Dalton, Treasure Dalton, John M. Dalton, Harold B. Treasure and John Hall Dallon for Albert James and J.W. Trammel, appellants. (1) The uncontroverted facts in this case conclusively show that Albert James was an independent contractor and the trial court erred in failing to sustain defendant Trammel's motion for directed verdict. Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 98 S.W.2d 717; Baker v. Scott County Milling Co., 20 S.W.2d 494; Skidmore v. Haggard, 110 S.W.2d 726; State ex rel. Chapman v. Shain, 147 S.W.2d 457; O'Brien v. Rindskopf, 70 S.W.2d 1085. (2) Instruction 1 given at plaintiff's request and Instructions 4D, 5D and 6D given at request of defendant Blanche Conrad, are prejudicially erroneous in failing to hypothesize the requisite facts for the jury's determination. Yates v. Manchester, 217 S.W.2d 541; Dahlen v. Wright, 235 S.W.2d 366; Carson v. Evans, 173 S.W.2d 30; Wright v. Osburn, 201 S.W.2d 935; Ferdent v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 247 S.W.2d 773. (3) Instructions 4D, 5D and 6D given at request of defendant, Blanche Conrad are prejudicially erroneous for assuming the existence of a controverted fact, namely: the existence of a master-servant relationship between defendants James and Trammel. Boyer v. General Oil Products, Inc., 78 S.W.2d 450; Grimes v. Red Line Service, Inc., 85 S.W.2d 767; Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 98 S.W.2d 978. (4) Instructions 2P, 4D, 5D and 6D are not warranted by the law or by the evidence, and the giving of these instructions is confusing, misleading and erroneous. Bury v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 17 S.W.2d 549; Hurger v. Doerr 170 S.W.2d 689; Sec. 304.560, RSMo 1919. (5) The verdict is so excessive as to show the passion and prejudice of the jury. Kulengowski v. Withington, 222 S.W.2d 579; Roberts v. Carter, 234 S.W.2d 324; Medellin v. Yellow Cab Co., 99 F. Supp. 107; Jones v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 246 S.W.2d 356; Arl v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 243 S.W.2d 797. (6) There is not enough competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury. Kimmie v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 66 S.W.2d 561; Hayes v. Equitable Life Assur. Society of the United States, 150 S.W.2d 1113; Baumhoer v. McLaughlin, 205 S.W.2d 274. (7) The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's attorney the right to cross-examine Albert James. Wilcox v. Erwin, 49 S.W.2d 677; A. Graff Distilling Co. v. Wilson, 156 S.W. 23; Gurley v. St. Louis Transit Co. of St. Louis, 259 S.W. 895. Ward Reeves for Blanche Conrad appellant. (1) Instruction 1-P for plaintiffs was too general in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury. It did not submit the essential and necessary facts constituting negligence and submitted mere conclusions and questions of law. Rayburn v. Fricke, 243 S.W.2d 768; Stakelback v. Neff, 13 S.W.2d 575; Watson v. Long, 221 S.W.2d 967; Barnes v. Vandergrift, 238 S.W.2d 439; Yates v. Manchester, 358 Mo. 894, 217 S.W.2d 541. (2) No facts or designated circumstances are submitted to the jury in connection with the failure to keep a lookout, which if found by the jury would make such failure actionable negligence. Ferdente v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 247 S.W.2d 773; See cases, supra, under (1). (3) The instruction was also erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that failure to keep a lookout under the circumstances was negligent. The failure to keep a lookout is not negligence per se. Watson v. Long, supra, l.c. 970. (4) If it may be said that the second paragraph of Instruction 1-P submits general negligence and the third paragraph submits specific negligence, then the instruction is erroneous, because "It is uniformly held error to submit both general and specific negligence." Watson v. Long, supra, l.c. 969. (5) Instruction 2-D gave the jury a roving commission, Rayburn v. Fricke, 243 S.W.2d 768; Stakelback v. Neff, 13 S.W.2d 575. (6) The court erred in telling the jury by Instruction 2-D it could find that the accident was caused by the sole negligence of Mrs. Conrad. Wilkins v. Stuecken, 359 Mo. 1047, 225 S.W.2d 131; Fassi v. Schuler, 349 Mo. 160, 159 S.W.2d 774; Hillis v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 348 Mo. 601, 154 S.W.2d 761; Ferdente v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 247 S.W.2d 773. (7) As to Instruction 3-D. The court erred in giving this instruction on behalf of James and Trammel, because there was no evidence that their truck reached the intersection before or at approximately the same time as the pickup truck. The instruction was further erroneous because it impliedly told the jury that it was the unqualified duty of Mrs. Conrad to stop her truck, even though she reached the intersection first. Rayburn v. Fricke, 243 S.W.2d 768; Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., 243 S.W.2d 111; Huelsmann v. Johnston, 213 S.W.2d 641. (8) The errors we have pointed out in Instructions 2-D and 3-D given on behalf of James and Trammel affect the question of defendant Conrad's liability to the plaintiffs and prejudices her interests. She can therefore complain of such instructions given on behalf of her codefendants. Barr v. Nafziger Baking Co., 328 Mo. 423, 41 S.W.2d 559; Grimes v. Red Line Service, Inc., 337 Mo. 743, 85 S.W.2d 767; Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate Inv. Co., 348 Mo. 407, 155 S.W.2d 90; State ex rel. Nevins v. Hughes, 347 Mo. 968, 149 S.W.2d 836; O'Donnell v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 246 S.W.2d 539. (9) As to Instruction 3-P. Instruction 3-P for plaintiffs when considered in connection with Instruction 2-D given at the request of defendants James and Trammel, was reversible error. Yates v. Manchester, 358 Mo. 894, 217 S.W.2d 541. (10) To tell the jury the plaintiffs are entitled to the wages and earnings during minority without qualification is clearly a misdirection. Hickman v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 22 Mo. App. 344; Knight v. Lead Zinc Co., 75 Mo. App. 541; White v. National Lead Co., 99 S.W.2d 535; Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993; Mennemeyer v. Hart, 359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960; Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; Smith v. Hertz Driv-Ur-Self Stations, 93 S.W.2d 56; Baldwin v. Harvey, 191 Mo. App. 233; Welker v. Construction Co., 153 Mo. App. 1; Rosenkrantz v. Lindell Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 9; Brunke v. Telephone Co., 112 Mo. App. 623; Drogmund v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 122 Mo. App. 154. (11) The verdict of the jury for $8,000 for plaintiff Priscilla Hooper is grossly excessive, and indicates bias, passion and prejudice against defendants and in favor of plaintiff. Kulengowski v. Withington, 222 S.W.2d 579; Merrick v. Bridgeways, Inc., 241 S.W.2d 1015; Roberts v. Carter, 234 S.W.2d 324. McHaney McHaney for respondents. (1) Instruction 1-P properly submitted the negligence of defendant Blanche Conrad. The instruction did not submit both general and specific negligence. Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 164 S.W.2d 914; Sullivan v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 248 S.W.2d 605; State ex rel. Spears v. McCullen, 210 S.W.2d 68. (2) Instruction 1-P in requiring the jury to find that defendant Conrad "negligently failed . . . to keep a lookout for vehicles and persons upon said highway and along the same" sufficiently submitted the negligence of defendant Conrad and the submission was not too general and did not fail to hypothesize the requisite facts necessary to guide the jury under the circumstances of this case. Fortner v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 244 S.W.2d 10; Spencer v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 250 S.W.2d 187; Riley v. Young, 218 S.W.2d 805; Nelson v. Evans, 93 S.W.2d 691. (3) One who has an obligation to look is charged with seeing what she could have seen in the exercise of the highest degree of care. If she fails to look and an injury results therefrom she is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. If she looks and fails to see what she should see, she is equally guilty of negligence. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972; Wilkins v. Stuecken, 225 S.W.2d 131; Kobusch v. Ruberoid Co., 194 S.W.2d 911; Van Sickel v. F.M. Stamper Co., 198 S.W.2d 539; Woods v. Moore, 48 S.W.2d 201; Alexander v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 38 S.W.2d 1023. (4) The objections based on the decision of Yates v. Manchester, offered to Instruction 2, has no application where there are no real differences in the factual theories of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the accident. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972. (5) The instruction did not declare the acts set forth therein to be negligent, but required the jury to find the acts specified were negligent. State ex rel. Spears v. McMullen, 210 S.W.2d 68; Nelson v. Evans, 93 S.W.2d 691. (6) Defendant Conrad has adopted and utilized the same theory of submission of negligence as was employed by plaintiffs and, therefore, cannot complain of plaintiffs' Instruction 1P. Simpson v. Wells, 237 S.W. 520; Gordon v. Park, 117 S.W. 1163; Kinlen v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 115 S.W. 523; Thorpe v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 651 (7) Plaintiffs' Instruction 2P given on behalf of plaintiffs properly submitted the negligence of defendants Albert James and J.W. Trammel. Being submitted in the conjunctive, if either of these negligent acts alone is a sufficient submission of negligence, it is immaterial that the other act or