Refining the Comparator Standard in Federal-Sector Gender Discrimination Claims:
A Commentary on Marshall v. Secretary of the Navy (11th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Jonathan Marshall, a Navy firefighter in Panama City, Florida, sued the Secretary of the Navy for gender discrimination under Title VII after the Navy denied his request for a light-duty reassignment following a disabling car accident. He pointed to the allegedly more favorable treatment of a transgender female colleague, Emily Gray, who was temporarily placed on light duty after her own injury. The Northern District of Florida granted summary judgment to the Navy, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an unpublished, non-argument-calendar opinion.

Although unpublished, the decision is significant because it tightens the application of the “similarly situated comparator” test in the federal-sector context and reinforces that an employee’s failure to produce a valid comparator will be fatal to a Title VII claim unless the overall “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence independently suggests discriminatory intent. The Court also reiterates that the federal-sector standard under § 2000e-16(a) requires proof only that the protected trait “played any part” in the challenged personnel action, while emphasizing that this relaxed causation does not eliminate the need for genuine evidence of bias.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Navy.
• Marshall failed to show that gender played “any part” in the denial of his accommodation request.
• Emily Gray was not a proper comparator: she had different job duties (fire captain with administrative tasks), a different injury profile (temporary vs. permanent), and a short-term light-duty placement within her existing position instead of a permanent reassignment.
• Marshall’s circumstantial evidence—a supervisor’s disparaging comments about men taking paternity leave and scheduling changes—was too attenuated from the challenged decision to create a triable fact issue.
• Because Marshall could no longer perform essential firefighter functions and no vacant, suitable positions were available, the Navy’s action was nondiscriminatory as a matter of law.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. Terrell v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2024)
   – Reaffirmed that federal-sector personnel actions must be “free from any discrimination,” meaning no taint of differential treatment based on protected characteristics. Provided the “played any part” causation formulation.
2. Buckley v. Secretary of the Army, 97 F.4th 784 (11th Cir. 2024)
   – Clarified that but-for causation is not required in § 2000e-16(a) cases; evidence that the protected trait contributed to the decision suffices.
3. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
   – Set out the “similarly situated in all material respects” comparator test, later distilled into four guideposts.
4. Phillips v. Legacy Cabinets, 87 F.4th 1313 (11th Cir. 2023)
   – Itemized the four Lewis guideposts: same basic conduct, same policy, same supervisor, and similar employment history.
5. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011)
   – Recognized the “convincing mosaic” theory whereby a plaintiff may survive summary judgment without comparators.
6. McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024)
   – Clarified that the “convincing mosaic” is simply the overall summary-judgment standard and not a distinct legal test.
7. Rosado v. Secretary, Department of the Navy, 127 F.4th 858 (11th Cir. 2025)
   – Emphasized the requirement that comparator employees share materially similar roles and injuries in workplace-injury comparators.

These cases furnished the analytical scaffolding for the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion: Marshall had the burden of presenting either (1) a valid comparator or (2) a convincing mosaic. The Court methodically applied Lewis, Phillips, and Rosado to dismantle the comparator argument, and then invoked Smith and McCreight to dispose of the circumstantial mosaic contention.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three logical steps:

1. Correct legal standard. Relying on Terrell and Buckley, the panel stated that Marshall only had to show that his gender “played any part” in the Navy’s refusal to provide light duty. This standard is uniquely plaintiff-friendly in the federal-sector context.
2. Failure of the comparator theory. Applying Lewis et al., the Court concluded Emily Gray was not “similarly situated in all material respects”:
   • Different positions: Marshall was solely a firefighter; Gray was a firefighter/EMT who also held the rank of fire captain with built-in administrative duties.
   • Nature of accommodation: Gray was permitted a temporary assignment performing pre-existing clerical tasks; Marshall sought a permanent reassignment to information technology or another non-related field.
   • Severity and permanence of injuries: Marshall’s injuries were permanent and incompatible with essential firefighter functions, whereas Gray’s were temporary.
3. Rejection of the “convincing mosaic.” Marshall relied principally on his supervisor’s negative comments about men taking paternity leave. The Court held those remarks were stray comments—remote in time and content from the accommodation decision—and they did not relate to the post-accident assessment of Marshall’s ability to perform essential functions. Scheduling changes and brief periods of unpaid leave (later repaid) likewise lacked probative force.

Because Marshall’s own physician declared that no accommodation could mitigate his inability to perform the core physical demands of firefighting, the Navy’s denial was the only legally permissible action absent a vacant, suitable position. Consequently, no reasonable jury could infer discriminatory motive.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

• Heightened Comparator Scrutiny. The decision reiterates that superficial similarities—same department, same injury timeframe—are insufficient. Plaintiffs must account for job scope, job duties, disability permanence, and the exact nature of the requested accommodation.
• Light-Duty vs. Reassignment Distinction. A temporary light-duty assignment within an employee’s job is qualitatively different from a request for permanent reassignment to an entirely new field. Future plaintiffs must frame accommodation requests carefully and identify comparators who requested—and received—the same type of accommodation.
• Stray Comments Doctrine Lives On. Even under the “played any part” causation standard, remarks unconnected to the adverse action remain insufficient. Practitioners must link biased statements to the challenged decisionmaker and the specific employment action.
• Practical Guidance for Agencies. Federal employers are reminded to conduct expansive job searches and to document medical assessments diligently. Doing so can defeat Title VII claims even under plaintiff-friendly federal-sector standards.
• Potential Circuit Influence. Although unpublished, the opinion will likely be cited informally in district courts as persuasive authority on comparator analysis, particularly in workplace-injury accommodation disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Title VII (Federal-Sector Provision)

While Title VII generally applies to private and public employment, § 2000e-16(a) imposes a unique standard on federal agencies: personnel actions must be “free from any discrimination.” Courts interpret this as requiring proof only that a protected trait contributed to the action—no “but-for” causation necessary.

Summary Judgment

A procedural device allowing courts to resolve a case without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Comparator Evidence

Evidence that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably. Under Lewis, comparators must match the plaintiff in key respects: job duties, policies, supervision, and employment history.

Convincing Mosaic

A holistic method for showing discrimination through circumstantial evidence. The “tiles” in the mosaic may include suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, disparate treatment, and procedural irregularities. All tiles viewed together must reasonably suggest discriminatory intent.

Light-Duty Assignment

A temporary modification of job duties—often clerical or less physically demanding—provided to employees recovering from injury. It differs from a permanent reassignment or a reasonable accommodation under disability law.

Essential Functions

Core duties of a position that an employee must be able to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, as defined by the job description and employer practice.

5. Conclusion

Marshall v. Secretary of the Navy crystallizes two doctrinal points. First, even under the lenient “any-part” causation test in federal-sector Title VII cases, plaintiffs still bear a heavy evidentiary burden: they must present genuinely comparable employees or a robust circumstantial record. Second, the Eleventh Circuit has again tightened the comparator lens, signaling that mere overlap in job titles or injury events will not suffice; the comparator must mirror the plaintiff in operational duties, injury permanence, and requested accommodation type.

For federal agencies, the decision underscores the importance of thorough, well-documented accommodation assessments. For litigants, it provides a roadmap—albeit a demanding one—for substantiating gender discrimination claims. And for the broader legal community, it serves as another incremental step in refining the interplay between Title VII, disability accommodation requests, and comparator analysis.