Refining State Action: Public School Employees Need Specific Delegated Authority to Conduct Searches

1. Introduction

In Holly Lawson v. Kayla Creely (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether two non-supervisory public school employees and their superintendent violated a colleague’s Fourth Amendment rights when they discovered—and later questioned her about—a handgun she brought on campus. Plaintiff Holly Lawson, a guidance counselor at Franklin County High School, alleged that coworkers Kayla Creely and Lori Franke searched her tote bag without any warrant or explicit policy authority. She further claimed that Superintendent Mark Kopp unlawfully detained her during a brief office meeting and induced her to search her own bag in front of two armed school‐resource officers. Lawson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting (1) a warrantless search by coworkers acting “under color of state law,” (2) an unlawful “seizure” and search by Kopp, and (3) Monell liability against the Franklin County Board of Education. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants; Lawson appealed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

No State Action by Coworkers: The Sixth Circuit held that Creely’s and Franke’s conduct—entering Lawson’s office and opening her bag—was not “state action” under § 1983 because no statute, regulation, or school‐board policy specifically authorized them to search personal belongings. They lacked both “actual” and “apparent” authority.
Lawful Investigatory Stop by Superintendent: The court found that Superintendent Kopp’s meeting with Lawson in the school‐resource officer’s office amounted to a brief Terry‐style investigative detention, supported by reasonable suspicion. It was limited in time and place, employed the least intrusive means, and did not escalate into a custodial arrest requiring probable cause.
Consent to Bag Inspection: Video evidence established that Lawson, unprompted, retrieved and showed the handgun in her bag. No search by state actors occurred; Lawson’s self-initiated action constituted voluntary consent.
Monell Claim Dismissed: Because no constitutional violation occurred, the Board could not be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services.
Disposition: The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for all defendants.

3. Precedents Cited

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Provides a remedy against state actors who deprive federal rights under color of state law.
Monell v. Department of Social Services (436 U.S. 658, 1978): Holds that municipalities (and boards) cannot be liable under § 1983 unless there is an underlying constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom causing it.
Lindke v. Freed (601 U.S. 187, 2024): Clarified that to be “state action” a public employee must exercise power “possessed by virtue of state law.” Mere status as an employee is insufficient; the challenged conduct must arise from actual or apparent authority.
Mackey v. Rising (6th Cir. 2024): Applied Lindke to define two situations for state action—(1) specific statutory or regulatory authorization for the precise act, and (2) general delegation of similar authority, even if misused or exceeded.
Dean v. Byerley (354 F.3d 540, 6th Cir. 2004): Established the “under color of state law” test requiring state authority enabling the conduct.
Stengel v. Belcher (522 F.2d 438, 6th Cir. 1975): Showed that off-duty police actions can nonetheless be state action if regulations impose duties “24 hours a day.”
Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1, 1968): Permits brief investigatory stops on reasonable suspicion without probable cause.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (457 U.S. 922, 1982) and Waters v. City of Morristown (242 F.3d 353, 6th Cir. 2001): Reinforced that deprivation of constitutional rights must be “fairly attributable to the State.”
Florida v. Royer (460 U.S. 491, 1983): Delineated the limits of Terry stops, cautioning when a move to a secluded location may convert an investigatory detention into a full arrest.

4. Legal Reasoning

4.1. State Action and Coworker Search

Under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that each defendant acted “under color of state law.” The court applied the two-pronged framework from Lindke as elaborated in Mackey:

Specific Authorization: No school‐board policy or statute explicitly tasked Creely or Franke with searching a coworker’s bag. The general handbook admonition to “use sound judgment” and “reasonable and commonly accepted measures” to protect safety was insufficiently precise.
General Delegation: Even if the Board delegated general safety‐related duties, it did not empower ordinary staff to conduct covert searches of personal effects. The Board’s weapons policy expressly reserves search authority to a principal on “reasonable suspicion.”

Because the coworkers neither had actual nor apparent authority to open Lawson’s purse, their conduct was not “state action,” and § 1983 claims against them failed at the threshold.

4.2. Superintendent’s Investigatory Stop

Kopp confronted Lawson in the lobby only to request a private meeting; she consented. In the school‐resource officer’s office, with the door closed and two officers present, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave—constituting a Fourth Amendment “seizure.”

Reasonable Suspicion: Reports from a social‐work supervisor and the school resource officer gave Kopp an articulable basis to suspect unlawful possession of a weapon on school property.

Limited Scope and Duration: The encounter lasted four minutes; Kopp promptly asked about the gun, and officers merely observed and photographed once the weapon appeared. This “brief and focused” inquiry comported with Terry.

No Arrest: Unlike in Lopez-Arias (transportation in separate cars, handcuffs) or an airport interrogation room in Royer, here the superintendent’s choice of a secure office was justified by school‐safety concerns and did not itself convert the stop into a custodial arrest.

4.3. Consent and Bag Inspection

Body‐camera footage shows Lawson, unprompted, reaching into her own purse and retrieving the handgun. No state actor physically searched her bag. Under Fourth Amendment doctrine, a person’s voluntary disclosure of evidence is not a “search” by the state and constitutes valid consent. The totality of the circumstances—no coercion, no threats, minimal delay, qualified adult—confirms voluntariness.

5. Impact

Limits on § 1983 Plaintiffs: Non-supervisory public employees cannot be sued for coworker searches absent specific legal or policy authority. This curbs expansion of “state action” in workplace disputes.
Guidance for School Districts: Boards should clarify in written policies who may conduct searches, under what circumstances, and require training to prevent unauthorized intrusions.
Reinforcing Terry’s Parameters: Even in sensitive settings like schools, brief, suspicion-based detentions remain constitutional if limited in scope and conducted safely.
Consent Doctrine Reaffirmed: Self-initiated disclosures by a suspect remain outside Fourth Amendment prohibitions on state searches.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

“State Action” under § 1983: To sue under § 1983, the defendant’s conduct must be “fairly attributable to the government.” Merely being a public employee is not enough; one must exercise power granted by law or policy.
Terry Stop vs. Arrest: A “Terry stop” lets police briefly detain someone on reasonable suspicion of crime. An “arrest” requires probable cause and triggers greater procedural safeguards.
Actual vs. Apparent Authority: Actual Authority: The precise right or duty given by law or policy.
Apparent Authority: When a reasonable person would believe the actor is empowered, based on how the actor presents themselves and the context.
Monell Liability: A municipality or board is only liable when a policymaker’s official action causes the constitutional wrong—not simply because a subordinate official misbehaved.

7. Conclusion

Lawson v. Creely refines the boundary between private workplace conduct and § 1983 liability by requiring clear statutory or policy authority before labeling a search “state action.” It also reaffirms that brief, suspicion-driven investigative detentions in schools comply with the Fourth Amendment so long as they remain proportionate, time-limited, and minimally intrusive. Finally, the decision underscores the importance of carefully drafted school policies and training to guide employees’ responses to safety concerns—and to prevent constitutional disputes over informal coworker interventions.