stringent standard for Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” and heat-exposure claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (King, Smith, and Douglas, JJ.) unanimously upheld the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of every claim. Key holdings include:

RLUIPA Claims: Lumsden failed to show a substantial burden because (a) participation in the Christian-oriented Field Minister School was voluntary and alternative avenues to spiritual leadership existed; (b) he did not use TDCJ’s accommodation process to request lay-ins or communal meals for the Equinoxes/Solstices; and (c) he provided no concrete evidence that he was barred from wearing his medicine bag beyond a bare allegation.
Free Exercise / Equal Protection: TDCJ afforded “reasonable opportunities” for Native-American worship and no evidence of purposeful discrimination appeared in the record.
Establishment Clause: Because the Field Minister School was privately funded, non-exclusive, and not compulsory, its Christian orientation did not constitute denominational preference forbidden by Larson v. Valente.
Eighth Amendment – Medical, Diet, and Safety: Disagreements over a “zipper shirt,” sporadic deviations from a prescribed “Diet for Health,” and staff shortages failed to meet the “extremely high” deliberate-indifference standard.
Eighth Amendment – Heat: Although Texas summers are brutal, TDCJ offered an air-conditioned “cool bed” which Lumsden declined; absent proof that the offered mitigation was constitutionally inadequate, no triable issue existed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Lozano v. Collier, 98 F.4th 614 (5th Cir. 2024): Reiterated that a verified complaint can function as summary-judgment evidence. The court leaned on Lozano for both procedural posture and RLUIPA burden-shifting.
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015): Supreme Court’s expansive reading of “religious exercise” under RLUIPA; cited for the broad definition but juxtaposed against the inmate’s failure to demonstrate a substantial burden.
Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004) & Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013): Provided the Fifth Circuit’s two-prong test for substantial burden—compelled violation or loss of a generally available, non-trivial benefit.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507 (2022) & Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014): The panel explicitly distanced itself from older “Turner reasonableness” tests for Establishment claims, acknowledging the Supreme Court’s history-focused approach post-Kennedy.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2019): Set the deliberate-indifference benchmark applied to medical, diet, safety, and heat claims.
Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015) & Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2017): Illustrated scenarios where heat mitigation was constitutionally inadequate—contrasting facts helped the court find Lumsden’s showing insufficient.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. RLUIPA Methodology
The panel rigorously applied the statute’s burden-shifting structure. Once Lumsden failed at step one—proving a substantial burden—TDCJ never had to demonstrate compelling interest or least-restrictive means. The court emphasized concreteness: a plaintiff must tie claimed burdens to an identifiable policy or decision, and to real requests or coercive choices. General feelings of unequal treatment or speculative harms do not suffice.

2. First Amendment Overlay
For Free Exercise and Equal Protection, the court relied on the well-worn rule that a restriction survives if “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” The chaplain’s affidavit that (i) Holy-Day practices vary by tribe and (ii) inmates may submit individualized requests furnished a rational justification the plaintiff failed to rebut.

On the Establishment Clause, the court adopted the post-Kennedy historical-tradition lens: because chaplaincy and volunteer religious programs have a long pedigree in U.S. prisons so long as participation is voluntary and non-exclusive, TDCJ’s cooperation with the Field Minister School did not cross constitutional lines.

3. Eighth Amendment Strictness
Consistent with circuit precedent, the panel required proof of both an objectively serious risk and a subjectively culpable state of mind. Medical disagreements (zipper vs. tie shirts) and diet imperfections were framed as, at most, malpractice or negligence—insufficient for an Eighth Amendment violation. For heat claims, the court distinguished between prisons offering no meaningful mitigation (Ball) and those offering an air-conditioned cell, even if it comes with trade-offs.

Potential Impact on Future Litigation and Prison Administration

Clarifying “Substantial Burden” Proof: Plaintiffs must document denied requests, written policies, or compelled participation. Counsel representing inmates will need meticulous paper trails—grievance records, accommodation requests, or depositions—to survive summary judgment.
Establishment-Clause Safe Harbor for Faith-Based Programs: Provided a program is privately funded, voluntary, and accessible in theory to other faiths, its sectarian content alone will not doom it. Wardens can partner with religious nonprofits without per se liability, but should maintain open enrollment and alternative tracks for non-participants.
Heat-Litigation Blueprint: The opinion signals that offering an air-conditioned “cool bed” may blunt Eighth Amendment heat claims, though prisons must ensure that placement conditions (e.g., segregation) themselves are not punitive or pretextual.
Procedural Takeaway—Verified Complaints Are Not Enough: While a verified complaint can substitute for an affidavit, it must still contain specific, admissible facts. Bare allegations—e.g., “I was never allowed my medicine bag”—will not create a genuine dispute.

Complex Concepts Simplified

RLUIPA: A federal statute giving extra protection to religious exercise for prisoners and others in institutions. In short: government can’t impose a “substantial burden” on an inmate’s religion unless it pursues a very important goal in the least restrictive way possible.
Substantial Burden: Prison rule forces you to violate your faith or lose a significant benefit that everyone else gets. Minor inconveniences or voluntary choices ≠ substantial burden.
Lay-In: TDCJ term for excusing an inmate from work or other duties so they can participate in religious observance.
Summary Judgment: A pre-trial ruling that no real factual dispute exists, so one side wins “as a matter of law.”
Deliberate Indifference: Knowing of a serious risk to an inmate and ignoring it. Mere negligence or disagreement with medical staff is not enough.
Establishment Clause: Part of the First Amendment that stops government from favoring one religion over another.
Qualified Immunity: Shields officials from money damages unless they violated clearly established law. Here, the court didn’t reach it because it found no constitutional violation at all.
“Cool Bed” / Respite Area: Air-conditioned cells or rooms provided to vulnerable inmates during extreme heat.

Conclusion

Lumsden v. Collier offers a meticulously reasoned reaffirmation of doctrinal guardrails shaping religious-liberty and Eighth Amendment litigation in prisons. The Fifth Circuit underscores that:

RLUIPA plaintiffs bear a heavy evidentiary burden to prove actual substantial burdens—not mere disparities or theoretical obstacles.
Prison partnerships with faith-based groups survive Establishment scrutiny if participation is voluntary, non-exclusive, and free of government subsidy.
Heat and medical-care claims require detailed proof of objectively dangerous conditions and subjective disregard by officials.

Although unpublished, the ruling is likely to influence district courts within the circuit and counsel for inmates nationwide. Its practical message is twofold: prison administrators should document accommodation processes and alternative measures carefully, while inmates (and their advocates) must assemble detailed factual records to clear the formidable summary-judgment hurdle. In the continuing tug-of-war between institutional order and constitutional rights, Lumsden tilts modestly toward administrative flexibility—without erasing established avenues for relief when genuine burdens are proven.