Refining Jury Instructions: Self-Protection Threshold and Combination Kidnapping Instructions under Kentucky Law

Introduction

The case of Dillon Brewster v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (2025-SC-0281-MR) arises from the tragic death of Kameryn Recchia and the subsequent flight of her live-in partner, Dillon Brewster, with her three-year-old son. After a jury trial in the Kenton Circuit Court, Brewster was convicted of murder, kidnapping, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO-1). He received a life sentence. On appeal, Brewster challenged five principal rulings of the trial court: (1) denial of his request for a self-protection jury instruction, (2) exclusion of proposed expert testimony on cocaine’s behavioral effects, (3) use of his post-Miranda silence by Commonwealth witnesses, (4) admission of crime-scene and autopsy photographs, and (5) a “combination” jury instruction on kidnapping that, he alleged, impermissibly diluted unanimity. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed each ruling, clarifying the thresholds for self-protection instructions, expert testimony admissibility, permissible impeachment with prior statements, evidentiary standards for graphic images, and the validity of alternative‐theory instructions in kidnapping cases.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Self-Protection Instruction: Brewster’s defense hinged on a claim that he reasonably believed Recchia posed an imminent threat—citing her alleged drug-induced aggression, previous physical altercations, and ominous threats. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-protection or imperfect self-protection under KRS 503.050 and 503.120. The Supreme Court held there was no evidentiary basis for Brewster’s subjective fear to justify the use of deadly force against an unarmed partner.

2. Expert Testimony on Cocaine Effects: Brewster proposed an expert toxicologist to opine on how high cocaine levels in Recchia’s blood would manifest in behavior. The trial court excluded any testimony linking drug concentration to specific behavioral intent. The high court affirmed, finding the testimony speculative and irrelevant to the issue of Brewster’s state of mind when he shot Recchia.

3. Post-Miranda Silence: During direct and cross-examination of Ohio State Highway Patrol officers, the Commonwealth questioned whether Brewster had ever told them he was “fending off an imminent attack” or “running for his life.” Brewster objected under Doyle v. Ohio. The Supreme Court held that, because Brewster had spoken freely after receiving and waiving Miranda warnings, the questions served only to impeach his trial testimony by exposing prior inconsistent statements, not to penalize silence.

4. Gruesome Photographs: Brewster objected to certain crime-scene and autopsy photos as cumulative and unduly prejudicial. Applying the balancing test of KRE 403 and the multi-factor approach of Hall I & II, the Supreme Court found that each admitted image added unique probative value and was not unduly inflammatory.

5. Combination Kidnapping Instruction: Brewster was charged under multiple subsections of KRS 509.040(1) but the Commonwealth declined to specify which intent element it would prove until after the close of evidence. The jury was instructed that Brewster’s intent might have been to advance a felony, to terrorize the child or another, or to deprive the legal guardian of custody. Brewster argued this “alternative-theory” instruction violated unanimity. The Court confirmed that so long as there is evidence for each alternative beyond a reasonable doubt, no unanimity error arises.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Supreme Court’s opinion draws on a line of Kentucky decisions clarifying self-defense and expert testimony limits. Sutton v. Commonwealth and Downs v. Commonwealth reaffirm that an objective basis for fear must exist before a self-protection instruction is warranted. Gribbins v. Commonwealth confirms that imperfect self-defense requires only a reasonable honest but mistaken belief, not an unreasonable one. In the expert-testimony context, the opinion refers to the American Academy of Forensic Sciences Standards (AAFSS 5.3(b)&(c)) and the Daubert framework, emphasizing that experts may not opine on behavioral intent based purely on toxicological data. On impeachment through prior statements, the Court relies on Miranda, Doyle v. Ohio, and Anderson v. Charles to distinguish total post-Miranda silence from voluntary answers later used for impeachment. Finally, on photographic evidence and cumulative impact, the decision cites Hall v. Commonwealth (Hall I & II), Easterling, Rucker, and Ragland to guide the KRE 403 balancing test. In the final section on unanimity, the Court follows Cox and Brown in approving combination instructions whenever each alternative theory is sufficiently supported by evidence.

Legal Reasoning

1. Self-Protection Threshold: Under KRS 503.050, only a genuine belief of imminent unlawful force can justify deadly force. The Court found that Brewster produced no evidence Recchia herself threatened him with a weapon or was about to do so. His fear, grounded in her drug use, threats that a third party would kill him, and vague references to prior oxygen-tank tampering, was too speculative. Even imperfect self-defense (KRS 503.120) demands an honest and reasonable belief; Brewster’s belief was neither.