acts specified may be technically defective. Fantin v. L.W. Harp, Inc., 242 S.W.2d 509. (8) The first charge of negligence in the instruction, i.e., failure "to keep a lookout for vehicles along and upon said highway" is not too general and does not fail to hypothesize the requisite facts necessary to guide the jury under the circumstances of this case. Fortner v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 244 S.W.2d 10; Spencer v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 250 S.W.2d 187; Riley v. Young, 218 S.W.2d 805; Nelson v. Evans, 93 S.W.2d 691. (9) The instruction was more favorable to defendants James and Trammel than they were entitled in that the failure to maintain a lookout under these circumstances was negligent as a matter of law. Wilkins v. Stuecken, 225 S.W.2d 131; Woods v. Moore, 48 S.W.2d 201; Alexander v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 38 S.W.2d 1023; Van Sickel v. F.M. Stamper Co., 198 S.W.2d 539. (10) The third charge of negligence concerned the failure of defendant Albert James to have adequate and sufficient brakes on his tractor and trailer and was more favorable to defendants James and Trammel than they were entitled. Sams v. Adams Transfer and Storage Co., 234 S.W.2d 593; Sec. 304.560 (3), RSMo 1949. (11) The rule announced in the Yates v. Manchester case has no application where there are no real differences in the factual theories of the parties and where the circumstances surrounding the accident are not in dispute. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972. (12) Instruction 3P given by plaintiffs when read in connection with Instruction 2D given at the request of the defendants James and Trammel was not prejudicial to appellant Conrad and she may not complain. Fantin v. L.W. Harp, Inc., 242 S.W.2d 509; Nixon v. Hill, 52 S.W.2d 208; Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 164 S.W.2d 914. (13) Instruction 2D did not mislead the jury into believing that they could award plaintiffs a verdict based on the negligent acts pleaded in that instruction. Ford v. Dahl, 228 S.W.2d 800; Rishel v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 129 S.W.2d 851; Hale v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 238 S.W.2d 876. (14) If defendant Conrad thought that the jury would be confused or mislead into believing that Instruction 3P and 2D when read together authorized a verdict for the plaintiff as contended by appellant Conrad, she was under a duty to offer a clarifying instruction and her failure to do so operates as an estoppel and she cannot complain. Norvell v. Schupbach, 185 S.W.2d 323; Garnett v. Kresge, 85 S.W.2d 157; Renfrow v. Loose Leaf Metals Co., 5 S.W.2d 665; Trusty on Instructions, sec. 24, p. 106. (15) The jury did not follow Instruction 2D, but found against both defendants. Defendant Conrad cannot complain of a rejected hypothesis even though it might have been too favorable to defendants James and Trammel. Augustus v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 134 S.W. 22. (16) Defendant Conrad cannot complain of an instruction given by codefendants which only authorized a verdict in favor of the codefendants and does not take away her defense or increase her burden. Neal v. Curtis Co., 41 S.W.2d 543; Storey v. Peoples Motor Bus Co. of St. Louis, 37 S.W.2d 898; Phegley v. Graham, 215 S.W.2d 499. (17) Defendant Conrad certainly cannot object to the failure of the plaintiffs to hypothesize facts which she has admitted concerning her actions. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972; Hgenfritz v. Mo. P. L. Co., 101 S.W.2d 723; Allen v. Purvis, 30 S.W.2d 196; Trusty on Instructions, sec 9, p. 41. (18) Defendant Conrad in adopting ultimate fact hypothesis against codefendants cannot complain of a similar lack of detailed hypothesis submitted in connection with her negligence. Simpson v. Wells, 237 S.W. 520; Gordon v. Park, 117 S.W. 1163; Kinlen v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 115 S.W. 523; Thorpe v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 651. (19) In any event, if defendant Conrad was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, she has not been prejudiced. Under the admitted and undisputed facts and the compelling inferences therefrom she is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972; Kobusch v. Ruberoid Co., 194 S.W.2d 911; Van Sickel v. F.M. Stamper Co., 198 S.W.2d 539; Woods v. Moore, 48 S.W.2d 201; Alexander v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 38 S.W.2d 1023. (20) Instruction 3D, given by defendants James and Trammel, was not prejudicial to defendant Conrad. Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., 243 S.W.2d 111; Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972; Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., 243 S.W.2d 111; Lillard v. Bradford, 243 S.W.2d 359; Lowry v. Mohn, 195 S.W.2d 652; Ross v. Wilson, 163 S.W.2d 342. (21) In any event, defendant Conrad cannot complain of the second half of the instruction because it could only serve to prevent a joint verdict (which it failed to do). Eller v. Crowell, 238 S.W.2d 310. (22) If defendant Conrad was guilty of negligence as a matter of law she has not been prejudiced. Under the admitted and undisputed facts and the compelling inferences therefrom, she is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972; Wilkins v. Stuecken, 225 S.W.2d 131; Kobusch v. Ruberoid Co., 194 S.W.2d 911; Van Sickel v. F.M. Stamper Co., 198 S.W.2d 539; Woods v. Moore, 48 S.W.2d 201; Alexander v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 38 S.W.2d 1023. (23) Ordinarily the question of whether a party is an independent contractor is a question for the jury and in this instance the question was properly submitted to the jury under Instruction 1. Mattan v. Hoover, 166 S.W.2d 557; Coul v. Peck Dry Goods Co., 32 S.W.2d 758; Hoelker v. American Press, 296 S.W. 1008; Clayton v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 27 S.W.2d 52. (24) Defendant Trammel is not entitled to rely upon the defense that defendant James was an independent contractor since defendant Trammel did not plead as a defense that James was an independent contractor. This information is peculiarly within the knowledge of defendants James and Trammel and if defendant Trammel expected to rely upon this defense it is necessary that it be pleaded. It is not raised by a general denial. Knoche v. Pratt, 187 S.W. 578. (25) When plaintiff made a prima facie case that defendant James was the agent and servant of defendant Trammel the burden of going forward with the evidence was upon defendant Trammel. Ward v. Scott County Milling Co., 47 S.W.2d 250; Knoche v. Pratt, 187 S.W. 578. (26) Even if Albert James was employed by the J.W. Trammel Trucking Company as an independent contractor, defendant Trammel would still be liable for the negligent acts of his employee while in the scope of the employment. State ex rel. Algiere v. Russell, 223 S.W.2d 481; Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 85 S.W.2d 80; 57 C.J.S., sec. 591. (27) Where no disputed questions of fact exist, the court may declare the existence of the agency relationship as a matter of law. Baker v. Scott County Milling Co., 20 S.W.2d 494. (28) If defendant Trammel ever intended to rely upon the defense of independent contractor he has waived that right and cannot now complain. Defendant Trammel did not plead that James was an independent contractor. Simpson v. Wells, 237 S.W. 520; Rhineberger v. Thompson, 202 S.W.2d 64; Studt v. Leiweke, 100 S.W.2d 30; Hill v. Landau, 125 S.W.2d 516; Knoche v. Pratt, 187 S.W. 578. (29) J.W. Trammel Trucking Company of Dallas, Texas, a common carrier, cannot rely upon the defense that James was an independent contractor. State ex rel. Algiere v. Russell, 223 S.W.2d 481; Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 85 S.W.2d 80. (30) Instructions 4D, 5D and 6D given at the request of defendant Conrad were not prejudicial to defendants James and Trammel in failing to hypothesize sufficient facts for the jury's determination. Knight v. Richey, 250 S.W.2d 972. (31) In an action involving injuries to the minor and where the minor survives the parents are not relieved of the expense of rearing the child and, therefore, it would be improper to instruct the jury that they should deduct from the loss of services the cost of rearing the minor. Schmitz v. St. Louis I.M. Southern Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 380; Mauerman v. St. Louis I.M. Southern Ry. Co., 41 Mo. App. 348; 67 C.J.S., p. 758. (32) The Instruction 4P was more favorable to defendants than they were entitled. Scanlon v. Kansas City, 81 S.W.2d 939; 67 C.J.S., p. 759. (33) In determining whether the verdict is excessive the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and defendants' evidence will be ignored except to the extent it aids plaintiff's case. Davis v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 233 S.W.2d 679; Williams v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 229 S.W.2d 1. (34) Where, under motion for a new trial, the trial judge has considered the excessiveness of the verdict and has refused to order a remittitur, this court upon appeal will give deference to his judgment unless it clearly appears that the verdict is so large as to shock the conscience of the court. Eller v. Crowell, 238 S.W.2d 310; Volino v. Illinois Term. Ry. Co., 200 S.W.2d 352. (35) A verdict for $8,000 and for a child whose earning power is yet undetermined is not excessive. Baker v. Kansas City Term. Ry. Co., 250 S.W.2d 999; Merrick v. Bridgeways, Inc., 241 S.W.2d 1015; Davis v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 233 S.W.2d 679; Williams v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 229 S.W.2d 1; Brewer v. Rowe, 252 S.W.2d 372.