Refining Review Standards for INA §237(a)(1)(H) Fraud Waivers: Jurisdictional and Exhaustion Clarifications

Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam opinion in Rohan Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 22-11486 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2025), in which the court addressed two principal issues: (1) the limits of federal appellate jurisdiction over discretionary denials of fraud‐based waivers under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H); and (2) the proper characterization of a motion filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) as a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider. The case arises from Rohan Mangroo’s admissions of marriage fraud, his subsequent removal proceedings, an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver request, the BIA’s affirmance of that decision and dismissal of his untimely motion for reconsideration, and Mangroo’s ensuing petitions for review in the Eleventh Circuit.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mangroo’s challenge to the denial of his § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver for lack of jurisdiction over discretionary decisions and for failure to exhaust an alleged error in legal standard before the BIA. It also upheld the BIA’s recharacterization of Mangroo’s “motion to reopen” as an untimely motion for reconsideration, explaining that he presented no newly available evidence and thus could not reopen proceedings. The court denied the petitions in part and dismissed them in part.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Matter of Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408 (BIA 1998): Established the balance-of‐factors framework—favorable versus adverse—for discretionary § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waivers.
INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): Bars judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General.
INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D): Retains jurisdiction over nonfrivolous constitutional questions and questions of law.
Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2008): Distinguishes garden‐variety abuse‐of‐discretion arguments from reviewable legal questions.
Santos‐Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023): Clarified exhaustion as a claims‐processing rule in removal proceedings.
Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2009): Limits review to grounds relied upon by the BIA.

Legal Reasoning

1. Discretionary Waiver Jurisdiction. INA § 237(a)(1)(H) grants the Attorney General discretion to waive fraud‐based inadmissibility. Pursuant to INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), courts lack jurisdiction to review such discretionary determinations unless they present a nonfrivolous question of law or constitutional claim under § 242(a)(2)(D). Mangroo’s claim—that the IJ misweighed favorable and adverse factors—was a pure discretionary dispute, outside the court’s review.

2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. Even if Mangroo pressed a legal‐standard challenge (whether the IJ applied an “extreme hardship” yardstick rather than the § 237(a)(1)(H) balance test), he failed to present that issue in his BIA appeal. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) and binding circuit law, a petitioner must fairly and plainly present claims to the BIA before seeking judicial review. The court therefore deemed this claim forfeited.

3. Motion to Reopen vs. Reconsideration. The BIA construed Mangroo’s “Motion to Reopen” as a motion for reconsideration because he did not proffer material evidence unavailable at the time of the hearing—one prerequisite for reopening—but instead challenged alleged errors of law and procedure. A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s order. Mangroo’s motion, filed more than six months later, was untimely and not subject to equitable exceptions. The court concluded the BIA acted within its discretion.

Impact

Reaffirms the stringent jurisdictional bar over discretionary waiver decisions under INA § 237(a)(1)(H).
Emphasizes the necessity of raising legal‐standard arguments before the BIA to preserve them for federal review.
Clarifies the criteria distinguishing motions to reopen (new, material evidence) from motions to reconsider (errors of law or fact), reinforcing strict filing deadlines.
Guides practitioners on formulating BIA appeals and administrative motions to avoid forfeiture and untimeliness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Discretionary vs. Mandatory Relief. A discretionary waiver means that, even if a petitioner technically qualifies, the agency can say “no” based on a balance of positive and negative factors. Courts generally cannot second‐guess that balancing.
Exhaustion Requirement. To bring an issue to federal court, an immigration appellant must first “have their shot” at raising it before the BIA. Otherwise, the court considers it forfeited.
Motion to Reopen vs. Motion to Reconsider. Reopen = you have genuinely new facts or evidence that nobody could have given before. Reconsider = you argue the agency made mistakes about law or facts known at the time.
Garden‐Variety Abuse of Discretion. Simply arguing that the agency got the balance “wrong” is not a question of law; it is a discretionary disagreement and unreviewable.

Conclusion

Rohan Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General clarifies critical procedural boundaries in removal litigation. It reinforces that discretionary § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud‐waiver decisions lie beyond judicial review absent a colorable legal question, underscores the imperative to exhaust legal issues before the BIA, and affirms the BIA’s authority to recharacterize untimely motions. This decision thus sharpens practitioners’ focus on appeal strategy, administrative deadlines, and the nature of reviewable claims in immigration law.