2. Expert Testimony Scope: Kentucky adheres to the AAFSS standard that toxicologists cannot translate a drug concentration into specific “behavioral intent.” While a toxicologist can describe general pharmacological effects, linking those effects to an individual’s actions or intent crosses into speculation. Brewster’s proffered witness conceded he could not assign a probability to specific mental states such as paranoia or grandiosity. The Court therefore deemed the testimony irrelevant under KRE 401 and excludable under KRE 702 and Daubert.

3. Impeachment vs. Silence: Brewster volunteered statements after Miranda warnings, affirmatively waiving his rights. The Commonwealth’s questions about whether he spontaneously claimed “self-defense” or “imminent danger” were fair impeachment of trial testimony that he feared for his life and fled with the child to protect him. Unlike Doyle silence (where defendant refuses to speak and is then penalized), Brewster spoke freely and thus opened himself to cross-examination on any inconsistencies.

4. Photographic Evidence: Applying the multi-factor test of Hall I, the Court reviewed each challenged photograph and compared it against admitted images to ensure no undue cumulative effect. The admitted photos each contributed distinct probative details—blood spatter patterns, bullet trajectories, entry/exit wounds—necessary to corroborate the forensic timeline and to refute self-defense claims.

5. Combination Kidnapping Instruction: Under KRS 509.040(1), kidnapping may be proved by showing any one of six mental-state alternatives. The Court held that so long as the evidence supports each submitted theory—even imperfectly—there is no requirement to single out just one. Brewster’s flight with the child after murdering Recchia could be viewed as delaying felony discovery, terrorizing the child or community, or depriving the natural guardian of custody. In each scenario, the jury had sufficient evidence to convict.

Impact

This memorandum opinion, though unpublished, offers practical guidance to Kentucky trial courts and practitioners on several fronts. First, it tightens the evidentiary gate for self-defense instructions in domestic violence homicides, underscoring that fear of a drug-intoxicated partner, absent any imminent weapon threat, is insufficient. Second, it reinforces the prohibition against wildcard expert opinions tying drug levels to specific individual behaviors—encouraging a strict adherence to AAFSS standards. Third, it clarifies impeachment mechanics post-Miranda: voluntary statements may be mined for inconsistencies, but a defendant who truly invokes his right to silence remains protected. Fourth, it provides a roadmap for KRE 403 analyses of graphic evidence, illustrating how trial judges should catalog unique probative elements and guard against cumulative prejudice. Finally, it cements the validity of combination instructions in charges with multiple mental-state alternatives, so long as each alternative rests on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Together, these clarifications will shape jury-instruction conferences, motions in limine, and appellate review in future Kentucky criminal cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Self-Protection Instruction (KRS 503.050): A jury may hear a “self-defense” charge only if a defendant genuinely believed a lawful threat of physical harm was about to occur.
• Imperfect Self-Protection (KRS 503.120): Applies when a defendant honestly—but unreasonably—believes deadly force is necessary; the belief must at least be plausible.
• Daubert Standard: Experts must employ reliable methods and data; speculative leaps from general drug effects to specific behaviors are excluded.
• Doyle Rule: You cannot punish a defendant’s silence after Miranda warnings. However, if the defendant speaks and later changes or contradicts that statement at trial, the earlier voluntary statement may be used to impeach.
• Combination Instruction: When a crime statute lists alternative intents (e.g., kidnapping “to terrorize” or “to facilitate a felony”), a jury may convict if any alternative is proved—even if jurors disagree on which one.
• KRE 403 Balancing: Judges must weigh each piece of evidence’s usefulness against its potential to inflame the jury’s emotions unfairly.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Dillon Brewster v. Commonwealth reaffirms critical limits on defensive jury instructions, expert testimony, impeachment tactics, and evidentiary discretion. By demanding concrete proof of imminent threat for self-protection claims, barring speculative toxicology opinions on individual behavior, distinguishing permissible impeachment from penalizing silence, and validating combination instructions when each theory is supported, this opinion fortifies the integrity of Kentucky’s criminal justice process. Trial judges and litigators should take heed: the thresholds for self-defense, expert relevance, and unanimity are neither malleable nor forgiving. This case will guide courtroom practice and appellate review, ensuring that jury instructions and evidence admissibility align with statutory text, common-law precedent, and fundamental fairness.